ELIZABETH ALICE CLEMENTS

BRAZILIAN POLICIES AND STRATEGIES FOR RURAL TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE: SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION AND THE CASE OF PROSAVANA AND PAA

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BRAZILIAN POLICIES AND STRATEGIES FOR RURAL TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE: SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION AND THE CASE OF PROSAVANA AND PAA

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes Brazil’s present role in South-South development cooperation in Africa, focusing on the implementation and impact of Brazilian policies for rural territorial development in Mozambique. Specifically, two different programs for agricultural development—ProSAVANA and PAA Africa—are examined. ProSAVANA is an ongoing trilateral program run by the governments of Brazil, Japan and Mozambique that aims to modernize agriculture in three provinces in Northern Mozambique. PAA Africa is a multilateral partnered pilot-project that promotes local food-purchasing and school-feeding programs in Tete province, financed by governments of Brazil and the United Kingdom and executed by the United Nations’ Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Food Program (WFP). The strategies for rural territorial development that each of the programs respectively entails, their influence on national policymaking, the impacts and implications on peasant livelihoods, and the paradigmatic and ideological conceptions that underpin the contradicting Brazilian initiatives are discussed. This thesis argues that Brazil’s dualistic agrarian structure and contradictory agrarian dynamics significantly influence the country’s approaches to international development cooperation in Mozambique—particular Brazilian models of development and their ideological underpinnings play a substantive role in the planning and decision-making process for agriculture development projects abroad, as is evidenced by the case studies presented.

Keywords: South-South cooperation, Brazil, Mozambique, ProSAVANA, PAA, rural territorial development
RESUMO

Esta tese analisa o atual papel do Brasil na cooperação Sul-Sul para o desenvolvimento na África, focando na implementação e impacto das políticas brasileiras para o desenvolvimento territorial rural em Moçambique. Especificamente, dois diferentes programas para o desenvolvimento agrícola são analisados: ProSAVANA e PAA-África. O ProSavana é um programa trilateral atualmente gerido pelos governos do Brasil, Japão e Moçambique, visando modernizar a agricultura em três províncias do norte de Moçambique. O PAA África é um projeto-piloto em parceria multilateral que promove a compra de alimentos produzidos localmente para a alimentação escolar da província de Tete, sendo financiado pelos governos do Brasil e Reino Unido e executados pela United Nations' Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) e pelo World Food Program (WFP). As estratégias para o desenvolvimento territorial rural que cada um dos programas respectivamente acarreta, sua influência na formulação de políticas nacionais, os impactos e implicações nas unidades camponesas e as concepções paradigmáticas e ideológicas que sustentam as contradições das iniciativas brasileiras são discutidas. Este tese discute também que a dualística estrutura agrária e as dinâmicas agrárias contraditórias influenciam significativamente as abordagens do país para a o desenvolvimento da cooperação internacional em Moçambique – particularmente, os modelos de desenvolvimento brasileiros e suas sustentações ideológicas desempenham um significativo papel no planejamento e no processo de tomada de decisões para os projetos de desenvolvimento agrícolas estrangeiros, como é apresentado no caso de ProSAVANA e do PAA-África.

Palavras-Chave: Cooperação Sul-Sul; Brasil; Moçambique; ProSAVANA, PAA, Desenvolvimento Territorial Rural
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Glossary

ABAG - Brazilian Agribusiness Association
ABC - Brazilian Cooperation Agency
ACNUR - United Nations’ High Commission for Refugees
AGRA - Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
APEX - Brazilian Export and Investment Agency
ASBRAER - Brazilian Association of Technical Assistance and Rural Extension
BNDES - Brazil National Development Bank
BWIs - Bretton Woods Institutions
CAMEX - Brazilian Foreign Trade Board
CECAT - Center for Strategic Studies and Training on Tropical Agricultural
CG - FOME - General Coordination for International Action against Hunger
CLUSA - United States National Cooperative Business Association
CPLP - Community of Portuguese Language Countries
CNA - Agriculture and Livestock Confederation of Brazil
CONAB - National Food Supply Agency
CPI - Investment Promotion Center
CSO - Civil society organization
DFID - United Kingdom’s Department for International Development
DNEA - National Directorate of Agricultural Extension of Mozambique
DNTF - National Directorate for Lands and Forests
DPC - Department for the Promotion of Trade and Investments of Mozambique
DUAT – Land Use and Benefit Right
EMBRAPA - Brazilian Agricultural Cooperation
EUMDG1 – European Union Program to “Accelerate progress towards MDG 1c in Mozambique”
FAO - United Nations’ Food and Agricultural Organization
FDI - Foreign direct investment
FFS - Farmers Field School
FGV - Getúlius Vargas Foundation
Fiocruz - Oswaldo Cruz Foundation
FNDE - National Development Fund for Education
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>Farmers’ organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHFSI</td>
<td>Global Initiative to Fight Hunger and Food Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBGE</td>
<td>Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIAM</td>
<td>Agriculture Research Institute of Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCRA</td>
<td>National Institute of Colonisation and Agrarian Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITC</td>
<td>Community Land Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JA</td>
<td>Justiça Ambiental (Friends of the Earth Mozambique)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JBPP</td>
<td>Japan-Brazil Partnership Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIRCAS</td>
<td>Japan International Research Center for Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAPA</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply of Brazil</td>
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<tr>
<td>MASA</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCT</td>
<td>Ministry of Science and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>Ministry of Agrarian Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDIC</td>
<td>Ministry of Development Trade and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDS</td>
<td>Brazilian Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEC</td>
<td>Ministry of Education of Brazil</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINAG</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture of Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINED</td>
<td>Ministry of Education of Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRE</td>
<td>Ministry of External Relations</td>
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<td>MST</td>
<td>Landless Rural Workers’ Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIEO</td>
<td>New International Economic Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMR</td>
<td>Observatório do Meio Rural</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORAM</td>
<td>Rural Association for Mutual Support</td>
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<td>P4P</td>
<td>Purchase for Progress Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAA</td>
<td>Food Acquisition Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIF</td>
<td>Development Initiative Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEC-G</td>
<td>Undergraduate Agreement-Student Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEC-PG</td>
<td>Graduate Agreement-Student Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEDEC</td>
<td>Project for Nacala Corridor Economic Development Strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEDSA</td>
<td>The Strategic Development Plan for the Agricultural Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEI</td>
<td>Independent Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGPAF</td>
<td>Price Guarantee to Family-based Agriculture Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNAE</td>
<td>National School Lunch Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNATER</td>
<td>National Policy of Technical Assistance and Rural Extension</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPOSC-N</td>
<td>Provincial Platform of Civil Society Organizations of Nampula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRONAE</td>
<td>Mozambican Government’s School Feeding Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRE</td>
<td>Economic Rehabilitation Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRES</td>
<td>Economic and Social Rehabilitation Program</td>
</tr>
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</table>
PRODECER - Program of Brazil-Japan Cooperation for the Brazilian Cerrado Development
PRONAF - National Program to Strengthen Family-based Agriculture
ProSAVANA-PD - The Project for Support of the Agriculture Development Master Plan
ProSAVANA-PEM - The Project for Establishment of Development Model at Communities' Level with Improvement of Rural Extension Service
PROSAVANA-PI - Capacity Improvement Project on Research and Technology Transfer for Development of Agriculture in the Nacala Corridor
ROSA - Network of Organizations for Food Sovereignty
SDAE - District Services for Economic Activities
SENAI - National Service for Industrial Apprenticeship
SENAR - National Service of Rural Learning
SESAN - National Secretary of Food and Nutritional Security
SNPA - National Agricultural Research System
SPGC - Provincial Services of Geography and Cadastre
SSDC - South-South development cooperation
UAM - Brazil Open University
UGC - General Union of Agricultural Cooperatives
UN - United Nations
UNAC - National Peasants’ Union of Mozambique
UNICA - Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Union
UNICEF - United Nations’ Children’s Fund
UPC - Provincial Peasants’ Union
USAID - United States Agency for International Development
WFP - World Food Program
WTO - World Trade Organization
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Introduction

Brazilian development cooperation has grown rapidly in recent years, particularly in Africa. Since the early 2000s, Brazil’s foreign policy toward Africa has undergone a dramatic transformation, replete with the revitalization of diplomatic, social, cultural and economic relations. This transformation is predicated on a renewed emphasis on a South-South model of cooperation for development initiated through a specific approach to foreign relations, as advocated by Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva during his presidency (2003-2010). Within the South-South framework, the specific modality of technical cooperation has become an increasingly important means for carrying out cooperation projects; it is also a powerful diplomatic device which can be used to influence the public policies of supplicant countries. Given Brazil’s status as a world leader in agricultural research and a prominent global agricultural producer and exporter, agriculture is one of the key priority areas for the country’s development interventions on the African continent.

Mozambique is one of the greatest beneficiaries of Brazilian development cooperation in Africa—with several agricultural projects promoted by Brazil under the auspices of technical and humanitarian cooperation currently underway. This thesis will specifically examine two of these agricultural development programs—ProSAVANA and PAA—in order to gain a better understanding of the Mozambique-Brazil agricultural cooperation encounter, while highlighting and contrasting the different models for rural territorial development that each program represents and their respective implications on changing territorialities in Mozambique.

A discussion of Brazil’s domestic agrarian dynamics and public policies for the development of national agriculture provides a conceptual backdrop from which the country’s cooperation agenda and strategies for rural territorial development in Mozambique can be more clearly analysed. Over the last half a century different paradigms for agricultural development in Brazil have been consolidated, promoting different models of rural territorial development—principally driven by either agribusiness or peasants and peasant movements, respectively. These models of development and their paradigmatic underpinnings play a substantive role in the planning and decision-
making process for agriculture development projects abroad, as is evidenced in the case of both ProSAVANA and PAA Africa in Mozambique. This thesis contends that Brazil’s dualistic agrarian structure and contradictory agrarian dynamics significantly influence the country’s approaches to agricultural development cooperation in Mozambique.

In chapter one of this thesis, I present some of the main contentions over development, focusing on the emergence and evolution of the South-South model of international development. This is followed by an examination of the evolution of Brazil’s foreign policy and its engagement in development cooperation, first in the international context, and then, in specific relation to Africa. I conclude the chapter with an overview of Brazil’s relationship with Mozambique, highlighting Brazilian development interventions in the area of agriculture.

Integrally linked to the notion of development, are the geographic concepts of territory, territoriality, and territorialization, which are in turn presented and discussed in relation to the present study. This is followed by a discussion of the agrarian question in a historical and contemporary context, using a food regime approach. Finally, a brief overview of the agrarian question in Brazil and in Mozambique, respectively, is presented.

Building on the conceptual framework established in the first two chapters, chapters three, four and five will specifically examine the ProSAVANA program in Mozambique, while chapter six will examine the PAA Africa pilot project. ProSAVANA is an ongoing trilateral program run by the governments of Brazil, Japan and Mozambique that aims to modernize agriculture in three provinces in Northern Mozambique. PAA Africa is a multilateral partnered pilot-project that promotes local food-purchasing and school-feeding programs in Tete province, financed by governments of Brazil and the United Kingdom and executed by the United Nations’ Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Food Program (WFP). The strategies for rural territorial development that each of the programs respectively entails, their influence on national policymaking, the impacts and implications on peasant livelihoods, and the paradigmatic and ideological conceptions that underpin the contradicting Brazilian initiatives are discussed.
Finally, conclusions regarding both programs and Brazilian cooperation in Mozambique more generally are presented, along with the author’s recommendations for future research.
Chapter 1
Brazilian south-south development cooperation

1.1 Contentions over development and the rise of south-south cooperation

In recent years, South-South development cooperation (SSDC) has come under the spotlight. The global geopolitical and geo-economic landscape has changed dramatically since the turn of the twenty-first century, marked by the gradual decline of the historic hegemony of the U.S. and Western European countries and the ascension of emergent economies like Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (which form the multilateral coalition of states known as the BRICS) to positions of greater economic and political prominence. The BRICS are a rising power in the arena of global politics and development cooperation in developing countries, particularly in Latin America, Africa and Asia, presenting new opportunities and challenges for global governance and development policy and practice. The individual and collective practices of these new emergent powers have gained the attention of international academics, politicians, development practitioners, and social and political activists from a wide range of disciplinary backgrounds.

According to the United Nations (UN) “South-South Cooperation is a manifestation of solidarity among peoples and countries of the South that contributes to their national well-being, their national and collective self-reliance and the attainment of internationally agreed development goals”. The UN adds that SSDC “initiatives must be determined by the countries of the South, guided by the principles of respect for national sovereignty, national ownership and independence, equality, non-conditionality, non-interference in domestic affairs and mutual benefit” (UNOSSC, 2015).

Despite the renewed focus on the topic, SSDC first emerged in the 1950s and 1960s in the context of the decolonization of Africa and Asia and the creation of the Group of 77 (G77). A coalition of 77 developing countries, opposed to colonialism and the imperialistic economic policies imposed by the West (principally Western European countries and the United States) on the developing world, the G77 called for the
creation of a New Economic World Order to replace the status quo of international economic and trade policy, which its members held, retarded or impaired the socio-economic development of poor countries and perpetuated conditions of dependency.

The G77 proposed that rather than looking toward the West for development “assistance” or submitting to the imposition of unequal terms of trade with developed countries, developing countries should take a more active role in defining their own policies for economic and social development. It advocated for the building of new and mutually beneficial economic and diplomatic partnerships between, and among, developing countries that promote just and sustainable development and takes into consideration the specific needs and challenges of developing countries.

Development is a highly contentious issue with a multiplicity of disputed meanings. The term is often used in a simply economic sense, equated with the notion of economic growth. Development, in this sense, is understood as a means of producing either an expansion of a country’s gross national product (GDP) or an increase in gross national income per capita (GNI). This narrow understanding of development regrettably dominates conventional economic thinking.

“Contentiously, [genuine] development analyses who controls production and consumption” in the “context of a highly uneven world” dominated by an entrenched system of global capitalism with the aim of “creating a better life for everyone” (PEET; HARTWICK, 2009, p. 2). For American geographers Richard Peet and Elaine Hartwick development necessarily entails two different forms of human emancipation:

…the liberation from the vicissitudes of nature, through greater understanding of the earth processes followed by carefully applied technology; and self-emancipation, control over social relations, conscious control over the conditions under which human nature is formed, rational and democratic control over the cultural production of the human personality….In both senses, external and internal, development entails economic, social, and cultural progress, including, in the latter sense, finer ethical ideals and higher moral values. (PEET; HARTWICK, 2009, p. 3)

In its most basic sense development means creating conditions (social, cultural, economic, and territorial) in which all persons—men, women and children—irrespective of class or social status, have access to the most fundamental of human needs—
sufficient nutritious food, clean water, adequate shelter and sanitation, basic education and health care. However, ensuring basic needs is not enough to constitute development. People must be free from want, but they must also be free to actively engage in, and consciously control, the production and reproduction of the social relations that shape and condition their lives. Genuine development cannot be imposed on one group or country by another; it must be desired by those who are being targeted by development. The “beneficiaries” of development must play a fundamental role in the development process, from decision-making to implementation, and decide for themselves what kind of development they need and want, or indeed, if they need or want it at all. Thus, development is fundamentally a bottom up, not top-down process; this is the understanding of development adopted by the author in this thesis.

South-South development cooperation arose in the late 1950s as a response by developing countries to the top-down, paternalistic, and ethno-centric nature of the “development” imposed on them by western European countries and the U.S. Proponents of SSDC repudiated the conventional (western) thinking that dominated economic and development theory at the time, in particular, the sociological theory of modernization, which emerged in the post-World War II period and came to prominence during the Cold War era. Modernization theory, propounded by the American economist and military strategist Walt Rostow, held that there exists a universal path to modernization and economic progress which developing countries must follow in order to modernize. Much like climbing a ladder, countries must pass through pre-determined “stages of growth”, embracing capitalism, and moving away from tradition toward modernity, to arrive at a single fixed end-point of development, that of a “mass consumption society” (ROSTOW, 1960). In modernization theory:

Development” came from a society that was assuming its allotted place within a global order already determined by the heroic rise of the West. Development meant assuming the mental models of the West (rationalization), the institutions of the West (the market), the goals of the West (high mass consumption), and the culture of the West (the worship of commodities). Modernization was the early sociocultural equivalent of neoliberalism. (PEET; HARTWICK, 2009, p. 132)
Despite the academic and political equivocation of modernization theory since the 1960s, some of its main components “especially the idea that progress means replicating the experience of the West, underlies most conventional development theories, including contemporary neoliberal economic policy” (PEET; HARTWICK, 2009, p. 131). Modernization theory continues to “inform geoeconomic and geopolitical ideas and policies, particularly when these come from elite academic institutions” (PEET; HARTWICK, 2009, p. 134) as we will discuss in more detail later on.

During the 1960s and 1970s, Rostow’s theory of modernization came under intense criticism from a number of dependency theorists, academics, political activists and development practitioners, particularly in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, including Andre Gunder Frank (1969a; 1969b) Teontonio dos Santos (1970), Walter Rodney (2012/1972) Eduardo Galeano (1973), and Samir Amin (1976). Contrary to the claims of the entrenched modernization theory adage, dependency theorists held that European and U.S. development had little to do with rational modernization, a cultural or intellectual superiority innate to European societies, internal innovation, or adherence to the Ricardian notion of comparative advantage. The rise of Europe and the U.S., they argued, was predicated on the violent conquest and brutal exploitation of the people, land and resources of non-western societies, first by means of colonialism and slavery (GALEANO, 1973), and later, through neocolonialism (AMIN, 1973).

For dependency theorists, the transfer of surpluses from developing (colonized) countries to developed ones, through the use of force, coercion and biased economic and trade policy, resulted in the underdevelopment of non-European societies, creating, maintaining and exacerbating a situation of dependency that subjugated the economies of poor and developing Third-World countries (the peripheries) to the whims of a European First-World “center”, which also included the U.S. (FRANK, 1969a; 1969b; AMIN, 1976; RODNEY 2012/1972). One of the “indispensable components of modern underdevelopment” describes Guyana historian Walter Rodney “is that it expresses a particular relationship of exploitation: namely, the exploitation of one country over another” (2012/1972, p. 14).

For the Brazilian dependency theorist Teontonio dos Santos:
Dependency is]...an historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it favors some countries to the detriment of others and limits the development possibilities of the subordinate economies...a situation in which the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which their own is subjugated. (DOS SANTOS, 1970, p. 226)

In other words, the relationship between the countries at the center of the capitalist mode of production and those that make up the periphery was shaped by the historical process of primitive accumulation¹ and solidified by unequal trade imposed on the latter by the former. The integration of the periphery into the capitalist world economy and the asymmetrical nature of its relationship vis-à-vis the centers of capital engendered the formation of entrenched structures of dependence in which the development of the peripheral countries is invariably determined by changes in the center. In the analysis of both Andre Gunder Frank and Dos Santos, underdevelopment in the periphery was directly caused by the development of the center, which in turn, was made possible only as a result of the center’s expropriation of the surpluses that were generated in the periphery (FRANK, 1969a; 1969b; DOS SANTOS, 1970).

According to Samir Amin (1976) there are “three symptoms of underdevelopment”, namely: “sectorial inequality of productivities, disarticulation, and domination”. Using disarticulation as an example, Amir highlights the fact that these symptoms do not “appear in the same way in Brazil as [they do] in Tropical Africa”:

In the case of the semi-industrialized countries of Latin America (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina), an integrated industrial complex already exists. This complex itself tends to become autocentric, in a special way: it is not, in fact, based on a large internal market embracing the entire population, as in the developed countries, but on a partial market made up of the rich, integrated fraction of the population. Industry therefore leaves out of the market a marginal population that forms the major part of the rural

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¹ The process of “primitive accumulation” was first articulated by Marx who understood it as “the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production. It appears as primitive, because it forms the pre-historic stage of capital and of the mode of production corresponding with it” (MARX; 1906, p. 431-434 apud KELLY, 2011, p. 685). Since Marx’s time, a great number of scholars have reinterpreted and redefined the concept applying it to contemporary processes of capital accumulation and enclosures of the commons, perpetuated primarily by transnational corporations and/or the State in conjunction with local elites. Alice Kelly (2011) provides a adept synthesis of three consistent and inter-related understandings of primitive accumulation in a contemporary context that draw on Marx’s original definition and expand on it: “1) primitive accumulation as an ongoing process with varying time frames rather than a static moment in history, 2) primitive accumulation as not only a change in economic mechanisms, but as a change in social relations and practices and 3) primitive accumulation as a violent act” (p. 685).
population as well as of its extension the urban shanty-towns. Agriculture, developed at an earlier stage of integration into the world system, remains externally oriented and therefore suffers from a very low and stagnating wage level for its workers. The disarticulation, which does not manifest itself at the industrial level, occurs between agriculture and industry at the national level. As is seen in the case of Brazil, foreign trade acquires a special structure as a result of this phenomenon. The pattern of exports is typically that of a classical underdeveloped country (predominance of primary products, especially agricultural ones) while imports are like those of a developed country (predominance of energy, semifinished goods, capital goods, and food products and not manufactured consumer goods) (AMIN, 1976, p. 381).

Speaking more generally to the Latin American context, prominent Uruguayan writer and journalist Eduardo Galeano commented on the structural dependency that affects the region:

The division of labor among nations is such that some specialize in winning and others in losing. Our part of the world, known today as Latin America, was precocious: it has specialized in losing ever since those remote times when Renaissance Europeans ventured across the ocean and buried their teeth in the throats of the Indian civilizations. Centuries passed, and Latin America perfected its role. We are no longer in the era of marvels when face surpassed fable and imagination was shamed by the trophies of conquest—the lodes of gold, the mountains of silver. But our region still works as a menial. It continues to exist at the service of others’ needs, as a source and reserve of oil and iron, of copper and meat, of fruit and coffee, the raw materials and foods destined for rich countries which profit more from consuming them than Latin America does from producing them (GALEANO, 1973, p. 1).

It is in this particular historical global context—characterized by the polarizing geopolitics and geo-economics of the Cold War era and the fierce contestation between modernization theory and theories emanating from the dependency school—that the G77 was born and the notion of SSDC came to the fore. The end of the Cold War in 1991 and the subsequent collapse of the former Soviet Union, led to the discrediting of socialism, and development theories rooted in the Marxist school of thought, including dependency theories, gradually faded out of polite international development discourse. With the rise of neoliberalism to prominence in the 1990s many large Third World coalitions, including the G77, underwent a political disintegration, attributed to the inability of member states to overcome the contradictions presented by the divergent ideologies and demands of the countries comprising the coalitions.
In 1999, the G20 “emerged as the most formidable opposition to the unequal trade liberalisation that the North was foisting on the South” (BELLO, 2014, p. 2). Following the creation of the G20, in the first decade of the twentieth century a number of other inter-governmental groups emerged, the most notable of which is the BRICS. The group, comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, is characterized by Walden Bello as “a conscious formation of big, rapidly developing countries with an ambivalent relationship to the traditional centre economies of Europe and the United States” (BELLO, 2014, p 2). As an expression of the dialectical relationship between the BRICS and the traditional centers of power, the group has acted as a platform advocating for the strengthening of trade relations between developing countries in the Global South\(^2\) under the rubric of South-South cooperation.

The degree to which the emerging powers and new inter-governmental groupings, such as the BRICS and IBAS (India, Brazil and South Africa), have actually shifted the existing global economic structure and power relations towards more equitable alternatives has been seriously questioned. In the view of the Indian scholar and journalist, Achin Vanaik:

> The rise of certain Southern countries [...and] the emergence of BRICS...has still not meant a serious change or shift in global power relations. Indeed, the current power shift, one can suggest, is a drift towards the creation of an informal collective. This is likely to be a quintet comprising those countries that by virtue of their combined and absolute levels of demographic, economic and military weights, will be effectively entrusted with the primary responsibility of stabilising the world capitalist order from which all elites and the most powerful TNCs can hope to continue benefiting. These five are the US, EU, Russia, China, India (VANAIK, 2014, p. 4).

\(^2\) The term the Global South emerged in the 1950s and 1960s to replace the term the Third World. As Marc Silver (2015, não paginada) acutely denotes, the “1-2-3 classification” of the so-called First, Second and Third World “is now out of date, insulting and confusing”. The denomination “Global South” is used to refer collectively to the world’s developing countries, most of which are geographically located in the southern hemisphere. However, this geographic labelling is politically loaded and not wholly accurate, since a number of developed countries such as New Zealand, Australia and Japan are located in the so-called “Global South” while one of the poorest nations in the world, Haiti, is geographically situated in the “Global North”. Presently, the more accurate (and politically correct) term used to refer collectively to developing countries is “the Majority World” – “a reminder to those of us in the West that we are but a very small minority on the globe. According to World Bank statistics, 80 percent of humanity lives on $10 or less a day” explains Wei (2015, não paginada).
Evidently there is uncertainty as to whether the growing role played by the BRICS (excluding Russia) in SSDC, actually constitutes a break from the vertical nature of the North-South model of development cooperation of OECD countries. Indeed, the BRICS countries and their transnationals are among the most aggressive participants in large scale land acquisitions and resource grabs in developing countries, particularly in Latin America and Africa (GLAUSER, 2009; HALL, 2011; HOFFMANN & HO, 2012; VANAIK, 2014).

1.2 The evolution of south-south development cooperation in Brazilian foreign policy (1961-2002)

Brazil, now among the leading proponents of SSDC, has been an active participant in multilateral negotiations and forums since the beginning of the nineteenth century. One of the founding members of both the United Nations in 1945 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now the WTO, in 1947, Brazil played a prominent role in the coordination of the developing country coalitions of the 1960s and 1970s, particularly the G77 (LIMA; HIRST, 2006). The country's expanded involvement and leadership in multilateral arenas during this period coincides with the affirmation of specific principles oriented toward SSDC in the Independent Foreign Policy (Política Externa Independente—PEI) introduced by the administration of Jânio Quadros in 1961.

Included in the PEI were the following directives: to denounce inequitable trade policies that subordinate developing country economies; to support decolonization movements in Africa and Asia; to acknowledge and attribute due importance to the common interests and aspirations of Brazil and the continents of Asia and Africa; to establish and consolidate relations with African states; and to establish greater integration with states in Latin America. The inclusion of such SSDC-oriented goals in the PEI did not necessarily mean an abrupt delinking of Brazil with its traditional partners, specifically Europe and the U.S. The PEI also affirmed the need to expand relations with Europe and to ensure relations of “sincere collaboration” with the U.S., “in
defence of democratic and social progress in the Americas” (CERVO; BUENO, 2011, p 335).

In 1964 the democratically elected left-leaning government of João Goulart (1961-1964), was overthrown in a U.S. backed military coup and a dictatorship government was installed, lasting for two decades, and ending in March of 1985. Between 1964 and 1985, the objectives of Brazil’s foreign policy agenda experienced significant fluctuations, especially in regards to the role of SSDC. The first military government of Castello Branco (1964-1967) adopted the directives of western-style economic liberalism and articulated a firm stance against the “threat of communism”. Castello Branco and his close group of “americanistas” wasted little time in dismantling the PEI that had been introduced previously by Quadros. Effectively “opening fire” on the PEI, the country’s pre-1964 path of national developmentalism was abandoned. Under Castello Branco, the national foreign policy agenda prioritized the reinforcement of the country’s ties with the West, and in particular, the U.S. as a strategy to promote foreign investment in Brazil and expand markets for Brazilian exports abroad. Improving bilateral relations with Latin American countries was secondary to the goal of economic and diplomatic realignment with the U.S., while the idea of rekindling Brazil-Africa relations faded almost out of existence (CERVO; BUENO, 2011; SARAIVA, 1994).

The following government, headed by General Arthur da Costa e Silva (1967-1969), acted quickly to overhaul the national foreign policy set out by his predecessor, seeking to recoup a margin of autonomy vis-a-vis the West and reassert the principle of national sovereignty. This change was in part a response to the frustration expressed by the Brazilian bourgeoisie, which relied on the internal market and could not compete with the transnational companies favoured by the previous government (VIZENTINI, 1998). A new doctrine known as “Diplomacy of Prosperity” (Diplomacia da Prosperidade) was introduced, which saw development as a “national responsibility”, and held that foreign diplomacy should only serve to accelerate national development, progress and modernization. It should also allow for a greater participation of the national bourgeoisie and domestic industries in the project of national development. Attracting foreign investment was still a high priority; it was viewed as a means of acquiring the technological know-how necessary for Brazil's autonomous economic
development. As in the government of Castello, both Latin America and Africa took a back seat on the policy agenda (BUENO, 1994; CERVO; BUENO, 2011).

During the Medici government (1970-1974), Brazil saw a continuation of the basic precepts of the Diplomacy of Prosperity and witnessed astonishing economic growth. Between 1971 and 1973, the GDP grew by approximately 10 percent each year, a phenomenon denominated the “Brazilian miracle” by the regime (VIZENTINI, 1998). The rapid economic growth that began in 1968 under Costa e Silva and continued until 1973 gave rise to the idea of “Brasil Grande Potência”—essentially, a plan to use Brazilian soft power to expand the country’s role in the international arena and boost its status as an intermediary player in global politics and multilateral forums. It was conceived that by capturing resources and technology from the North, and appropriating the associated knowledge processes, that Brazil could then re-pass this technology on to developing countries in the South (CERVO; BUENO, 2011).

Under the Médici government, the country also began to see a return to economic developmentalism, nationalism and a renewal of support for the political activism of Third-World coalitions. In 1970, speaking to a group of graduates at the Rio Branco Institute, Médici declared: “Our country refuses to believe that history develops necessarily to the benefit of some [countries] and to the detriment of others”. According to the Médici’s minister of foreign affairs, Gibson Barbosa, there were five main functions of foreign policy: a) to facilitate changes in the current international rules governing global trade and finance b) to leverage national power, derived from economic growth, to assist other countries aspiring to progress; c) to challenge the consolidated power in the western hegemonic bloc and advocate for a New International Economic Order (NIEO); d) to act in solidarity with the peoples’ of developing countries; e) to promote the principle universalism in foreign policy actions (CERVO; BUENO, 2011, p. 412).

In 1974, in the context of the international economic crisis, resulting from the sharp rise in the price of oil at the end of 1973, the government of Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979) redefined the foreign policy adopting an approach that he called “pragmatismo

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3 The NIEO was a set of proposals put forward in the 1970s by the G77 countries calling for a restructuring of the international rules on trade and economic policy that would promote a more equitable distribution of the economic and social gains made through trade for developing countries vis-a-vis the highly developed States.
responsável" (responsible pragmatism). The effects of the global “oil crisis” were acutely felt in Brazil—alongside the increase in the price of oil, the cost of Brazilian imports increased, and the country’s exports to developing (non-oil producing) countries, which had been affected by the recession in Western bloc of countries, were dramatically reduced. Brazilian capitalism had grown to such an extent that it in fact necessitated greater insertion into the international market, especially since incomes for the majority of the population had plummeted during the period of the military dictatorship, significantly reducing the size of Brazil’s internal consumer market (VIZENTINI, 1998).

Guided by the notion of responsible pragmatism, foreign policy focused exclusively on the building and strengthening of relations with states of strategic interest for the internal and external expansion of Brazilian capitalism. Geisel established ties with a number of Arab states (exporting food for oil), in particular regional leaders such as Algeria, Libya, Iraq and Saudi Arabia; consolidated existing ties with the Soviet bloc, China, Western Europe and Japan; dropped the euphemistic notion of “Brasil Grande Potência” in order to re-establish and solidify cooperation with other Latin American countries; and sought to establish diplomatic relations with a number of African countries in the Gulf of Guinea. Brazil’s strategic cooperation with these countries represented a means of affirming its autonomous presence in the global arena, with the country playing a protagonist role in the multilateral forum of the UN and other international organizations, in convergence with other developing countries (VIZENTINI, 1998).

In continuity with the responsible pragmatism of his predecessor, the government of Joao Batista Figueiredo (1979-1985) followed a similar foreign policy approach designating national development and progress as the explicit goals of international diplomacy. Notably, on the national level, from 1964-1985, none of the five military governments paid much attention to the pressing need for domestic social reforms; indeed, the entire period of the military dictatorship was marked by mass torture, killings and disappearances of left-wing political activists and the brutal repression of large segments of the Brazilian population, especially rural workers (VIZENTINI, 1998; CARNEIRO; CIOCCARI, 2011).
When José Sarney de Araújo Costa became president in 1985, he inherited an enormous foreign debt, and had a number of significant problems to deal with including pervasive corruption, rampant inflation and the completion of country’s transition to democracy. These problems, particularly the crushing burden of the growing national debt, ultimately framed the foreign policy agenda of the new Sarney government (1985-1990), which Brazilian historian Clodoaldo Bueno (1994, p. 117) described as being characterized by “disinhibition and default”.

The government’s approach to external affairs was largely a continuation of the notion of responsible pragmatism under the two prior governments of Geisel and Figueiredo. Trade was the paramount priority. Thus, external relations focused on servicing the national debt by expanding access to external markets for Brazilian exports and engagement in multilateral forums was used primarily as a means to denounce the protectionist policies of developed countries. Brazil vehemently condemned the structure of the international trade regime that subjugated Brazil and much of the rest of the developing world to the conditionalities imposed on them by the IMF and World Bank under the control of the Western powers—policies that no Western country adhered to themselves (BUENO, 1994).

Brazil played a prominent part in the G77 and, in 1988 was elected onto the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Administrative Council of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Brazil also actively engaged in the Uruguay round of negotiations of GATT; however, little progress was made in terms of the North-South dialogue in both the GATT and in the forums of the United Nations during this period. Further, with many of the world’s developing countries facing national economic crises, the advancement of South-South cooperation was severely restricted. One of the notable accomplishments of the Sarney government in the area of South-South Cooperation was the promotion the economic and political integration of Latin America. Accords signed by Sarney and the president of Argentina Raúl Alfonsin during this period resulted in the creation of a common market between the two countries, and led to the formation of Mercosur in 1991.

4 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was a set of multilateral trade agreements set out in 1947 that aimed to promote world trade liberalization through the abolishment quotas and reduction of tariff duties among its signatory countries. It was superseded by the World Trade Organization in 1995 and now has 160 member States.
With the end of the Cold War and the triumph of capitalism over communism in 1991, epitomized by the fall and gradual dissolution of the former Soviet Union, neoliberalism emerged as the prominent economic doctrine guiding international trade, with severe implications for both the external and domestic policy actions of States. As with most developing and indebted countries, the globalization of the neoliberal paradigm of economic development acutely affected the nature of Brazil’s external relations, particularly in terms of the country’s capacity to influence international trade regulation and its disposition in multilateral forums. From 1990-2002, a sequence of neo-liberal governments—Fernando Collar de Mello (1990-1992); Itamar Franco (1992-1994) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2000)—came to power, and Brazil submitted to both the first and second generation reforms suggested by the so-called “Washington Consensus”\(^5\). Foreign policy was characterized by a great deal of instability and plagued by overwhelming contradictions throughout the period. The focus of the successive neo-liberal governments was almost exclusively on strategic alliances to expand Brazil’s access to export markets and promote foreign investment in key industries as a means to balance the national budget and pay off some of the country’s crippling debt load (CERVO; BUENO, 2011).

Central to the foreign policy agenda was the promotion of U.S. foreign investment in Brazil, which grew rapidly during the 1990s. The continuing protectionism of the United States led the Brazilian government to place an even greater emphasis on regional integration, converging with other South American countries in strengthening Mercosur in an attempt to consolidate a space of autonomy vis-a-vis the U.S. The Brazilian government used Mercosur to initiate negotiations over trade and cooperation with the European Union (EU), leading to the signing of an inter-institutional cooperation agreement in 1992 aimed at sharing institutional experience related to regional

\(^5\) The phrase “Washington Consensus” refers to a specific set of neo-liberal policy prescriptions imposed by Washington-based institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and the US Treasury Department on highly indebted countries to “structurally adjust” their economies. In Brazil, the main priorities of the first generation of Washington Consensus reforms were to control inflation and resume economic growth through the adjustment of macroeconomic policy, the liberalization of trade and the financial sector, the deregulation of the economy, fiscal adjustments, privatization and added measures for the protection of private property. The objective of the second generation of reforms was three-fold: a) to consolidate the new macroeconomic landscape as a permanent feature of societies; b) to advance the institutional restructuring, understood as reform of the state administration, the universalization of administrative decentralization, the expansion of public-private arrangements and the establishment of new regulatory frameworks; c) to liberalize land, labor and credit markets, until then little or not affected by the first phase of reforms” (PEREIRA, 2006, p. 357).
integration and an interregional cooperation agreement in 1995 which sought the creation of an interregional free-trade zone. Between 1992 and 1997, EU direct investments in Mercosur increased by 700 percent, reaching 7.9 billion dollars, while trade between the two blocs increased by 266 percent. Through Mercosur, bilateral relations with several Eastern Asian countries were also initiated by the Brazilian government. The EU, as well as Russia and China, which earned the status of “strategic partners” for Brazil during this period, were of particular importance as they reinforced the country’s distinction as a regional leader in South America. Aside from the creation of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) in 1996, during the 1990s, the succession of neoliberal governments in Brazil showed little interest in strengthening ties with non-oil producing countries in Africa (CERVO; BUENO, 2011).

1.3 Brazilian foreign policy and south-south development cooperation under the Lula government (2003-2011)

Since the turn of the twenty-first century Brazilian foreign policy has undergone a dramatic transformation. With the inauguration of the administration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on 1 January 2003, one of the first acts of the new government was to restore the principles of SSDC, regionalism and universalism in Brazil’s foreign policy (COSTA VAZ; INOUE, 2007). At both the World Social Forum held in Porto Alegre and the World Economic Forum in Davos, in 2003, Lula articulated his country’s ambition “to take a leading position in the search for a new paradigm” for international cooperation and announced Brazil’s aspiration of gaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (AMORIM, 2003). In 2005, Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim, commented on the recent inflection of Brazilian diplomacy, and described the new foreign policy priorities of President Lula as follows:

...to extend the geography of the external relations of Brazil, updating the content of our universalistic place of vocation; and take a firm and active role in multilateral negotiations, including regional, in order to ensure a fair and balanced international regulatory space. Underlying these priorities is the need to preserve our sovereign ability to define the development model that we want for the country (AMORIM, 2005).

6 The CPLP is an intergovernmental forum currently comprised of nine member countries: Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, São Tomé and Príncipe, Timor-Leste and Equatorial Guinea.
Under Lula, Brazil dramatically expanded and diversified diplomatic and economic relations in virtually all geographical regions of the globe. As Lídia Cabral and Julie Weinstock highlight, “the President holds a record of official country visits and, during its administration, 37 new Embassies have opened (or reopened) across the world” (2010, p. 10). In the first two years of his mandate, the president realized 56 visits to 35 countries and received 52 visits from foreign heads of State and government ministers, originating from 39 countries (AMORIM, 2005).

Moving beyond the country’s traditional focus on Latin America, Europe, the U.S. and Lusophone Africa, the president established and consolidated relations with countries in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Brazil expanded its involvement in regional and national coalitions, such as Mercosur, CPLC and the G20, which had been formed in 1999. In 2003, Brazil, India and South Africa, considered to be regional leaders on their respective continents, initiated the IBAS Dialogue Forum—an international tripartite forum, also known as the G3, that aims to promote political and economic cooperation among the three countries and a greater representation of their mutual interests in the multilateral forums of the UN. In 2009 the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) coalition was founded with similar objectives. The coalition expanded in 2010 to include South Africa and has since become known as BRICS. The formation of new geopolitical alliances has been an instrumental part of Brazil’s strategy to gather support for its bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (CABRAL et al., 2013), and gaining greater autonomy in international relations (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007; CABRAL et al., 2013).

In recent years the country has gradually transitioned from being a recipient of foreign aid and development assistance to becoming an emerging provider (CABRAL; WEINSTIEN, 2010). This trend coincides with the impressive growth of the Brazilian economy under Lula, characterized by a solid macro-economic policy framework, relatively stable inflation rates, expanding trade surpluses, increased investment in infrastructure and a growing internal market for Brazilian products due to gradual increases in income levels. In mid-2005, the government announced that it would not be renewing its loans with the IMF (BBC, 2005). Since paying off the country’s foreign debt,
Brazil has become a lender to the IMF. In 2009, the country loaned US$ 10 billion to its former creditor, insisting that the money be loaned by the IMF on a non-conditional basis (DA SILVA, 2009a). Presently, Brazil ranks as the world’s seventh largest economy, behind the United States, China, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom (WORLD BANK, 2014).

The doctrine of orthodox economic liberalism introduced in the 1990s has continued to inform both national and foreign economic policy (COSTA VAZ; INOUE, 2007). Externally, economic policy has focused on expanding export markets for Brazilian products and promoting the internationalization of Brazilian companies. Domestically, the president emphasized inclusive economic growth and sought to balance economic priorities with improvements to social well-being. A number of ambitious publically-funded social programs, such as Bolsa Família (Family Purse), the Food Acquisition (PAA) and the More Food Program (Mais Alimentos) implemented by the Lula administration have had a significant impact, reducing poverty and hunger, and resulting in modest improvements in income. The Bolsa Família program, for example, is presently the largest conditional cash transfer program in the world and has decisively decreased extreme poverty and income inequality in Brazil (CABRAL et al., 2013; DA SILVA et al., 2011).

Exceptional economic growth and social achievements have legitimized Brazil’s projection of itself as a model of successful tropical industrialization that other developing countries can follow. In the areas of health, social protection and agriculture in particular, Brazilian technology and expertise has earned international acclaim, and increasingly become important references for the development processes of countries in the Southern-Axis. “Brazil has made use of the solutions created and developed domestically, on topics such as agriculture, education and public safety, to support countries facing similar difficulties” explains Lula (IPEA; ABC, 2011, p. 8).

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7 As a result of progressive social policies implemented by the government, between 2003 and 2009, poverty (people living with US$ 2 per day) dramatically decreased, falling from 21 percent of the population to 11 percent; extreme poverty (people living with US$ 1.25 per day) also dropped markedly, from 10 percent in 2004 to 2.2 percent in 2009. See: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/brazil/overview>
The framework of Brazil's SSDC discourse has been profoundly shaped by social imaginaries of a shared experience of colonialism with other developing countries, and subsequently, neo-colonial exploitation under U.S. hegemony. Speaking to a group of Brazilian and Kenyan politicians and entrepreneurs in Nairobi at the end of his final mandate, Lula stated:

...we [the South American and African countries] are regarded as poor or emerging countries. Now, Brazil, in a more sophisticated line, is in BRICS. But in any case, we [the South American and African countries] are still treated as developing countries, and in some, we are still treated as underdeveloped countries. And it is these definitions and these economic analyses that made me, from the 1st [of January] 2003 to a make a shift in the Brazilian government's behaviour and diversify the route of our travels to find new partners and to do new business (DA SILVA, 2010).

The notion of solidarity is said to be a fundamental precept guiding Brazil's diplomatic relations and cooperation initiatives with the Global South. Central to Brazil's conception of SSDC, or horizontal cooperation, is the claim that it is distinct from the traditional North-South model of OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries (IPEA; ABC, 2011), which has been subjected to sharp criticism emanating from both the North and South for its vertical (characteristically top-down) nature and tendency to tie aid and development “assistance” to conditions (HASLAM et al. 2009). In contrast, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação—ABC) states that Brazil’s development cooperation is demand-driven, does not impose conditions on partner countries or interfere in their domestic affairs, is not linked to commercial interests, and is based on the principles of reciprocity, joint-diplomacy and mutual respect between nations (IPEA; ABC, 2011; 2013).

Between 2005 and 2009, the federal government invested a total of BRL$ 2.9 billion (US$ 1.6 billion) in its international development program. Cooperation almost doubled during the period, growing from BRL$ 384.2 million (US$ 277 million) in 2005 to over BRL$ 724 million (US$362 million) in 2009, divided among the modalities of technical cooperation (BRL $87 million), humanitarian aid (BRL$ 97 million), scholarships for foreigners (BRL$ 44 million) and contributions to international organizations including several UN agencies and the Inter-American Development Bank.
(BRL$ 495 million) (IPEA; ABC, 2011). During the same period, the modalities of humanitarian assistance and technical cooperation experienced a dramatic increase in investment, from a combined total of BRL$ 28.9 million in 2005 to BRL$ 184.8 million in 2009. Although absent from the survey, debt relief and the provision of export credits to countries in Latin America and Africa constitute further expressions of Brazilian development cooperation (CABRAL et al., 2013).

A second survey conducted by IPEA and ABC (2013) indicates that, in 2010, the total volume spent on international development cooperation reached BRL$ 1.6 billion (US$ 923 million), an increase of 91.2% in relation to the previous year. The survey adopted a different classification of the modalities comprising the framework of international development cooperation than that of the 2011 survey. In addition to the modalities of technical cooperation, humanitarian cooperation, educational cooperation and contributions to multilateral organizations, the 2013 survey included scientific and technological cooperation, support and protection of refugees and peacekeeping operations. In 2010, the sum of resources directed toward humanitarian cooperation totalled BRL$ 284 million (US$ 161 million), accounting for 17.5 % of the total investment for that year. The amount of investment in this modality represented a 227.7 percent increase in relation to 2009. In 2010, the modality of technical cooperation accounted for 6.3% of the total investment made for that year, equivalent to approximately BRL$ 102 million (US$58 million), representing a four-fold increase since 2005 (from BRL$ 25 million). In 2010, 53.3 % of the funds allocated for technical cooperation went to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, while 39.5 % of the total went to African countries. Asia received 7 % of the total, and 0.2 % went to other countries. The expansion of technical and humanitarian cooperation has been interpreted as “a clear sign of the growing importance that Brazil attaches to international cooperation in a global framework of economic and social development” (IPEA; ABC, 2011, p.19).

Note that there are discrepancies between the data of IPEA and ABC’s 2011 survey and the 2013 survey, given changes to the classification of modalities and methodological procedures. For example, the 2010 survey estimates investment in humanitarian cooperation for 2009 to be BRL$ 97 million, while the data given for the same year for humanitarian cooperation (including the modality of support and protection of refugees) in the 2013 survey is BRL$ 87 million. The increased between 2009 and 2010 of 277% is calculated based on the later estimation.
Operating under the Ministry of External Affairs (MRE), the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) is the federal body responsible for negotiating, coordinating, implementing and monitoring Brazil’s technical cooperation programs and projects abroad. Technical cooperation involves the transfer and adaptation of knowledge, skills and technology from Brazilian institutions to partner countries in a wide range of fields, including agriculture, education, health, sanitation, transportation, the environment, energy and public administration. Agriculture and health are two priority areas of Brazil’s technical cooperation, with the Brazilian Agricultural Cooperation (Embrapa) and Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz), leading the implementation of projects in these fields of knowledge. Capacity-building activities such as professional training courses, seminars, workshops, consultancies and exchange programs comprise the main activities carried out under the auspices of this modality. In 2010, Brazil provided technical cooperation to 99 different countries, the majority of which were located in Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa. The same year, resources from 44 publically administered federal institutions and ministries, including the ABC and MRE, were diverted by the federal government in order to finance international technical cooperation projects in partner countries (IPEA; ABC, 2013).

Although technical cooperation accounts for a small part (6.3%) of the Brazil’s overall budget for international development cooperation, it is the modality most explicitly used to establish and consolidate bilateral diplomatic and economic relations. It is a central element of Brazil’s presidential diplomacy, and during his presidency, Lula actively promoted the sharing of Brazilian knowledge, technology and domestically tested development solutions through SSDC as an expression of Brazil’s solidarity with other countries. In tandem with the growth and diversification of the country’s technical cooperation portfolio globally, Brazil has increasingly partnered up with developed countries (traditional donors) or international organizations to implement cooperation initiatives through a triangular or trilateral cooperation framework. Triangular arrangements allow for Brazilian technical cooperation to be complemented with the financial and logistical resources offered by a second donor for the promotion of development projects in a supplicant country (IPEA; ABC, 2013). Although the Brazilian government states that trilateral arrangements must conform to the country’s principles
for SSDC (see above), technical cooperation and financing schemes introduced under trilateral agreements have been used as a means to influence the national policies of supplicant governments and promote the interests of private companies, as exemplified by the case of ProSAVANA in Mozambique, discussed in more detail in chapters 3, 4 and 5.

The modality of humanitarian cooperation has also grown significantly over the last decade, inspired by the social policies implemented under the Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) program introduced by Lula in 2003, specifically: the PAA, *Bolsa Família* and the National School Lunch Program (PNAE). With the launch of Fome Zero in 2003, the eradication of poverty and hunger became key priorities of Brazil’s domestic and foreign policy agenda. Improving rural incomes through the promotion of local food-purchasing programs, and reducing hunger and malnutrition through food donations and school-feeding programs, are central strategies of Brazil’s international humanitarian cooperation. In 2004, the General Coordination for International Action Against Hunger (*Coordenação-Geral de Ações Internacionais de Combate à Fome*—CGFome) was created to coordinate the federal government’s international humanitarian cooperation for food and nutritional security, as well as for disaster relief assistance. Affiliated to MRE, CGFOME also acts as an interlocutor on these topics with FAO, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), WFP, United Nations’ High Commission for Refugees (ACNUR), and the United Nations’ Children’s Fund (UNICEF), among others (IPEA; ABC, 2013).

Brazilian humanitarian cooperation consists of two main types of assistance: emergency aid and structural humanitarian development assistance. The former focuses on reducing the suffering of populations in countries stricken by war or affected by natural disasters (including famine and drought) in the short-term through the donation of food, water, medication and the provision of shelter. The latter seeks to create sustainable livelihoods, stimulate dynamism in local economies and reduce poverty and hunger in the long term through the promotion of local-food purchasing and school lunch programs. Humanitarian cooperation can be implemented bilaterally (directly with partner country governments through coordination between embassies and ministries) or multilaterally through intermediaries such as NGOs or international
organizations affiliated with the UN (IPEA; ABC, 2013). The pilot-project PAA Africa in Mozambique (discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis) is an example of multilateral Brazilian humanitarian cooperation, although the project also has a technical cooperation component executed by EMBRAPA in coordination with FAO and WFP.

1.4 Brazil-Africa relations in a historical and contemporary context

Relations between Brazil and Africa were initiated in the early sixteenth century through Portuguese colonization and the consolidation of the transatlantic slave-trade. Between 1550 and 1855 over four million African slaves came in through Brazilian ports; this number does not include the millions more that did not survive their violent capture in Africa or the brutal journey across the Atlantic. The origins of Brazil’s slaves were varied with the most important exportation centers located on the western coast of Africa—Guinea (Bissau and Cacheu), Angola, the Egyptian Sudan and the Congo. Some slaves were transplanted from as far east as Mozambique (FAUSTO, 1999)

With the proclamation of Brazil’s independence in 1822, the country gained political autonomy from Portugal, but its traditional economic and class structure remained essentially unchanged. At the time of independence the national population was comprised of 2,813,351 free inhabitants and 1,147,515 slaves. Indeed, “owning land and owning slaves were among the highest aspirations of the age” (DA COSTA, 1985, p. 128). Brazilian abolitionists vehemently condemned slavery insisting that it “corrupted society and the family, encouraged laziness and wastefulness, degraded the masters, debased the slaves, corrupted the language, religion, and mores, and violated natural law” (DA COSTA, 1985, p. 165). In addition, they argued that “slavery created obstacles to the economic development of the country, impeded immigration, inhibited the mechanization of agriculture, and generated a false wealth” (DA COSTA, 1985, p. 164). From 1850 onward, the latter set of arguments articulated by abolition movement gradually gained credence among the Brazilian bourgeoisie and political elites and were instrumental in leading to the official abolition of slavery in 1888.
Entrenched patterns of racial discrimination that had been developed under slavery remained deeply ingrained in the consciousness of Brazil’s class society. Former slaves continued to encounter pervasive inequalities and were marginalized by the Brazilian economic, political and class structure which systematically excluded them from employment and educational opportunities. As Brazilian historian Emilia Viotti da Costa explains:

Since abolition had been the result more of a desire to free Brazil from the problems of slavery than of a wish to emancipate the slaves, the dominant classes did not concern themselves with the black man and his integration into a class society. The ex-slave was left to his own devices. His difficulties in adjusting to new conditions were taken by the elites as proof of his racial inferiority. Many ex-slaveholders went as far as to say that the blacks had been happier as slaves than they were as free men since they were incapable of leading their own lives (DA COSTA, 1985, p. 170).

The inescapable nature of racial discrimination in Brazil led to a ‘deliberate distancing’ of the country from its own inherent afro-identity, initiating a prolonged period of ‘silence’ in the history of Brazil-Africa relations (SARAIVA, 1994).

It wasn’t until almost a century later that Brazil began its re-approximation with Africa, marked by the introduction of the Independent Foreign Policy in 1961 under the Quadros government (SARAIVA, 2012). Between 1961 and 1974 maneuvers to (re)establish relations with the much of the African continent (particularly “black” Africa) were hindered by the contradictory relationship that Brazil maintained with Portugal, which was relentless in its attempts to retain control over its colonies in Africa. The Portuguese government, confounded by Quadros’ firm anticolonialist position, accused the president of betraying the traditional alliance between the two countries. A Portuguese lobby (both within Brazil and in Portugal) wielded its appreciable economic and political influence to keep Brazil’s foreign policy agenda in Africa in line with the global interests of Portugal (PENHA, 2011). On several occasions Brazil abstained or voted against proposals in the UN General Assembly that either condemned colonialism or proposed independence for African nations (as in the case of Algeria, Guinea Bissau and Angola). Brazil also voted against imposing sanctions on the South African apartheid government, which was one of the country’s largest trading partners in Africa at the time (PENHA, 2011; RODRIGUES; 1982).
Attempts to rekindle ties with the African continent were further inhibited by the inability of Brazil to overcome, or even acknowledge, its internal problem of racial inequality, which remained pervasive in the mid-twentieth century. This contradicted the government’s diplomatic and political discourse that sought to strengthen ties with African nations. The euphemistic notion of Brazil as a “racial democracy”, first propounded by sociologist Gilberto Freyre (1945) captured the imaginations of Brazilians during the 1950s and 1960s and effectively shaped and controlled popular perceptions on racial issues. Freyre saw the gradual “whitening” of the population (or a disappearing of blacks) through miscegenation as an encouraging phenomenon which allowed Brazil to avoid the racial problems that affected other countries, primarily the US. Racial inequality, for Freyre, was explained away as discrimination based on class difference and not race or color (DA COSTA, 1985). The majority of Brazilians (both black and white) closed their eyes to the problems of racial inequality but the official figures for educational enrollment in 1950 speak for themselves:

These figures classified about 60 percent of the total population as technically white, about one-fourth as mulatto [mixed race] and 11 percent as black. But the population of the elementary schools had a dramatically different distribution. Only 10 percent of pupils were mulatto, and only 4 percent were black. And as one moved up the educational ladder, the warping along racial lines became even more marked. Only 4 percent of the students in secondary schools were mulatto and less than 1 percent were black; in universities, just over 2 percent were mulattos, and only one-quarter of 1 percent were blacks. These figures were not secret, and were not difficult to understand. But they were ignored (DA COSTA, 1985, p. 236).

During the 1950s and 1960s blacks or afro-decedents were virtually absent in civil service, or academic circles. There were no Brazilian experts on Africa, black or white, available to participate in, or contribute to, the formulation of foreign policies pertaining to the continent (IPEA; WORLD BANK, 2011).

In the 1970s the myth of racial democracy was effectively rebuked and discredited by a new generation of Brazilian social scientists studying race relations—most notably, Octávio Ianni, Floresetan Fernandes and Thales de Azevedo. This movement coincided with a turning point in Brazil-Africa relations in 1974 under the Geisel government. Portuguese overtures in favor of negotiating an end to their colonial
wars after the *Revolução dos Cravos* (Revolution of Cravos) created an aperture for Brazil to reassess its traditional alliance with Portugal and reformulate its foreign policy toward the African continent. In 1974, Brazil recognized the independence of Guinea Bissau, and Mozambique and Angola in 1975. From 1975 to the end of the twentieth century Brazilian interests in Africa (under responsible pragmatism and neoliberalism) remained focused on economic relations that would promote national economic growth and internal development (PENHA, 2011).

The turn of the twenty-first century marked the beginning of a new era for Brazil-Africa relations and represents the most recent inflection in Brazil’s foreign policy toward Africa. Engagement with the continent greatly intensified under President Lula, who came into office in 2003 with a plan for Africa that differed radically from that of his predecessors. Rapprochement with the continent was underscored by Brazilian geopolitical and economic interests, but it was also viewed as a political and moral obligation of the nation. During his first trip to Africa Lula visited São Tome and Príncipe, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa where he extended a formal apology to African leaders for his country’s role in slavery. Brazil has a “historical debt” to Africa, said Lula, acknowledging that Brazilian society had been constructed with the blood and sweat of African slaves over three centuries. In retribution for the sacrifice made by the African people the president expressed his country’s intentions to build relations of solidarity and camaraderie with African nations and assist in the social and economic development of the continent (DA SILVA, 2003a). Speaking in Mozambique in 2003, Lula stated:

...this relationship that Brazil intends to maintain with African countries is not a relation of an imperialist country with hegemonic vocation. We are tired, we have been colonized, and we have already freed ourselves from hegemonism. We now want partnership, we want fellowship, we want to work together...for the construction of an equitable international policy, for democratic multilateral organizations, and so that we have equal opportunities (DA SILVA, 2003a).

Beyond historical affinities associated with a shared colonial past, Lula also emphasized the cultural and ethnic ties that bind Brazil to its African “brothers and sisters” on the other side of the Atlantic. Approximately half of the Brazilian population is of African descent, making Brazil home to the second largest population of Africans in
the world, behind only Nigeria (in absolute numbers) (IPEA; WORLD BANK, 2011). The country’s re-approximation with the continent was described as a search for Brazil’s own afro-identity and a reaffirmation of its intrinsic African heritage (AMORIM, 2003). During his presidency (2003-2010) Lula made 12 trips to Africa, visiting 21 countries—more than all of his predecessors combined—and opened or reopened 20 Brazilian embassies across the continent, adding to the 17 already there. At the same time Lula received 47 visits from African heads of State, originating from 27 countries and expanded the number of African embassies in Brasilia, from 16 in 2002 to 33 by the end of 2010 (IPEA; WORLD BANK, 2011).

Between 2003 and 2012 trade between Brazil and Africa burgeoned, rising from US$ 6 billion to $US 26.5 billion. The continent, as a whole, represents the fifth largest export market for Brazilian goods and services, behind China, the US, Argentina and the Netherlands. None the less, Africa still accounts for a relatively small portion of Brazil’s overall trade balance, representing only 5.7 percent of the country’s total exports in 2012. However, trade relations are characterized by deep asymmetries; in the period 2003-2012, manufactured goods accounted for three-quarters of Brazil’s total exports to Africa, while oil represented 71% of its imports (ROSSI, 2013a). The surge in trade in the last decade is directly linked to an increase in Brazilian foreign direct investment (FDI) and the growing presence of Brazilian companies on the African continent. “Africa is a new frontier for business worldwide. With strong growth, all the countries are rushing to [invest] there and we have to be present” says André Alvim, secretary-general of the Brazilian Foreign Trade Board (CAMEX) (ROSSI, 2013b). As a 2011 report by the IPEA and World Bank puts it: “the new Africa coincides with a global Brazil” (IPEA; WORLD BANK, 2011, p. 3, original italics).

A first step in promoting the expansion of commercial and investment opportunities in Africa came with the granting of debt relief to several highly indebted poor countries, including Mozambique, Nigeria and the Congo. By 2006, a total of US$ 931 million had been disbursed to African countries in the form of debt relief (UNDP, 2007). Presently, over 500 Brazilian companies have installed operations in African countries (ROSSI, 2013b); yet just a handful of transnational giants—Odebrecht, Camargo Corrêa, Andrade Gutierrez e Queiroz Galvão, Petrobras and Vale—acting...
in the sectors of mining, oil and gas extraction, civil construction and infrastructure account for the overwhelming majority of Brazil’s FDI. The Brazilian Export and Investment Agency (APEX) and the National Development Bank (BNDES) have been instrumental in promoting investment in Africa, providing credit lines to Brazilian companies to finance the acquisition of machinery, equipment, inputs and services for their operations on the continent. Between 2003 and 2012, for example, BNDES and the Bank of Brazil issued US$ 4 billion in export credits to prop up investment in Africa (ROSSI, 2013b). In 2008, under an initiative known as Program Integration with Africa (Programa Integração com a África) BNDES disbursed BRL$ 477 million (approximately US$ 265 million) to stimulate the activities of Brazilian companies; the following year this sum rose to BRL$ 649 (approximately US$ 265 million) (BNDES, 2010). The expansion of Brazilian companies and promotion of investment in Africa underpin a geopolitical strategy to gain access to natural resources and export markets, in competition with other traditional and emergent powers such as India, China, the EU and the US (WHITE, 2010).

That said, Brazil’s interests in Africa go beyond purely geopolitical and economic motivations. In the area of development cooperation, Brazil has tried to set itself apart from other traditional and emergent countries, emphasizing ‘mutual learning’ (CABRAL et al., 2013) and the sharing of Brazilian experiences, which the former director of ABC, Marco Farani claims “are more easily adapted and applied to real cases [in Africa] if compared to traditional solutions offered by traditional partners” (ABC, 2010, p. 97 apud CÁBRAL et al., 2013, p. 54-55). Indeed, Brazilian expertise and technologies, particularly in the areas of vocational training, health, agriculture and social protection have been in high demand by a growing number of African countries. In 2010, 39.5 % of Brazil’s technical cooperation budget was destined to Africa countries (IPEA; ABC, 2013). The five Portuguese-speaking countries—São Tome and Príncipe, Mozambique, Cabo Verde, Guinea Bissau and Angola—are the main beneficiaries of Brazilian technical cooperation, receiving 61.3 % of the total amount disbursed in 2010. However, ABC has sought to diversify its cooperation portfolio significantly in recent years. In 2010, in addition to Lusophone Africa, 42 other countries across the continent received
Brazilian funds for vocational training and the implementation of technical cooperation initiatives.

Agriculture is among the top priorities of Brazil’s development cooperation in Africa. On numerous occasions during his visits to the continent, the former president Lula highlighted in his speeches Brazil’s agricultural capacity and the potential for partnerships with African countries to promote agricultural development. In 2009, Lula declared:

> We offer our African partners finance and technology, which will help mitigate shortages in key sectors such as agriculture and health. I have proposed conducting in Brazil a meeting between agriculture ministers from across Africa to discuss partnerships to foster, on African soil, the green revolution that Brazil experienced in recent decades. The Brazilian experience in technology and public policies for the small and medium farmer will be at the service of this cooperation (DA SILVA, 2009b).vii

Embrapa and the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) are key institutions actively engaged in expanding agricultural-related cooperation projects across the continent. Embrapa, a public research corporation, operating under the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply (MAPA), was created in 1973 to advance technological knowledge for the development of Brazilian agriculture. Technological innovations developed by Embrapa in the 1970s and 1980s contributed in transforming the Brazilian savannah region, known as the Cerrado, into the most productive grain-growing regions in the country. The corporation presently coordinates the National Agricultural Research System (SNPA), which includes most universities and public and private entities that engage in agricultural research. With over 9,700 employees, 46 specialised research units located across the country and an annual budget of BRL$ 2.6 billion in 2014, Embrapa has a tremendous research capacity (EMBRAPA, 2015). Today, it is recognized as a world-leader in tropical-agricultural, research development and technology. In coordination with ABC and with the fervent support of President Lula, Embrapa has expanded its presence in Africa. In 2006, it opened up its first (and only) office on the continent in Accra, Ghana, and has since set up coordinating units in a number of other countries where it is implementing cooperation projects.

Embrapa’s international technical cooperation initiatives focus primarily on the transfer of technology, testing and validation of seed varieties, human resource training
and technical capacity building to strengthen local institutions. In 2010, Embrapa allocated BRL$ 1.5 million used to execute 44 technical cooperation projects. Of these, 12 were implemented in African countries; the other 32 were carried out in countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (IPEA; ABC, 2013). The vast majority of Embrapa resources destined for international cooperation went to pay the wages of Embrapa’s own technical experts stationed abroad.

Five of the most notable “structuring projects”\(^9\) implemented by EMBRAPA in Africa are: the Project for Support and Development of Rice Farming in Senegal\(^10\); Support to the Development of the Cotton Sector in the C-4 Countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali), plus Togo, also known as the Cotton-4 + Togo Project\(^11\); the Embrapa–Mozambique Project (Technical Cooperation for Mozambique’s Agricultural Innovation Platform), also known as “Parallels”,\(^12\) Technical Support to Nutrition Programs and Food Security in Mozambique, also known as “ProAlimentos”\(^13\); and Capacity Improvement Project on Research and Technology Transfer for Development of Agriculture in the Nacala Corridor, also known as PROSAVANA-PI. The first two projects (Rice Farming in Senegal and Cotton-4 + Togo) are implemented bilaterally; that is to say, they are implemented directly Embrapa, with support from ABC, in direct cooperation and coordination with national agricultural institutions located in the six respective beneficiary countries. The latter three initiatives are triangular or multilateral cooperation arrangements, and will be discussed in more detail in the following section.

In addition to advancing technical projects, Embrapa provides technical training programs through the Center for Strategic Studies and Training on Tropical Agricultural (CECAT) and seeks to strengthen ties between Embrapa and African researchers through the Africa-Brazil Platform for Agricultural Innovation (also known as the Agricultural Innovation Market Place) which was launched in 2010.

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9 Generally projects with a budget of over a million $US dollars, implemented over the course of two or more years, and requiring the permanent placement of a professional from Embrapa to coordinate all activities related to the project during its period of implementation.


12 See: <http://www.cnpm.embrapa.br/projetos/mocambique/conteudo/ingles.html>

13 See: <https://www.embrapa.br/en/seguranca-alimentar-em-mocambique>
Brazil’s Ministry of Agricultural Development (MDA) has become increasingly more involved in development cooperation with Africa in recent years, in both the areas of technical and humanitarian cooperation. MDA is responsible for formulating and executing policies that promote family-farming in Brazil. It oversees the national land reform agency, INCRA (Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária) and runs a number of programs implemented under the National Program to Strengthen Family-based Agriculture (PRONAF). Among the other policies promoted by MDA are: PAA, the More Food Program, the National Policy of Technical Assistance and Rural Extension (PNATER), the Price Guarantee to Family-based Agriculture Program (PGPAF) and the National Land Credit Program. The Brazilian Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger (MDS), responsible for overseeing Brazil’s National Food and Nutritional Security Policy, works in conjunction with MDA to implement specific programs related to food-security and the social well-being of family-farmers, such as PAA.

In May 2010, at the Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food Security, Fighting Hunger and Rural Development, the participation of MDA and MDS in development cooperation on the African continent was given a vigorous push. Held in the Brazilian capital, Brasília, the event brought together more than 40 African ministers and heads of state and a number of Brazilian institutions, agencies and ministries, including Embrapa, MDA and MDS, and CG-FOME to discuss possibilities of bringing Brazilian programs such as PAA, PNAE, and the More Food Program to Africa countries. At the high-profile meeting former president Lula emphasized that importance of Embrapa’s world-leading technology and expertise in tropical agriculture and its role in the transformation of the Cerrado. He also promoted the possibility for building partnerships in the area of agro-fuels and bio-energy. The meeting resulted in the approval of an action plan that included activities such as the establishment of an Afro-Brazilian Center of Excellence in bioenergy and joint implementation of 10 pilot programs in five Africa sub regions. Following the meeting, MRE tasked GC-FOME and MSD with coordinating PAA-pilot programs in 5 Africa countries—Mozambique, Malawi, Ethiopia, Niger and Senegal—while MDA was tasked with adapting a version of the More Food Program to be implemented in partner counties on the continent. Since 2010, the governments of
Ghana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique have signed cooperation agreements with Brazil for the More Food Program. To assist with the implementation of these projects CAMEX has approved credit lines of US$ 95.5 million, $98.6 million and US$ 97.6 million, respectively to the three countries to finance the acquisition of Brazilian-made equipment and inputs for family farming-based activities (MDA, 2015a).

In continuity with the trends set down by her predecessor, the foreign policy of current president of Brazil, Dilma Rouseff (2011-present) has reinforced the importance of Brazil-Africa relations and encouraged an expansion of Brazilian commercial, investment and development cooperation with the continent. Dilma’s approach, however, has been characterized as being “less emotional and more pragmatic than Lula’s, with an explicit emphasis on commercial and investment opportunities for Brazilian enterprises” (CABRAL et al. 2013, p. 5). A reflection of this change is evidenced in the marked decline in development cooperation in Africa, both in terms of both the number of projects and amount of federal spending. Due to dramatic cut-backs made to ABC’s overall budget that have occurred under Dilma, the agency is increasingly unable to respond to new requests made by African governments. Thus projects initiated under Lula have been continued but few new projects have been taken on. In 2013, for example, only 10 technical cooperation projects were initiated by ABC, compared with 144 in 2010 (ROSSI, 2013a). This shift also reflects the changing priorities of the Brazilian government which has had to scale down some of its efforts internationally, in order to address challenges that the country faces domestically.

Still, Brazil-Africa relations remain significantly tied to Brazil’s pursuit for greater global prestige and to its objectives to expand its influence in international relations. Gaining a permanent UN Security Council seat has continued to be a high priority for the Brazilian government, and in 2013, Roberto Azevêdo, a Brazilian diplomat and the current Director-General of the World Trade Organization, accompanied by the director of ABC visited 14 African countries in 9 days to gather support for Brazil’s bid for a permanent seat (ROSSI, 2013a). The president also created Grupo África, an inter-ministerial group, formed by MRE, the Ministry of Development Trade and Industry (MDIC), Ministry of Finance and MDA, tasked with diagnosing current Brazil-Africa relations and devising new strategies for Brazilian engagement. A number of
government institutions such as CAMEX, APEX and BNDES also participate in the group, as well as several private sector entities. In 2013, Dilma announced a plan to provide US$ 900 million in debt relief to 12 African countries in order to open up new avenues for expanding Brazilian investment and commercial opportunities in Africa (ROSSI, 2013b). That same year BNDES inaugurated its first representative office in South Africa to facilitate the coordination of its activities and prop-up Brazilian companies currently active across the continent.

1.5 Contextualizing the Brazil-Mozambique south-south cooperation encounter

Over the course of the last decade the embryonic ties between Brazil and Mozambique have taken on new dimensions with Mozambique rapidly becoming one of the top destinations for Brazilian investments and development cooperation in Africa. The importance of a strong and growing bilateral partnership between the two countries has been affirmed and enthusiastically promoted by both countries. “Brazil’s experience of political, economic, technological and social development is incredibly relevant for Africa and, it is with satisfaction that we are seeing the cooperation of Brazil...as a priority of the Brazilian government” declared former Mozambican president Joaquim Alberto Chissano, in a speech made at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul in 2004 (CHISSANO, 2004, p. 26). More recently former vice-President Michel Temer referred to Mozambique as “a strategic and preferential partner”, while then Mozambican Prime Minister, Aires Bonifácio Baptista Ali, reassured Brazilian corporations, that their presence in Mozambique is “extremely important”, and that those interested in investing in land in the country can rest assured that they will receive “a fertile ground” on which to operate (EXMAN, 2012).

Trade exchange between the two countries has grown rapidly, reaching US$ 85.3 million in 2011 – a marked increase of 101.2 percent in relation to 2010, according to Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE 2012). While the exceptional growth in trade is laudable, one does not have to look far to conclude that the flow of trade and project realization is overwhelmingly asymmetric. For example, official data of Mozambique’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) and Department for the Promotion of Trade and Investments (DPC) show that, of the total US$ 85.3 million in goods exchanged between the two trading partners in 2011, Brazil’s exports to Mozambique accounted for US$ 81.2 million of that amount – 64.8 percent of exports were either manufactured or semi-manufactured goods. Mozambique, on the other hand exported US$ 4.1 million in goods to Brazil, none of which were classifiable as manufactured goods (MRE; DPR 2012).

Corresponding to the exponential growth in trade, there has also been a sharp rise in the number of Brazilian corporations active in Mozambique. On his first visit to the country in November 2003, Lula declared: “We need...large projects, which serve to anchor our economic relationship. So I have sought to support the interest of some companies and especially Vale do Rio Doce” (DA SILVA, 2003b). In 2007, the Brazilian mining giant Vale signed a contract with the government of Mozambique for the extraction of coal in the Moatize Valley in the central province of Tete. The investment at the mine in Moatize is estimated at US$ 4.5 billion (of which $US 1.9 billion has already been spent—as of 2013) and covers a total area of 23,780 hectares (MRE, 2011; CCIABM, 2013; MOSCA; SELEMANE, 2011). Coal production began in 2011 and reached approximately 4 million tons in 2013. At maximum capacity for the mine is expected to produce about 22 million tons per year (VALE, 2015a). The project involves parallel investments in infrastructure including the construction of a new railway that will link the company’s operations up with an existing railway line to the port of Nacala. In addition to building the new rail-line over 682 kilometers of the existing line is being rehabilitated. A new coal terminal at Nacala-a-Velha is also being constructed by the company. The estimated cost for these two major infrastructure projects is US$ 4.4 billion.

A handful of other Brazilian companies—namely, Odebrecht, Camargo Corrêa, Andrade Gutierrez, Petrobras and Eletrobras—operating in the construction, engineering and energy sectors have also made sizable investments in Mozambique. The operations of Vale and these transnational giants have received generous financing from BNDES which allows them to import Brazilian goods and services used in the

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14 See: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201403150077.html>
development of their mega-projects. In 2009, BNDES approved a US$ 300 million line of credit to support Brazilian investments in the country (IPEA; WORLD BANK, 2011). Notable projects include the construction of the Nacala Airport by Odebrech, a hydro-electric dam being developed by Andrade Gutierrez in the southern province of Maputo and another to be built by Camargo Corrêa in the province of Tete.

Mozambique is one of the greatest beneficiaries of Brazilian international development cooperation, and the largest in Africa, both in terms of volume of resources and number of projects. Noteworthy initiatives have been undertaken or are currently underway in the areas of health; education; agriculture, and professional training. One of Brazil’s most emblematic cooperation initiatives in Mozambique is the construction of a public factory in Maputo for the production and distribution of generic drugs for the treatment of AIDS/HIV. A full ten years after former President Lula first proposed the idea in 2003 the factory has finally been constructed, becoming operational in 2013. The project has been spearheaded by the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz) which oversees all technical and training aspects related to the development and cost the Brazilian federal government approximately $US 20 million. The Mozambican Society of Medication, the official name of the factory, is run completely by Mozambican with oversight from Fiocruz and is the first public factory to produce AIDS/HIV treatment on the African continent (ROSSI, 2013c).

Cooperation between Brazil and Mozambique in the area of education has also greatly expanded over the last decade. Between 2000 and 2011 approximately 300 Mozambican students received scholarships for Brazilian universities through the Undergraduate and Graduate Agreement-Student Programs, known as PEC-G and PEC-PG, run by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT) and the Ministry of Education (MEC) (MRE, 2011). A second initiative run by MEC is the Brazil Open University (UAM) in Mozambique that was established in 2011 to promote distance-learning, free of cost to Mozambican students. Currently the university has 630 students, and in 2015, MEC affirmed that UAM will expand to offer two-thousand more openings for the enrollment of students in Mozambique\(^\text{15}\). Finally, the National Service

\(^{15}\) See: <http://www.brasil.gov.br/educacao/2013/05/universidade-aberta-do-brasil-em-mocambique-sera-ampliada-a-partir-de-2015>
for Industrial Apprenticeship (Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial or SENAI), in coordination with ABC, has expanded its operations in country, and is now in the process of implementing a vocational training center in the capital, Maputo.

In the area of agriculture, the number of development cooperation projects between the two countries has skyrocketed since 2003. Brazil’s intensified engagement in agriculture in Mozambique was propelled by Lula, who made explicit on several occasions, Brazil’s capacity and desire to “contribute decisively to the growth of Mozambique agriculture” (DA SILVA, 2003a). Speaking in 2004 in Brazil Lula affirmed that “Embrapa has technology for Mozambique” and “the entrepreneurs of rural Brazil have much to contribute” (DA SILVA, 2004). In a noteworthy speech made in Maputo on a last visit to the country during his final mandate, Lula confirmed his country’s strong commitment to Mozambique’s food sovereignty. “The greatest demonstration of the sovereignty of a country” he held, “is its capacity to produce all the food necessary for its people...and in this Brazil has accumulated experience, technical assistance and results to share with Mozambique” (MONTEIRO, 2010). Between 2003 and 2010, the agricultural sector represented 24% of Brazil’s cooperation portfolio with the country (NOGUEIRA; OLLINAHO, 2013). Table 1 highlights the main agricultural projects in Brazil’s cooperation portfolio between 2010 and the present.

**Table 1: Brazil’s agricultural portfolio in Mozambique, 2010-2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Stated objective</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Main institutions involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ProSAVANA</td>
<td>2011-2021</td>
<td>“To create new models of agricultural development, taking into account environmental and socio-economic aspects, seeking market-oriented rural and regional agricultural development with competitive advantages” (GoM, 2015a)</td>
<td>Trilateral</td>
<td>IIAM, JICA, JIRCAS, ABC, EMBRAPA, FGV and MINAG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Plataforma (Parallels)| 2010-2014 | a) “Surveying and mapping the potentials of Mozambique’s natural resources for agriculture”;  
b) “Developing an institutional model, organizing and furnishing the Agricultural Geoprocessing Unit at IIAM in Maputo”;  
c) “Developing and implementing training” | Trilateral | Embrapa, USAID and IIAM                                      |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs and Qualifying Human Resources in Geoprocessing Technologies*</th>
<th>Trilateral</th>
<th>ProAlimentos</th>
<th>2011-2014</th>
<th>“To contribute to food security of Mozambicans by making the country self-sufficient in vegetable production” (EMBRAPA, 2014).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More Food International</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>2014-2016</td>
<td>“To establish a concessional credit line to finance Brazilian exports of machinery and equipment for family farming and provide support to rural development projects for strengthening family farming production through technical cooperation and exchange of public policies.” (MDA, 2015b)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAA Africa</td>
<td>Trilateral</td>
<td>2012-2015</td>
<td>“To support the local [food] production in rural areas, aligned with its character of productive social protection, to uphold school feeding, reducing farmers’ vulnerability to external shocks and improving overall food security” (PAA AFRICA, 2015b).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRONAE</td>
<td>Multilateral</td>
<td>2010-2012</td>
<td>“To construct the National School Feeding Programme in Mozambique; implement a pilot project; identify the modalities for local purchasing of food and production potential in specific provinces/districts.” (OLIVEIRA, 2013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRONAE Pilot-Project</td>
<td>Multilateral</td>
<td>2013-2015</td>
<td>“To carry out local purchase of food from family agriculture to deliver in 12 pilot-schools selected in four provinces” (PAA AFRICA, 2015b).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native seeds conservation</td>
<td>Trilateral</td>
<td>2011-2014</td>
<td>“To train family farmers, technicians and leaders of South Africa and Mozambique in procedures for the rescue, multiplication, storage and use of traditional / native seeds” (TECCHIO et al. 2012).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Presently, the trilateral program ProSAVANA, run by the Japanese, Brazilian and Mozambican governments is Brazil’s most ambitious cooperation intervention in agriculture in Mozambique. The program, which will be the focus of Chapter 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis, targets 19 districts in three provinces along the Nacala Development

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16 Specifically: Brazil’s Popular Peasant Movement (Movimento Popular Camponês—MPC); Peasant Women’s Movement (Movimento de Mulheres Camponesas—MMC); with technical coordination from the Brazilian Institute for Social and Economic Analysis (Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas—IBASE).
Growth Corridor, home to an estimated 4.3 million people. Officially launched in 2009, ProSAVANA claims as its objective: to increase agricultural productivity among smallholder farmers and promote private sector investment in the region as a means to achieve greater food security and alleviate poverty. In its first phase (2011-2019) the twenty-year long program is structured around three main components: technology transfer (involving Embrapa, Japan’s International Research Center for Agriculture, JIRCAS, and the Agriculture Research Institute of Mozambique, IIAM), the formulation of a master plan (being executed by the consulting arm of Brazil’s Getúlius Vargas Foundation, FGV Projetos, the Japanese consulting firm Oriental Consulting Ltd. and “Mozambican counterparts”), and the elaboration of agricultural extensions and models (implemented by Japan’s International Development Agency, JICA, the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture, MINAG, and a national credit-agency, GAPI Investimentos). The estimated investment for these three components is US$ 36 million (NOGUEIRA; OLLINAHO, 2013).

Two other notable programs being executed by Embrapa in the country are the Embrapa–Mozambique Project (Technical Cooperation for Mozambique’s Agricultural Innovation Platform), also known as “Parallels” and Technical Support to Nutrition Programs and Food Security in Mozambique, also known as “ProAlimentos”. The first is a trilateral partnership between Embrapa, the IIAM and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) aimed at “surveying and mapping the potentials of Mozambique’s natural resources for agriculture and cattle production, indicating the areas which are more suitable for annual and perennial crops and for cattle rearing”. Research is focused on the Nacala Corridor region (located within the parallels 13ºS and 17ºS), which is claimed to share similarities with the Brazilian Cerrado, and three specialized divisions of Embrapa are involved in executing the project: Embrapa Satellite Monitoring, Embrapa Soils and Embrapa Cerrado. The program also entails “developing and implementing training programs and qualifying human resources in geoprocessing technologies”. The project has resulted in the creation of a cartographic database for Mozambique and the development of a system of territorial management of natural resources for the Nacala Corridor (WEBGis-Moçambique). Maps and cartographic images depicting land use cover, soil type, rainfall, altimetry, administrative
structure, roads, and hydrographic systems\textsuperscript{17}. As with the investments of Vale in the Nacala Corridor and the creation of the Nacala Fund by FGV, Parallels is unofficially linked to ProSAVANA, with data obtained through surveying, mapping and geoprocessing activities feeding into the components of technology transfer and the formulation of the Master Plan.

The Technical Support to Nutrition Programs and Food Security in Mozambique ("ProAlimentos"), is another triangular imitative between Brazil (Embrapa), the United States (USAID, the University of Florida, and the State University of Michigan) and Mozambique (IIAM). Developed under the Global Initiative to Fight Hunger and Food Security (GHFSI), the program aimed to test seed varieties (horticultures) and strengthen vegetable production among smallholder farmers in Maputo. Through the program, which began in 2011 and ran until December 2014, more than 70 different varieties of vegetables have been tested, many of which proved to be adaptable to the context of family farming in Mozambique. Technical training courses were also offered in Brazil, the US and Mozambique, and more direct training, based on "hands-on" learning with smallholders was carried out in Maputo. The program’s implementation is estimated to have cost US$ 12 million (BRL$ 24 million), with outlays shared between the three partner governments\textsuperscript{18}.

In addition to cooperation programs implemented by Embrapa, the MDA, MDS, and the National Fund for Educational Development (FNDE) have become increasingly involved in promoting projects in Mozambique with a strong focus on food security. In February 2015, for example, 583 tractors, along with 2,600 other agricultural implements were exported to Mozambique through the Program More Food International. This technical cooperation program is coordinated by the MDA and includes the participation of over 500 Brazilian companies (MDA, 2015b)\textsuperscript{19}. The tractors and equipment exported are made in Brazil and their acquisition by the Mozambican

\textsuperscript{17} For more information, see: \texttt{<http://www.cnpm.embrapa.br/projetos/mocambique/conteudo/ingles.html>}


\textsuperscript{19} Also see: \texttt{http://www.mda.gov.br/sitemda/tv-mdm/minist%C3%A9rio-do-desenvolvimento-agr%C3%A1rio-entrega-583-tratores-para-mo%C3%A7ambique}
government is financed through a US$ 97.6 million line of credit approved by CAMEX (MDA, 2015a).

Another noteworthy initiative is the PAA pilot project, which began in 2012 and is ongoing. The project is executed by FAO and WFP, with the financial support from the Government of Brazil and United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID). Although PAA is by Brazil’s own classification a humanitarian cooperation project, it entails several technical components. Brazil’s MDS is crucial partner in PAA Africa, lending its technical expertise and coordination support to the learning activities of the Program. More recently, Embrapa has become involved in PAA Mozambique, supporting the FAO to provide training on topics related to vegetable production planning and post-harvest practices. The PAA pilot project is linked to the Mozambican Government’s new School Feeding Program (PRONAE), which resulted from a tripartite technical cooperation project (denominated the PRONAE pilot program) that was initiated in 2010 between Brazil (ABC and FNDE), Mozambique (represented by the Ministry of Education—MINED) and the World Food Program. The PAA pilot-project in Mozambique will be the central focus of chapter 6 of this thesis.

Despite Brazil’s claims that its South-South model of technical cooperation does not promote private interests or impose conditions on partner countries, there exists an obvious confluence of Brazil’s SSDC activities and commercial interests in Mozambique. This is particularly evidenced in the case of ProSAVANA and the Nacala Fund, which exposes distinct ruptures between Brazil’s development discourse and its practice (NOGUEIRA; OLLIANHO, 2013; MOSCA, 2014). Another example can be seen with More Food Program, which explicitly promotes Brazilian exports and therefore the commercial interests of Brazilian private entities. Statements made by the former president Lula and then Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim further elucidate the explicit contradiction between promoting investment and commercial opportunities for Brazilian private entities and development cooperation. In the area of agriculture, said Amorim in an interview with Agência Brasil in 2003, it is “[…] very important for some Brazilian companies to invest in Mozambique to reach the South African market” (RANGEL, 2003). In a similar manner, Lula confirmed that “with the help of Brazilian private companies, Mozambique can join” in the biofuels “revolution” and “will benefit
from the modernization of its agriculture and the consequent creation of income and jobs \( ^{\text{xvii}} \) (DA SILVA, 2007). Indeed, behind the rhetoric of SSDC are deeply entrenched economic and geopolitical interests. Through development cooperation States and private enterprises are able to exercise power, in diverse forms and for diverse reasons, to influence or control social relations, actions, policies or territory in partner countries.
Chapter 2
Territoriality and the agrarian question

This chapter will first discuss three key geographical concepts—territory, territoriality and territorialization—and their intrinsic relation to the notion of development. In particular, it will describe the importance of examining the power-relations and ideologies inherent to processes of rural territorial development. I will then outline the conceptual framework for understanding the agrarian question and the contemporary debate between agrarian capitalism and food sovereignty, followed by a discussion of the agrarian question in the specific context of Brazil and Mozambique, respectively.

2.1 Territory and the geography of development

Territory, a fundamental element for analysing the modern social world, is indispensible to any analysis of international development cooperation in agriculture and programs promoting rural development. However, the (inter)disciplinary appropriation of the concept has often resulted in territory being used as a means or vehicle for explaining or simplifying something else—such as specific issues related to economic development, food security, human rights, culture/identity, international relations or social justice—rather than territory itself being placed as the centre of analysis of social life and its production and reproduction. Too often territory is presented as if it were simply a container in which social processes unfold, as though it referred merely to a specific space of governance—the bounded and well defined administrative area of a nation-state or the spaces of governability found “inside” nation-states. Unfortunately, this process of conceptual reductionism, has resulted in a tendency for governments, politicians, academics, organizations, institutions, even companies to focus “on this or that territory or boundary, at the expense of analyzing more complex territorial mosaics” (DELANEY, 2005, p. 51). In the process whereby public policies or development cooperation programs are discussed and devised by diverse actors, ranging from governments and politicians to NGOs and local community groups, the complex matrix
of constitutive, overlapping and intrinsically related territorial configurations that exist “inside” spaces of governance is all too often overlooked. This is in large part due to the fact that the concept of territory itself is continually being subordinated to the central concerns of different actors from wide-ranging theoretical and academic backgrounds, each selectively employing it for different purposes, and with different intentionality.

As Fernandes (2009, p. 199) points out, “in order to understand the interests, actions, relations and conflicts between institutions [different agents] and different territories,” we need to look beyond such narrow definitions and discourses and consider territory in a more ample, and, complex, mannerxviii. Territory and the generation of conflicts (both material or immaterial) associated with incessant human territoriality and the intrinsically related processes of territorialization, de-territorialization, and re-territorialization are inextricable from any comprehensive understanding of the ways in which social relations and practices are created, reproduced and transformed across space and time.

So, what then is territory and how do we discuss rural development in relation to territory? How should we define it? And how can we begin to understand the concept in a more holistic way that will enable a more apt and adept analysis of social realities in diverse contexts? To begin, territory must be conceptualized as a product of social relations predicated on power. Territory is understood here as a bounded and meaningful space that signifies and is inherently multidimensional, existing simultaneously across multiple geographical scales and comprised of multiple territorialities (FERNANDES, 2008; 2009; DELANEY, 2005). Rural development is directly related to the concept of territory. Referring to a specific local or regional territorial base wherein diverse actors, productive sectors, policies, economic activities, and social relations interact, rural territorial development combines a mixture of economic, social and environmental aspects. These aspects generally translate into measures which seek to increase and/or stabilize family income through the diversification of income generating activities, create the conditions for an improved and socially acceptable quality of life for the rural populations, and preserve or improve the local or regional environmental conditions and access to resources for local populations in the targeted territorial base (KAGEYAMA, 2008).
Although, territory is, first and foremost, a product of social relations, territories are characteristically constitutive meaning that they incorporate, reflect and reproduce the social relations inherent in the “social orders whose features that they express” (DELANEY, 2005, p. 10). Territoriality, then, as Delaney (2005, p. 10) describes, is an “important element of how human associations – cultures, societies, smaller collectives – and institutions organize themselves in space. It is an aspect of how individual humans as embodied beings organize themselves with respect to the social and material world.” In his foundational work, geographer Robert Sack, defines territoriality as “the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area”—or territory (SACK, 1986/2009, p. 19). Sack’s explains territoriality as “a “strategy”, and in doing so, he rightfully “places territoriality entirely within the realm of human motivations and goals” (SACK, 1986/2009, p. 21). The concept of territoriality, understood in this way, is particularly pertinent to discussions on international cooperation projects and development programs. Human territoriality – and any manifestation of it – is always ideologically informed, and therefore, has an immaterial existence that finds expression and meaning through actions, typically political acts, and the exercise of power for specific purposes (FERNANDES 2008; 2009; DELANEY, 2005). Relations of power, whether coercive and oppressive or benign and emancipating, are always involved in the transformation of territory. So is intentionality – that is, the purpose for which relations of power are exercised.

It is social relations defined by power that determine the use of territory and explain, in part, multi-territoriality. Different types of social relations determine and produce different types of territories – such as those pertaining to peasants or agribusiness. These territories often co-exist alongside one another, yet they are in a state of permanent conflict with one another. The different actors pertaining to or associated with each respective territory or territorial configuration engage in “struggles” effectively vying for control over the same geographical spaces and for the power to determine the use of the territory (or territories) being disputed, and thus, the kinds of social relations produced therein. This distribution of political power in the struggle over territory is often asymmetrical, as is clearly the case with disputes between peasants
and international agribusiness. Territorial struggles, then, can be understood as manifestations of a permanent struggle between opposing classes; these struggles are not only over the material control over territory – they are highly metaphorical and metaphysical as well. They are about who has the control to inscribe territory with meaning and attribute symbolic forms of representation to it. Multi-territoriality indeed results in the creation of permanent material and immaterial territorial conflicts. This brings us to a principle and defining characteristic of territory, regardless of shape and size and geographic scale – that is, sovereignty.

As the eminent geographer Jean Gottmann stated in his classic work *The significance of territory* (1973, p. 3), “It would seem indeed that sovereignty needs territory on which it is to be exercised, and a territory would appear useless for all practical purposes unless it was under some recognized sovereignty.” For Gottmann, sovereignty is understood within the narrowly defined auspices of international relations and international law, used to refer to the absolute, and unhindered, political authority exercised by a nation-state over its territory, population and natural resources contained therein. However, as Fernandes (2009) and others (HOLT-GIMÉNEZ, 2012) point out, sovereignty means much more than the exclusive political control of the state within the internationally recognized bounds of its national territory. For both these authors there can be many “sovereignties”, each expressing itself in one of the many different territories or territorial configurations that comprise the overarching territorial framework of the nation-state. The concept of land sovereignty as set out by Giménez (2012, p. 3) is an incredibly useful tool for conducting territorial-based analyses, and serves as a more practical and appropriate definition of sovereignty, aptly describing its relationship to territory/territories in today’s modern social world:

Land sovereignty is the right of communities and peoples to sustainable, land-based livelihoods; their right to have a democratic say in its use and an equitable share in the stream of social, environmental and economic benefits of the land where they live. Land sovereignty is a strategy of resistance in the face of territorial restructuring.

Thus, just as the institutions, political parties and governing powers that form nation-states create territories within the greater territory of the state, so too do a wide-range of
other actors – including communities, cooperatives, NGOs, corporations, and social movements. In the process of creating territories, these actors are also constructing forms of sovereignty (FERNANDES, 2009). Yet, just as the presupposed sovereignty of nation-states over their own internal affairs has been significantly eroded with the rapid expansion of economic globalization and the increasing mobility of people, capital and goods over the course of the last four decades (DELANEY, 2005, p. 27), the different “sovereignties” constructed by different social actors within nation-states are also, to a great extent, relative and subject to constant transformation. They are continually being disputed and called into question as the forces of capitalist integration and economic globalization persist, effectively re-territorializing almost every aspect of social life on a planetary scale.

Both Delaney and Fernandes draw attention to the fact that territories exist even in the most mundane and smallest of scales – such as that of the home, a room, or even one’s own body. These authors hold that there are potentially billions of territories that make up and define our world today. Still, as Fernandes (2008; 2009) reminds us, territory is formed from innumerable multidimensional territories vertically overlapping one another across multiple-scales. Only when we perceive territory in this way, comprising an incredibly complex and infinitely intricate territorial matrix do we begin to recognize and understand its multidimensionality. The multiple dimensions of territory – social, economic, political, environmental and cultural – are produced “by the conditions created by subjects through their social practices”. Each dimension expresses a “unity of space, [time] and social relations constructed by actions and intentionality” (FERNANDES, 2009, p. 202).

While territories are spaces of governance overlapping one another across different geographic scales of analysis – nation-state, state/province, region (micro and macro), district, municipality/city etc. – territories are also properties – landholdings, lots, houses, apartments, stores, factories etc. – considered to be the “spaces of life” held either privately (by individuals, groups, or corporations) or collectively (as in a community). Properties are fractions of the former territory, contained within the verticality of the recognized geographical scales of governance and should not be confused as spaces of governance.
As the above discussion highlights, even “an apparently simple territory may be the spatial referent of an extremely complex set of textually based ‘meanings’. Due to this complexity,” explains Delaney, “even what appears to be the most obvious meanings may be open to divergent interpretations and reinterpretations” (2005, p. 30). Delaney further points out that:

Nearly all modern territories, one way or another, implicate complex relations of power that include, or can be reinterpreted to include at some point, those associated with the modern bureaucratic (local, sub-national, national) state. And almost any territory occupies a position at the intersection of an open number of legal texts with reference to which it is made “meaningful.” Nearly any modern territory, therefore, is interpretable, and, potentially open to a range of divergent interpretations (DELANEY, 2005, p. 30).

This raises a few fundamental questions: How then, are the respective territories of peasants and of agribusiness and capital enterprise produced in Brazil and in Mozambique; and how are they made “meaningful”? What ideologies, paradigms and relations of power are involved in this process? And, how are these meanings being interpreted and re-interpreted by different actors on different scales? Territoriality is intricately linked to the geopolitical strategies of nation-states and the projection of one state’s power in the international arena of development politics and the international political economy. So, in relation to specific Brazilian development interventions in Africa and in Mozambique, a key question that we need to ask is: in what ways is human territoriality being employed by different institutions and actors in the development processes and in what ways and social relations being affected by these Brazilian interventions? We will look at some of these questions in more detail later on in this text.

2.2 Global food regimes and the agrarian question

This section will explore the discourse surrounding agrarian capitalism and the peasantry within global food regimes in order to highlight and contrast differing theoretical perspectives on the agrarian question, and in turn, their implication for contemporary agricultural development and agrarian change. I will use this approach to

The food regime concept, first articulated by Philip McMichael and Harriet Friedman (1989), combined the concept of the world system (WALLERSTEIN, 1974) and the regulation of capital accumulation (AGLIETTA, 1979), “situating the rise and decline of national agricultures within the geopolitical history of capitalism” (MCMICHAEL, 2013, p. 1). A food regime is defined as a “rule-governed structure of production and consumption of food on a world scale” (FRIEDMANN, 1993, p. 30), characterized by relatively stable patterns of accumulation for a specific period of time within the world food system’s history. The food regime analysis combines different analytical approaches including political economy, social ecology and history to explore the relationship between the reproduction of global capitalism and the relations of power entrenched in food production and consumption patterns. It is provides a useful tool of analysis to examine the complex intersection of social, political, historical and ecological dynamics that surround food insecurity, class struggle and territorial disputes on a world scale. In addition to the above approaches, I would suggest that an approach rooted in tradition of human geography is essential to any analysis on food regime dynamics and the agrarian question, which are inextricably linked and “mutually conditioning across space and time” (MCMICHAEL, 2013, p. 63).

From a food regime analysis perspective, the world food system’s history broadly consists of three distinct regimes. The first was a British-centered imperial food regime (1870-1930s), also denominated a “colonial-diasporic” regime, based on outsourcing agricultural production to colonies of settlement as a means to cheapen staple food stuffs (especially grains) and decrease the costs of provisioning the growing proletariat and industrial classes in Britain in particular, and western-Europe in general. At the end of the nineteenth century the food regime linked to the agrarian question through value relations imbued in the transformation of food into an international commodity. The first
food regime sought to strengthen the hegemony of the British Empire, and effectively underwrote Britain’s “workshop of the world”.

The second, US-centered intensive food regime (1950s-1970s), also referred to as the “mercantile-industrial” food regime or postwar regime, was characterized by a transition from extensive to capital-intensive agriculture within the US, which succeeded Britain as the new global hegemonic power, and re-routed agricultural surpluses (obtained through heavy State subsidization programs) from Europe to developing countries, disbursed in the form of food aid. State subsidies fuelled the industrialization of national agriculture, giving rise to the Green Revolution in the US, and its subsequent spread internationally, resulting in phenomenal increases in global agricultural production and productivity. Currently, we are in the midst of a consolidated neoliberal or “corporate food regime” (1980s-present) governed by the rules set down by the WTO, controlled by transnational agribusiness, driven by finance capital and organized around supplying vertically-integrated international supermarket-chains (MCMICHAEL, 2009; 2013).

Marx’s concept of the capitalist mode of production (1976) is central to an analysis of the agrarian question within world food regimes. Capitalism can be characterized as a mode of production in which “free workers”, dispossessed from the means of production, produce surplus value. Following the abolishment of slavery at the end of the nineteenth century, free labour became a commodity that could be bought on the market by the owners of money (capitalists and the bourgeoisie), who also controlled the factories and plantations, and therefore the means of production. The surplus value produced by wage labourers (proletariats) is derived from their production of commodities, and is the source of profit for the owners of the means of production, who expropriate this added value to expand the original supply of money. A portion of these profits, expended as capital, are reinvested in improved technology and used to cover the costs of reproduction, thereby enabling the production of even more commodities, and expanding profit margins (i.e., Money-Commodity-Money, or M-C-M). For Marx, development under the capitalist mode of production is an inherently contradictory process in which the forces of production are based on exploitative social relations. Through the exploitation of labour occurring under conditions of compulsive
competition, the capitalist mode of production effectively perpetuates an eternal struggle between opposing classes and (re)produces social relations of inequality (MARX, 1976).

In the case of agriculture, specifically, the trajectory of industrial capitalism is intrinsically related to land ownership and property regimes. Land ownership structures determine how the means of production and reproduction are distributed within the existing capitalist mode of production. In what Marx called the “primitive accumulation” of capital, the wealth of capitalists and the bourgeoisie was derived from the exploitation of land, labour and the natural resources of other societies during earlier periods of history. According to Marx:

> The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent, the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blacks [to be sold into slavery], are all things which characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are chief moments of primitive accumulation (MARX, 1976, p. 915).

In the agrarian context, capitalists were originally commercial farmers or plantation owners (often decedents of the landed gentry), who accumulated wealth through savings or hoarding, and through capitalized land rent. Land, itself is not capital, but it operates in a similar way, such that it allows for the accumulation of capital by landowners in the form of capitalized land rent, or ground rent, understood as part of the surplus, or part of the sub-product or residual earnings above the average profit margin derived from the economic activities conducted on the land. The social relation of capitalized land rent has historically been and continues to be a primary means by which capitalists appropriate the surplus produced by the peasantry. “The ideas and practices of private ownership and private property,” explains Henry Bernstein (2010, p. 23) “have been invented under capitalism and help to define it”, and “this is particularly so in relation to land, the basis of farming.” Indeed, “the widespread conversion of land into private property–into a commodity–is one of the defining features of capitalism” (ibid).
Writing at the end of the nineteenth century in the midst of what Friedmann (2005) has termed the imperial-diasporic food regime, Lenin (1977) and Kautsky (1988), published notable works that analyzed the establishment and expansion of the capitalist mode of production in agriculture in the Russian and German contexts, respectively. Although these classical studies appeared in disparate geographical and politico-ideological scenarios, the main concern of both works was similar: to investigate the agrarian question, succinctly described by Kautsky in 1899 as “whether, and how, capital is seizing hold of agriculture, revolutionising it, making old forms of production and property untenable and creating the necessity for new ones” (1988, p. 15). Within this general framework of analysis also resides the critical question as to whether or not the smallholding (i.e. the peasantry) has a future; and if so, what might this future look like? (KAUTSKY, 1988)

Regarding the first question, along general lines, both authors concur that the emergence agrarian capital and its growing requirements for agrarian labour necessitates the transformation of landed estates into capitalist farm enterprises and in this process, subsumes a considerable part of the peasant population (petty commodity producers) as wage-labourers. In regards to the second point, Lenin held that the expansion of capitalist agriculture leads to the inevitable disintegration of the peasantry through differentiation, whereby “an insignificant minority of small producers [become] rich, 'get on in the world,' turn into bourgeois, while the overwhelming majority are either utterly ruined and become wage-workers or paupers, or eternally eke out an almost proletarian existence” (LENIN, 1977, p. 32). On the other hand, Kautsky forecast the eventual demise of the peasantry all together, with smallholdings being subsumed completely by larger capitalist holdings which furbished the technologically superior model of industrial capitalist agriculture.

According to Brazilian geographers and scholars of the agrarian question, Rosemeire Almeida and Eliane Paulino (2000), Kautsky (1988) interpreted the peasantry as “a miserable, retrograde and vacillating class, an obstacle to overcoming the capitalist mode of production” (p. 115), either affiliated to the bourgeoisie or the proletariat, disappearing in some regions while making futile attempts at resistance in others. The peasantry was viewed as an ambiguous subject in a society wherein only
two social classes should prevail, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat—the latter being the embryo for the impending socialist revolution, that would eventually see large capitalist holdings replaced with state-owned farms under socialism. In this sense, even the peasant units of production that most imperviously resisted the change induced by agrarian capitalism, would, in due course, still succumb to the capitalist mode of industrial agriculture that ultimately represented the “vehicle of its disappearance” (ALMEIDA; PAULINO, 2000, p. 114).

The theoretical and empirical work done by Alexander Chayanov (1974), a Russian agricultural economist, in the early twentieth century differed dramatically from that of Lenin and Kautsky, whose Marxian-construed analyses focused mainly on the contributions of agriculture to industrialization and the process by which the peasantry is incorporated into agrarian capitalism (becoming proletariats). Of central interest to both Lenin and Kautsky were the possibilities presented within these two concurrent processes for a socialist revolution and the subsequent transition from a capitalist to a socialist economy. Chayanov, on the other hand, analysed the development of agriculture from the specific point of reference of cooperative peasant households, and elaborated a theory of “the peasant economy” that he argued is characterized by a mode of production distinct from that of capitalism. For Chayanov, peasant farms are part of the capitalist economy (albeit a subordinate part); however, they are not governed by the general capital-labour relations that characterize agrarian capitalism. Instead, they are centered on household reproduction, based on family labour and family social relations, with the primary objective of providing subsistence for the household by balancing labour inputs with family consumption. Jan Douwe Van der Ploeg, a rural sociologist and renowned scholar of the agrarian question, describes the “Chayanovian approach” as follows:

The peasant farm is not structured as a capitalist enterprise; it is not grounded on a capital labour relation. Labour, within the peasant farm, is not wage labour. And capital is not capital in the Marxist sense (i.e., it is not capital that needs to produce surplus value to be invested in order to produce more surplus value)....The buildings, equipment, etc., are instruments (or means) to facilitate and improve the labour process....It is the absence of the capital-labour relation that turn particular units of agricultural production into peasant farms. (VAN DER PLOEG, 2013, p. 15)
In other words, while peasant farms “might be affected” by capitalist relations, “they are not directly shaped and re-shaped (“determined”) by them” (VAN DER PLOEG, 2013, p. 30). Though Chayanov’s ideas were highly criticised in his time (by many who postulated: why develop a theory about a social group that would eventually cease to exist?), his theoretical and empirical insights on the dynamics of peasant farming continue to be exceedingly pertinent to the study of the contemporary agrarian question today.

By the mid-twentieth century, in the heyday of the postwar food regime, peasant farmers found themselves facing a new challenge with the advent of the modernization of agriculture. This process was characterized by the convergence of agricultural and industrial systems and represented the initial phase in the formation of modern agribusiness. The modernization of agriculture only further increased land concentration and exacerbated existing inequalities between capitalist agriculture and peasant agriculture. In the following decades, the Green Revolution that began in the US gradually spread its way across the Americas and Asia, introducing chemical inputs (fertilizers and pesticides), improved seed varieties and advanced technology and machinery in agriculture that dramatically improved productivity and resulted in a remarkable increase in global food production. The globalization of neoliberal orthodoxy beginning in the 1980s integrated technological and financial systems with agro-industrial systems to further consolidate the hegemonic status of agribusiness as the model of development of capitalist agriculture. Since the initial shift to the current corporate food regime under neoliberalism, Haroon Akram-Lodhi and Cristóbal Kay observe that:

The traits of accumulation have significantly changed...In particular, the emphasis on the expansion of the home market that previously prevailed during the mid-twentieth century has been largely, but not completely, replaced by an emphasis on the promotion of an agricultural export-led strategy as the principal means of enhancing rural accumulation. (AKRAM-LODHI; KAY, 2008, p. 318)

Peasant agriculture has persistently been marginalized by the current neoliberal food regime which prioritizes agribusiness interests, large-scale export-oriented commodity production and highly-mechanized monoculture plantations. Since the
1980s, the neoliberal policy agenda for agricultural expansion has ridden rough-shod over a large mass of humanity. Widespread social and economic inequality, dispossession, landlessness, hunger, malnutrition, deforestation and environmental pollution have been among the inevitable impacts. The hegemony of the current corporate food regime is predominately advanced and maintained by a host of transnational agro-industrial giants and a relatively small contingent of wealthy international elites with tremendous economic and political clout. This prevailing minority plays a significant role in determining agricultural policy at the national and international level, and thus, have been able to shape it to their advantage. Rooted in an uncritical orthodox approach to development—understood primarily in terms of economic growth—this globalized food regime and the ideologically laden policies of its proponents have failed to create sustainable and dignified livelihoods for the vast majority of the world’s peasants and rural poor (MADELEY, 2002; HOLT-GIMÉNEZ; SHATTUCK, 2011; PATEL, 2012; MCMICHEAL, 2013).

However, agrarian capitalism has not succeeded in completely exterminating the peasantry, nor has it resulted in the utter conversion of the peasantry into the proletariat class (as Lenin and Kautsky foreshadowed). Smallholders, family farming and local food systems continue to play a fundamental role in ensuring the food security of many countries in the world today (FAO, 2014; GRAIN, 2014). Indeed, peasant farming is a crucial part of agrarian capitalism; peasants “are not absent in agrarian capitalism but rather play an active part in creating it” (JANSEN, 2014, p. 7). For Van der Ploeg, the peasantry represents “an uneasy part” of the capitalist system that “generates interstices and frictions. It is the cradle of resistance that produces alternatives that act as a permanent critique of dominant patterns” of capitalist accumulation (VAN DER PLOEG, 2013, p. 16). The contradictory expansion of agrarian capitalism simultaneously destroys and re-creates the peasantry through the process of territorialization, de-territorialization, and re-territorialization (TDR), but peasants are not simply passive objects in this process (FERNANDES, 2013). In response to dispossession and marginalization by the dominant agribusiness model of agricultural development peasants have mobilized in social movements and become active agents of social change. The growth of peasant movements worldwide and their increasing
articulation through international movements such as Via Campesina has given rise to a food sovereignty movement and provided impetus to processes of re-peasantization across the globe.

Via Campesina (DESMARAIS, 2007), the Brazil’s Landless Workers Movement (MST) and a growing number of food policy specialists (HOLT-GIMÉNZ, 2009; ALTIERI, 2009) hold that food security at any level (local, national, or international) cannot be extricated from the more fundamental concept of food sovereignty. The Final Declaration of the World Forum on Food Sovereignty (2001) states that food sovereignty “is the means to eradicate hunger and malnutrition and to guarantee lasting and sustainable food security for all...peoples”. Thus, the absence of food sovereignty is, ultimately, the cause of food insecurity. A recent definition provided by the organizers of a conference on food sovereignty held at Yale in 2013 (cited in LI, 2014) considers food sovereignty to be: “the right of peoples to democratically control or determine the shape of their food system, and to produce sufficient and healthy food in culturally appropriate and ecologically sustainable ways in and near their territory”.

The very concept of food sovereignty implies a revolutionary restructuring of the current international economy characterized by Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, recently rejuvenated by neo-liberalism and its three core-policy tenets—privatization, deregulation, and trade liberalization (DESMARAIS, 2007). It expresses a moral need to address the structural issues that underlie rural poverty and hunger—such as the inequitable distribution of land and financial resources necessary to purchase and/or cultivate food.

With the expansion of mono-cropping practices, the intensive use of chemical pesticides and the introduction of genetically modified seeds additional concerns have been added to the agrarian question, such as environmental degradation and human health problems. More recently, the agrarian question has taken on increasingly important geopolitical dimensions (FERNANDES, 2013), with the emergence of unprecedented global food and energy crises in 2007-2008. At the global level, food

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and energy crises persist, constituting an imminent threat to the future food and energy security of humankind; thus the agrarian question is not only a question of land, but of production of, and access to, quality food and water resources vital to agricultural production. The dramatic increase in “land grabs” by transnational corporations in developing countries (principally in Latina America and Africa) for the production of food and agrofuel are indicative of this new geopolitical dimension of the agrarian question.

“For many years family farmers were seen as part of the problem of hunger”, says José Graziano da Silva, Director-General of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO). “Family farmers are in fact, not a problem but part of the solution to hunger”. Indeed, 2014 was inaugurated by the FAO as the International Year of Family Farming, precisely to “put a spotlight on the people that are [vital] for food security in most countries in the world, but, at the same time, [ironically] among the world’s most vulnerable population” (DA SILVA, 2014, não paginada). In many countries in the world, including Brazil and Mozambique, rural poverty and hunger remain persistent problems that have only been exacerbated by the expansion of modern agriculture. While there are no easy or fast “fixes” to these difficult issues, it is clear that different approaches to development are necessary in order to address them. There are pathways forward and concrete actions that can be taken by States in the genuine interest of making a better life for the majority of their people. What is necessary, as renowned Mozambican Economist and Rural Sociologist João Mosca accurately states, are approaches that recognize “food security as a pillar of sovereignty, the question of social and territorial equity as elements of social and political stability [and] the elimination of poverty as a national imperative, not just for humanitarian reasons but for economic ones”xxi as well (MOSCA, 2012a, p. 10). State intervention is crucial to any solution and new public policies that support peasants and family farming must necessarily be created, implemented and expanded.
2.3 The agrarian question in Brazil

With a population of over 200 million people and a territorial land base of 8,514,876 km², Brazil is the world’s fifth largest country in terms of both population and size. The country is one of the top ten industrial economies in the world and second only to the United States as a global agricultural producer. According to the most recent Agricultural Census, in 1996–2006, of the total territory, 330 million hectares (3,300,000 km²)—an area approximately equivalent to the size of India—were used for agriculture and livestock production. Brazil’s current agrarian property structure is characterized by extreme regional and territorial inequalities. Land concentration is the greatest of these inequalities, represented by a Gini index of 0.856 in 2006. According to the Census, 4,367,902 family farms occupied 80,250,453 hectares, or 24.3 percent of the total land used for agriculture, while 805,587 capitalist landholdings occupied 249,690,940 hectares, or 75.6 percent (IBGE, 2009a; IBGE, 2009b).

Brazil’s grossly concentrated land structure has its roots in a colonial past deeply marked by exploitation, rural oppression, dispossession and disenfranchisement. These have been recurring themes over the last five hundred years of post colonial history. The Land Law of 1850 was enacted with the intention of institutionalizing private property, and allowed land barons and latifundiários (large landholders) to acquire formal title to the vast territories under their control. With the abolition of slavery in 1888, the newly freed slaves were essentially shut out of the new order of private ownership as they did not have the resources to purchase land and were left with little choice but to hire out their labour to the new landowners in exchange for wages. Following abolition, hundreds of thousands of immigrants made their way to Brazil to work on the country’s large-scale plantations. Much like the former slaves, these immigrants were largely shut out of the private land tenure system, seen primarily as a needed source of cheap farm labour. This situation led to the emergence of the peasantry in Brazil, through the miscegenation of indigenous, black and migrant farmers; a mass of humanity, with neither the means to purchase land, nor access to it, as those who already had land could now hire others to work it and further consolidate their holdings.
The historically inequitable distribution of land has been a “foundation for the growth of stark inequalities in income, social status, education, health care, social services, participation in community affairs and access to the courts” (WOLFORD; WRIGHT 2003, p. xv). In the 1960s and 1970s, the modernization of agriculture saw the transformation of large landholdings, known as latifundios, into large-scale agribusiness operations (SAUER; LEITE, 2013), further exacerbating existing inequalities. With the rise of neo-liberalism in the late 1980s, the Brazilian State became a radical promoter of an export-oriented food regime linked to an increasingly globalized food system model. This opened up the Brazilian economy to an influx of multinational agribusinesses which swallowed up more agricultural land for the production of commodities, primarily for export. The incessant territoriality of agribusiness and the territorialization of monocultures of commodities such as soybean, corn, cotton, and sugarcane led to the de-territorialization of peasant lands on a massive scale. It is estimated that during Brazil’s military dictatorship, from 1964 to 1984, millions of peasant farmers were dispossessed by the modernization of agriculture and the implementation of the Green Revolution (WELCH, 2006). A study carried out by the Pastoral Land Commission found that 1,566 rural workers were assassinated between 1964 and 1989; of these cases only 17 went to trial, with only 8 convictions, epitomizing the pervasive culture of impunity during two decades of Brazilian dictatorship rule (CARNEIRO; CIOCCARI, 2011, p. 28).

Since the end of the military dictatorship the agrarian question has become a major issue in Brazil, largely due to the increased mobilization and organization of peasant movements like the MST (Brazil’s Landless Rural Workers’ Movement). The expansion of capitalist development in the countryside, while transforming the substantive conditions of the peasantry, has not resulted in its elimination. On the contrary, the process of TDR—territorialization, deterritorialization, and re-territorialization—of agribusiness has perpetuated a contradictory cycle in which the peasantry is simultaneously being both destroyed and recreated. The peasantry is destroyed through territorial dispossession and/or integration with the agribusiness-led model as wage labourers. The recreation of the peasantry, or process of re-peasantization, occurs through participation in socio-territorial movements, like the MST.
which engage in land occupations. Socio-territorial movements are movements in which territory is fundamental to the existence and reproduction of the movement and the defining element of their struggle (PEDON, 2013). In Brazil, land occupations are the primary means for the mass of dispossessed peasants to access land (FERNANDES, 2000); land occupations are also the principal means through which the process of re-peasantization occurs (FERNANDES, 2013).

In Brazil, the struggle of socio-territorial movements for access to agricultural lands in order to work, make a decent living and guarantee local food security is about more than the acquisition of rights to property (material territory); it is an inherently immaterial struggle as well. It is about resisting the territoriality of agribusiness in peasant territories by maintaining autonomy over their lands, including the modes of production that occur within the geographical parameters that define their territory. For agribusiness, land is viewed only as a place of production; for peasants land is both a place of production, imperative to the subsistence of future generations, and a place to call home. At its core the peasant struggle is against neoliberalism and capitalist exploitation in all their forms. Opposition to a land-use model based solely on production requires the advancement of a radically alternate ideological vision based on socialist values seen as fundamental to the construction of a more fair and equitable society.

As a result of peasant mobilization and organization in socio-territorial movements, like the MST, more than 1,000,000 families have gained access to over 80 million hectares of land in 8,957 agrarian reform settlements across the country (DATALUTA, 2013). This, however, has not altered the situation of extreme land concentration in Brazil, which remains among the highest in the world. Large national and multinational corporations currently control the majority of Brazil’s agricultural land. Agribusinesses have been able to advance their agenda “and effectively control agricultural development policies, by capturing the majority of resources for agricultural credit...and directing the application of technology for increasing agricultural production” (FERNANDES, 2013, p. 13).

The agribusiness sector has significant support at the state level, in particular from the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply (MAPA) and the bancada ruralista (the Land Party), an influential caucus within the Brazilian Congress. According
to MAPA, the Ministry “is responsible for the management of public policies to stimulate agriculture, the promotion of agribusiness and the regulation and standardization of services related to the industry” (MAPA, 2014). Two other influential bodies advocating for the interests of agribusiness are the Brazilian Agribusiness Association (ABAG) and the Agriculture and Livestock Confederation of Brazil (CNA). CNA is one of the main forums for discussions and decisions of agribusiness in Brazil and currently represents the interests of close to two million large, medium and small-scale commercial rural producers.

Agribusiness constitutes a hegemonic power in Brazil. The continuity of the hegemony of agribusiness is perpetuated by the continuous subordination of the peasantry to the production interests of agribusinesses in the process of producing capitalist territory. As Fernandes describes:

This same group [dominated by agribusiness interests] also maintains a significant share of the wealth produced by the peasantry, through capitalized land rent, because agribusiness commercializes the majority of food products produced by peasants. The peasant class of over 2 million families, while contributing to 38 percent of gross production, receives a monthly income of less than US$15 dollars and is forced to depend on government assistance to survive (FERNANDES, 2013, p. 14-15).

Strategies for the commercialization of peasant farming have historically emphasized the production of commodities (DEVES; RAMBO, 2013), requiring the subordination and integration of peasants with the dominant capitalist agricultural model and globalized neoliberal food regime. Such strategies, often implemented by agribusinesses with the support of the Brazilian government and the World Bank or IMF, have tended to promote monoculture production, mechanization, and the use of industry-touted “technological packages”–including, “improved” seed varieties/GMOs and increased use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides–thus reinforcing the dependency of farmers on external markets, inputs and pricing mechanisms (PEREIRA, 2006).
Over the course of the last decade there has been a dramatic shift in the framework and focus of public policies, most notably in the area of family farming and food security. This shift reflects the changing attitudes of the Brazilian State and the growing middle class in Brazil regarding the respective roles played by peasant farmers and agribusinesses in provisioning for domestic food security needs. The agribusiness-led model that has historically dominated development policy and discourse in Brazil has resulted in the further concentration of land and resources—and while making an important contribution to Brazil’s positive trade balance and GDP, the hegemonic power of agribusiness has proven to be unable or unwilling to address the needs of local, regional and national markets and meet domestic food security demands. The decisive role that peasant farming plays in providing food for the Brazilian population, has gained more attention and is now widely recognized, in large part due to the success of programs implemented under the administration of Lula which have prioritized the “family farming” sector and sought to expand peasant production as a means to ensure national food security. Peasant farming is responsible for producing about 70 percent of all the food consumed domestically.

Brazil’s relatively recent shift away from a characteristically neoliberal approach in these two key policy areas of family farming and food security is most clearly demonstrated with the introduction of the Zero Hunger Program by the Lula administration in 2003. Under the Zero Hunger Program, the Brazilian government proposed new policies, such as the Food Acquisition Program (PAA), aimed at strengthening rural economies, actively fostering (and publically funding) the creation and expansion of institutional markets and decentralized local food supply systems as a means to create rural employment and reduce household food vulnerability. The program represents an alternate strategy for commercializing peasant agricultural production, supported by a different set of institutional actors than those promoting an agribusiness-centered model of rural territorial development. Breaking with the neoliberal leanings of the past, the PAA does not uniformly seek to promote solely

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23 According to Law 11,326 of July 24th 2006 of the National Family Farming Act, to be defined as an agricultor familiar: the rural establishment (or area of activity) must not exceed four fiscal modules; the labour used in the related activities is mainly family-based; the family’s income is based mainly from activities related to farming and the smallholding; and the establishment is directly managed by the family (BRASIL, 2006)
productive gains by means of capital accumulation; nor does it promote the commercialization of family farming by means of integration with the globalized model of capitalist agriculture. Through the program the government purchases food products throughout the year from marginalized segments of the Brazilian population, and in particular agrarian reform farmers (acampados/assentados), thereby creating a space for marginalized farmers and social groups to participate and play a fundamental role in the creation and implementation of public food and agricultural policy. Food products destined for the program are procured through a non-bidding process, and farmers are guaranteed fair prices\textsuperscript{24} and a market for their food products. The PAA represents a considerable public policy gain in the benefit of poor rural farming families, particularly those who organize in agrarian reform movements, like the Landless Rural Workers Movement (MST), as well as for thousands of food-insecure families across the country to whom the food procured through PAA is distributed (MDS, 2012; DA SILVA et al., 2011).

The amount of public funds made available to family farmers through PRONAF has expanded considerably since 2003. This increase is primarily attributed to the strong political commitment to the implementation of rural agricultural development programs for family farmers demonstrated by Lula during his presidency (2003-2010). In the case of the PAA, for example, the sum of resources used for the acquisition of products annually has substantially increased. In 2012 alone R$ 586,567,131 (USD $ 240,381,630) was invested, representing a 30\% increase compared with the previous year, and a 619\% increase compared with 2003. Between 2003 and 2012 a total sum of R$ 2,784,037,371 (USD $1,142,732,660) was invested in the program in Brazil as a whole (CONAB, 2013). The amount of agricultural credit provided to agribusiness has risen alongside that for family farming and a profound disparity between the two persists. While family farmers receive only 15\% of all the resources destined to agricultural credit, agribusiness receives 84\% (FERNANDES, 2013).

As researchers at the Future Agricultures Consortium (FAC) have noted: “the penetration of the two different [federal] ministries” for agricultural development (MAPA

\textsuperscript{24} Prices are fixed by the Operational Manual of Conab, based on average regional/local prices.
and MDA) “by distinct and often mutually antagonistic social and political forces has...translated into a ‘two-headed’ polarised structure and...entrenched political divisions” (CABRAL et al., 2013, p. 60). This institutionalized dualistic approach to food and resource management has found paradigmatic expression among different academic circles in Brazil, each using their own logic to interpret and explain the country’s paradoxical agrarian structure and rationalize the respective development models promoted by the peasantry and agribusiness.

Generally-speaking, the agrarian question is analysed through the lens of either one of two ideological/scientific paradigms—the paradigm of agrarian capitalism (PAC) or the paradigm of the agrarian question (PAQ)—and naturally, the differing interpretations of the causes of the agrarian question lead scholars, scientists, corporations and politicians to different understandings of, and solutions to, the socioeconomic, environmental and territorial shortcomings of the hegemonic capitalist model. For proponents of the paradigm of agrarian capitalism, the production of social inequalities by capitalism is understood as a conjunctural problem that can be resolved only through the implementation of new capitalist or neoliberal policies that further enable the ‘integration’ of the peasantry within capitalist market systems (FERNANDES et al., 2010; 2012). From this perspective, the peasantry is seen as a “backward” and “unproductive” segment of Brazil’s modern capitalist society—redistributive agrarian reform and the territorial struggles of peasant movements are viewed as impediments to development and economic growth and peasant farmers who are unable to compete in a competitive “free market” system should be eliminated as part of the natural process of capitalism. In order to avoid elimination and “transcend” their condition of “backwardness” and “unproductiveness”, peasant farmers must effectively integrate with the dominant agribusiness-led model by becoming “family farmers” or wage labourers (ABRAMAVAY, 1992). Agribusiness presents this process as a harmonious transition, discussed in terms of friendly “co-existence” of small and medium-scale farmers with large agribusiness entities and mutually advantageous outcomes. The idea of class struggle is glaringly absent from analyses presented from this perspective, as though it ceases to be a factor in the ongoing territorial disputes that mark the Brazilian countryside.
Those who scrutinize Brazil’s agrarian paradox through the alternate analytical lens of the agrarian question paradigm hold that the agrarian question is the proverbial outcome of a predatory capitalist “free market” system which can only satisfy its production characteristic through the exploitation of land, labour, and the very environmental and ecological support systems upon which all life depends. Seeing the agrarian question as a fundamentally structural problem inherent in capitalism, the agrarian question paradigm stresses the importance of understanding the nature, creation and reproduction of asymmetrical relations of political and economic power, and prioritizes class struggle in order to explain territorial disputes (FERNANDES et al., 2010; 2012). From this perspective, integration of the peasantry into the capitalist market system is understood as subordination. The interactive relationship between the capitalist and the peasantry is seen to be characterized by highly unequal power relations that result in the loss of peasant autonomy on the land, the growth of social and economic inequalities, and ultimately, domination of the peasantry by capital. Proponents of this perspective advocate for the expansion of public policies that promote agrarian reform, peasant autonomy, smallholder production systems, and access to agricultural credit for small-scale farmers. While the paradigm of agrarian capitalism views the problem as the peasant, the paradigm of the agrarian question sees the structure of the capitalist economic system as the problem and, thus, is also the paradigm that seeks the construction of a different society (FERNANDES et al., 2010; 2012).

The existence of these two major paradigms of agricultural development in Brazil is widely recognized by both academics and government officials. The debate, however, is highly nuanced, and, naturally there are differing interpretations of what constitutes and differentiates these paradigms: “Whether they are a sign of a ‘Gramscian struggle for hegemony’ or of a ‘pluralistic model’ is a matter of interpretation” (CABRAL et al., 2013, p 63). For Cabral et al. (2013), these “competing visions of development” are an expression of the “tension between a model of agricultural development prioritizing smallholder production systems and a model driven essentially by capital intensive and large-scale commercial farming interests” (p. 63). Francesco Maria Pierri, a former consultant for the International Affairs Office of the Ministry of Agrarian Development
Bernardo Mançano Fernandes, a geographer and professor at the São Paulo State University (UNESP) and leading scholar of the agrarian question and paradigm debates in Brazil, interprets the origination of the concept of “family farming” or “family farmer” as a construct of the agrarian capitalism paradigm. The concept of family farming emerged in the 1990s in the context of neoliberalism in Brazil. According to Fernandes it “sought to conceal the differences between non-capitalist family social relations and capitalist relations, masking the existence of the permanent [social and territorial] conflicts” (FERNANDES, 2013, p. 16). Presently, the concept of “peasants” and the “peasantry” has been replaced by “family farmers” and “family farming” in government public policy discourse and rural territorial development programs aimed at smallholders. The growth of government policies promoting family farming and the increase in agricultural credit to family farmers led to the introduction of legislation in 2006 which defined the requisites for a smallholder to be formally recognized by the State as a “family farmer”. This legal recognition is important, because in order to receive a line of agricultural credit from PRONAF or participate in programs like the Food Acquisition Program (PAA) one must first obtain a document which certifies the status of a producer as a family farmer. Fernandes also sheds light on the way in which the family farming concept has been appropriated by peasant movements over time as part of the process of re-peasantization:

The concept of family farming, now well established, has been incorporated by peasant movements, although without the modern/backward dichotomy in which the term originated. In fact, every peasant is a family farmer and every family farmer is a peasant. The reaction of peasant movements to the concept, especially the MST, was positive, steering clear of the dichotomy that is frequently employed by government institutions. This is also a part of the process of re-peasantization: the response of the peasant movement was to recover the concept of peasant by associating it to the concept of family farmer. In fact, it is not through the use (or non-use) of such concepts that the peasantry is differentiated, but rather the condition of subordination of peasants to the model of capitalist development. (FERNANDES, 2013, p. 16)
Language, ideology and the ways in which concepts are defined and understood by different social actors—civil society organizations, social movements, agribusinesses, corporate lobby groups, state officials etc.—are vitally important to the ways in which territories, both material and immaterial are inscribed with meaning. Both agrarian paradigms discussed here represent the ongoing immaterial struggle over territory by means of territoriality. The paradigmatic debate over agricultural development models in Brazil is characterized by complex and highly asymmetrical relations of power that have, to a large degree, been institutionalized at the State level. Predicated on the permanent struggle between opposing classes, these oppositional ideological perspectives are influential in shaping public policy promoting different development models for agriculture, particularly that promoted by agribusiness. Agribusiness often plays a significant role in the planning and implementation of state-led agricultural development programs and projects; while peasants, who clearly have much less influence, politically and financially, are often excluded from participating in the planning process for development projects, and simply submitted to the projects implemented by the state with the support of agribusiness.

2.4 The agrarian question in Mozambique

In order to contextualize the contemporary agrarian question in Mozambique, it is first necessary to historicize and reflect on the ways in which past events (political, social and economic) have transformed social relations of power and territories across space and time, shaping the social realities of the present. In Mozambique, one of the poorest countries in the world\textsuperscript{25}, the ongoing process of primitive accumulation has deep-seated roots in Portuguese colonialism.

The allocation of vast tracts of land to Portuguese settlers began in the seventeenth century with the introduction of the \textit{prazo} system\textsuperscript{26}. However, it was only

\textsuperscript{25} In 2013 Mozambique ranked 178 out of 187 countries in the UNDP Human Development Index (UNDP, 2014)

\textsuperscript{26} The \textit{prazo} system "was originally devised to establish Portuguese rule by legitimizing the land seized by deported convicts, either by force or by marriage alliance with African chiefs". Later on, former military officers and the destitute widows and orphaned daughters of deceased Portuguese noblemen were the main recipients of land allocated via the \textit{prazo} system. "Despite Portugal's intention of creating a large population of Portuguese people in its colony, \textit{prazo}-holders [often] married locally and amalgamated \textit{prazos} through intermarriage. As a result, it was said that 14 or 15 powerful \textit{prazo} holders controlled 112 \textit{prazos} in 1801 (FUNADA-CLASSEN, 2013, p. 89).
after the Berlin Conference in 1885 that Portugal effectively consolidated its control over Mozambican territory (HANLON, 2011). The constitutional monarchy government granted long-term concessions to foreign companies and encouraged prazo owners to set up large-scale plantations for export agriculture as part of a strategy aimed at “effective occupation” of the Mozambican territory. These actions initiated a process of land concentration with far-reaching consequences: by the end of the nineteenth century about 65 percent of the country, was controlled by just three foreign concession companies - the Mozambique Company, the Nyassa Company and the Zambezia Company (FUNADA-CLASSEN, 2013, p. 60). The Portuguese government further created irrigated settlements (colonatos), and sent hundreds of thousands of poor, illiterate peasants to Mozambique in order to circumvent calls for land redistribution at home (HANLON, 2011). This was a successful strategy of the Portuguese government to establish human territoriality in the colony, which persisted for the next fifty years.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, with decolonization movements gaining ground across the African continent, demands for liberation by the Mozambican people “were severely suppressed by Portugal, whose dictator, António Salazar insisted on the country’s colonies being considered as ‘overseas provinces’” (FUNADA-CLASSEN, 2013, p. 2). In 1964, the National Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frelimo), launched its revolutionary war of independence; and after a decade of bloodshed and political, economic and social upheaval, in 1975, Mozambique won its liberation, becoming a single-party, socialist state, with Frelimo at its head. At independence, on 25 June 1975, the government announced its decision to nationalize all land in Mozambique, declaring the state to be the sole proprietor of land with absolute authority over determining the conditions for its use27. Most Portuguese fled or were expelled from the country in the years following independence, and the state took swift action to appropriate the Portuguese colonatos and large landholdings that had belonged to foreign individuals and companies. Many of these territories were subsequently transformed into over-sized state-run farms by the new Mozambican government (MOSCA, 2011; HANLON, 2011).

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27 This was enshrined in the 1975 Constitution of the Popular Republic of Mozambique, Article 24.
In 1978, state farms occupied 100 thousand hectares of arable land; by 1982 this area had increased to 140 thousand hectares (CASTEL-BRANCO, 1994, p. 55). Before the country fully transitioned to a capitalist economy in the 1990s, it is estimated that over 100 state farms occupied more than 600 thousand hectares of the best agricultural land (HANLON, 2011). The dominance of the plantation system of monoculture farming that had prevailed during colonialism continued under socialism, and the recruitment of agrarian labour on state-owned farms followed a pattern similar to that of the colonial period (BOWEN, 2000). The rapid expansion of the state sector came at the expense of the peasantry, whose lands were frequently expropriated to make way for the development of the new state-run mega-farms (CASTEL-BRANCO, 1994; BOWEN, 2000). The hard-line socialist agenda of the Frelimo government systematically denied Mozambicans who had been dispossessed during the colonial period the possibility of returning to their ancestral lands, and asphyxiated the aspirations of peasants who had hoped to gain access to more land following independence (PITCHER, 2002; MOSCA, 2011). Instead, the state encouraged peasants and workers to organize themselves in cooperative collectives, whose development was to be supported by the government. Small villages, known as aldeias were arbitrarily formed by the state in order to promote the development of the cooperative collectives. Aldeias were usually distant from towns and urban centers, and comprised of aggregated families cultivating small parcels of land (1.5 hectares per family) (MOSCA, 2011).

Peasants had little time to adjust to their new conditions before the country descended into two more wars – the first started by white-ruled Rhodesia in 1977, culminating in the civil war, launched in 1981 by the anti-government guerrilla resistance movement, the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), later renamed Renamo. The magnitude of the casualties, social divisions and destruction caused by the civil war (1981-1992) was colossal. The war, waged primarily in remote rural areas, resulted in a million deaths and over 20 billion US$ in damage (HANLON, 1996). More than 6 million people were either displaced or became refugees (FUNADA-CLASSEN, 2013) and much of the rural population remained “cut off from villages, shops and health posts for years” (HANLON, 1996, p. 16).
Migrations caused by sixteen years of war reconfigured the complex web of social relations that held rural families and communities together, fundamentally altering traditional mechanisms of managing natural resources and redefining relations of power (MOSCA, 2011). The de-structuring effects of migrations on communities consequently facilitated the ‘legal usurpation’ of land by national and multinational companies with or without the knowledge of communities (ibid). During this period, companies often acquired vast concessions of land in complete disregard of existing land use rights, and peasants, when confronted post-hoc by new land occupants, had no effective means of recourse available to them to recuperate their patrimony (BOWEN, 2000).

In 1984 the country became a member of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) -- the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) -- marking the beginning of the liberalization of the Mozambican economy. In tandem with liberalization, land tenure patterns were transformed and large-tracts of land were allocated to private companies and farmers with the capacity to produce on a large-scale. These allocations only increased existing social inequalities and favoured a small group of domestic elites and former colonizers. White farmers and Mozambicans in positions of social power were able to take advantage of privatizations and acquired the largest parcels of the best land (PITCHER, 2002; MOSCA, 2011).

In the midst of the civil war, the Mozambican government introduced an economic rehabilitation program (PRE) in 1987, aimed at stabilizing the economy by reducing inflation and promoting deregulation and privatization of state-owned assets. Mozambican economist Castel Branco describes PRE as “the first systematic and large-scale opportunity for the development of national capitalist classes through massive privatisation of state assets” and affirms that “more than one thousand state-owned enterprises and state shares in many more companies were privatised” through the programme (2014, p. 29). Mozambican entrepreneurs, mainly wealthy merchants, Frelimo war veterans and former managers of state-owned companies, acquired approximately 80 percent of the total state-assets sold off during the PRE period (1987-1991); most of which were small to medium-size businesses. Foreign investors scooped up the remaining 20 percent of state-assets, which consisted of larger and more economically viable business enterprises. The failure rate of the smaller businesses
purchased by domestic investors was remarkably high: “there were no specific policies” or “support mechanisms in place to help the rehabilitation and development of these firms” and “as a result, more than 40%...went bankrupt within five years of privatisation” while “more than half of the remaining were traded for cash or shares or transformed into warehouses” (CASTEL-BRANCO, 2014, p. 29).

Mozambique finally succumbed to IMF pressure in the 1990s, signing an agreement with the Fund in 1991 to implement a neoliberal Economic and Social Rehabilitation Programme (PRES). The program imposed the adoption of the entire package of structural reforms promoted by the so-called Washington Consensus – including trade liberalization, deregulation and privatization (HANLON, 1996). With the formal abolition of apartheid in South Africa in 1991 and the subsequent removal of UN enforced economic sanctions by the Mozambican government, the flow of South African FDI (and material goods) expanded exponentially (CASTEL-BRANCO, 2014). South African firms took over key industries (such and sugar and gas) and acquired significant tracts of land in Mozambique. The convergence of these two landmark events represented the beginning of a second major wave of FDI in which most fledgling national entrepreneurs, unable to compete with foreign companies and products (especially from South Africa) were consequently shut out of the market (ibid).

As Joseph Hanlon (1996, p. 97) describes, by the end of the twentieth century Mozambique was “caught in a trap”. This author succinctly historicizes the situation as follows:

The colonial era made it very difficult for Mozambicans to gain business experience and accumulate even small amounts of capital. The [central planning phase] created a little more space. But now the door has been firmly slammed shut; only those who already have money and experience can play. This will inevitably lead to widening gaps between rich and poor and between city and country; the urban rich will use the lack of regulation to make sure that markets are not free, but tightly controlled by private cartels instead of the government. (HANLON, 1996, p. 97)

The neoliberal economic policies imposed by the BWIs only compounded the acute poverty and human suffering that had been bequeathed upon Mozambicans by colonialism and three decades of armed conflict. Rather than promoting genuine social
or economic development in Mozambique, the BWIs fixated on creating a class of subservient elites that would respond to the demands of foreign agencies, donors and firms and promote a rapid restructuring of the Mozambican economy in accordance with orthodox neo-liberal principles (HANLON; SMART, 2008). This compliant elite, or “comprador group” as Joseph Hanlon and Teresa Smart have called it, “cannot function on [its] own as a national capitalist class and instead become wealthy by serving the interests of foreign companies against the interests of their own people” (HANLON; SMART, 2008, p. 129). As a result, over the last two decades FDI has become “the fundamental shaper of the Mozambican economy, creating the foundations of the extractive economy as a mode of capital accumulation” (CASTEL-BRANCO, 2014, p. 30).

“Mozambique is one the most land-abundant countries in Africa” with a territorial land-base of approximately 80 million hectares (LOCKE, 2014, p. iii). The entire territory pertaining to Mozambique is owned by the state, under the current (2004) Constitution, which has supreme authority over issuing land-use rights to national individuals, private enterprises and communities, as well as foreign investors. The nationalization of land is widely viewed as one of the main achievements of independence and has become a powerful symbol of the state, patriotism and liberation from colonial oppression (MOSCA, 2011). In the preamble of the first Land Law, introduced in 1979, Frelimo affirmed that “in the process of building a new society...it became clear that political independence would have no real meaning for the Mozambican people...if land continued to be controlled by a handful of latifundiários [large landholders]” and that “after five-hundred years of usurpation and dispossession of the best lands by Portuguese colonialism...returning the [land] to the Mozambican people was a...condition for a real and effective independence”. The Frelimo party, which has been in power since independence in 1975, is the primary political institution responsible for shaping the legal framework for land governance described below.

Mozambique’s current Land Law was created in 1997\textsuperscript{29} and is complemented by the 1998 Rural Land Law Regulations\textsuperscript{30} and by a ‘Technical Annex’\textsuperscript{31} introduced in 1999. The legislation offers no mechanisms to address existing land disputes, such as those stemming from the colonial expropriations, the usurpation of peasant lands by state companies in the socialist period, or the predatory land grabs that occurred between 1977 and 1992 in the wake of forced migrations (HANLON, 2002). Still it is widely recognized as one of the most progressive legal frameworks for land governance in Africa due to its provisions for safeguarding the rights of local communities (NHANTUMBO; SALOMÃO, 2010). Within the institutional framework of continued state land ownership, the legislation attempts to guarantee access and secure rights to land for Mozambican peasants while also facilitating investment from foreign and national corporate entities. Although private land ownership is strictly prohibited under the constitution secure property rights (land titles) can be obtained by individual persons and communities who occupy land or individual persons or companies that wish to obtain it. Formal property rights are conferred in the form of a single state-granted land tenure right known as the \textit{direito de uso e aproveitamento da terra} or DUAT.

A DUAT may be acquired in three ways: through traditional (customary) occupation, “good faith” occupation or by requesting land from the government. The first of these, traditional occupation, recognizes the long-standing occupancy of land by individual persons and by communities in accordance with customary norms and practices. A noteworthy innovation of the 1997 land law is that it defines “local communities” as single legal entities, thereby allowing for the formal recognition of communal land rights. The second means of acquiring a DUAT is through “good faith” occupation. This option is only available to individuals of Mozambican nationality who have been using the land that they occupy in good faith for at least 10 years; it does not apply to communities or foreign nationals. Land rights acquired by both of these means are inheritable and do not require registration.

The third way to acquire a DUAT is by requesting new rights from the state. DUATs awarded through this avenue are granted by the government to individuals or

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\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Lei de Terras} – Land Law of 1997 (Law nº. 19/97 of October 1)  
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Regulamento da Lei de Terras} – Rural Land Law Regulations (Decree nº. 66/98 of December 8)  
\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Anexo Técnico} – Technical Annex (Ministerial Diploma of December 7, 1999).
\end{flushleft}
corporations (foreign or national) on a concessionary basis under state lease-hold agreements. Concessions are granted for periods of up to 50 years with the possibility of renewal for a subsequent 50 year period. All requests are subject to a parallel approval process requiring that foreign and national applicants submit a formal request for land to the National Directorate for Lands and Forests (DNTF) in conjunction with an investment proposal submitted to the national Investment Promotion Center (CPI). Prior to this, applicants are required to conduct at least two consultations with local communities to verify that the land in question is free or to negotiate the terms by which local inhabitants are willing (or not) to cede their rights to the applicant. Aside from the investor and the affected community or communities, two other parties must be present at these meetings – a representative of the Provincial Services of Geography and Cadastre (SPGC) and the District Administrator. During meetings applicants are obliged to share complete details of proposed projects with the community, including all of the benefits and risks of a social, environmental and economic nature that may potentially result from their project, if approved. Community members should be given the opportunity to ask any questions about projects as well as to stipulate changes, make additional demands or even veto proposals outright. The meeting minutes (acta da consulta) should be recorded in writing, clearly stating what was discussed and agreed upon. Minutes must be signed by each of the four parties present and each should retain a copy of meeting minutes as a record. In addition to the community consultations, all applicants must carry out delimitation and demarcation processes, and all rights awarded by state allocation must be registered. Final approval on DUATs for areas up to 1,000 ha is granted by the provincial governor, while areas between 1,000 and 10,000 ha require approval from the Minister of Agriculture. Applications for DUATs for areas 10,000 or more must be approved by the Council of Ministers.

The allocation of long-term land concessions by the state has allowed Mozambique to ward off pressure for land privatization from the BWIs. Indeed, privatization would be politically problematic as it would seriously undermine the legitimacy of Frelimo, whose party banner is historically linked to the liberation of land and its subsequent nationalization (MOSCA, 2011; SERRA, 2013). Further, privatization would imply a massive transfer of power from the state to the private sector, thereby
reducing the influence of Frelimo in the social and economic sphere of everyday life. The current land law “is vague and full of omissions and lacunas” which allows for “the exercise of discretionary power” by the government in the negotiation of land deals, explains João Mosca (2011, p. 207). Frelimo members are in a privileged position when it comes to mediating land concessions involving foreign investors and have often leveraged their social power and status to acquire land for themselves (PITCHER, 2002; MOSCA, 2011). Because the actual legislation is not a serious impediment to the free market and does not encumber private investment the BWIs do not impose land privatization in Mozambique. Despite the government’s claim to absolute proprietorship of the country’s territory, in reality it only effectively controls about 20 percent of all land (FRANCISCO, 2013).

Both the 1997 Land Law and 2004 Constitution clearly stipulate that land cannot be bought, sold, rented, mortgaged or in any way alienated, meaning that there is no formal land market in Mozambique and that land cannot be acquired for purposes of speculation. In reality, however, a vibrant informal land market exists – land transactions are openly carried out by third parties and speculation is a patent objective of many land deals in the long-term (MOSCA, 2011; SERRA, 2013). As Carlos Serra comments, “we are in the midst of a situation in which the Land Law does not correspond with the reality in practice,” especially in terms of land transfers. The legislation is “completely out of touch with land market dynamics that, while they have not been institutionalized”, still constitute actual practices (SERRA, 2013, p. 62). The primary means for third parties to acquire land is through the sale or transfer of constructions or other physical improvements situated on the land. Any physical improvement made on, or to land, such as buildings or irrigation systems, can be claimed as the private property of the owner of a DUAT. Since the right to private property is recognized in the constitution, when private assets are bought or sold between third parties, the underlying DUAT is transferred along with the assets in question. All DUAT transfers involving the purchase of assets are subject to government authorization and must be registered. For Serra the informal land market exists due to the “progressively weakening role of the state in the administration of land and the growing tendency of land hoarding” by political elites or wealthy individuals with strong political connections (SERRA, 2013, p. 64).
Currently, 64 percent of Mozambicans live in rural areas\textsuperscript{32} and over 70 percent depend on farming to earn a livelihood\textsuperscript{33}. The majority of the rural poor, who depend on agriculture (hence land) for subsistence, do not have their land rights registered in the National Cadastre. It is estimated that only 3-5% of all landholdings are formally registered in Mozambique (LOCKE, 2014, p. iii); most of which pertain to foreign landholdings, urban properties, and national corporate persons. Although it is not mandatory for communities to formalize their DUATs, without official documentation customary rights are easier to revoke than formal rights. Significant asymmetries exist in the access to information regarding the land law, often putting communities at a disadvantage in relation to politicians and corporations during the negotiation of land deals (MOSCA, 2011). In order to better secure the rights guaranteed to peasant communities under the Land Law, especially in the face of the growing number of foreign land deals occurring across the country, a number of local institutions and NGOs, such as the Rural Association for Mutual Support (ORAM) and the community land initiative (ITC), have launched campaigns to assist communities in formalizing their land titles and obtaining official documentation. The first stage of the formalization process involves a delimitation of community lands, including areas that are currently occupied or being used by the community (by individuals or collectively) as well as areas that have been set aside for use in the future. Through a series of community discussions and a detailed mapping process all lands pertaining to the community are identified, measured, quantified, mapped and recorded in writing. Once delimitation has been completed a community receives a certificate that formally documents its land claim. In order to apply for an actual land title, however, the community must further conclude the demarcation process.

The absence of government investment and decades of inadequate and ineffective agricultural policies, in particular for the family farming sector and food production, has had a far-reaching impact. The structural reforms of the IMF and World Bank only compounded the situation further: “the [BWIs] and donors maintained a rigid line of no subsidies and no government investment in agriculture” (HANLON; SMART,\textsuperscript{32} See: MATAVEL et al., 2011, p. 9.\textsuperscript{33} See MOSCA, 2012b, p. 42.)
Productivity per hectare is essentially the same as it was almost four decades ago and per capita agricultural production is more than 40 percent less than in 1970 (MOSCA, 2012b). The country possesses 36 million hectares of arable land; of this, 5.7 million hectares are estimated to be cultivated (WFP, 2014). Yet, in order to feed Mozambique’s growing population large quantities of several staple food products, including rice and wheat\textsuperscript{34}, currently need to be imported.

Since the turn of the century high levels of poverty and malnutrition have remained virtually constant. Between 2002/2003 and 2008/2009 poverty actually increased slightly, rising from 54.1 percent to 54.7 percent (MPD, 2010). Over half of these extremely poor people live in rural areas. When population growth is considered, the total number of Mozambicans living below the poverty line increased by about 2.8 million people, from an estimated 10 million in 2002/2003 to 12.8 million in 2008/2009 (MOSCA, 2012a). Chronic malnutrition also remains a serious problem, affecting 46.4 percent of children in 2008/2009 (MPD, 2010) and one-third of all families face chronic food insecurity (WFP, 2014).

“One reason for the very high levels of chronic malnutrition [and food insecurity] in Mozambique is that the average farmer produces only enough food to feed the family adequately for less than eight months of the year, and this is not changing” (HANLON; SMART, 2014, p. 12). Agriculture is predominately rain-fed and thus, susceptible to variable and increasingly unpredictable climatic events—drought, floods, or rain too early or too late in the agricultural season can affect entire harvests leaving whole communities in conditions of extreme food insecurity, hunger and malnutrition. With most farmers tilling the soil using only a hoe, farms are typically small, between 0.5 and 2 hectares in size. Smallholders\textsuperscript{35} dominate the agrarian landownership structure, constituting 99.3 percent of all farms and controlling 96.37 percent of the total area cultivated (INE, 2011). Only 5.3% of farms are irrigated, 3.7% use fertilizers, 2.5% utilize pesticides, and 1.6% use tractors (MOSCA, 2012a). Despite longstanding challenges

\textsuperscript{34} See: HANLON; SMART, 2014, p. 50-51.
\textsuperscript{35} In the 2009-2010 Agricultural Census smallholder farms (smallholdings) are classified as being agricultural establishments between 0 and 10 hectares in size (INE, 2011). Medium farms are between 10 and 50 hectares, and large-holdings are more than 50 hectares.
(political, economic, social and natural), it is estimated that smallholders are responsible for 90 percent of all food production\textsuperscript{36}.

In recent years, the Mozambican government has introduced a number of public policies that prioritize agricultural development as a means to combat poverty and hunger. One particularly important document, PEDSA 2011-2020\textsuperscript{37} attributes rural poverty to “limited agricultural development, limited access of markets...and the weak productivity of food markets” (MINAG, 2011, p. 5). While causes of rural poverty and the need to overcome it by modernizing agriculture are frequently reiterated, the actual actions taken by the government and its decisions for development do not correspond with the prevailing policy discourse (IBRAIMO, 2013; MOSCA, 2011; 2012a; 2012b). Instead, the government has adopted an extremely controversial policy for modernizing agriculture that promotes large-scale land investments for foreign agribusinesses.

Hyperbolic claims regarding the availability of unused or underused farmland (WORLD BANK, 2009)\textsuperscript{38} and contemporaneous discoveries of oil, gas and mineral deposits (SELEMANE, 2013; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2013) have added to the country’s allure, intensifying commercial pressures on land and water resources. Between 2004 and 2009, the national government granted more than one million hectares of agricultural land to foreign investors; of this, 73 percent was used for commercial forest plantations and 13 percent was destined for sugar and agrofuels production (HANLON, 2011). The largest tracts of land have been allocated to companies originating from just a handful of countries – Portugal, Britain, Sweden, Norway and South Africa – all of which have strong historical ties with Mozambique. Other countries such as Italy, India, Japan, Ireland, Libya, Zimbabwe, China and Brazil have also acquired land use rights to sizeable areas. Civil society organizations and peasant movements, such as the National Peasants’ Union (UNAC) and Justiça Ambiental (JA), have mobilized in response to the territorialization these foreign agribusinesses, forestry companies and mining giants whose operations in the country

\textsuperscript{36} Interview with João Mosca on 22.07.2014
\textsuperscript{37} The Strategic Development Plan for the Agricultural Sector (Plano Estratégico de Desenvolvimento do Sector Agrário).
\textsuperscript{38} According to a 2009 World Bank Report, “Mozambique is home to immense tracts of unused forests and sparsely populated savannah land. Nearly one-half (46 percent) of the national land are cultivatable, yet only 10 percent is currently farmed” (p.51).
have had profound (and mostly adverse) impacts on the livelihoods of peasant communities (MATAVEL et al., 2011; GRAIN; UNAC, 2015). It is in this particular context that the trilateral initiative ProSAVANA, run by the Brazilian, Japanese and Mozambican governments is being implemented in Mozambique.
Chapter 3
Contextualizing ProSAVANA

In order to understand the discursive politics, paradigmatic underpinnings and territorial strategies of Brazil’s south-south cooperation in agriculture in Mozambique, I have chosen to conduct a case of study on the triangular cooperation program ProSAVANA being developed in the Nacala Growth Development Corridor, a region located in the north of Mozambique. Increasingly becoming a salient foreign investment destination for large-scale mining, construction/infrastructure and agricultural projects, the Nacala Corridor is an ideal site to explore the complex web of intersecting Brazilian business and cooperation interests in Mozambique and to examine the ways in which Brazil’s domestic agrarian dualism finds expression in its agricultural cooperation initiatives in the country.

This chapter will first describe the research site, the Nacala Growth Development Corridor, where both the ProSAVANA program and the PAA Africa pilot-project are being implemented. In particular, it will describe the corridor’s significance in the process of mineral extraction in Mozambique, underscoring ongoing Brazilian investments and strategic interests in the region, while also situating the ProSAVANA target area within the overall context of the Nacala Corridor. I will then outline the methodological framework for the research conducted on ProSAVANA.

3.1 Research site context
3.1.1 General research site context: the Nacala Growth Development Corridor

Located in northern Mozambique, the Nacala Growth Development Corridor spans five provinces—including all of Nampula, most of Tete, and significant parts of the provinces of Niassa, Zambezia and Cabo Delgado (see Map 1). Bordered by Malawi in the northwest, Zambia and Zimbabwe to the west and the Indian Ocean in the east, the corridor is a prominent center of national agricultural production and is home to
a burgeoning cohort of foreign companies that have recently set up operations in Mozambique in the mining and agricultural sectors. The corridor has been identified by the Mozambican government as one of six growth corridors in the country and is recognized as a region of strategic importance to the future social and economic development of Mozambique (MINAG, 2011; GoM, 2015b; MASA, 2015). In recent years the region has become a hotspot for foreign direct investment, particularly in the mining, construction, infrastructure and agricultural sectors.

Map 1: Location of the Nacala Development Growth Corridor

The recent territorialization of foreign capital in the region has been largely driven by the discovery of coal in the Tete province. Estimated at about 23 billion tons, the province’s coal reserves are said to be the fourth largest in the world, and the largest in Africa. Two of the longest-standing mining operations in the province are run by the Brazilian mining giant Vale in Moatize (I and II) and International Coal Ventures Limited of India, which acquired Rio Tinto’s mines and exploration licenses in Mozambique in
In addition to these major players, the Indian company, Jindal Steel and Power and a British firm, Beacon Hill Resources began coal mining operations in 2012 and in 2013, Japan’s Nippon Steel also acquired coal-mining rights in Tete with plans to begin commercial production by 2016. According to Human Rights Watch (2013), as of October 2012, at least 245 mining concessions and exploration licenses in Tete, covering approximately 3.4 million hectares, had been approved by the Mozambican government (see Map 2). Between forty and sixty percent of the province’s territory is presently held under concession or mining licences attributed to foreign companies (ibid).

**Map 2: Mining licenses and concessions in the Tete Province**

Vale has been present in Mozambique since November 2004, when the company obtained a concession for the extraction of coal at Moatize (I and II) in Tete. Investments in the construction of the Moatize I mine, initiated in 2008, totalled US$ 1.6 billion and in 2011 the company began commercial production (VALE, 2011). Currently,

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39 In July 2014 International Coal Ventures Limited purchased all of Rio Tinto’s mining assets, including concessions and mining licenses covering 127,900 hectares. Two of the notable mine holdings are the Benga mine (4,560 hectares) and the Zambeze coal mine (24,740 hectares). Both Vale and Rio Tinto have carried out the forced eviction of thousands of families and involuntary resettlement. Between 2009 and 2010, Vale resettled a total of 1,365 families while the resettlement process related to the development of Rio Tinto’s former Benga mine is still presently underway and involves a total of 736 families. For a more detailed analysis of the impacts of these two companies see: (MOSCA; SELEMANE, 2011), (HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2013) and (LILLYWHITE et al., 2015).
Vale is in the process of constructing a new mine in Moatize (Moatize II), which is set to be completed by late 2015. Once Moatize II is operational, the maximum production capacity of the mine is expected to double, from its present limit of 11 million tons to 22 tons (VALE, 2015b). Presently, all coal extracted by Vale (and other mining companies) in Tete is transported along the Sena Railroad and exported from the Beira Port in Sofala province (see Map 3). Vale has a concession for the use of Terminal 8 at the Beira Port, which can export up to 6 million tons of coal per year (VALE, 2015b); however the maximum amount of coal that can be transported by Vale to the terminal via the Sena Railway is restricted to about 4.5 million tons per year due to the rail-line’s limited capacity (MACUAHUB, 2013a; VALE, 2015c). In 2014, Vale transported a total of 3.7 million tons via the rail-line, the most coal transported in any single year since it began operations (VALE, 2015c). It is anticipated that neither the Sena Line nor the Beira Port, which are already operating at close to maximum capacity, will be able to accommodate the increasing demand for coal transport from Tete as new companies begin commercial production in the next five years (ORIENTAL CONSULTANTS CO., LTD, et al., 2014).

In early 2014, in order to sustain the expansion of its Moatize mining operations, Vale initiated the Integrated Nacala Logistics Corridor (NLC), a project which includes the rehabilitation of 682 kilometers of existing rail-line (the Nacala-à-Velha Railway), the construction of a new deep water port and coal terminal in Nacala-à-Velha, and the construction of 230 kilometers of new rail-line that will run through Malawi and link the existing Nacala-à-Velha rail-line up to the company’s coal operations in Moatize (VALE, 2015b) (see Map 3). Since 2012, Vale has operated in Malawi through the Central East Africa Railways (CEAR), where it currently controls 43.4 percent of the shares (CAMPBELL, 2012; VALE 2014a). The company also has a significant stake (43.4 percent) in Mozambique’s Corredor de Desenvolvimento de Nacala (CDN), the company operating the Nacala Railway, as well as the company Corredor Logístico Integrado de Nacala S.A. (CLN) which operates the NLC project (VALE, 2014a)40.

40 According to Vale’s 2014 Annual Report, the company retains control of its stake in CEAR and CDN through a 85% stake in SDCN (Sociedade de Desenvolvimento do Coredor de Nacala), which owns 51% of the shareholdings of both CEAR and CDN, respectively (VALE, 2014a, p. 60-61). SDCN is a partnership between Vale and the Mozambican company Insitec (see footnote 31 below).
The NLC project will allow Vale to transport coal from its mine in Moatize through Malawi and across the Nacala Corridor to the new coal terminal at Nacala-à-Velha which will be able to export up to 18 million tonnes of coal a year (VALE, 2015b). Total costs for the entire NLC project are estimated at $US 4.4 billion (ALLAFRICA, 2014). In December 2014, Vale sold 15 percent of its shares in the Moatize mine, and half of its 70 percent equity stake in the NLC project to the Japanese company Mitsui, describing the transactions as “essential for the continuity [of its] investment in Mozambique and Malawi as it provides the funding for the completion of the Moatize project and of the NLC” (VALE, 2014b). Mitsui also holds a 20 percent stake in the liquefied natural gas (LNG) development off the coast of Cabo Delgado province, which is set to begin producing in 2019 (OBAYASHI, 2015).

Map 3: Existing Railroad System in Northern Mozambique, showing the Sena Railway to the Port of Beira and the Nacala-Velha Railway to the Port of Nacala

The presence of Vale in the Nacala Corridor has been a catalyzing force drawing further Brazilian investments into the region in order to support the company’s vast mining and logistical operations. A number of Brazilian giants in the area of civil construction, in particular, Odebrecht, Andrade Gutierrez and Camargo Corrêa have
won massive contracts for the development of mega-infrastructure projects in the region and are now expanding their operations elsewhere in the country. These companies have received generous financing from Brazil’s National Development Bank (BNDES) which allows them to purchase Brazilian-made goods, material and services used in their operations in Mozambique. Odebrecht, for example, led the consortium responsible for the construction of Vale’s first mine in Moatize (Moatize I) and constructed the coal terminal currently in use by the company at the Port of Beira. It also constructed the International Airport of Nacala, which was inaugurated in January 2015\textsuperscript{41}. The company received a credit line of US$ 200 million from BNDES for the airport construction project (MOURA, 2015), which included the installation of an Odebrecht operational base in Nacala (ODEBRECHT, 2015).

Another of Vale’s projects, the construction of the new deep-water port and coal terminal in Nacala-a-Velha, was done by Andrade Gutierrez in partnership with Brazil’s OAS Group. When construction began in mid-2011, total investments for the project were estimated at US$ 1.6 billion (MACUAHUB, 2011a). In July 2015, the coal terminal received its first shipment of coal from Moatize, and exports from the port are expected to begin in August 2015 (MACUAHUB, 2015a). Andrade Gutierrez also heads a consortium responsible for the construction of the Moamba Major Dam in the southern province of Maputo. Construction officially began in December 2014 and is expected to be completed within five years at a cost of $US 500 million (COELHO, 2014). For the development of the project the company has received US$ 450 million in financing by BNDES (MOURA, 2015). In addition to these major projects Andrade Gutierrez was involved in the rehabilitation of 230 km of roads in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, completed in 2014 (ZAGOPE, 2013; MACUAHUB, 2014).

Camargo Corrêa also has a number of investments and construction projects operating in Mozambique. The company was part of the consortium (led by Odebrecht) that constructed Vale’s Moatize I mine in Tete, and since 2012, the firm has a controlling stake (51 percent) in the Mozambican cement company Cimentos de Nacala (CINAC) which runs a factory in the port city of Nacala (GAZZONI, 2012; MACUAHUB, 2014).

\textsuperscript{41} Odebrecht is leading another major infrastructure project denominated BRT (Bus Rapid Transport) in the southern province of Maputo. The project is financed by BNDES to the tune of $US 220 million, and aimed at improving urban mobility in the country’s capital (MOURA, 2015).
The remaining 49 percent of CINAC’s shares are held by Insitec, a Mozambican consortium that operates primarily in the civil construction sector (MACUAHUB, 2010). Camargo Corrêa also holds a 40 percent stake in a joint Brazilian-Mozambican consortium contracted to design and construct the Mphanda Nkuwa dam and hydro-electric plant along the Zambézia River in Tete province. The project is expected to be completed by 2017 at an estimated cost of US$ 4.2 billion. Partners in the consortium include the Mozambican companies Electricidade de Moçambique and Insitec (MACUAHUB, 2015b). Presently, the Brazilian company Electrobras is also negotiating a stake in the Mphanda Nkuwa hydro-electric project, which would include the construction of two transmission lines totalling 1,300 km to supply energy to customers in South Africa and in Mozambique (ELETROBRAS, 2014).

A further project that brings together major investments in infrastructure, transportation and resource extraction in the region is the Project for Nacala Corridor Economic Development Strategies (PEDEC) led by Japan's International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the primary Japanese institution involved in the implementation of ProSAVANA. Since 2007, JICA has been financing a number of road upgrading projects in the Nacala Corridor, including the Montepuez-Lichinga Road Upgrading Project, the Nampula-Cuamba Upgrading Project and the Ile-Cuamba Road and Bridge Construction Project. In addition to these three projects, JICA and the African Development Bank are co-financing the rehabilitation of the N13 road from Cuamba to Lichinga (see Map 4) (JICA, 2013). The last three of these road projects, in particular, are of crucial importance to the development of ProSAVANA, as the roadways being rehabilitated are located directly within the ProSAVANA target area (See Map 5 in the following section 3.1.2).

42 Through its ownership stake (94.8 percent) in Cimentos de Portugal (CIMFOR), Camargo Corrêa also controls two other cement factories located in Dondo, Sofala province and in Matola, Maputo province, both of which are controlled by CIMFOR’s local subsidiary Cimentos de Moçambique (MACUAHUB, 2013b).

43 Insitec was created by Celso Correia, who has direct ties to the former president of Mozambique, Armando Guebuza, and has been called a “Guebuza protégé” (HANLON; MOSSE, 2010). In 2010, the U.S. Ambassador made serious allegations about Guebuza’s use of “his business proxies to amass a still larger personal fortune” and called Insitec a “Guebuza front company”, according to a cable released by Wikileaks (WIKILEAKS, 2010).
Much like the activities being developed under PEDEC, Vale's activities in Mozambique also overlap with those of the ProSAVANA program. Between 2010 and 2011 the company financed pre-feasibility studies to determine the land availability and agricultural potential within the Nacala Corridor and to categorize land zones according to ecological and climatic conditions (NOGUEIRA; OLLINAHO, 2013). The convergence of Brazilian mining, infrastructure and agribusiness interests in the region is further underscored by Vale’s acquisition of the Evate phosphate mine in Monapo and its plans to develop a fertilizer plant in Nacala-à-Velha (MACUAHUB, 2012)⁴⁴. As the company states on its website: “Global demand for food is increasing, while the space available on the planet to grow crops is decreasing. How can we resolve this situation? The answer lies in fertilizers: substances that raise crop yields and enable larger harvests” (VALE, 2015d). This nexus of Brazilian and Japanese private interests in the Nacala

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⁴⁴ Vale is presently Brazil’s biggest producer of phosphate and nitrogen nutrients, both key ingredients used in agricultural fertilizers. The company is also currently producing fertilizer in Peru and is developing projects in Canada, in addition to Mozambique (VALE, 2015d).
Corridor and the integrated infrastructure network presently being developed have resulted in the substantial restructuring of territory in order to promote the further expansion of global capitalism and corporate controlled commodity production chains in northern Mozambique. Through the Nacala Logistics Project, PEDEC and the territorialization of Brazilian and Japanese corporations in the Nacala Corridor, both Brazil and Japan are re-territorializing social and economic life on multiple scales—local, regional, national and global. Existing relations of power are being redefined and a new wave of corporate territoriality is spreading across the region. Beneath the veneer of development cooperation, Brazil’s commercial expansion in the Nacala Corridor exemplifies latent sub-imperialist subtext, most clearly highlighted through the close relationship between the state, its foreign policy objectives, public resources and banks and the promotion of private commercial interests.

3.1.2 Specific research site context: the ProSAVANA target area

It is within this over-arching regional context that this research analyses the triangular ProSAVANA initiative. For the purposes of this sub-section, I will only introduce the program briefly in order to contextualize the overall research site. A more detailed discussion and analysis of the program and its discursive politics and territorial implications will be presented in chapters 4 and 5.

Officially launched in April 2011, ProSAVANA is an ambitious and highly controversial trilateral cooperation program for the development of agriculture in Mozambique run by the Japanese, Brazilian and Mozambican governments. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the program was signed on September 17, 2009 by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação—ABC), Japan International Development Agency (JICA) and Mozambique’s Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG)—the primary institutions responsible for implementing ProSAVANA on behalf of the three respective signatory governments. The program envisions a radical transformation of the Mozambican Savannah through the modernization of agriculture along the Nacala Corridor. According to its official vision statement the
program seeks to promote “sustainable and inclusive agricultural development” that will “improve the living conditions for the population living in the Nacala Corridor”\(^{45}\).

Within the Nacala Corridor region, the program targets 19 districts in three provinces—Nampula, Niassa and Zambezia—and covers a total of 107,002 km\(^2\) (10.7 million hectares) (see Map 5). The districts in each province included in the program are as follows:

- **Nampula province** (10 districts): Monapo, Meconta, Muecate, Mogovolas, Rapale (Nampula), Murrupula, Mecuburi, Ribaué, Lalaua, and Malema.
- **Niassa province** (7 districts): Chimbunila (Lichinga), Ngauma, Mandiba, Cuamba, Sanga, Mujane and Mecanhelas
- **Zambezia province** (2 districts): Gurué and Alto Molócué.

**Map 5: Target area of ProSAVANA – 19 target districts**

![Map of ProSAVANA's target area](https://www.prosavana.gov.mz/index.php?p=pagina&id=9)

Source: ProSAVANA-PD, 2013, p. 3

Of the total area covered by ProSAVANA, 45 percent is located in Niassa province (4,768,700 hectares), followed by 44 percent in Nampula (4,728,800 hectares)

and 11 percent in Zambézia (1,202,700 hectares) (see Table 2). According to 2011 data, some 4.3 million people are estimated to live in the target area, the majority of which live in rural areas and depend on agriculture for their subsistence. Of the total target area population, about 60 percent live in Nampula, followed by 24 and 16 percent in the Niassa and Zambézia provinces, respectively. Average population density in the area is 40.1 persons per km², although there exists a wide variation between districts. The district of Monapo in Nampula province exhibits the highest population density of all the target districts with a ratio of 97.2 inhabitants/km², while in Majune district in Niassa province the ratio is just 3 inhabitants/km² (MASA, 2015).

Table 2: Area and population in Niassa, Nampula and Zambézia provinces, showing specific data for the ProSAVANA target area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Niassa</th>
<th>Nampula</th>
<th>Zambézia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Entire Province</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area (ha)</td>
<td>12,956,000</td>
<td>8,160,600</td>
<td>10,500,800</td>
<td>31,567,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>1,472,387</td>
<td>4,647,841</td>
<td>4,444,208</td>
<td>10,564,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (persons/km²)</td>
<td>11.41</td>
<td>56.95</td>
<td>42.32</td>
<td>33.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ProSAVANA Target Area</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area (ha)</td>
<td>4,768,700</td>
<td>4,728,800</td>
<td>1,202,700</td>
<td>10,700,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>1,049,757</td>
<td>2,556,961</td>
<td>670,697</td>
<td>4,287,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (persons/km²)</td>
<td>22.01</td>
<td>54.28</td>
<td>55.77</td>
<td>40.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part of Province</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>71.3%</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>40.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MASA, 2015, p. 3-6, adapted by author.

Given the breadth of the area of ProSAVANA’s actuation, a great deal of geographic variation exists within the target zone, which includes: coastal areas, highlands, low wetland, mountainous areas, urban suburbs and inland areas. Generally speaking, compared to Mozambique’s southern region, the country’s northern and central regions have overall adequate rainfall and soil conditions suitable for agriculture and a wide-range of food and cash crops are grown. In the ProSAVANA target area, specifically, there is estimated to be approximately 4 million hectares of non-forested arable land (see Table 3) (MASA, 2015, p. 3-7).
Table 3: Actual land cover and use in the ProSAVANA target area, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification of Land</th>
<th>Area (ha)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Total Area of Non-Arable Land</td>
<td>(2,774,700)</td>
<td>(26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Conservation Areas</td>
<td>936,000</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2. Non-productive areas (sterile lands, rocky areas, urban centers etc.)</td>
<td>1,838,700</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Total Arable Land (excluding 1.1 and 1.2)</td>
<td>(7,925,500)</td>
<td>(74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1. Forested Areas</td>
<td>3,910,500</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Non-Forested Areas</td>
<td>4,015,000</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,700,200</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MASA, 2015, p. 2-2, 3-27, adapted by the author.

Of the 4 million hectares of non-forested agricultural land in the target area, approximately 930,000 hectares are cultivated annually by 692,000 rural families (see Graph 1 and Table 4). Given that the average rural household in the region is comprised of 5 family members, it can be estimated that close to 3.5 million people in the target area (more than 80 percent) live in the countryside and are engaged in agriculture. Smallholder farming is practiced by 99 percent of all of rural households in the region, and typical farms average 1.34 hectares in size (MASA, 2015, p. 1-6).

Graph 1: Actual use of non-forested arable lands in the ProSAVANA target area

Source: MASA, 2015, p. 3-26, adapted by the author.
As Graph 1 (above) highlights, large concessions of land in the target area are controlled by private individuals and investors, with 174,900 hectares being used for agricultural purposes, 329,300 hectares for forestry plantations and 288,400 for other economic activities, such as mining and industrial processing. In contrast, the DUAT area held by communities is just 96,900 hectares, reflecting the fact that only a very small percentage of communities in the region have formalized their land claims and hold official documentation to the lands they occupy.

The small size of most farms in the target area is due to the fact that the majority of farming families till the soil by hand, using only a hoe. The main agricultural crops cultivated are maize, cassava, sorghum, beans, peanut, rice and soybeans, which represented approximately 90 percent of the total area cultivated in the target area between 2006/2007 and 2010/2011 (MASA, 2015, p. 3-27) (see Table 4). In addition to the area cultivated (930,000 hectares) by rural families, it is estimated that another 1.86 million hectares of productive farmland is set aside by smallholders as fallow land according to traditional farming practices. Most farmers in the region practice “shifting” or itinerate farming, rotating the areas that they cultivate every three to five years in order to allow soils to replenish.

Table 4: Principle agricultural crops produced in the ProSAVANA target area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Base Year (2011)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area (ha)</td>
<td>Productivity (tons per hectare)</td>
<td>Production (tons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>270,300</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>377,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassava</td>
<td>265,000</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>1,616,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>103,000</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>82,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>107,700</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>76,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peanuts</td>
<td>65,700</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>45,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>35,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soybean</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>8,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>840,700</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2,243,600</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Crops</td>
<td>89,300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>930,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MASA, 2015, p. 3-27, based on data collected by the DPASAs in Nampula, Niassa and Zambézia.
Despite the relatively high levels of agricultural production in the target area, productivity levels are low for most crops since few farmers have access to fertilizers, pesticides or irrigation. Levels of chronic malnutrition are increasing in the region and poverty levels remain high. As Table 5 highlights, between 1996/1997 and 2002/2003, poverty in all three provinces witnessed a significant decrease, attributed to increased foreign development assistance following the end of the 16 year civil war and the transitioning of the national economy to capitalism. Between 2002/2003 and 2009/2010, however, poverty levels have not improved in Nampula or Zambezia (Mozambique’s first and second most populous provinces, respectively) with levels in Nampula remaining stagnant and levels in Zambézia showing a marked increase. In contrast, Niassa, the country’s largest and most sparsely populated province experienced a notable decrease in poverty as a result of its increasing integration into the matrix of national development and massive injections of foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly in the forestry sector.

The predatory form that capital accumulation has taken in Mozambique, and its claims for poverty alleviation, have been highly criticized with many raising questions about the extent to which an economic model based on orthodox liberalism and the ever-greater injection of FDI can actually make sustainable reductions to poverty and not exacerbate further existing social inequalities (MOSCA 2012c; CASTEL-BRANCO, 2014; HANLON; SMART, 2014). As one CSO respondent in Nampula stated:

[...] unfortunately, it's hard to reconcile this reality when you have a poverty rate like our country of around 54% of the population, which has remained constant over the last 5 years, despite also maintaining a high level of economic growth at the level of 7 to 7.5%. And what one asks is when will the trickle-down of this growth happen for the development of the communities, for the well-being of the communities? ... When will we see the start of a social approach for these communities who are excluded?46

In 2014, Nampula had one of the highest levels of chronic malnutrition in the country with a rate of close to 55 percent (PAULINO, 2014). Among the districts in Nampula most affected were Murrupula, Muecate, Ribaué and Malema, all of which are

46 Interview conducted in Nampula with a member of the Provincial Platform for Civil Society Organizations of Nampula (PPOSC-N) on June 24, 2014.
included in the ProSAVANA target area. Ironically, the last two of these districts are widely referred to in the region as the bread-basket districts (“celeiros”) of Nampula province\textsuperscript{47}. In the 2013/2014 season, 6.5 million tons of diverse crops were produced by farmers in Nampula province; yet of this, cassava accounted for 81 percent (PAULINO, 2014), indicating the need for greater diversification of food crops in the province. The ProSAVANA target area is not only a considerable producer of food crops, but it is also a noteworthy participant in agricultural commodity production in Mozambique and thus in the neoliberal food regime. Traditional export crops grown in the region include cotton, tobacco, tea and cashew nut, most of which is cultivated by smallholder farmers through contract farming arrangements. In addition to these traditional cash-crops, soybean and sesame are the latest in a series of commodity trends in the region.

Table 5: Incidence of poverty in Nampula, Zambézia and Niassa, 1996-2009 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nampula</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambézia</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>70.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niassa</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Average</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Based on feasibility studies conducted by FGV Projects in the region, under ProSAVANA-PD the target area has been divided into six ecological/agroclimatic zones, each with different agricultural “vocations” (see Map 6).

\textsuperscript{47} As stated in interviews with SDAE representatives in Malema and Ribaué on June 17, 2014 and June 18, 2014, respectively.
The methodology used for the ProSAVANA area zoning was designed by FGV Projetos, a branch of Brazil’s Getúlios Vargas Foundation, which used this same methodology in bio-fuels feasibility studies conducted under cooperation agreements between Brazil and the United States and Brazil and Europe (SENATORE; MATOS, 2012). Financed by the Brazilian government and the mining company Vale, Mozambique was one of 12 countries that were included in these bio-fuels viability studies. A 2014 news report published by the Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Union (UNICA) states that:

According to the specialist of the Africa Division of FGV Projetos, Frederico Paiva, the studies have mapped the entire territory of the countries and indicated the feasibility of the production of sugarcane and other crops such as elephant grass, palm, jatropha and eucalyptus. FGV, as an additional contribution, included food crops in the analysis, such as corn, beans, cassava and soybeans, among others. Besides pointing out the viability of the crops, the studies indicate the best location for sugarcane projects, including refineries, and present a review about the regulatory framework and the environmental and social impacts of investment in African countries (UNICA, 2014, italics added by the author).
Based on this zoning methodology, each of the respective ProSAVANA target area zones (I, II, III, IV, V and VI) has been attributed certain agricultural “vocations” and specific development strategies. Table 6, shows the “Orientation for Agrarian Development” of each of these six zones, as shown in the 2015 version of the ProSAVANA Master Plan (ProSAVANA-PD) (MASA, 2015).

**Table 6: Orientation for agrarian development in the ProSAVANA zones**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Orientation for Agrarian Development</th>
<th>Crops</th>
<th>Grains and cash crops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I Monapo¹, Muecate, Mecuburi</td>
<td>• Supply surpluses of the principle crops to the urban areas of Nacala and Nampula; • Replace old cashew trees and revitalize the cashew industry; • Promote the production and processing of cotton; • Support small-scale pump irrigation and the rehabilitation of irrigation installations for vegetable production; • Develop logistics linking to the areas of Nacala and Pemba • Promote reforestation for the production of biomass as a substitute for wood (Monapo)</td>
<td>Cassava, Maize, Cow pea, Peanut</td>
<td>Cotton, Sesame, Cashew, Vegetables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Meconta, Mogovolas, Murrupula, Nampula</td>
<td>• Meet the demand within the zone of the principle food crops; • Promote various types of agroindustry in order to develop an agriculture “clusters” center; • Replace old cashew trees and revitalize the cashew industry; • Support small-scale pump irrigation and the rehabilitation of irrigation installations for vegetable production; • Use fallow land and land held under agricultural DUAT in an effective manner; • Promote reforestation for the production of biomass as a substitute for wood; • Rehabilitate the network of rural roadways</td>
<td>Cassava, Maize, Cow pea, Peanut</td>
<td>Cotton, Sesame, Cashew, Vegetables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Lalaue, Ribaue, Malema, Alto Molocue</td>
<td>• Supply surpluses of the principle crops to Zone II and Zone V; • Develop an advanced center of agricultural production; • Support small-scale pump irrigation and the rehabilitation of irrigation installations for vegetable production; • Promote the production and processing of cotton; • Develop the poultry industry; • Support commercial seed producers; • Use land held under agricultural DUAT in an effective manner (Alto Molocue); • Rehabilitate the network of rural roadways connecting to Nampula and Cuamba.</td>
<td>Cassava Maize Cow pea, Peanut, Soybean Beans</td>
<td>Soybean, Sesame, Sunflower, Cotton, Tobacco, Vegetables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Gurue (excluding Lioma)</td>
<td>• Meet the demand of the principle crops within the zone; • Supply high value crops, such as potatoes and vegetables to other areas; • Replace old tea plants and revitalize the tea industry; • Promote reforestation for the production of biomass as a substitute for wood; • Rehabilitate the network of rural roadways</td>
<td>Maize, Cassava, Cow pea, Peanut</td>
<td>Soybean, Sesame, Sunflower, Cotton, Tobacco, Vegetables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V Gurue (Lioma), Cuamba, Mechanhelas, Mandimba, Ngauma</td>
<td>• Meet the demand of the principle crops within the zone; • Promote industrial production of high value grain crops; • Support pump irrigation for vegetable production and of other high value crops; • Promote various types of agroindustry in order to develop an agricultural “clusters” center; • Support commercial seed producers; • Use land held under agricultural DUAT in an effective manner (Gurue).</td>
<td>Maize Beans</td>
<td>Soybean, Sesame, Sunflower, Cotton, Tobacco, Vegetables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Develop the logistical connection to areas internal to Mozambique and to Malawi;
Carefully manage rural development (due to very high population pressure);
Supply surpluses of the principle crops to Zone V;
Rehabilitate existing irrigation installations for vegetable production and of other high value crops;
Develop the poultry industry;
Supply potato to other areas;
Support commercial seed producers;
Rehabilitate rural roadways

| VI     | Majane, Lichinga, Sanga | Maize Beans | Soybean Sesame Sunflower Tobacco Potato Vegetables |

Source: MASA, 2015, p. 2-41, 2-42. Table elaborated by author**
*Districts in bold were visited by the author
**For the most part the table was translated directly from Portuguese to English by the author from the source (MASA, 2015). The author added in the names of the districts, not included in the original table.

Rapid population growth in the target area, estimated at about 1.8 percent per year, raises important questions about the extent to which the traditional system of extensive (shifting) farming will be able to feed the regional population twenty or thirty years from now and whether there is enough land available for rural families to continue extensive farming practices and still accommodate the growing demand for land within communities. Lands available for the natural growth of communities are already facing constraints in some districts, particularly in the western part of Nampula province where population density is relatively high. In contrast, in Niassa, Mozambique’s largest and most scarcely populated province, land availability is more abundant due to low population density in most districts. In all three provinces, however, land and resource pressures faced by communities have been exacerbated by the rapid increase in large-scale land deals and the occupation of vast tracts of arable land by foreign companies for the production of commodities for export. The cash crops of choice among foreign companies in the region are soybeans and cotton.

3.2 Methodology for ProSAVANA fieldwork

In the two chapters of this thesis to follow (chapter 4 and chapter 5), I will analyze the construction of the ProSAVANA program, from its early ideological imaginings to the present. In order to do this, I will use the aid of the available literature on the program and complement it with data obtained during field research in Mozambique between April 2014 and August 2014. In addition to an examination of official program
documents and the extensive literature on ProSAVANA, the study is based on 3 months of fieldwork and 49 formal and informal interviews with stakeholders (such as CSOs, government institutions, private entities, official program representatives and peasants and local communities) situated in the Maputo, Zambezia or Nampula provinces (see Appendix 1). The majority of interviews (44 out of 49) were conducted in the Nampula province in the districts of Monapo, Mogovolas, Malema, Ribauè and Nampula Cidade. Of the remaining five interviews, two were conducted in Zambézia province (in the capital city, Quelimane, and the district of Guruè) and three were conducted in Maputo (one of which was via Skype) (see Table 7). All interviews related to research on ProSAVANA in the three abovementioned provinces were conducted between April 23, 2014 and July 22, 2014, with the exception of the interview conducted via Skype, which occurred in September 2014. Additionally, I was a participant observer at the Triangular Conference of the People of Mozambique, Brazil and Japan II (Conferência Triangular dos Povos – Moçambique, Brasil e Japão II), hosted by a coalition of civil society organizations, including Justiça Ambiental and UNAC, in Maputo on 24 July, 2014. At the event ProSAVANA was intensely discussed and debated by a number of stakeholders involved in, concerned about, or opposed to the program and its implementation, including CSOs, academics and official representatives from the three implementing governments.

**Table 7: Geographic distribution of interviews conducted related to research on ProSAVANA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Number of interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nampula</td>
<td>Monapo</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mogovolas</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malema</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ribauè</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nampula Cidade</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambézia</td>
<td>Quelimane Cidade</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guruè</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo</td>
<td>Maputo Cidade</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the Zambézia and Nampula provinces, all interviews were conducted in districts targeted by the ProSAVANA program—with the exception of the city of Quelimane in Zambézia, which is not linked to the ProSAVANA area. The six primary fieldwork districts of Monapo (Zone I), Mogovolas and Nampula Cidade (Zone II), Malema and Ribauè (Zone III), and Guruè (Lioma in Zone V) can be located on Map 5 and Map 6 in the above sub-section (3.1.2) which shows all of the 19 districts targeted by ProSAVANA and ‘district-wise’ agricultural zoning. The six districts just mentioned had been identified by the author as areas of interest for fieldwork prior to arriving in Mozambique, based on a careful reading and analysis of the first version of the ProSAVANA Master Plan, dated March 2013, and the subsequent Concept Note on ProSAVANA that was released that same year. However, upon arriving in Mozambique, in particular, in the Nacala Corridor, the final determination of the fieldwork locations was based on information received by local contacts and interview respondents.

Given that ProSAVANA was (and still is) in an incipient phase of implementation, at the time of fieldwork only a small number of initiatives directly related to the program were in an operational stage. Identifying and locating these initiatives posed a major challenge, especially due to an overall lack of publically available information regarding the program, and the invariable unwillingness of most official representatives of the ProSAVANA coordination unit in Nampula and Maputo to reveal specific details regarding ongoing projects or to concede to an interview with the author. This lack of transparency and access to information also affected CSOs based in Nampula City and peasant farmers in rural areas, and shaped the overall research setting which was characterized by widespread uncertainty, discontent and fear in relation to ProSAVANA. Aside from a number of pilot-projects being implemented under ProSAVANA-PEM and activities being developed under ProSAVANA-PI (each of which will be discussed in more detail below), interview respondents were unable (or unwilling) to identify any other specific projects related to ProSAVANA.

As previously mentioned, the area targeted by the program is home to a number of foreign investments in agriculture, mining and forestry, and large-scale acquisitions of agricultural land are a perceptible reality. Thus, almost all interview respondents (specifically CSOs, peasants and government officials) identified cases of 'land-grabs'
or ‘land-deals’ (depending on the perspective of each individual respondent) involving agricultural corporations, and pointed to a wide-range of adverse impacts that specific projects had on local communities. It is important to mention only one Brazilian company (Pinesso) was identified in the ProSAVANA target area (see below). Aside from this company, which is a partner in the company AgroMoz operating in Lioma, Gurué, none of the 49 respondents interviewed had any knowledge of the existence of any other Brazilian agribusiness operating in the region, and fieldwork in the districts visited by the author did not provide any evidence to the contrary.

The company AgroMoz (visited by the author) is a joint venture involving the Brazilian company Pinesso, the Grupo Américo Amorim of Portugal and the Mozambican firm Inistec (CANEZIN, 2012, p. 58; JOSÉ, 2012), and has a DUAT for approximately 10,000 hectares in the administrative post of Gurué. AgroMoz began operations in the 2013/2014 season cultivating 2,100 hectares, in soybean and rice on 1,700 and 400 hectares respectively (UNAC; GRAIN, 2015). The company is suspected by CSOs and local peasants to have been implemented under the auspices of ProSAVANA, an allegation that was denied by the government officials interviewed. In addition, one Japanese company was also identified by a number of interview respondents, and fieldwork conducted to follow up on these claims confirmed that the Japanese company Nitori had indeed acquired a DUAT for 1,000 hectares in the district of Malema for the cultivation of cotton. As with AgroMoz, a number of peasant farmers and CSOs believe that Nitori is part of ProSAVANA; government officials and ProSAVANA representatives also deny these allegations and claim that the company has no ties to the program.

Given the reality of land-grabbing and the dispossession of peasant families in many districts targeted by ProSAVANA, and the extent of the concern over the program’s plans for the region, there was a significant degree of confusion among respondents regarding whether foreign firms and their activities in the region were ProSAVANA-related or not. In one particular case, I received a text message from a CSO informant who claimed that conflicts had been reported by members of three local communities as the result of a “prosavanista”, a term used to refer to a company or individual linked to, or suspected to be linked to ProSAVANA. The informant claimed
that this “prosavaniista” was looking for land in Monapo district in the administrative post of Itoculo. Upon arriving in Monapo, and interviewing several community members and traditional leaders in the area, as well as the District Services for Agriculture, it was revealed that the company in question was in fact a South African-based company called AlfaAgricultura, which already has a DUAT for approximately 1,000 hectares in the administrative post of Namialo where it cultivates soybeans. This case illustrates how the uncertainty related to ProSAVANA led to instances of misinformation regarding the program’s actual activities and the unearthing of land-grabbing cases that, while not directly relevant to research on ProSAVANA, still contributed to the fieldwork by allowing for a better understanding of the reality of large-scale agricultural land investments in the region, as well as the formal processes involved in the negotiation of land deals and the types of territorial and social conflicts resulting from these foreign acquisitions.

While the majority of interview subjects had varying degrees of awareness and prior knowledge about ProSAVANA, it is important to note that not all respondents had heard of the program. Interview subjects in the districts were selected by snowball sampling. Given the remoteness of many rural communities and the communities’ potential wariness of outsiders, in some cases it was essential to utilize contacts with access to the communities, such as local inhabitants, community members or CSO representatives who work in the region in order to gain access. Additionally, rural areas and communities are difficult to navigate without a guide from within the community or district/locality itself largely because there are little or no road signs or visible markers of addresses. Local contacts helped locate interviewees related to the ProSAVANA pilot-projects, particularly in the districts of Mogovolas, Ribauè and Malema as well as other interviewees of interest to the research being done. Interviews were conducted with individuals and in groups. All fieldwork carried out in the specific districts of Monapo, Malema, Ribauè and Guruè was conducted in conjunction with a researcher from the Observatório do Meio Rural (OMR), based in Maputo, while fieldwork conducted in all other districts (Nampula Cidade, Mogovolas, Quelimane Cidade and Maputo) was carried out individually by the author or with the assistance of local contacts.
A series of interview schedules following a semi-structured format were prepared for each of the following different types of stakeholders involved in, or affected by, the ProSAVANA program prior to initiating fieldwork activities: government officials, representatives of ProSAVANA, CSOs, agribusiness, peasants or peasant organizations involved in, affected by or with knowledge of ProSAVANA. Due to a number of specific and unforeseen factors and challenges which presented themselves during actual fieldwork, virtually all interview schedules had to undergo impromptu structural changes of a drastic nature in order to maintain their relevance to the research at hand. The reasons for making these changes are outlined below:

a) At the time of research the program was in a very incipient phase of its development, therefore there were few projects actually being implemented and that could be identified/located ‘on the ground’;

b) The reluctance, or in most cases, outright refusal of government officials or official representatives of ProSAVANA to concede to interviews, give out specific details regarding the program or even talk about ProSAVANA more generally;

c) The timing of the research corresponded with a major push in the uprising against ProSAVANA and the launching of the National ‘No to ProSAVANA Campaign’. This only further added to the unwillingness of public officials and program representatives to discuss the topic of ProSAVANA.

d) The lack of transparency and publically available information on the program, combined with the high degree of confusion, uncertainty and fear that permeated civil society during the period of fieldwork. A direct result of this was that few specific details related to actual ongoing ProSAVANA-related projects could be identified by CSOs and non-ProSAVANA related cases were frequently confused as being part of the ‘ProSAVANA plan’;

e) There was a wide geographical distribution of the few ProSAVANA-related projects identified by interview respondents in different districts. This limited the number of projects that could be investigated due to time and logistical restraints;
f) Of the four cases related to ProSAVANA that were investigated, all were in a very early phase of development and thus a concrete assessment of the outcome of territorial impacts of projects could not be ascertained.

In light of the abovementioned circumstances, in each of the specific fieldwork districts it was necessary to locate contacts with verifiable information about ProSAVANA and ProSAVANA-related projects and with knowledge of the specific localities where projects were being implemented. In the districts of Monapo, Ribauè, Malema and Guruè in particular, almost all interviews had to be adapted *in situ* to account for local realities, newly uncovered information, sudden or unexpected opportunities and unforeseen situations and circumstances. In Nampula, interviews had to be re-structured in order to focus on understanding the discursive politics surrounding ProSAVANA in the region (as opposed to understanding impacts of ProSAVANA), with the specific aim to elicit personal narratives, experiences, perspectives, understandings, concerns and positions that individuals and specific institutions had regarding ProSAVANA.

All names have been changed to ensure the anonymity of individual interview respondents. Only the name of the organization or institution to which an individual respondent is affiliated will be mentioned. The author transcribed all interviews from audio-recordings with the assistance of a close confidant and translations of the interviews were done by the author. The interviews are meant to complement existing literature and data on the topic and should be seen as the opinions and perspectives of the stakeholders themselves.

The following statement made by a CSO respondent in Nampula accurately describes the opaque nature of ProSAVANA in the target area at the time of research:

I think that ProSAVANA has other objectives, different than those which it publically advocates. [...] Today, few people, few Mozambicans know about ProSAVANA, even governors cannot explain what ProSAVANA is ... And if you listen to three or four governors, they will give you different opinions. The only thing that they can say is that this program came to revolutionize agriculture, but in which way? What are the models? What is the strategy? No one can explain; no one. In addition, some say that ProSAVANA is still being conceived, that it does not exist yet, or that it has not yet begun to be implemented, but within these same people,
there are those who say that ProSAVANA is already producing positive effects. “Thanks to ProSAVANA, farmers already know how to do this, how to do that” [...]. I think that here we clearly see an image that ProSAVANA is something that nobody knows, at least those who are defending [the program] do not know exactly what they want to do with ProSAVANA.\footnote{Interview conducted with a member of ORAM in Nampula on June 20, 2014.}
CHAPTER 4
ProSAVANA and its early development (2009-2014)

Building on the conceptual framework highlighted in chapter two and the methodological framework outlined in chapter three of this thesis, in the current chapter the early genesis and competing narratives on ProSAVANA and the role of civil society and social movements are presented and analyzed with particular reference to the paradigmatic debates (described in section 2.3) and the theoretical framings of territorial disputes (see section 2.1). I will look specifically at the discursive politics related to ProSAVANA and examine the policies and strategies promoted by Brazil through the program in the period between 2009 and 2014. I will concentrate on how Brazilian commercial interests intersect with its development cooperation through ProSAVANA and the ways in which the agrarian dualism and paradigm debates that shape agricultural development policy and practice in Brazil are being reflected through the program.

4.1 Early political discourse and the genesis of ProSAVANA

In recent years, the ProSAVANA program has attracted considerable international attention and has been at the center of a growing number of academic studies (FUNADA-CLASSEN 2013a; 2013b; CLEMENTS; FERNANDES, 2013; NOGUEIRA, 2013; NOGUEIRA; OLLINAHOO, 2013; FERRANDO, 2013; CABRAL et al. 2013; SCHELESINGER, 2014; MOSCA, 2014; EKMAN; MACAMO 2014; CABRAL 2015; MOSCA; BRUNA, 2015; FINGERMANN, 2015; OKADA, 2015). The program has also been widely studied by Mozambican and international CSOs, many of which strongly condemn the way the program has been designed (from the top-down and with no participation of Mozambican CSOs) and how it is currently being implemented by the Brazilian, Japanese and Mozambican governments and their respective state institutions (in an exclusionary manner, shrouded in secrecy and without civil society approval) (UNAC, 2012, JUSTIÇA AMBIENTAL, 2013a; UNAC et. al, 2013; JUSTIÇA AMBIENTAL et al., 2013; ATTAC JAPAN et al., 2013).
Since the signing of the ProSAVANA agreement on September 17 2009, the three signatory governments have consistently demonstrated an aversion to engage in meaningful dialogue with Mozambican civil society and have failed to appropriately address the concerns and demands that have been expressed by local CSOs (discussed in more detail below). Instead, individuals and groups who have raised critical questions or expressed legitimate concerns regarding the model, objectives, and potential or real social, environmental and territorial impacts of ProSAVANA, have been ignored, admonished or labelled as “anti-development” activists\(^49\). In 2014, CSO dissatisfaction and frustration reached an apex, culminating in the launch of a national campaign against ProSAVANA under the banner “No to ProSAVANA!” (UNAC et al., 2014). Initiated by a coalition of national CSOs\(^50\), the campaign calls for the indefinite termination of ProSAVANA and is supported by a number of international and Brazilian CSOs\(^51\).

In order to understand the current contentions and paradigmatic debates surrounding ProSAVANA at present, it is crucial to first examine the official political discourse on the program, from its inception in 2009 until 2014. As this section highlights, the uprising against ProSAVANA, beginning in late 2012, emerged in a particular historical and political context, as a direct response to the official narrative of ProSAVANA at that time, which unequivocally promoted the territorialization of Brazilian agribusiness interests and the territoriality of an agribusiness model of agricultural development in Mozambique. Indeed, at the heart of the ongoing contentions over ProSAVANA is a heated paradigmatic dispute between different stakeholders (the state and civil society) over different models of agricultural development—an agribusiness-centered model or a peasant-centered model—each of which encapsulates drastically different ideas about what development means, how it is best achieved, and the way in

\(^49\) This was expressed in a number of interviews with CSOs conducted by the author, namely CSO respondents 1, 2, 3, 11, 12, 15 and 16, which occurred between the April 23, 2014 and July 1, 2014.

\(^50\) Including the National Peasant Union (UNAC); Liga Moçambicana dos Direitos Humanos (LDH); Justiça Ambiental-JA; Accão Académica para o Desenvolvimento das Comunidades Rurais (ADECRA); Fórum Mulher; Actionaid Moçambique Associação de Apoio e Assistência Jurídica as Comunidades (AAAC); Livinango and Kulima.

\(^51\) Such as the National Confederation of Rural Workers (CONTAG), the Movement of Peasant Women (MMA), the Movement of Smallholder Producers (MPA) and FASE from Brazil as well as the international peasants’ movement *Via Campesina* and the Spanish-based NGO GRAIN.
which the benefits (and risks) associated with development are ultimately distributed among those involved in the process.

It is critical to understand that, from the beginning, the ProSAVANA program was neither conceived of as a way to meet the actual needs of local people living in northern Mozambique, nor was there any consultation with local farmers or CSOs in the Nacala Corridor prior to the signing of the MoU in 2009. Rather, the program originated as part of an existing cooperative arrangement between Japan and Brazil established on March 28, 2000, known as the Japan-Brazil Partnership Programme (JBPP), and was designed entirely behind closed doors by top-level politicians and diplomatic officials.

The JBPP set up a tripartite framework for intergovernmental development cooperation and sought to boost the political and economic prestige of Brazil and Japan in the global arena by increasing the visibility of both countries as providers of international development cooperation and promoting greater participation in multilateral forums, such as the United Nations, G20 and the BRICS (FUNADA-CLASSEN, 2013a). In April 2007, then Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim and former President of JICA, Sadako Ogata, announced the “strengthening of the Assistance for Africa through cooperation under the framework of JBPP” and in April 2009, JICA and ABC signed an agreement “to confirm common interest in the ‘Japan-Brazil Partnership Programme on Cooperation for the Development of African Tropical Savannah, based on the results of the Program of Brazil-Japan Cooperation for the Brazilian Cerrado Development’ also known as PRODECER (JICA; ABC; Republic of Mozambique, 2009). A few months later, in July 2009, at the G8 Summit held in L’Aquila, Italy, former Brazilian President, Lula, and Prime Minister of Japan, Taro Aso, “agreed on promoting the agricultural development of Mozambique through cooperation under JBPP, applying the knowledge acquired during [the] implementation of [PRODECER]” (JICA; ABC; Republic of Mozambique, 2009).

On September 17, 2009 the ProSAVANA program was signed into creation under the formal name PROSAVANA-JBM (Japan, Brazil and Mozambique). The triangular agreement, presented by Brazil and Japan as a ‘win-win-win’ partnership, aimed to modernize agriculture in the tropical savannah region in northern Mozambique through the transfer of Brazilian tropical agricultural technology and the infusion of
Japanese capital (HONGO, 2009). According to the ‘Minute of Meeting’ signed in 2009, the objective of the program was “to create new models of sustainable agricultural development” in Mozambique’s Nacala Corridor, that were “market-oriented...with a competitive edge”, specifically, “taking into account the similarities of [the region’s] natural environment with the Brazilian Cerrado region” (JICA; ABC; Republic of Mozambique, 2009).

ProSAVANA was clearly inspired by PRODECER, a bilateral development program implemented by the Brazilian and Japanese governments in the 1980s and 1990s in Brazil’s Cerrado biome. The Cerrado, classified as a biologically diverse wooded tropical savannah, is Brazil’s second largest biome next to the Amazon Rainforest, and covers over 200 million hectares stretching across most of the country’s mid-western region and parts of the north (Tocantins) and northeast (Bahia and Maranhão)\(^52\). With the introduction of PRODECER, the government sought to incorporate large areas of the Cerrado into the national and international commodity production process through colonization projects and agricultural subsidies. The colonization projects, carried out under the purview of the program, assisted over 700 medium and large-scale farmers, mainly European or Japanese descendants from southern Brazil, to acquire large tracts of land in the country’s mid-western region, but also in Bahia, Maranhão and Tocantins\(^53\). In addition to land, these ‘select’ farmers received generous subsidies from the government to develop large-scale mechanized farming operations focused on monoculture agriculture and the production of key export commodities such as corn, cotton and soybean (with considerable emphasis on the latter) (INOCÊNCIO, 2010).

Agricultural research conducted by Embrapa under the auspices of the program, and heavily financed by Japan, led to the development of cutting-edge technologies

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\(^{52}\) Eight Brazilian states are covered by or partly covered by the Cerrado: Minas Gerais, Goiás, Tocantins, Bahia, Maranhão, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Piauí and the Distrito Federal (Brasília).

\(^{53}\) The program developed in three stages (PRODECER I, II and III) beginning in 1981, in Minas Gerais, with a pilot-project of close to 58,745 hectares. The second phase began in 1987, and included additional projects in Minas Gerais, as well as projects in Bahia, Goias, Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul, covering approximately 200,000 hectares. In its final phase, beginning in 1994 and ending in 2001, the program expanded the agricultural frontier in the north and northeast, implementing two pilot-projects in Tocantins and Maranhão, respectively, each of which covered 40,000 hectare. In total, PRODECER involved the implementation of 21 projects on 350,000 hectares of land located in the seven states. Total investments for the twenty-year long program amounted to $US 570 million, split roughly even between the Brazilian and Japanese governments (MATOS, PESSÔA, 2014).
(seeds, fertilizers and pesticides) specifically suited to agriculture in tropical regions. These technologies, widely diffused under PRODEREC, combined with the intensive infusion of capital, low land prices and mechanization, played a central role in the modernization of agriculture in the Cerrado and the institutionalization of the agribusiness model of development that now predominates in the region (SCHELLSINGER, 2014). Prior to the 1970s, the Cerrado was of little significance to the economic development of the country, and much of its soil was considered to be unfit for commercial agriculture (HOSONO; HONGO, 2012). Today the region, commonly referred to as the ‘breadbasket’ of Brazil, is a significant producer of agricultural export commodities and thus a major participant in the global corporate food-regime. In 2010, soybean and corn produced in Brazil’s center-west accounted for 46 percent and 31 percent of total national production, respectively (MATOS; PESSÔA, 2014). In the words of prominent JICA representative, Akio Hosano: “the Cerrado development is an achievement, sometimes called ‘historic,’ made possible by Brazil-Japan cooperation” (HOSONO, 2012, p. 11). Through this cooperation the “tropical savannah in Brazil, once regarded as a barren plateau, has been transformed into one of the world’s largest and most productive...agricultural regions” (HOSONO, 2012, p. 43).

The focus on export commodities and their territoriality in the Cerrado is exemplified by production statistics for Brazil’s center-west between 1970 and 2010, as shown in Table 8. It is important to note that while the production of soybean, corn and cotton has increased dramatically since 1970, the production of food products, such as rice and beans, important staples in the Brazilian diet, has been insignificant in comparison54, experiencing much slower rates of growth (as in the case of beans) or constant fluctuations followed by a drastic reduction (in the case of rice).

54 Brazil is currently a net importer of beans and rice, importing 130,000 and 750,000 tons, respectively, to meet domestic consumption in 2014/2015. Of Brazil’s total total grain production for the the same growing season, estimated at 200.8 million tons, beans accounted for only 2 percent of this total, while rice accounted for 6 percent. In comparison, soybean and maize represented 46 and 40 percent of total production, respectively (CONAB, 2015).
Table 8: The production of main crops in Brazil’s Center-West region, 1970-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cotton (Tonnes)</th>
<th>Corn (Tonnes)</th>
<th>Soybean (Tonnes)</th>
<th>Rice (Tonnes)</th>
<th>Beans (Tonnes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>114,959</td>
<td>807,405</td>
<td>24,778</td>
<td>1,331,971</td>
<td>130,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>81,581</td>
<td>1,344,696</td>
<td>250,411</td>
<td>2,086,270</td>
<td>111,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>106,383</td>
<td>1,603,536</td>
<td>1,590,967</td>
<td>2,725,295</td>
<td>124,275</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>200,460</td>
<td>2,010,986</td>
<td>4,646,369</td>
<td>1,624,990</td>
<td>149,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/1996</td>
<td>269,438</td>
<td>5,616,168</td>
<td>8,246,396</td>
<td>952,758</td>
<td>115,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1,387,968</td>
<td>6,297,443</td>
<td>15,446,445</td>
<td>2,374,964</td>
<td>267,136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2,307,568</td>
<td>7,857,797</td>
<td>28,652,564</td>
<td>2,862,821</td>
<td>406,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,784,448</td>
<td>16,900,451</td>
<td>31,558,236</td>
<td>1,051,288</td>
<td>503,573</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The PRODECER experience and its significance in transforming the Cerrado into Brazil’s ‘breadbasket’ underwrite the entire ProSAVANA narrative, especially from 2009 until 2013. ProSAVANA was presented as a program seeking to replicate the success of the Cerrado in Mozambique’s Nacala Corridor, with PRODECER serving as an expedient model for the cooperative venture. In order to justify the applicability of Embrapa’s agricultural technology and give credence to Brazil and Japan’s plan to “bring the success of the Cerrado to the Nacala Corridor,” endaphoclimatic similarities between the Brazilian Cerrado and the Mozambican tropical savannah, located within the same latitude parallels (13°S and 17°S), were strongly emphasized (SANTANA, 2011; HOSONO, 2012; BATISTELLA; BOLFE, 2010; ZAIA, 2012). Figure 1 (below), was used in a 2010 publication by Embrapa entitled Parallels: Nacala Corridor in order to highlight the similar geographic coordinates of the Brazilian Cerrado and the Nacala Corridor region. In the publication, the ecological and climatic similarities between the Brazilian Cerrado and the Guinean African savannah zone, said to cover about 70 percent of Mozambique’s total territory (approximately 540 thousand km²), are specifically noted. “It is expected that Brazilian agricultural technologies developed for [the] cerrado be tested and validated in the Nacala Corridor so that Mozambican producers can also take advantage of their benefits” explains Embrapa (BATISTELLA; BOLFE, 2010, p. 48).
The Guinean Savannah belt covers “about 700 million hectares, of which approximately 400 million hectares are arable. This is the largest non-used agricultural area in the world”. This assertion, central to the early ProSAVANA discourse, is found in the “Minute of Meeting” signed in September 2009. The statement is derived from a 2009 World Bank report entitled ‘Awakening Africa’s Sleeping Giant: Prospects for Commercial Agriculture in the Guinea Savannah Zone and beyond’. The World Bank report describes the African Savannah as “one of the largest underused agricultural land reserves in the world”, with “agroclimatic features...similar to [those] found in the Cerrado region of Brazil” (WORLD BANK, 2009, p. 2), and presents the Brazilian Cerrado experience as an agricultural model that could potentially be applied in order to incorporate this “sleeping giant” into the global commodity production process. The same report states that, “Mozambique is home to immense tracts of unused forests and sparsely populated savannah land. Nearly one-half (46 percent) of the national lands are cultivatable, yet only 10 percent is currently farmed” (WORLD BANK, 2009, p.51).

In a subsequent report by the World Bank, Mozambique is identified as one of seven countries—along with Sudan, Brazil, Australia, Russia, Argentina and the Democratic Republic of Congo—“with the largest amount of land available” for large-scale land investments (DEININGER; BYERLEE, 2011, p. 79).

As a result of the global food price crisis of 2007-2008, the question of global food security gained greater international attention with discussions centering on how to
increase commodity production and expanding the agricultural frontier globally to ensure future supply. In 2009, FAO announced that in order to meet the future food and feed demand of the global population in 2050 (projected to be over 9 billion people) world food production will need to increase by 70%. This would require expanding the arable area “by around 120 million hectares in developing countries, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America”, taking into consideration that “arable land in use in developed countries is expected to decline by some 50 million hectares” mainly due to degradation and the expansion of bio-fuels production (FAO, 2009). This declaration has frequently been referenced in order to further justify the ProSAVANA mission to modernize agriculture in the Nacala Corridor (BATISTELLA; BOLFE, 2010; BOLFE et al. 2011). Against this background, the focus of cooperation under the Japan-Brazil Partnership Program shifted in 2010 toward “the new concept of ‘Japan-Brazil Global Partnership for the solution of global issues’” (HOSONO, 2012, p. 55), with ProSAVANA viewed as a means to “contribute not only to guaranteeing food security of the [Mozambican] population and to promoting the socioeconomic development of the [Nacala Corridor] but also to enhancing food security globally” (JICA; ABC; Republic of Mozambique, 2009).

Private Brazilian and Japanese enterprises were openly encouraged to participate in the transformation of agriculture in the Nacala Corridor (see Table 9), which was presented in the dominant discourse as a largely “uncultivated” and/or “unproductive” region with cheap land waiting to be developed by investors with the necessary technology, capital and agricultural know-how. Affirmations made by the Mozambican Minister of Agriculture José Pacheco and Mozambican Prime Minister, Aires Bonifácio Baptista Ali in 2011/2012 only reinforced the existing narrative of land abundance and large-scale farming opportunities. Additionally, in 2011, Carlos Ernesto Augustin, President of the Mato-Grosso Association of Cotton Producers (Ampa), was cited in the Brazilian newspaper, Folha de São Paulo, calling Mozambique “a Mato Grosso in the middle of Africa, with land for free, with no environmental

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55 The Folha de São Paulo cites Pacheco as having stated that: “Brazilian farmers have accumulated experience that is very welcome. We want to repeat in Mozambique what they did in the Cerrado 30 years ago” (MELLOS, 2011)
56 In the Brazilian news source Valor Econômico, Ali was quoted saying that the “Brazilian presence [in Mozambique] is extremely important” and that “We [the Mozambican government] want to reaffirm our commitment so that Brazilian entrepreneurs find a fertile field” (EXMAN, 2012).
obstacles and a cheaper shipping cost to China (MELLOS, 2011). This statement embodies the underlying suppositions held in many Brazilian business circles at the time.

Between 2009 and 2013, a number of seminars and presentations were organized by ABC, Embrapa, JICA, CCIABM and FGV in Brazil and Mozambique in order to promote the opportunities for agribusiness development in Mozambique, and a succession of business delegations were deployed to the country for potential investors to ‘get to know’ the ProSAVANA target area and learn about the possibilities for land and business deals. Table 9 presents a timeline highlighting some of the main events, presentations and business missions that took place during this period.

**Table 9: Missions and meetings to promote ProSAVANA and private investment in the Nacala Corridor region, 2010-2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type of Event</th>
<th>Name/Topic of Event</th>
<th>Persons/Institutions Involved/Attending</th>
<th>Observations from/about Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2010</td>
<td>Mozambique: Maputo/ Tete/ Nacala Corridor</td>
<td>Meetings/ Business/ Diplomatic Delegation</td>
<td>ProSAVANA</td>
<td>Kátia Abreu (CNA/SENAI); Ademar Silva Júnior (CNA); José Pacheco (MINAG); Susumu Segawa (Japan Ambassador); Antônio José Maria de Souza e Silva (Brazil Ambassador); Masami Shukunobe (JICA); Assuero Doca Veronez (CNA); José Mário Schreiner (CNA); Rui Prado (CNA)</td>
<td>&quot;Mozambique has a very special location, not only for the African market, but also to the Middle East as well as China and Japan to right, Brazil and Latin America to the left.&quot; – Kátia Abreu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2011 (15th)</td>
<td>Brazil, São Paulo</td>
<td>Seminar</td>
<td>&quot;International Agribusiness in Mozambique: Cooperation Brazil-Japan and Opportunities for Investment&quot;</td>
<td>Event organized by ABC, Embrapa and JICA. At least 200 participants attended the event including: Mateus Batistella, Edson Bolfe, Francisco Basílio de Souza and Pedro Arraes (Embrapa) Lourenço Sambo (CPI), Kátia Abreu (CNA), Roberto Rodrigues (FIESP); Masaki Kondo (Mitsubishi Corporation), representatives of development banks (i.e. BNDES), and Brazilian and Japanese multinationals and agribusinesses.</td>
<td>&quot;According to the head of the Secretariat of the Embrapa International Relations, Francisco Basílio de Souza, an important component of structuring technical cooperation projects is attracting investments.&quot; – Santana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2011 (5th- 15th)</td>
<td>Mozambique: Maputo/ Cuamba/ Lichinga/ Nacala</td>
<td>Business Delegation</td>
<td>ProSAVANA/ Exploring agricultural opportunities</td>
<td>Delegation organized by CCIABM. Participants included “a group of businessmen from the south of Brazil”.</td>
<td>&quot;The aim of the Mission is to promote visits in the northern region (ProSavana Project) [and]...in the agricultural region of the Nacala Corridor....to promote the agrarian sector in Mozambique, developing and promoting partnerships between Brazil and Mozambique – CCIABM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2011 (19th- 26th)</td>
<td>Mozambique: Maputo and other locations</td>
<td>Business Delegation/ Event/ Seminar/ Meetings</td>
<td>Exploring business opportunities</td>
<td>Delegation and event organized by CCIABM in partnership with APEX Brazil and MDIC. Over 150 participants were present at the main event held in Maputo, including: Ney Bittencourt and Pedro Cardoso (Brazilian Embassy Representative and Secretary); Murade Murargy (Ambassador of Mozambique in Brazil); Representatives from CPI Mozambique and from 60 Brazilian</td>
<td>&quot;In view of this continued growth of investments in the country, the Mission of CCIABM sought to align the goals of the participants to the opportunities that are arising from this internal development – CCIABM&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
businesses, including Vale, Camargo Corrêa, Odebrecht, and Zagope-Andrade Gutierrez.

### April 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location/Corridor</th>
<th>Event Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique: Maputo/Nacala Corridor</td>
<td>Business/ Diplomatic Delegation/ Seminar</td>
<td>ProSavana Exploring agricultural opportunities</td>
<td>The Brazilian team included 20 persons (politicians and entrepreneurs linked to the agricultural sector, cooperatives and associations of soybeans of Mato Grosso) and was lead by Deputy Luiz Nishimori (PSDB-PR). The Japanese team was comprised of 17 persons (representatives of JICA and government officials) and was headed by Eiji Inui (JICA).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### April 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location/Corridor</th>
<th>Event Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil, Minas Gerais</td>
<td>Seminar</td>
<td>&quot;Brazil and Mozambique Together in the Fight against Poverty and Hunger through Agricultural Development&quot;</td>
<td>Seminar realized by CCIABM with the support of Embrapa.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### July 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location/Corridor</th>
<th>Event Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil, Brasilia</td>
<td>Seminar</td>
<td>Launching of the Agricultural Investment Fund for the Nacala Corridor (Nacala Fund) Seminar</td>
<td>Event organized by FGV, with the support of ABC, FAO, Embrapa, CCIABM, MINAG, JICA and 4iGREEN. In the official preliminary program for the seminar the following persons are noted as participants: President Dilma Rousseff; Antônio Patriota (MRE); Jorge Alberto Portanova Mendes Ribeiro (Brazilian Minister of Agriculture); Mozambican President Armando Guebuza; Aires Bonifácio Baptista Ali (Mozambican Prime Minister); José Pacheco (Mozambican Minister of Agriculture); Akira Miwa (Japanese Ambassador in Brazil); Satoshi Murosawa (JICA); José Graziano (FAO); Marco Farani (ABC); Pedro Araes (Embrapa); Carlos Ivan Simonsen Leal (FGV); Cesar Cunha Campos (FGV); Roberto Rodrigues (FGV); Cleber Guarany (FGV).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Oct. 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location/Corridor</th>
<th>Event Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>ProSavana Exploring agricultural opportunities</td>
<td>Organized by CCIABM, in partnership with the Rural Workers Union of Guarapuva in order to present information about an upcoming business mission to Mozambique and South Africa in 2013. Main participants at the meeting include rural producers and Director of CCIABM, Paulo Rago.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Feb./ Mar. 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location/Corridor</th>
<th>Event Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique: Maputo/ Nampula/ Niassa South Africa/ Durban</td>
<td>Business Delegation/ Events/ Meetings</td>
<td>ProSavana Exploring agribusiness opportunities</td>
<td>Organized by CCIABM, in partnership with the Rural Workers Union of Guarapuva. The delegation included agribusiness representatives from Parana, Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul and was accompanied by Fábio Vale and Flávio Sotelo (CCIABM). Agricultural areas in the ProSavana region were visited as well as Embapra’s field testing sites at the IIAM centers in Nampula and Niassa. Participants also attended the 2013 World Soy Congress held in Durban, South Africa.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Based on the outcome of business delegations and preliminary findings of feasibility, agroecological and socioeconomic studies conducted in the Nacala Corridor, mainly by JICA, FGV and Embrapa, by mid-2012 the discourse shifted as empirical facts emerged which, combined with firsthand knowledge of the Nacala Corridor area, demonstrated what Mozambican CSOs already knew and had been saying all along. Far from a “barren”, “unproductive” and “empty” savannah resembling the Brazilian Cerrado in the 1970s, the Nacala Corridor is one of Mozambique’s most populous regions and demonstrates high levels of agricultural production, precisely due to the rich soils that cover much of the corridor’s territory (FUNADA-CLASSEN, 2013a; JAIANTILAL, 2013).

Contrary to the widely popularized myth, in the Nacala Corridor, contingent blocks of land, tens or hundreds of thousands of hectares in size, are not simply “free” for the taking; most of the best agricultural areas and land located along the main roads are already occupied by peasant communities who have legal title over these areas under systems of customary tenure ship. Moreover, much of the land that is not currently being used, and thus viewed by potential investors as unoccupied, is in fact fallow land claimed by local inhabitants under the traditional system of itinerant farming. These “new revelations” effectively called into question the entire ideological foundation upon which ProSAVANA had thus far been conceived, justified, designed, and promoted.

“It’s not a question of turning up and requesting 70,000 hectares and [then] start planting as some Brazilians seem to think” explains Luis Perreira of TechnoServe57, a U.S.-based non-profit which has been promoting the cultivation of soybeans among

57 Founded in 1968, TechnoServe is “one of the top five NGOs for corporate partnerships” in the United States and has worked in over 40 countries to create or expand business in the agricultural sector. Some of its main corporate partners include: Cargill, The Coca-Cola Company, General Mills, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Nestle-Nespresso, and Olam International (EDER, 2010). In 2004, TechnoServe and the US-based NGO Clusa jointly implemented a support program in Mozambique to promote soybean production among smallholder farmers. For over a decade now, TechnoServe has played a key role in both soybean and chicken production in the country, establishing connections between soybean producers and local chicken farmers through a number of different projects. Financing has come from a number of sources, including the Norwegian government, USAID, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. As Hanlon and Smart highlight: “Unlike many donor projects which only offer information and help to organise associations, the Norwegian funded Clusa/TechnoServe support programme involved people getting their hands dirty — supplying tractors and ploughing, organising seed production, promoting marketing, and training people to see farming as a business” (HANLON; SMART, 2014, p. 26). They add: “It has taken a decade, but the seeds planted by the more hands-on, practical agencies such as Clusa and TechnoServe have produced at least an initial crop” (HANLON; SMART, 2014, p. 65).
smallholder farmers in Mozambique since 2004. “Without a good local partner and strong institutional relations, it’s still easy to lose everything ... [and] unless they respect the challenge facing them, 90% of the Brazilians venturing over to Africa will simply go bust” adds Perreira (STEWART, 2012). At the 6th Brazilian Soy Congress in Mato Grosso in 2012, companies like TechnoServe and Pinesso, a Brazilian agribusiness operating soybean farms in both Sudan and Mozambique, shared such “cautionary tales about the rudimentary state of soybean production” with Brazilian investors eager to start farming in Mozambique, pointing to major logistical and political challenges as well as existing costing systems that presently affect the profitability of soybean farming in the country.

Indeed, the lack of infrastructure (resulting in high transportation costs) and lack of access to essential production inputs (machinery, seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides) locally still constitute significant risks for potential investors (STEWART, 2012). In addition, many agribusinesses view the system of land concessions (long-term leaseholder agreements) in Mozambique as a hindrance, despite the low annual government tax on lands held under lease in the country (ESBER, 2014). In 2014, in an interview with the Brazilian news source Amanhã, Gustavo Lunardi of the Brazilian agricultural giant SLC summed up the benefits of purchasing land in Brazil, as opposed to leasing land in African countries:

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58 Pinesso is one of Brazil’s largest producers of soybean, corn and cotton operating eight production units located in the Cerrado Biome, specifically in the states of Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul and Piauí. The company controls a total of 181,952 hectares in Brazil, of which 100,000 hectares were cultivated in the 2011/2012 agricultural season (CANEZIN, 2012).

59 Pinesso has been operating in Sudan since 2009 when the company was invited by the Sudanese government to develop a large-scale agricultural plantation on an area of 100,000 hectares. Of this total area, in 2013, about 17,000 hectares had been planted, with cotton (10,000 ha), corn (3,000 ha), sorghum (3,000 ha), and sunflowers (1,000 ha) (ONDEI, 2013). With the support of the Sudanese Ministry of Agriculture, the company plans to implement a new project in 2015, denominated the National Corn Program. With a planned duration of 4 years, the project aims to develop 45,000 hectares (of the original concession area) for irrigated corn in order to meet national demand for the staple food product (DCI, 2014).

60 As mentioned in section 3.2, in Mozambique, Pinesso has partnered up with the Portuguese Group Américo Amorim and the Mozambican firm Inistec in a joint venture company called AgroMoz (CANEZIN, 2012, p. 58; JOSÉ, 2012). Located in the Gurê district, AgroMoz controls approximately 10,000 hectares and began operation in 2013. A total of 2,100 hectares of soybeans and rice were planted in the the 2013/2014 growing season (UNAC; GRAIN, 2015).

61 SLC Agrícola is one of largest landowners in Brazil, controlling 320,000 hectares of its own land and cultivating a total area of 342,000 hectares (including leased areas) with agricultural commodities such as soybeans, cotton, corn and sugarcane (ESBER, 2014). In 2012, SLC Agrícola, Arlindo Moura, President-Director of the Brazilian agricultural giant SLC announced the intention of his company to have operations up and running and be industrially producing soybeans in Mozambique before 2015 (BATISTA, 2012b). However, in February 2013 the company announced that it had abandoned its plans for Mozambique, saying that there was still much potential for growth in Brazil (BATISTA, 2013). In 2014, Gustavo Lunardi, the President of SLC LandCO, the branch of SLC responsible for the purchase and sale of land, stated that agricultural land prices in Brazil were still relatively low in comparison to most other major...
We invest in Brazil both by leasing and purchasing land. The leased area would be equivalent to a concession area. However, even if you do not have to pay [for the land] in the concession, the property is not yours. When you purchase land and you plant on it adds value in the equity of the company. If the property is granted [as a concession] you will be adding value in a property that will never be yours. So the way of looking at profitability will be different. Ownership of the land asset itself also ensures a real estate gain. But when you look at a farm in Africa, the feasibility study is different, based solely on the return of the farming operation. And the big problem there today is that African countries are far behind Brazil in terms of infrastructure, manpower and legal framework that allows a foreign company to invest heavily. The agricultural sector is very intensive; it makes heavy use of capital. So this constitutes a high risk\textsuperscript{xlv} (ESBER, 2014).

Furthermore, as TechnoServe, director Luis Pereira explained “in Mozambique there are many properties available for soybean planting, but not in continuous lands, as seen in Mato Grosso”\textsuperscript{xlvi} (BAZANI, 2012). As a result, Brazilian agribusinesses have thus far remained hesitant to set up agricultural operations in Mozambique; aside from Pinesso, at the time that research was conducted for this thesis no other Brazilian agribusiness was known to be operating in the Nacala Corridor.

Still, the early ProSAVANA narrative, as presented in this section, clearly demonstrates that from the outset, “ProSAVANA was conceived of starting from the outside, with interests from outside, and the government of Mozambique simply responded to satisfy these interests” as one CSO respondent describes\textsuperscript{62xlvii}. This directly contradicts Brazil’s stated principle that its development cooperation is purely demand-driven. In addition, ProSAVANA was originally envisioned as a program to promote large-scale, high-input and capital intensive agriculture in Mozambique, with a clear plan for the territorialization of Brazilian agribusinesses, hence contradicting Brazil’s claims that its cooperation does not promote private commercial interests. In direct response to this discourse, a major civil society movement against ProSAVANA emerged and with it, a new counter-narrative to the prevailing PRODECER-ProSAVANA “agribusiness” discourse.

\textsuperscript{62} Interview with a member of ORAM carried out in Nampula City on June 26, 2014.
4.2 Shifting political discourse, paradigms in dispute and the mobilization of civil society against ProSAVANA

Although the MoU for ProSAVANA was formally signed in 2009, the program only began to be implemented in Mozambique in the first trimester of 2011. Set up with a total duration of 20 years, in its first phase, from 2011 until 2019 ProSAVANA is comprised of three components (see Table 10). The first is a technological component—the Project for Improving Research and Technology Transfer Capacity for Nacala Corridor Agricultural Development, or ProSAVANA-PI—executed principally by Embrapa in partnership with IIAM. The second component, ProSAVANA-PEM, focuses on the development of agricultural models and the improvement of rural extension services, and a third component, denominated ProSAVANA-PD, involves the formulation of an Agriculture Development Master Plan that will serve as a “blueprint” for the agricultural development of the Nacala Corridor region63. This last component is executed by the consulting arm of Brazil’s Getúlios Vargas Foundation—FGV Projetos—together with three private Japanese consulting firms, Oriental Consulting, NTC International and Task Co. Ltd. and Mozambican counterparts (MINAG, and the Provincial Directorates of Agriculture, or DPAs). Total investments for ProSAVANA in its first phase are estimated at US$ 36 million (NOGUEIRA; OLLINHAO, 2013).

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63 The names of the three respective components of ProSAVANA in Portuguese are as follows: Projeto de Melhoria da Capacidade de Pesquisa e Transferência de Tecnologia (PROSAVANA-PI); Projecto de Criação de Modelos de Desenvolvimento Agrícola Comunitários com Melhoria do Serviço de Extensão Agrária (PROSAVANA-PEM) and Projeto de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento do Plano Diretor (PROSVANA-PD).
Table 10: Three main components of the ProSAVANA program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Stated objective</th>
<th>Main Activities</th>
<th>Institutions Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| ProSAVANA-PI  | Apr. 2011 – Mar. 2016 (5 years) | “The development and transfer of adequate agricultural technology in the Nacala Corridor Region” (GoM, 2015c)                                          | a) Strengthen the research capacity of IIAM centers in Niassa and Nampula and develop the experimental testing sites in Lichinga and Nampula  
b) Conduct studies to quantify and analyze regional and national resources and socioeconomic conditions.  
c) Develop soil improvement and conservation technologies  
d) The development of adequate seed varieties and their diffusion.  
e) To develop demonstration units in areas close to the testing sites (Lichinga/Nampula) to diffuse new technologies among “emergent” and “in transition” producers (GoM, 2015c) | IIAM and EMBRAPA, with participation from JIRCAS |
| ProSAVANA-PEM | May 2013 – May 2019 (6 years) | “To increase agricultural production in different growing areas through the adoption of agricultural development models in the target areas of ProSAVANA” (GoM, 2015d) | a) To define different development models and projects of reference to be implemented; select target groups/areas to be partners in projects; create synergies among the public and private sector and NGOs in the implementation of projects.  
b) Based on the outcome of pilot (reference) projects, recommend agricultural development models and identify possible agents/partners for the implementation, promotion and expansion of these models.  
c) Establish methodologies of agricultural extension, train extension workers and support an expansion/improvement of extension services in the region (including the public and private sectors, NGOs and leading farmers in communities) (GoM, 201d). | MINAG, JICA, GAPI |
| ProSAVANA-PD  | Mar. 2012 – 2014 (2 years) | “To formulate a Master Plan aimed at agricultural development, that contributes to social and economic development, to promote a sustainable production system and reduce poverty... with special attention to small producers” (GoM, 2015e). | a) To develop a blueprint for the agricultural development of the Nacala Corridor aligned with the four pillars of PEDSA,  
b) To establish development projects to be implemented in the Nacala Corridor and a timeline/budget strategies for the implementation of these projects. | FGV Projetos, Oriental Consulting Co. Ltd., NTC International Co. Ltd., Task Co. Ltd., MINAG and DPAs. |

Source: GoM 2015c; 2015d; 2015e.
In addition to these three projects, the Brazilian team leader for ProSAVANA-PD, Cleber Guarany of FGV, is also the designer of the Nacala Fund, a Luxembourg-based private equity fund launched by FGV in Brasília in June 2012. At the time of its launch, the fund was described as an initiative promoted by ABC, FGV, JICA, FAO, MINAG and 4I.GREEN, as well as a consortium of Brazilian experts from the business sector, “to develop and turn the Nacala Corridor in Mozambique into an important production hub” (FGV, 2012). The fund aimed at attracting a total of US$ 2 billion in investment from investors in Brazil, Japan and Mozambique, as well as multilateral organizations and international development banks, interested in long-term agricultural projects, with high annual return rates (BATISTA, 2012; BRITO, 2012; ZAIA, 2012). According to Cleber Guarany, coordinator of FGV Projectos: “This is perhaps the best area to develop agriculture on the continent, with estimated returns between 18% and 23% per year” (ZAIA, 2012).

In 2012, there was little ambiguity about the objective of the fund: “the Nacala Fund is aligned with the strategies of private investment attraction of the program ProSAVANA-JBM, carried out in the realm of the trilateral cooperation between Japan, Brazil and Mozambique” explained FGV, and it “follows the guidelines pertaining to the Nacala Corridor Master Plan of Agricultural Development (ProSAVANA-PD)” (FGV, 2012). In conjunction, the Nacala Fund and the ProSAVANA program were presented by FGV as an “institutional package” for the reduction of investment risks in the region (SENATORE; MATOS, 2012). Official FGV documents confirm that the strategy for rural territorial development adopted by the fund, unequivocally based on the paradigm of agrarian capitalism, promotes an export-oriented, capital intensive and high-input, agricultural production model based on the large-scale mechanized production of corn, cotton, rice and soybean monoculture (FGV PROJETOS 2014; undated).

At the time that the Nacala Fund was launched, in mid-2012, Mozambique was already facing an intensifying wave of corporate territorialization and the mass usurpation of peasant land for the development of large-scale foreign owned farms.

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64 FGV describes itself as one of “the world’s leading think tanks in public policies development” (SENATORE; MATOS, 2012, p. 2) and in a document on the Nacala Corridor Fund initiative it proudly states that the institution “has been named Top Think Tank in Latin America and the Caribbean” (FGV PROJETOS, undated).
(HANLON, 2011; MATAVEL et al., 2011)65. As a member of the National Peasants’ Union (UNAC) commented: “You have the configuration of a new map [in Mozambique]; a new map of occupation advancing in the territories of peasants, without a process of consent and in a situation practically of the re-colonization of people”66lii. A similar remark was made by another member of UNAC interviewed in Nampula:

Here in Nampula, or here in Mozambique, we already have many [foreign] companies...They are exploiting, they are taking the lands of the people without any consent ... It’s a serious problem ... And we watch ... especially me, and others, we have passed through many areas where the companies occupy land, there is no community that is satisfied with a company. There is not.67lii

Hence, the explicit focus of the Nacala Fund to establish large-scale plantations of export commodities in the Nacala Corridor and the “blending” of public and private interests in ProSAVANA, raised alarm bells among local civil society organizations. Already in the midst of a national struggle against unbridled global capitalism and foreign land grabs, it was evident to civil society, based on the early discourse of ProSAVANA and the Nacala Fund initiative, that the program “is the result of a confluence of a diverse set of interests; it is within a much more comprehensive global strategy of [agribusiness] advancement in African territories based on the idea that Africa is the new agricultural frontier”68lii.

Since 2012, Mozambican civil society organizations have raised concerns about ProSAVANA through a succession of public statements, reports and open letters (UNAC, 2012; JUSTIÇA AMBIENTAL, 2013a; UNAC et al. 2013; JUSTIÇA AMBIENTAL et al. 2013). The central concerns articulated by the resistance movement can be summarized as six interrelated points: a) lack of transparency, dialogue and access to information b) land grabbing/dispossession c) destruction of ecological systems d) labour exploitation/subordination e) food insecurity and f) social exclusion and the

65 Between 2004 and 2009, the Mozambican government granted more than one million hectares of agricultural land to foreign investors; of this, 73 percent was used for commercial forest plantations and 13 percent was destined for sugar and agrofuels production (HANLON, 2011).
66 Interview conducted with an UNAC respondent via Skype on September 5, 2014.
67 Interview with respondent from UNAC in Nampula City on July 10, 2014.
68 Interview with respondent from UNAC, via Skype on September 5, 2014.
degradation of national sovereignty and civic rights. Considering the central role of the PRODECER experience in the early discourse espoused by ProSAVANA’s planners, the new counter-narrative, articulated primarily by local and international CSOs and academics aligned with the movement against ProSAVANA, called into question the so-called “success” and “sustainability” of the Cerrado transformation in Brazil (ORAM, 2012; CLEMENTS; FERNANDES, 2013; FUNADA-CLASSEN, 2013a; SCHLESINGER, 2014; ORAM; UNAC, 2013), and pointed to a set of well-documented facts about the impacts of large-scale farming in the Cerrado region that had conveniently been omitted by enthusiastic ProSAVANA promoters (especially by Embrapa and JICA).

As a result of the territorialization of the agribusiness model that now predominates in the Cerrado, the local environment and its inhabitants have been severely compromised. The region has faced massive deforestation, environmental degradation, increased social inequality, and land and income concentration. As the Brazilian geographer Inocêncio (2010) describes, the reality of PRODECER and the adoption of a “large farm model” in the Cerrado:

[...] served expansionist interests...It was the ‘model’ of expulsion of rural workers and small producers...which did not have sufficient capital to adapt to the [imposed] model of the modernization of agriculture [and who were subsequently] forced to migrate to the cities, swelling the ranks of the underemployed or unemployed, resulting in serious socio-economic problems (INOCÊNCIO, 2010, p. 94).

As a result of the territorialization of agribusiness and export commodities in the Cerrado, the territory of the region has been radically reconfigured, becoming:

[...] [a] territory of grains, cattle, agribusiness, and industry; the cerrado in an economistic perspective presents an organization of space compatible with the contradictions of its use: now its area is empty, but it is

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69 For a more indepth analysis of the social, environmental and territorial impacts of PRODECER and the modernization of agriculture/territorialization of agribusiness in the Cerrado region, refer to the following authors: PESSÔA, 1988; MEDONÇA, 2004; KLINK; MACHADO, 2005; BAKER; SMALL, 2005; CHAVEIRO, 2008; INOCÊNCIO, 2010; LIMA; CHAVEIRO, 2010, MATOS; PESSÔA, 2014. The well documented social and environmental realities of the Cerrado region discussed in great detail in these aforementioned studies, stands in stark contrast to the idealization of the Cerrado’s economic/agricultural ‘success’ and claims of social inclusion and environmental sustainability of Cerrado agriculture by Hosono and Hongo (2012), of JICA, and the business news source the Economist (2010).
productive; its urbanization is accelerating, but it is uneven. Before modernization, it was a territory of the difference grounded in its rich biodiversity, the varied forms of its terrain, the different uses of the soil, now its landscapes are unison, standardized, but it is an area of social inequality

(CHAVEIRO, 2008, p. 88).

While ProSAVANA was clearly inspired by PRODECER, the two are entirely different development programs in terms of actual projects and overall structure and geographical context, and ProSAVANA is in no way a “replica” of PRODECER, due to the dramatically different social, political and historical realities that were unique to Brazil in the 1970s and are found in Mozambique at present. This palpable observation has been emphasized by Frederico Paiva (2013), a consultant for FGV, and Natalia Fingermann (2013; 2014), a researcher with academic affiliations to FGV, in order to defend ProSAVANA from condemnation and to try to discredit academics and civil society organizations that have raised legitimate concerns about ProSAVANA. According to an article by Paiva (2013), published in the FGV journal of agribusiness, *Agroanalysis:*

Since its launch, the ProSavana is accused of trying to destroy Mozambican agriculture through an “invasion of Brazilian mega-producers” that “would use Japanese funding” in a “repetition of the process that destroyed the Brazilian Cerrado.” The list of accusations is endless, and obviously there are misconceptions that need to be clarified.

One of them is that ProSavana is the repetition of...Prodecer which occurred beginning in the late 1970s, leading JICA to be accused of promoting in Mozambique the same practices that it promoted in Brazil over thirty years ago. Three decades ago, the Eco 92 [the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development of 1992, also known as the Rio Summit] was far from occurring, and the Brazilian government funded deforestation in rural properties in Brazil. The Brazilian agrarian structure is different than that of Mozambique. And the world has changed. Mozambique has an adequate environmental legislation, and both Brazil, and Japan apply strict environmental controls in the activities performed in the Nacala Corridor (PAIVA, 2013, p. 15).

In addition to this, Paiva dismisses the idea that Brazilian companies will occupy land in Mozambique through ProSAVANA, emphasizing the technical nature of the cooperation program and the possibilities for attaining national food sovereignty by means of an allegedly “sustainable” green revolution promoted under ProSAVANA:
A [second] recurring criticism is about a supposed invasion of Brazilian farmers in Mozambique. Mistake. Within the Brazilian State there is no public policy to support the internationalization of its agribusiness. ProSavana is a technical cooperation [program] that involves primarily technology transfer. To advocate the idea that the program supports an invasion of Brazilian farmers who, in turn, will occupy the lands of Mozambican farmers, is, we say, to misinform. There is no basis of any kind for the support for this supposed process...

[... ] As the main intention of cooperation is to provide Mozambique [with] a technology adequate to achieve food sovereignty, ProSavana can, contrary to what critics say, provide the ideal parameters for a sustainable green revolution, not only for Mozambique, but for all of Africa, perhaps to the world\textsuperscript{viii} (PAIVA, 2013, p. 15).

Similarly, instead of analysing the actual discourse of JICA, Embrapa, ABC and FGV—the main sources of information on ProSAVANA in its early phases—Fingermann (2013; 2014) also tries to discredit civil society organizations and authors such as Clements and Fernandes (2013), Funada-Classen (2013a; 2013b) and Nogueira and Ollinaho (2013) disparaging them as myth creators. According to Fingermann (2014):

[... ] there is in the literature the construction of three myths around that ProSavana: 1) that that ProSavana is a replica of PRODECER; 2) that ProSavana aims to usurp land and; 3) that ProSavana creates conflicts between agribusiness and small farmers. These myths are usually aligned with a clear ideological discourse that links any agribusiness investment or conflict to the program...

[... ] The next section [of this PhD thesis]... is expected to show what really happens in ProSavana, demystifying the idea that there is a preconceived plan, by the Brazilian government to seize land in Mozambique\textsuperscript{ix} (FINGERMANN, 2014, p. 132).

The above statements made by both Paiva and Fingermann resonate with the paradigm of agrarian capitalism and represent an attempt to recreate the ProSAVANA discourse in the face of harsh (but well-directed) criticism, and thus reshape the territorial dispute in the realm of immaterial territory. One of the many important points that both Paiva (2013) and Fingermann (2013; 2014) omit from their analysis, is that whether or not these two distinctly different programs are actually alike, is not the question at the heart of the debate or being pointed out by authors and CSOs who have raised critical questions about ProSAVANA. Rather, it is the very ideological precepts that underpin ProSAVANA, rooted in the paradigm of agrarian capitalism, and the
blatant intentionality of the program and its implementing institutions to promote an agribusiness model and a “green revolution” technological package in Mozambique that is neither sustainable as proponents claim, nor in the best interests of Mozambican peasants and national food security. Whether implemented in the Cerrado, or elsewhere in Brazil, or in the world, the advancement of a neo-liberal export-oriented model of agricultural development has had, and will have, profoundly negative impacts on the livelihoods of peasants and the environment. The blatant omission of this fact by both of these authors, in favour of a narrow minded technocratic focus that emphasizes primarily the technical component of ProSAVANA is more than just a little unsettling. As João Mosca, a renowned Mozambican economist and Executive Director of the Maputo-based agricultural research institute, Observatório do Meio Rural (OMR), explains:

No less important than the claims related to the dialogue, transparency and accessibility to information should be the debate on the development model subjacent to ProSavana. This program has in its origin the philosophy/ideology of the implantation of large and medium-sized private farm holdings, with the use of capital intensive technologies, whose aim is the integration into international agribusiness systems through the production and export of commodities, configuring a pattern of accumulation dominated by the interests of multinationals [that control and sell the] factors [of production] (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and equipment). If this model is deployed, the risks referred to above and that motivate the positions of civil society could be a reality\textsuperscript{x} (MOSCA, 2014, p. 3).

Consequently, in response to the intensity of the civil society uprising and the counter-narrative presented by its agents, by late 2013 a new discourse was adopted by the three signatory governments and their respective institutions involved in implementing ProSAVANA. This new “official” discourse downplayed ProSAVANA-business links and highlighted small and medium-holder Mozambican producers as the program’s main beneficiaries in an attempt to distance ProSAVANA, a public government cooperation program, from the earlier discourse emphasizing large-scale farming and business opportunities. This has been the prominent discourse since late 2013.
As one interview respondent explained: “the ProSAVANA discourse is a discourse that is being adapted, moment by moment. I think we can count maybe more than five or six discourses since ProSAVANA was conceived until now. To the extent that there is pressure against something the ProSAVANA discourse changes”.\textsuperscript{70}i

4.3. Entering ProSAVANA-PD: the intensification of the ProSAVANA uprising and of the paradigm dispute

Our analysis will begin with ProSAVANA-PD, since this is the element of ProSAVANA that has been at the epicentre of the ongoing controversy over the high-profile trilateral initiative. This is because, in contrast to ProSAVANA-PI (the component which focuses on technology transfer and research capacity building, which will be discussed in more detail below), ProSAVANA-PD is precisely the political tool used to give form and substance to the overall ProSAVANA development plan, defining and formalizing both the policy agenda to be implemented along the Nacala Corridor, as well as the program’s specific strategies for rural territorial development. Through implementation, the contents and policies devised in the formulation of the Master Plan and the related Nacala Fund, will forever change the lives of thousands, and potentially hundreds of thousands or millions, of Mozambican peasants living along the Nacala Corridor. The question at the heart of the debate is whether this change will be for the better.

By early 2013, with ProSAVANA already underway and criticisms of ProSAVANA escalating, neither the Mozambican government, ABC, JICA, Embrapa or FGV had involved local CSOs in the design of the program and had failed to adequately respond to civil society concerns and engage in a meaningful dialogue (as opposed to simply “information sharing”). The secrecy and lack of transparency regarding ProSAVANA is captured in the following account shared by a CSO respondent in Nampula:

[...] The process of the evolution of the ProSAVANA design is very strange, because in Mozambique this process evolved in a very hidden

\textsuperscript{70}i Interview with a member of ORAM carried out in Nampula City on June 26, 2014.
way, it was never public, until very recently...we are talking about 2012 when ProSAVANA became known to the [Mozambican] public...it was as if it was a bomb that exploded. For this reason people reacted immediately, and reacted in a very surprised manner. ‘What is this ProSAVANA?’ ‘What is it?’ No one could explain, yet by this time the program had already taken a very significant step in the preparation of a Master Plan. But this Master Plan was also never publicly shared, it was developed in secrecy. Until, starting at the beginning of last year [2013], under pressure from civil society, the Master Plan was leaked, but already complete...Importantly, the acquisition of the document in 2013, was not through official channels, it was via Japanese and Brazilian friends who were part of the [ProSAVANA] technical team...That to me is also very strange, if ProSAVANA is a program that is intended to have space in Mozambique, how is it that the preparation of this Master Plan for this program does not involve Mozambicans themselves, does not consult Mozambicans themselves?  

As the respondent above mentions, the first version of the Master Plan (ProSAVANA-PD), entitled “Report No. 2” and dated March 2013, was leaked to the public in May 2013. Published on the website of the Spanish-based NGO, GRAIN, under the heading “Leaked ProSAVANA Master Plan confirms worst fears” (JUSTIÇA AMBIENTAL et al., 2013), Report No. 2 indeed resembles an elaborate business plan, proposing a number of “high profitability” projects for investors with projected rates of return of between 20 and 30 percent per year (ProSAVANA-PD, 2013a, p. 3-43, 3-46). The document confirms ProSAVANA’s intentions to promote the large-scale exploration of land along the Nacala Growth Corridor based on an agribusiness-centered development model, and emphasizes the integration of family farmers with large and medium-scale agribusinesses, principally, through the promotion of contract farming and out-grower schemes. The objective of “engaging private investment” as a means to promote a “sustainable production system and poverty reduction in the Nacala Corridor” is explicit in the Report (ProSAVANA-PD, 2013a, p. 1-1), and the interests of investors are prioritized over those of peasant farmers. Hence, existing CSO concerns re: land-grabbing/land dispossession, the degradation of local ecologies, labour exploitation/peasant subordination, food insecurity and national land and food sovereignty were only more deeply exacerbated (JUSTIÇA AMBIENTAL et al. 2013).  

71 Interview with ORAM in Nampula City on June 26, 2014.  
72 Additionally, it appears that the contents of the draft Mater Plan drawn up by FGV, came as a surprise not only to civil society and local communities, but also MINAG, and a number of high-level officials from the Ministry, including...
Following the leak of the Report No. 2 a coalition of 23 Mozambican CSOs drafted and signed an “Open Letter” addressed to the Brazilian, Japanese and Mozambican heads of State, calling on them to “Urgently Stop and Reflect on the ProSAVANA Program”. In addition to the 23 Mozambican signatories, 43 international CSOs, from Brazil and Japan (and beyond), and 72 individuals (mainly Japanese development practitioners and researchers) also signed the document in a demonstration of solidarity with Mozambican civil society. The letter demanded that the three signatory governments of ProSAVANA “immediately suspend all activities and projects underway in the tropical savannas of the Nacala Development Corridor within the scope of [the program]” (UNAC et al., 2013). Specifically, addressing the Brazilian president, Dilma Rouseff, the authors of the letter posed the following question:

[...] how is it justified that the Brazilian Government does not give priority to the Food Acquisition Programme in Mozambique, which we rural populations support and encourage? Paradoxically, all financial, material and human resources at various levels are allocated to agribusiness development promoted by ProSavana. How is it that international cooperation between Brazil, Mozambique and Japan, which should promote solidarity among peoples, is converted into an instrument to facilitate obscure commercial transactions and promote the grabbing of community land, which we use in the age-old manner to produce food for the Mozambican nation and beyond? (UNAC et al. 2013)

Denouncing various aspects of ProSAVANA’s conception, design and implementation process, including “the importation into Mozambique of the built-in contradictions of the development model of Brazilian agriculture”, the alternative model of rural territorial development advocated by Mozambican CSOs was also clearly espoused:

We advocate for the development of agriculture based on production systems, rather than products, i.e., the non-destruction of the family method of production, which over and above economic issues also incorporates specifically the way of occupation of geographic spaces, the social and anthropological dimension that has proved very sustainable throughout the history of mankind (UNAC et al., 2013).

Raimundo Matule, claimed that until then (May 2013), they too had neither seen nor reviewed the key policy document (HANLON; SMART, 2014).
Considering the trilateral nature of ProSAVANA and the confluence of Brazilian, Japanese and Mozambican interests expressive within ProSAVANA’s parameters, it was evident to Mozambican civil society that an effective resistance movement to ProSAVANA involved networking with international CSOs, particularly in Brazil and Japan, and consolidating strong relationships of solidarity. The importance of building an international movement against ProSAVANA is described by UNAC as follows:

 [...] due to this recognition...it was necessary to expand this struggle, and join with civil society organizations in Japan and Brazil. And that’s why we started this multinational dialogue with our correspondents in Brazil and Japan, so that in fact there would be this collective pressure for an international campaign of this magnitude, so that we could halt the [ProSAVANA] process taking into account these three fronts. But it also drew to our attention the need for much broader international solidarity, involving greater international pressure.

 ...But solidarity in words is not enough...from there we have to depart to practical actions. And the Mozambican government has already demonstrated that there is no opening for change [to ProSAVANA], just as the Brazilian and Japanese government will want to move forward with the model that has been proposed. And there, of course, we will have to resort to [further] action, including extra-judicial mechanisms in order to apply greater pressure. 73ixliii.

Indeed, “solidarity in words” was transformed into “practical actions” taken by Mozambican CSOs in conjunction with their Japanese and Brazilian counterparts through exchanges and joint research/fact-finding missions carried out between the three countries. These actions culminated in the Triangular Peoples’ Conference (against ProSAVANA) (Conferência Triangular dos Povos), held on August 7-8, 2013 in Maputo. Over 60 social movements, environmental, peasant and other civil society organizations from Mozambique, Japan and Brazil participated in the event, where they bluntly manifested their criticisms, concerns and demands regarding ProSAVANA to members of the Mozambican government also present at the event (UNAC, 2013; MELLO, 2013). CSOs further reiterated the demands and proposals made in the Open Letter, including: that all of the resources allocated to the ProSAVANA program “be reallocated to efforts to define and implement a National Plan for the Support of
Sustainable Family Farming (the family system), advocated for more than two decades by rural families throughout the Republic of Mozambique” and that the government prioritize “food sovereignty, conservation agriculture and agro-ecology as the only sustainable solutions for reducing hunger and promoting proper nutrition” (JUSTIÇA AMBIENTAL et al., 2013).

In turn, the Mozambican government told CSOs at the conference that no one will be removed from their land by ProSAVANA and that the program is designed to benefit primarily peasants, to help peasant families to be more productive on the lands that they currently cultivate through the transfer of appropriate agricultural technology. Affirming the government’s continued commitment to the trilateral intervention, Agriculture Minister José Pacheco declared that “ProSAVANA is a priority of the Government of Mozambique and we are betting everything on the success of this program” (HANLON; SMART, 2014, p. 61). This conference marks the beginning of the new “official” discourse of the governments of Brazil, Japan and Mozambique (and consequently, MINAG, ABC, Embrapa, JICA, FGV and Oriental Consulting) on ProSAVANA (JUSTIÇA AMBIENTAL, 2013b). As Fátima Mello of the Brazilian NGO FASE explains: “The event...changed the game which until recently was largely favourable to Brazilian and transnational agribusiness corporations” and which had been taking place only behind closed doors, in corporate offices and government bureaus (MELLO, 2013). Interestingly, in light of the criticism over the program, the objective for ProSAVANA-PD on the Mozambican government’s official website has been modified from that which is found in the highly criticized 2013 Master Plan: “with special attention to small producers” has been added.

Following the Triangular Peoples’ Conference two further documents on ProSAVANA, denominated “Conceptual Note I” and Conceptual Note II” also surfaced—the first in September 2013, the second is not dated. At the time that field research for this thesis was carried out in Mozambique (April-August 2014), the final copy of the Master Plan had not yet been completed. In one particular conversation with a representative from Oriental Consulting Ltd. in late April, it was conceded that errors

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75 Meeting conducted in Nampula with representatives of ProSAVANA-PD and ProSAVANA-PEM on April 28, 2014.
had been made during the formulation process of the notorious Report No. 2, and that criticism of the document since made by civil society organizations (and noted in Conceptual Note II, specifically) was being considered in the re-elaboration of the final document. The following statement by a CSO representative in Nampula sums up the overall sentiment on ProSAVANA-PD widely held among Mozambican civil society at the time of research:

If there is hidden information, there is something that is not right. What we want are accurate and clear details. To date we have not had access to the ProSAVANA Master Plan. So what is behind this? Why are we denied access? It is either because they still do not even have the vision of what they want [from ProSAVANA], or it is because they do not want to share with us their vision.

As a second CSO representative from a different organization added, this secretivity was intentional on the part those designing the program. Specifically: “the communication strategy which was adopted [was] not to open the package of ProSAVANA [to the public] precisely so that we do not know.”

The shift in emphasis in the political discourse and program policy texts begins with the Conceptual Note I released in September 2013. Rooted in the same productivist logic of the earlier Master Plan, the first Conceptual Note also promotes large-scale investments in agriculture and the industrial production of both food and cash crops. The document, however, puts greater emphasis on smallholders as the central beneficiaries of ProSAVANA, specifically highlighting the eminent problems faced by peasant farmers in the Nacala Corridor region. These problems include: an overall lack of resources necessary to acquire seeds and fertilizers; lack of access to agricultural machinery (for land preparation/irrigation); and difficulties associated with commercialization, such as high transportation costs and not having a buyer for

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76 The abovementioned consultant would not add much more than this, nor answer any of the authors’ other questions directly regarding ProSAVANA-PD, specifically. Instead, the researcher was informed that she should send an email to ProSAVANA Headquarters (HQ) in Maputo, along with a copy of her interview questions, since, she was told, HQ would better be able to answer them. However, neither the author’s request for an interview with HQ or with the Coordinator for Technical Cooperation in Agriculture and Food Security from ABC, Thais Braga (who is also on the HQ committee), responsible for answering questions related to ProSAVANA, were accommodated. The indisposition of PROSAVANA officials to talk about the program is likely related to MINAG’s attempt to control information, especially at a time when contentions over ProSAVANA between civil society organizations and the Mozambican government have become particularly acute at the national and provincial levels.

77 Interview conducted in Nampula with a member of AENA on June 30, 2014.

78 Interview conducted in Nampula with a member of the Provincial Platform for Civil Society Organizations of Nampula (PPOSC-N) on June 24, 2014.
products (or being forced to sell produce at extremely low prices even when buyers do exist). The document proposes strategies to deal with some of these pervasive challenges, which can be attributed to the low level of productivity of peasant agriculture that persists in much of the region. These measures include: improving access to quality seeds and fertilizers at affordable prices, introducing a subsidization system for fertilizers; offering credit and financing to small and medium-scale agribusinesses and individual producers; improving extension services in rural areas; improving the organizational and managerial capacity of farmers’ associations through the promotion of models of modern agricultural cooperatives; and increasing access to tractors and machinery at an affordable cost by augmenting the number of persons able to provide such services (ProSAVANA-PD, 2013b).

Generally speaking, the measures above are widely accepted by CSO organizations and peasant farmers that the author spoke with in Mozambique, and could certainly contribute to the improvement of smallholder livelihoods. However, the critique of ProSAVANA-PD lies not just in the agribusiness model that it espouses (and its conceptualization of peasants as inevitable appendages to this model), but in the fact that the entire Master Plan is based on an analysis of peasant agriculture rooted in certain presuppositions associated with an agrarian capitalist paradigm perspective; all of which are controversial and are disputed by civil society organizations and academics with attitudinal ideologies and experiential knowledge that more closely align them with the agrarian question paradigm (though to varying degrees and with much internal debate among different groups and actors). A full year after the “Open Letter” had been sent to the Japanese, Brazilian and Mozambican heads of State, in June 2014, Mozambican CSOs had still not received any response what-so-ever to their plea to halt the program nor acknowledgement of their proposals for an alternate development model for the country. This culminated in the launching of the “No to ProSAVANA” campaign by a coalition of Mozambican CSOs in Maputo on June 2, 2014, closely followed by the Triangular Peoples’ Conference II in Maputo on July 24, 2014. The author had the opportunity to attend both of these important events.

A member of UNAC described the fundamental rationality and objective of the national campaign against ProSAVANA as follows:
The model of ProSAVANA is an undesirable model, a model does not correspond to that which are the real needs of Mozambique and for this reason this campaign, No to ProSAVANA, was born. No to ProSAVANA is no to the model, which is a destructive model, a colonial and imperialist model. No to ProSAVANA is no to the usurpation of land that is behind this model and no to the exclusion of the peasantry within a model that it does not integrate, that does not coexist with models already existing within the peasant culture. So the goal is to halt this model and seek alternative models that can support peasant agriculture. This is the main objective of the campaign No to ProSAVANA, in the sense that it is no good, this model does not respond to the demands and needs of peasants\textsuperscript{79xvii}.

In the following chapter I will look more closely at the other two components of ProSAVANA – ProSAVANA-PI and ProSAVANA-PEM, and then return to ProSAVANA-PD and the paradigm debates, examining the (dis)articulation between and among these three competing discourses and their relation to the agrarian question paradigm and agrarian capitalist paradigm.

\textsuperscript{79} Interview with UNAC via Skype on September 5, 2014.
Chapter 5
ProSAVANA in Development (2013-2015)

Since its initial conception the discourse around ProSAVANA has shifted considerably, often in dialectical relation to the civil society uprising against the program. Building on the conceptual framework highlighted in Chapter Two, the methodological framework outlined in Chapter Three, and the above discussion in Chapter Four, the current chapter will discuss in more detail the three constituent component projects that comprise the ProSAVANA program (ProSAVANA-PD, ProSAVANA-PI and ProSAVANA-PEM) looking at both their discursive politics and actual implementation in order to analyze the policies and strategies for rural territorial development promoted by Brazil through ProSAVANA, specifically from 2013 to the present. Insights from fieldwork conducted between April and August 2014 are presented throughout the chapter.

5.1 ProSAVANA-PI and ProSAVANA-PEM: the technical and social elements of the trilateral intervention

As highlighted in the previous chapter, official program representatives have attempted to spin the ProSAVANA narrative with a pro-poor, pro-peasant twist, yet they have only been met by growing opposition as, time and time again, their noble declarations are contradicted by the early discourse and statements made on the program, as well as the information imparted from careful reading of the policy documents related to ProSAVANA-PD and the Nacala Fund. In the face of severe criticism over ProSAVANA, representatives (from each of the three signatory countries) repeatedly try to obfuscate the private interests that clearly underlie the program. One of the ways in which this has been done is by highlighting the positive impacts being achieved under ProSAVANA’s technical component (ProSAVANA-PI) and rural extension component (ProSAVANA-PEM). Indeed, during fieldwork in Mozambique, when the author asked specifically about what benefits ProSAVANA will bring Mozambique, government officials and program representatives often directed the
conversation towards ProSAVANA-PI, emphasizing the benefits of technology transfer, research infrastructure development, and improved local research capacity. Similarly, officials were more open to talking about ProSAVANA-PEM and the extension work being done with peasant associations under ProSAVANA, but often closed up when ProSAVANA-PD or the Nacala Fund was mentioned. A brief synopsis of ProSAVANA-PI and ProSAVANA-PEM is presented below.

5.1.1 ProSAVANA-PI

While in Nampula the author met with the Embrapa team leader for ProSAVANA to discuss the investigation and technology component of the Program. According to the respondent\textsuperscript{80}, the role of Embrapa in ProSAVANA is two-fold: a) to work with IIAM to improve local research capacity and train Mozambican agronomists in new technologies and experimental statistics and b) provide technical assistance to the program through the transfer of Brazilian agricultural technology by Embrapa. The expectation is that Embrapa, in partnership with IIAM, will assist in the development of agricultural production systems suited to the local context and agro-ecological conditions. These systems would both inform and be integrated into technological packages, including improved seed varieties and agricultural inputs, that would increase agricultural productivity along the Nacala Corridor. The technological package currently being developed includes seeds for seven different agricultural products: rice, cotton, maize, soybean, tropical wheat, beans and cow pea as well as mineral-based (chemical) fertilizers, using different formulas of NPC (Nitrogen, Phosphates, and Calcium). Seeds are donated to IIAM by Embrapa which claims that it will not be involved in any part of the subsequent process of further disseminating the technology currently being developed; this responsibility lies fully with IIAM and the Mozambican government. It is assumed that the National Directorate of Agricultural Extension (Direcção Nacional de Extensão Agrária—DNEA) will be the government agency responsible for the dissemination of technology to local farmers.

\textsuperscript{80} Interview in Nampula with an Embrapa respondent carried out on June 30, 2014.
Although ProSAVANA-PI formally began in 2011, comprehensive mapping and geographic zoning exercises were initiated by Embrapa as early as 2009 in order to determine different soil-types, climate variations, land cover uses and agro-ecological conditions along the Nacala Corridor. These activities and analyses were conducted by a team of Embrapa researchers working under the Embrapa-Mozambique Project\textsuperscript{81} mentioned in Chapter 1 (section 1.5) of this thesis, which was implemented in partnership with USAID and IIAM. Similar to the results of feasibility studies conducted by FGV Projetos, discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.2), the results of the studies and exercises conducted by Embrapa have also fed into the design and development of ProSAVANA-PD, and likely informed the division of the 19 districts comprising the ProSAVANA target area into six distinct zones (review Map 6, section 3.2).

In 2012, under ProSAVANA-PI, experimental field sites for seed development and testing were initiated in both Nampula and Niassa, on an area of 6 hectares and 10 hectares, respectively. 27 different seed varieties are tested at each site for each growing season, based on a selection from the seven different agricultural products that comprise the technological package outlined above. At the time of research, in Nampula, five of the seven crops are being grown—excluding wheat and beans. In Niassa, all of the crops are tested, with the exception of cotton. Two growing cycles, referring to the 2012/2013 and 2013/2014 agricultural seasons, have been completed at both locations; a third cycle began in the second half of 2014 and ran until June 2015. According to the Embrapa team leader in Nampula, the Niassa field site has shown more positive results than Nampula, and is, generally speaking, more adequate for high income generating agricultural activities ("agricultura de alto rendimento"). This difference is attributed to better soil conditions and greater precipitation in the Niassa province.

When asked if any of the improved seed varieties being tested in the IIAM field sites are currently being used in any of the projects related to ProSAVANA-PEM (discussed below), it was said that they were not; but they will likely be utilized by

\textsuperscript{81} Some of these maps are used in the following publications: BATISTELLA; BOLFE, 2010 and BOLFE et al. 2011. Also, Embrapa has developed a special site WebGIS-Moçambique, which features a mapping tool that can be used to visualize different types of land cover and land use map of Mozambique. See: <http://mapas.cnpm.embrapa.br/mocambique/mapa.html>.
ProSAVANA-PEM projects in the future. At the time research was conducted only two seasons of experimental testing of seed varieties had been concluded; according to the respondent from Embrapa, a minimum of three complete growing cycles of experimentation are necessary before any kind of conclusion regarding the suitability of varieties to the local context can be made. The third season of experimental testing was concluded in July 2015.

In terms of infrastructure development, a Research Laboratory for Advanced Soil and Plant Analysis was constructed in Nampula and inaugurated in June 2015. Funding for the construction of the laboratory, which is run by IIAM, was provided by the Japanese government as agreed to from the outset of ProSAVANA-PI. A similar research facility was planned to be built in Lichinga, and completed by 2014, using funding provided by the Brazilian government. At the time of research the construction of this second facility had not yet been initiated. As the Embrapa team leader in Nampula highlighted, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), which is responsible for contracting out and overseeing the laboratory’s construction, has undergone significant cuts to its budget in Brazil. As a result of internal cutbacks, technical cooperation under ProSAVANA appears to be taking a hit; evidenced in the inability of ABC to make good on prior promises.

In a separate conversation with the ProSAVANA team leader from IIAM in Nampula, the installation of meteorological stations was mentioned as a tangible contribution of ProSAVANA’s technological component. A 2014 presentation on ProSAVANA given by the coordination team in Nampula indicates that a survey of meteorological data in the districts of Nampula city, Lichinga, Mutuali, Gurue and Namialo is currently being carried out (MINAG, 2014). Although ProSAVANA-PI has been underway since 2011, no attempts to include civil society were made until mid-2014.

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83 Interview conducted with IIAM representative in Nampula on July 3, 2014.
5.1.2 ProSAVANA-PEM

Initiated in March 2012, the primary objectives of ProSAVANA-PEM include developing agricultural extension methodologies, improving extension services and defining and implementing different models for the development of agriculture in the ProSAVANA target zone. The primary institutions responsible for executing PEM are JICA along with MINAG/MASA, the Brazilian Association of Technical Assistance and Rural Extension (Associação Brasileira de Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural—ASBRAER), National Service of Rural Learning (Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Rural—SENAR) and Brazil’s Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA).

The provision of rural extension services in the ProSAVANA target area is characterized by a number of significant deficiencies, including: the inadequate number of extension workers in relation the areas cultivated and the number of communities/associations/individual farmers requiring assistance; general low levels of qualification of extension workers; low level of knowledge and adherence/adoption of innovative production systems (such as agro-ecological methods or conservation agriculture); and an inadequate allocation of public resources, resulting in a lack of necessary equipment/materials for extension workers to provide services and to make regular visits to rural communities. In addition, certain districts which play a more significant role in regional food production, such as the “breadbasket districts” of Ribaué and Malema, do not receive any special consideration (MOSCA; BRUNA, p. 18)

In 2014 there were just 183 extension workers in the entire Nampula province (comprised of 18 districts); this is dramatically less than the minimum number of extension workers considered necessary (at least 1,350 technicians) in order to meet the demand of some 3.9 million producers that live and practice agriculture in the province. This situation results in major deficiencies in the transfer of technology to producers and compromises their ability to improve productivity per unit area and the quality of products produced (JORNAL NOTÍCIAS, 2014).

At the time that field research was conducted in Mozambique, there were five main extension methodologies being tested under ProSAVANA-PEM: 1) community-based extension 2) extension to associations 3) extension to modern business
cooperatives 4) extension through contract farming and 5) extension to local small and medium agribusinesses (MINAG, 2014). Figure 2 depicts the first four of these models focus on organizing and supporting smallholder farmers and peasant organizations to increase their production in order to promote their integration with Model 5 (an agribusiness model). Model 5 involves supporting small and medium (local) agribusinesses in the development of agricultural value chains in the ProSAVANA target area. The central idea is that these local agribusinesses “will create business partnerships with the new, modern cooperatives organized [though models 2, 3 and 4] in order to further develop agricultural logistics and market opportunities” (MASA, 2015, p. 3-15).

**Figure 2: ProSAVANA-PEM models and target groups**

Source: MINAG, 2014; MASA, 2015. Figure elaborated by the author.

In other words, small and medium agribusinesses will serve as the engine of agricultural development in the region, a centering pivot around which peasants will be organized and into which the most productive farmers/associations/cooperatives will be inevitably integrated. According to a presentation given by the ProSAVANA coordination team in Nampula on June 2014, the expected outcomes of Model 5 include:
Outcome 1: Organizations (associations, cooperatives and other local organizations involved in agribusiness) supported by Prosavana-PEM establish value-added activities and begin to earn profits from such activities.

Outcome 2: Local SMEs [small and medium-size companies] (agricultural companies, distributors, dealers, stores, etc.) become more active than before the intervention of Prosavana\textsuperscript{ix} (MINAG, 2014, não paginada).

As part of ProSAVANA-PEM, a Development Initiative Fund (DIF) was set up in September 2012 under a tri-party agreement between MINAG, JICA and GAPI “to finance selected agribusinesses in the Nacala Corridor on a piloting basis” (PROSAVANA-PD, 2013a, p.3-8). The initial capital for the fund was US$ 750,000 provided by the Japanese government through the MINAG’s Counterpart Fund\textsuperscript{84}. Funds for the DIF are channelled to agribusinesses through GAPI-Sociedade e Investimentos (GAPI-SI), which is responsible for administering the loans made under the tri-party agreement. GAPI is a Mozambican financial institution that mobilizes resources and provides loans to national businesses (including peasant associations and cooperatives) in order to promote the development of national enterprise. In October 2012, five national agribusiness companies—Lozane Farms, Matharia Empreendimentos, IKURU, Oruwera Seed Company and Santos Agricola—were granted loans through the DIF and have since been carrying out production of diverse agricultural products. Between June and July of 2013 the call for a second round of applications was announced and two additional national enterprises were selected to receive financing; this time, the company Morais Comercial Sementes and the farmer’s organization Forum Iapaca were chosen as beneficiaries (see Table 11).

\textsuperscript{84} The Counterpart Fund is pooled through grant aid assistance provided by the Japanese government under its Grant Assistance for the Food Aid Project (KR). The KR project began in 1968 and came out of the Kennedy Round (KR) at GATT, which occurred in 1967. The KR project is based on the food aid rules of the International Grain Agreement that came into effect after the KR round.
Table 11: List of companies financed under ProSAVANA-PEM through the Development Initiative Fund (DIF)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Use of Loan</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Crops</th>
<th>No. of producers contracted</th>
<th>Area cultivated (ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year 1 (2012-2013)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lozane Farms</td>
<td>Alto Molocué</td>
<td>Purchase of fertilizes and other inputs</td>
<td>In progress</td>
<td>Soybeans, Vegetables</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matharia Emprendimentos</td>
<td>Ribué</td>
<td>Purchase of a tractor and equipment; rehabilitation of a warehouse</td>
<td>In progress</td>
<td>Soybeans, Vegetables</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKURU SARL</td>
<td>Nampula</td>
<td>Purchase of two tractors; also purchasing product (sesame and peanut)</td>
<td>In progress</td>
<td>Sesame, Peanut, Feijão cute</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruwera Seed Company</td>
<td>Murrupula</td>
<td>Purchase of fertilizes and other inputs</td>
<td>In progress</td>
<td>Maize, Peanut, Sesame</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santos Agrícola</td>
<td>Namiolo</td>
<td>Installation of greenhouses and an irrigation system for the production of vegetables</td>
<td>In progress</td>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year 2 (2013-2014)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morais Comercial Sementes</td>
<td>Iapala</td>
<td>Seed production</td>
<td>Disbursed in Dec. 2013</td>
<td>Maize, Soybean, Peanut, Sorghum Beans</td>
<td>Expected to be around 120</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iapaca Forum</td>
<td>Malema</td>
<td>Commercialization of maize and sesame</td>
<td>Not yet disbursed. Contract awaiting legalization of storage facilities</td>
<td>Maize, Sesame</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GAPI-SI, 2014; MINAG, 2014. Table elaborated by author compiling data from documents from GAPI-SI and MINAG accessed in mid-2014. Table reflects data at the time of research only (April-August 2014).

The financing received by these seven entities from GAPI was issued in the form of short term loans (with terms of three to 30 months depending on the ends for which each individual loan is acquired) of up to a maximum of $US 100,000, with an annual interest rate of 10 percent. One of the pre-requisites for the loans was that each beneficiary must have a guarantee against the loan. This guarantee should be a formally registered land title (DUAT); although documentation proving the legalization of physical structures, such as warehouses or storage facilities, on a property could also
serve as a guarantee, depending on the value of the physical structures relative to the loan amount. A second pre-requisite is that the company must promote contract farming with smallholder producers from local communities in the area of actuation of each company\(^\text{85}\). At the time of research the pilot projects being implemented under the DIF were categorized as being examples of Model 4. According to MINAG (2014), the target groups considered for Model 5 will be selected from successful pilot-projects developed under Models 2, 3 and 4.

As Table 11 demonstrates, there is considerable diversity among the entities financed under ProSAVANA-PEM, each of which has its own unique history, agricultural production focus and plans for local development and business expansion. The history, mission and agricultural activities of each company are briefly summarized below.

1) **Lozane Farms** is a local seed supplier and out-grower located in Alto Molocué district, Zambézia. It was founded in 2003 as a seed producer for a number of agricultural products such as soybean, corn, sorghum, chick peas and sweet potato and in 2011, it moved into soybean outgrowing with farmers associations (HANLON; SMART, 2014). Since then it has become “one of the country’s biggest producers of high-quality seeds—particularly soybean seeds”, with the involvement of US-based NGOs Clusa and TechnoServe as well as AgriFuturo operated by USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development) (USAID, 2014). According to the government agency, “With support from USAID under Feed the Future, the U.S. Government’s global hunger and food security initiative, Lozane Farms is now a soybean production hub” (ibid). Lozane currently partners with 12 farmer associations and has signed up with the G8 New Alliance for Food and Nutritional Security. In 2013, it also signed a partner agreement with the agro-industrial giant Bunge Ltd. Lozane Farms operates its own 1,250 hectare farm and has developed seed production on approximately 250 ha (MARAPUSSE et al., 2014).

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\(^{85}\) Interview conducted with GAPI in Nampula on June 26, 2014.
2) **Matharia Empreendimentos** describes itself as “a family firm operating a farm” in Iapala, Ribaué district (Nampula). The farm was originally owned by a Portuguese colonial settler (João Ferreira Dos Santos) who stayed in Mozambique at independence; it was passed down to his son (the late Américo Dos Santos) and is now owned by his grandson, Luis Dos Santos, who currently lives and works in Maputo. In colonial times the land had been used to grow flue-cured Virginia tobacco; however, by 2012, the company had closed down production for regulatory reasons, and wanted to transition from tobacco to other crops. With the founding of Matharia Empreendimentos in 2012, the farm began production again. The company has land rights to a total area of 2200 hectares, of which 60 hectares is cultivated with soybean, corn, sunflower, onion and potato. In addition the company runs an out-grower program with approximately 600 small scale farmers on a total area of 250 hectares (outside of the farm) for the production of soybean, beans and peanuts. The company also raises cattle on about 50 hectares and is experimenting with share-cropping (also referred to as “in-growing”) with a small number of producers, a type of contract farming in which smallholders produce for the company on land owned by the company, not the farmer.

3) **IKURU (SARL)** is a farmer-owned agri-trading company founded in 2003 with the support of GAPI and Oxfam-Novib. Owned by 29 farmers associations, as well as GAPI and Oxfam-Novib, the company’s membership comprises over 20 thousand small and medium-holder farmers, most from the provinces of Nampula and Niassa. The main products commercialized by IKURU’s members are cashew nut, groundnut (peanut), sesame, cowpea, soybean and corn. Since 2006 the company has had Fair Trade certification for its groundnuts and

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86 See: <https://vc4africa.biz/ventures/matharia-empreendimentos-lda/>
87 Summary is primarily based on information retrieved through an interview conducted with a representative of Matharia Empreendimentos in Ribué on June 18, 2014; but also Hanlon and Smart, 2014.
88 For a more indepth study of IKURU’s history, organizational structure, business strategies, specific challenges and agricultural activities in Mozambique refer to a report by Randi Kaarhus and Philip Woodhouse, entitled: Development of National Producer Organizations and Specialized Business Units in Mozambique (KAARHUS; WOODHOUSE, 2012)
89 See: <http://www.gapi.co.mz/content/o-nosso-trabalho/participacoes-sociais/ikuru.php>
The company buys, transports, sorts, packs and markets all of its agricultural products and cashew is processed on contact by a local company. In 2013, the company purchased 1500 tonnes of crops from its members, of which 40 percent was exported. In the 2013/2014 growing season, the IKURU started to do its own seed production on an area of 200 hectares, with a small group of commercial farmers from the surrounding area as outgrowers (HANLON; SMART, 2014). In 2013 IKURU received a grant for $US 68,225 from USAID’s AgriFuturo Program for the construction of an office and a warehouse (ABT ASSOCIATES INC., 2013) and in 2014, IKURU signed separate partnership agreements with two United States-based organizations: CLUSA\textsuperscript{90} and the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA)\textsuperscript{91}.

4) Oruwera Seed Company is a local seed company registered in 2010 which does both basic seed production on its own farm as well as on contract with as many as 16 different associations and 15 larger individual farmers (50 ha or more). The company focuses on the production of corn, sesame, sorghum, chick pea, pigeon pea, beans and ground nuts and all seed produced by the company and its outgrowers is subject to inspection and certification by the National Seed Service (SNS). With its head office located in Nampula City, Oruwera seed is sold at 56 local re-sale stores located across the Nampula, Zambézia and Cabo Delgado provinces. The company estimates that some 30,000 smallholder farmers purchase its seed in these three provinces (ORUWERA, 2014). In 2014, Oruwera received a grant from AGRA to multiply disease-resistant cassava varieties to be disseminated to an estimated 100,000 smallholder producers in Mozambique, some of which will be integrated into the operations of commercial

\textsuperscript{90} In 2014, IKURU signed a three-year agreement with the National Cooperative Business Association Clusa International (CLUSA) under the USAID Feed the Future Program. Through the public-private partnership 17 IKURU input agents in Nampula and Zambézia provinces are receiving training and financial support to increase their ability to provide agricultural services (extension and land preparation) and inputs to local farming communities. The Mozambican start-up company Phoenix Seeds is also a partner in the agreement with 200 of its leading farmers receiving support and training (FEED THE FUTURE, 2015).

\textsuperscript{91} Founded in 2006 AGRA is a partnership between the Rockafeller Foundation and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. For more info on AGRA, see: <http://www.agra.org/> Regarding IKURU's most recent grant with AGRA, see: <https://www.growafrica.com/groups/ikuru-mozambique>. IKURU also received a grant from AGRA in 2011: <http://archive.agra.org/silo/grants/309-Ikuru%20Sarl%20451400.pdf>
supply chain companies DADTCO (a private Dutch trading company) and SAB Miller (the world’s second largest brewing company)\textsuperscript{92} which use cassava to make beer in Nampula province (FEED THE FUTURE, 2014).

5) **Santos Agrícola** is a large farm located in Meconta district owned by Adventino Santos, a former Portuguese soldier who arrived in Nampula in the 1960s and stayed at independence. The initial aim of this DIF pilot-project was to develop 20 hectares of irrigated vegetable production (tomato, onion, garlic, cabbage, carrot etc.) on Santos’ own farm and to promote contract farming for vegetables on 10 hectares (ProSAVANA-PD, 2013a). According to information provided by Hanlon and Smart (2014, p. 58), Santos “is developing a 50 ha sharecropping scheme in which each grower, usually women, will have 0.25 ha. He estimates that each producer could grow 10 tonnes of vegetables a year on 0.25 ha”.

6) **Morais Comercial Sementes**, located in Iapala, is a registered Mozambican seed company owned by João Morais, which focuses on the production of corn, soybean, peanut, sorghum and bean seeds for the local market. The company’s plans include developing outgrowing schemes with an estimated 120 smallholder producers in the area surrounding the company.

7) **Forum Iapaca**, created in 1999, is presently comprised of 10 different peasant associations and has a total of 529 members (as of June 2014). The area cultivated by the forum varies from year to year, but generally ranges between 1200 ha and 3000 ha. The main food crops produced are corn, sorghum, beans and cassava. Cash crops produced are sesame, beans and cotton. In the past the Forum has produced cotton on relatively large scale. However, input costs are high and the only potential buyer in the region at present is Asamo, which holds a monopsony (buyer’s monopoly) over all of the cotton produced in the area and regularly refuses to purchase cotton from the forum. Thus, producers are increasingly abandoning cotton to switch to sesame. In comparison, there are

\textsuperscript{92} See: <http://www.dadtco.nl/mozambique> and (HANLON; SMART, 2014, p. 57).
fewer costs associated with producing sesame and there are many buyers that keenly seek out the association at harvest time. Iapaca has also experimented with growing soybean, but because of falling prices it decided that members would not produce the commodity on a large scale.\textsuperscript{93}

5.2 Insights from the field

During fieldwork in Mozambique the author visited three of the seven aforementioned pilot-projects: Matharia Empreendimentos, Forum Iapaca and Oruwera Seed Company. This section will discuss only the first two of these pilot-projects in more detail, given that fieldwork in the former two locations was more comprehensive than in the latter and since social/territorial conflicts were discernible at both Matharia and Forum Iapaca. The most serious of these conflicts was at Matharia Empreendimentos, which was mentioned by GAPI as being one of the most successful of the pilot projects at the time of research.\textsuperscript{94}

5.2.1 The case of Matharia Empreendimentos

As stated in the summary on Matharia Empreendimentos in the previous section, the territory that the company currently occupies (and has been granted a formal land title to) has been held in the Dos Santos family since the colonial period. Since then, its ownership has been highly contested. For the last half a decade the area has been subject to the processes of territorialization (colonial occupation), de-territorialization (peasant dispossession), and the re-territorialization (the re-establishment of peasant communities and family farming activities in the territory). Now, it appears that the process has swung full circle and is repeating itself in the age of corporate territorialization, shaded with a neo-colonial tinge. As one peasant farmer from the area explained:

\textsuperscript{93}Summary based on information received during an interview conducted by the author with a representative of Forum Iapaca on June 16, 2014 in Malema.

\textsuperscript{94}Interview conducted with GAPI in Nampula on June 26, 2014.
That whole area belonged to the people, but a Portuguese arrived and spoke to the colonial government and then he began to turn people away. Everyone abandoned their farms and left the Portuguese to do his business. After the owner died, the people returned to their land and the people have remained there. It is this population that until now they are still excluded. The population when going up there [to Matharia], continue to make their farms that they have had since the colonial period. But now it is not possible because the Whiteman occupied the land, bought the whole area and drove out the people.95

A representative from the Matharia farm summarizes the history as follows:

[...] when Mozambique achieved independence, he [João Ferreira Dos Santos] stayed here as a Mozambican with his children and practiced certain activities - trade, agriculture, cattle farming. So when this civil war appeared, this armed conflict with Renamo, he left Ribaué to live in the city, and left his plantation with the guards ... when the war ended, he died and his sons took over the business and all of the fortune that had belonged to their father. Then they occupied the area and began to do their activities96.

When Matharia began its operations, with support from ProSAVANA’s DIF, a significant number of peasant families had long been living in the formal boundaries of the company’s 2200 ha DUAT and using the land to practice agriculture, mainly for subsistence. Since the onset of the civil war in the late seventies, the entire area had been left essentially unoccupied and unproductive by Santos and his descendents. “And he [Santos] has been occupying all the land without purpose; he’s not doing anything there. He occupied the whole area but only uses a small corner,”97 explains one peasant with a farm within the parameters of the DUAT. Indeed the area is quite vast; it possesses significant water resources (ponds and streams) and much woodland and heavy brush that have been being used by the area’s native inhabitants who depend of these vital resources for their livelihoods (see Photo 1). Traditional burial grounds and spiritual and cultural sites of importance to the local population are also found within the DUAT.

Most of the families living and farming within the Matharia area have been occupying these lands for over a decade. Under Mozambique’s national Land Law,

95 Comment made in a group interview conducted on 18 June, 2014 in Ribaué with several members of a community affected by Matharia Empreendimentos.
96 Interview with a representative of Matharia Empreendimentos conducted on 18 June, 2014 in Ribaué.
97 Comment made in a group interview conducted on 18 June, 2014 in Ribaué with several members of a community affected by Matharia Empreendimentos.
individuals and communities that occupy land for a period of ten years or more and use the land in good faith are conferred, by law, customary land title to the areas that they occupy. Thus much of the land claimed by Matharia as its property should legally belong to the communities that have been occupying it in good faith for over a decade and which depend on it for their subsistence. Instead these people are being forced to abandon their homes and lands. One farmer describes the experience of dispossession as follows:

It was exclusion all at once ... and still now [the company] is excluding ... Everyone left behind their homes, but some have signed up as a worker ... Everyone who retreated [from the area] left their homes and no one remains [living] there. The entire population that was there was excluded. Now there are only a few workers that remain in order to do work for the boss.\textsuperscript{98}

A representative at the company verified the existence of this salient territorial conflict between Matharia and local residents at the farm. Not surprisingly, the nature of the conflict was viewed much differently from the perspective of the company:

Practically there exists a war with the residents ... they try to go on a site to clear the fields so we have talked with them as well as with [SDAE] and the administration [local government] so that they can help us, for those people to leave, because we have big plans, programs for agricultural production and livestock. So at this point there are some communities that have still become residents and do not leave\textsuperscript{99}.

The company estimates that as many as 500 people dispersedly lived and had their small farms (machambas) in the DUAT area. Whether or not the representative meant to say 500 families or 500 people was ambiguous, but it was explained that a contingent area of 500 hectares had been set aside by the company for the families so that they could continue to practice their agricultural activities. Families who had constructed houses and had been living and cultivating on areas outside of the current designated 500 ha block, had to leave their houses behind. “Everyone had a home there and was told that they could not continue living there, but only producing”\textsuperscript{100},

\textsuperscript{98} Comment made in a group interview conducted on 18 June, 2014 in Ribaué with several members of a community affected by Matharia Empreendimentos.

\textsuperscript{99} Interview with a representative of Matharia Emprreendimentos conducted on 18 June, 2014 in Ribaué.

\textsuperscript{100} Comment made in a group interview conducted on 18 June, 2014 in Ribaué with several members of a community affected by Matharia Empreendimentos.
describes one farmer. These families did not receive compensation since land use rights to the property were considered by the government to be held by the Santos family since before independence. The peasant families who continue to farm in the Matharia DUAT were informed that they are not to build permanent structures or plant perennial crops like cashew, banana, or mango trees, since at some point in the future, the company plans to expand production onto that area (reserved for the internally displaced population) and that farmers will eventually have to find somewhere else to grow their crops. Still, “for now everyone continues to make their farms there....where there was the village” says an exasperated local inhabitant, who explains that most of the community has nowhere else to go.

**Photo 1: Matharia Empreendimentos, Ribaué district, Nampula province**

Local peasants gathering water from one of the ponds located on the Matharia DUAT, while pumps bring water to fields for irrigation.

Photo Credit: Elizabeth Clements, June 18, 2014.

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101 Comment made in a group interview conducted on 18 June, 2014 in Ribaué with several members of a community affected by Matharia Empreendimentos.
5.2.2 The case of Forum Iapaca

As with Matharia Empreendimentos, in the case of Forum Iapaca the author also noted certain conflictual elements during fieldwork; though of a very different nature than those described in the case of the former. Members of Forum Iapaca claim that they were not aware from the beginning that the source of the financing being offered by GAPI through the DIF was ProSAVANA. They only became aware of this fact, after the document to legalize their storage facilities was finalized and a team from ProSAVANA arrived and explained that the money that the Forum was going to receive from GAPI was actually from ProSAVANA. As a leading member of the Forum explained:

The Forum has already handed in the production plan to GAPI and GAPI granted a small loan to support the legalization of our warehouses. It was after this small financing that GAPI came with the ProSAVANA team and informed us that the financing that we have from GAPI is from ProSAVANA.\textsuperscript{102}

Both GAPI and the ProSAVANA extension team told the Forum and its members that they should not be worried about working with ProSAVANA. However, the Forum has been aware of ProSAVANA since 2009 and does not agree with the program and its plans to promote private investment in land along the Nacala Corridor. Under these circumstances, Forum Iapaca laments the lack of transparency by GAPI in not disclosing correct information from the onset; at the time representatives of the Forum felt that it would have been imprudent to deny the credit on offer outright. Especially given that opportunities to receive financing are so hard to come by and that a larger sum of money, such as that being offered by the DIF, presents the Forum with a chance

\textsuperscript{102} Interview conducted with a representative of Forum Iapaca on June 16, 2014 in Malema. Note: the Forum currently has three warehouses—one located at the Forums headquarters and the other two in the areas of different associations that comprise Forum. The interviewee felt that by legalizing the warehouses the associations could protect their lands from usurpation. The legalization of the warehouses was also desirable since it allows the Forum to access greater amounts of credit. According to the interviewee, the silos were worth equal to or more than the 3 million meticais in credit that GAPI was offering to finance.
to invest more in production and get a good return from the loan, therefore stimulating further benefits. As a member of the Forum noted:

> When we manage small amounts of credit the profits are not worth it. For example, with the 51 thousand meticais in financing that Forum Iapaca previously received from GAPI, the Forum earned almost 38 thousand meticais in profit, but we suffered some changes to this return, because we had had to buy bicycles to go out into the field to supervise the credit and make other trips.

Needless to say, the financing offered by GAPI under DIF was extremely alluring to the Forum and its members:

> This year we enter into a new agreement with GAPI for a higher value, but [the Forum] needed a guarantee, so our guarantee is our three warehouses. [...] The purpose of the funding is to commercialize sesame and the value [of the loan] is up to 3 million meticais, with an annual interest rate of ten percent. We are thinking of selling 100 tonnes of sesame, and have already negotiated with [the local company] IKURU to sell.

> ...In every ten associations, we selected two members to benefit from this fund to produce sesame, to create the farming field schools. Afterward the other members of the associations will participate in these farming field schools and learn together. All [of the members of the Forum] will sell product, but who will manage the credit are these [two] associations....We have high hopes about what can be done with this value...

As the Forum representative explained, “we do not have any kind of assistance from the government” adding that “to support means to say something and then comply.” The establishment of contracts with agribusiness was seen as “welcome”, that is, so long as contracts are fair and do not result in the usurpation of peasant lands.

> We must make it clear, we can make a tour across the district ... we will not go 10 kilometers without running into occupations. Every 2 kilometers we will find some communities, the land being worked....it should not be as they [ProSAVANA. and the government] want—to displace the

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103 In previous years, the Forum had received small amounts of financing from GAPI on two separate occasions for amounts equal to 51,000 MZN and 61,000 MZN, respectively.
104 Interview conducted with a representative of Forum Iapaca on June 16, 2014 in Malema.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
people—but rather to encourage contract farming and work with communities.\textsuperscript{107}

Some members of civil society groups believe that the DIF pilot projects and the activities conducted under ProSAVANA-PEM are attempts to create alliances at the local level, and generate support at a time when criticism of the program is unrelenting. The train of logic is that beneficiaries created through PEM and the DIF will, in turn, become supporters of the program and partake in its promotion in the future; either ignorant or impervious to the underlying intentions of the program (embodied in ProSAVANA-PD and the Nacala Fund), but not necessarily reflected in supporters’ own experience (having been assisted through DIF and PEM). This is one way in which the recruitment of Forum Iapaca and other farmers, individuals or organized groups, by ProSAVANA, is being perceived by some civil society movements.

5.2.3 The case of AgroMoz and Nitori

Members of Forum Iapaca and other family farmers in the region fear that ProSAVANA will usurp land from peasant families and communities. As examples of what kinds of negative impacts this will have for Mozambican peasants and rural communities, a representative of the Forum points to the operations of AgroMoz (Gurué) and Nitori and Mozaco (Malema), all cases which the author had the opportunity to visit and study first hand\textsuperscript{108}. I will only discuss the first two of these three cases here as they involve Brazilian and Japanese capital and are suspected by local inhabitants to be related to ProSAVANA.

Concerns about the usurpation of peasant land by foreign agribusiness are well founded in the Nacala Corridor. While in the administrative post of Lioma, in the district of Gurué, I visited the area occupied by AgroMoz and spoke with peasants from the community living on the side of the road directly across from the farm. As mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, the AgroMoz is a joint-venture between Brazil, Mozambique

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{108} A summary of the activities and impacts of both AgroMoz and Mozaco can be found in a 2015 report published by the NGO Grain and UNAC (see: GRAIN; UNAC, 2015).
and Portugal producing soybean and rice in the Zambézia province. Since the company began operations hundreds of peasants have been forced off their land. In 2012, the Wakhua community was told by the company that it only wanted 200-500 hectares of land; today it currently occupies an area of close to 10,000 hectares (see Photo 2).

**Photo 2: AgroMoz in Lioma, Gurué district, Zambézia province**

![Photo Credit: Elizabeth Clements – A tractor working in the field at the AgroMoz farm.](image)

The official line of the ProSAVANA coordination team and the Mozambican government is that AgroMoz has nothing to do with the program, but most peasants in the region, and most civil society organizations in Nampula believe that there is a connection, and fear that AgroMoz is representative of exactly the type of development that Brazil will bring to the region through ProSAVANA. Regarding the company’s impact in Lioma, a representative of Forum Iapaca stated:

AgroMoz has already hurt [the population] and will continue causing harm to the people. It has harmed people because it removed people from their land with a compensation value that we consider to be insufficient and it is practicing agriculture but dismissed the labour power of the people. And, evidently, as you saw, the company is very big and works with
machines. So, to create employment, as the company promised, it seems like it is a lie, at least from what I have seen so far. And the communities themselves may have more other problems besides [inadequate] compensation and the loss of their land...they could have health problems because a plane comes to spray chemicals on the fields that are toxic that can affect the communities. In short, we can say that the area of the company is so large that we don’t even know to say how many hectares it is. You stop in one place and look and you cannot even tell where it ends.\textsuperscript{109}

In addition to Lioma, the ‘breadbasket district’ of Malema has been explicitly named as a key district for ProSAVANA’s implementation (PROSAVANA-PD, 2013a; MASA, 2015). Yet at the time of research, a government official from Malema informed me that ProSAVANA had still not begun implementing activities “on the ground”. According to this official:

ProSAVANA has still not started to do anything here in Malema. We had already identified some areas....but we are having difficulties because the whole Corridor is already full of people. But the aim of ProSAVANA is to work with the population, support the population. Not because ProSAVANA will open a parcel of land; that is not what ProSAVANA is. It will only support some communities and some investors. But still the program has not started to act on the ground\textsuperscript{110}.

With the arrival of the Japanese agricultural company, Nitori, in Malema in early 2014, suspicions regarding ProSAVANA’s underlying objectives to acquire land for commodity production have only been heightened. As one farmer from Mutuali (Malema) recalls:

After announcements about ProSAVANA some white people [Japanese] arrived who wanted 27,000 hectares in a village here in Mutuali for cotton production. As we had knowledge about this, we sat down and discussed and decided that we did not want this investor. So they [the company] failed to get [land]. When they failed in Mutuali, the government of Malema led the company to [the administrative post of] Chiulo and deceived the people there. There they said that we in Mutuali denied this company because in Mutuali there is already a cotton company doing outgrowing. “So you should accept”. And there the population accepted and the whites [Japanese/owners or representatives] of that company departed from that community and said they will go to Maputo to deal with

\textsuperscript{109} Interview conducted with a representative of Forum Iapaca on June 16, 2014 in Malema.
\textsuperscript{110} Interview conducted with a government representative in Malema on June 17, 2014.
According to the local government\textsuperscript{112} Nitori’s initial request was for 20,000 ha and as of June 17, 2014 the company had already conducted two community consultations regarding this request. Following these consultations the company was granted a DUAT for 1,000 ha only, with the possibility of occupying the other 19,000 ha as per requested in the future; but allegedly only after the company has successfully cultivated the first 1,000 ha and has made good on its promises to the communities. As with AgroMoz, the government claims that Nitori has nothing to do with the ProSAVANA. The district of Malema received close to 12 requests for land from investors from diverse countries around the world in 2013/2014 alone, highlighting the extent of international interest in the region’s fertile soils. Civil society organizations and a number of peasant farmers, however, remain sceptical, and see Nitori as an inevitable extension of ProSAVANA. According to information recently shared with the author from a confidential research contact, Nitori has since withdrawn its DUAT and completely pulled-out of its plans to invest in Malema.

5.3 Returning to ProSAVANA-PD, the paradigmatic debates and strategies for rural territorial development

This section will return to the paradigmatic debate surrounding the ProSAVANA program and its real and potential territorial implications for the region and its people. In order to highlight the aforementioned contentions between civil society, farmers, the Mozambican government and those organizations spearheading the ProSAVANA intervention I will divide the following discussion into five main categories based on the central concerns highlighted by Mozambican CSOs in relation to ProSAVANA: a) land usurpation, a large-scale farming model and land dispossession; b) labour exploitation, peasant subordination and social exclusion c); food (in)security d) the destruction of ecological systems, and e) the degradation of national sovereignty and civic rights. As

\textsuperscript{111} Interview conducted with a farmer in on July 16, 2014 in Malema.
\textsuperscript{112} Interview conducted with a government representative in Malema on June 17, 2014.
the Report No. 2 and the Conceptual Note I and II have been carefully scrutinized by a number of CSOs and academics whose findings have been published and widely disseminated (FUNADA-CLASEN, 2013b; FERRANDO, 2013; NOGUEIRA; OLLINHAO, 2013; JUSTIÇA AMBIENTAL et al. 2013; SCHELNSINGER, 2014; EKMAN; MACAMO, 2014; HANLON; SMART, 2014), I will not engage in an in-depth explanation or analysis of them here. Rather, I will utilize them, highlighting specific premises and statements within the respective policy texts, in order to discuss the strategies for rural territorial development proposed by ProSAVANA, and points of contention in the competition between discourses (immaterial territory) and ultimately, opposing paradigms for agricultural development. For the purpose of this analysis, the author will also refer to the current draft of ProSAVANA-PD’s Master Plan (Draft Zero) which was released in May 2015. Some of the main concerns shared with the author by interview respondents in the region will be highlighted here and compared and contrasted with statements contained in the aforementioned key policy texts.

5.3.1 Concerns about large-scale farming, land grabbing and land dispossession

Based on a careful reading of the 2013 version of the Master Plan (MP), it is evident that a large-scale agribusiness model is intended to be implemented in the ProSAVANA target area. Explicitly, one of the highest priorities of the program is to “attract large-scale investments for development” in each province. In order to achieve this goal it is stated that “practical measures to facilitate access to available land” should be adopted by the provinces (PROSAVANA-PD, 2013a, p. 3-16). The MP also patently states that six of the projects that it proposes “may eventually imply the need for involuntary resettlement” of peasant farmers (PROSAVANA-PD, 2013a, p. 4-60). “In [the] case that involuntary resettlement is inevitable,” it is advised that “the resettlement activities should be formulated and implemented as sustainable development plans, providing resources for the displaced people so that they can enjoy benefit derived from

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113 The Plan explains that “[t]he expression of ‘available lands’...does not exactly mean truly free lands where nobody claims the right of use or its occupancy. Instead, the term only stands for the ‘mass of lands that can potentially be made available for investment projects relatively easier than other areas’” (PROSAVANA-PD, 2013a, p. 4-60)
the project” (PROSAVANA-PD, 2013a, p. 4-60). In one particular instance the MP indicates that resettlement might be needed for the development of a proposed agri-
industrial project in Majune district (Niassa province) that plans to cultivate “large areas
of grains, especially soybeans, maize and sunflower” on 45,000 hectares (PROSAVANA-PD, 2013a, p. 3-43).

The territorial implications of such a model and its impacts on peasant farmers are evident. As a member of UNAC explains, the promotion of large-scale private investments in agriculture in the region, based on an agribusiness model, directly endangers peasant territorialities as it is on the lands of the peasantry that these mega-
farms are planned to be developed:

The major problem is that these large companies will be established, of course, within the territories of the peasants themselves. This means expropriation of land, it means the usurpation of lands belonging to peasants, to make way for large investment projects ... The investments are of the agribusiness industry and investors want plantations...

In an attempt to distance ProSAVANA from the strong agribusiness orientation embodied in the first draft of the Master Plan, the Conceptual Note I, published in September 2013, clarifies that ProSAVANA is not specific to an agribusiness model, but rather seeks to support farmers at all scales of production—small, medium and large. The document also affirms that smallholder farmers are the primary beneficiaries of the program. In response to this shift in discourse and the sudden renewed emphasis on peasant farmers, a local CSO respondent had this to say:

We are concerned about the form of development that is being implemented...in the case of ProSAVANA. Why? Well, because the development that the program intends to implement is unclear, and for us, it is unrealistic. There are several versions of ProSAVANA that contradict each other. ProSAVANA when it began aimed to develop agribusiness. It’s good to develop agribusiness. But where is it that agribusiness will develop? The program will develop agribusiness in the lands of the poor. What is the modality? It was said that the program will work with small producers. But what we have seen so far is that there is land grabbing. It is taking land from farmers. Here [in Mozambique] we do not have producers capable of producing 200 or 300 hectares. The most that we have, a national producer, is 10 hectares, 20 hectares....So

114 Interview conducted with respondent from UNAC on September 5, 2014.
it's not realistic the version of ProSAVANA that says it will work with the producers of the family sector, because no investor throws money away. No one will give money to a producer to produce a half a hectare and to produce with the production system that the producer already has.\footnote{\textsuperscript{115}}

One of the central premises of ProSAVANA-PD is the idea that “through the transformation of small to medium scale farmers’ practice into fixed farming” the “unit yield of major crops” will increase (PROSAVANA-PD, 2013a, p. 2-12). This premise is rooted in an assumption that much of the land in Mozambique is “available” or “unproductive” due to the prevailing itinerant or shifting farming production systems practiced by the majority of peasant families and smallholder farmers. According to the Conceptual Note I: “The transition from fallow agriculture to fixed farming is the main premise for increased productivity” and will be achieved “through the introduction of intensive farming technology”\footnote{\textsuperscript{116}} (PROSAVANA-PD, 2013b, p. 8).

This vision, and its central importance to the entire ProSAVANA program, is deeply rooted in the paradigm of agrarian capitalism which prioritizes, above all else, the production characteristic of territory. A CSO respondent in Nampula contests the alleged benefit of this top-down approach for agricultural transformation, pointing to the detrimental impact that this transition will have on the territorialities of peasant communities:

[...] these projects, such as ProSAVANA, when they come to Mozambique they always have the idea that the land is empty, that it is unoccupied land. So then, with the understanding that the land is unoccupied, what they say is “let’s fix people to the place where this year they are producing.” But when you “fix” people to one place, you are suffocating people. There are also resettlement programs, which cause the disintegration of communities, especially because... a community is a dynamic thing, which comes from history and ancient traditions and that continues in a perspective of sustainability. The communities have a connection with the ancestors; they have a relation with the fallow land, the land in expansion, the community land reserves, etc. Land that, today, these foreign investments consider as empty or unproductive land, unaware of this traditional reality. So the policy of opening the country up to investment, of attracting large investments that want large land areas, completely breaks with the schemes and ways of life of traditional societies. What you have is the imposition of a model for communities that will do nothing if not perpetuate and worsen poverty. Unfortunately, this is reality.\footnote{\textsuperscript{116}}
As the above passage highlights, while agribusiness views territory as a place for production and for the accumulation of profit only, for peasants their properties are spaces of life based on the production and reproduction of family relations; in peasant territories, agricultural production/productivity is but one element in a complex set of social relations. The social relations produced by peasant territories are fundamentally different than those produced by capitalist territories. In response to CSO criticism regarding the productivist approach of ProSAVANA-PD, the planners of ProSAVANA have attempted to reinforce the urgency of this transition, pointing to the rapid population growth in the region. The 2015 Master Plan issues the following warning: “Producers in the region are at a crucial point and need to change the practice of family farming in order to survive...It is necessary to realize that there will not be vast areas available for agriculture if the current predominant extensive cultivation continues to be practiced...” (MASA, 2015, p. 2-4).

One of the advantages of this transformation, according to this recent policy text, is that it will allow for an expansion of the total cultivated area in the ProSAVANA target area, by bringing these fallow lands into production:

...the unused area under the current fallow cultivation system, which is estimated to have at least the same extent as the area cultivated annually, can be used to increase the area of cultivation after the transformation [to intensive farming] (MASA, 2015, p. 4-5).

However, it is affirmed that the transition to this “modern” system of farming will not be imposed on producers, but rather:

[...] promoted within the context of general consensus with the members of [a given] community by their own free will. An area of idle land defined during the transformation should be recognized as part of the community’s land and the land should be effectively used on a sustainable basis by the community (MASA, 2015, p. 3-26).

After the “allocation” of existing fallow land for local communities has been determined through negotiations, the remaining fallow areas can then be siphoned out
of the peasant production system and serve as a land reserve upon which agribusinesses can expand their operations. The Master Plan confirms that “entrepreneurial farmland will be developed by private investment, particularly in areas of [agricultural] DUAT and partly in the areas of community DUAT” (MASA, 2015, p. 3-26). In order to mitigate the “negative impacts” that “can be expected during the transformation of extensive cultivation” the government plans to promote the simultaneous acquisition of community and individual DUATs (MASA, 2015, p. 4-5), and affirms that all private investors interested in agricultural development in the region must comply with the national Land Law.

Additionally all projects, it is stated, must adhere to the World Bank’s “Principles for Responsible Agriculture” (PRAI) and FAO’s “Voluntary Guidelines for Responsible Investments in Land”. However, it is unclear exactly how these two sets of voluntary guidelines, widely contested by international academics, development practitioners and civil society (DE SCHUTTER, 2011; KÜNEMANN; SUÁREZ, 2013; BORRAS et al., 2013), are to be enforced, or how the development of agricultural investment projects will be overseen by the Mozambican government especially given that, to date, little has been done to mitigate or address most of the land conflicts between communities and investors that are ongoing in the region. A UNAC respondent in Nampula lamented:

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119 As Olivier De Schutter, the former United Nation’s Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (2008-2014), explains: “Since both the investors and the governments in host countries have every incentive to shield the deals they negotiate from outside scrutiny, voluntary approaches to discipline land-grabbing are bound to fail” (DE SCHUTTER, 2011, p. 274). With specific regard to PRAI, De Shutter refers to the principles as a “checklist of how to destroy the global peasantry responsibly” (DE SCHUTTER, 2011, p. 275) that both “ignore[s] human rights” and “neglect[s] the essential dimension of accountability” (DE SCHUTTER, 2011, p. 274). The Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests, on the other hand, “seek to maintain the viability of smallholder production and autonomy of rural and indigenous communities” and present a vision that differs dramatically from “PRAI’s unquestioned approach of integrating rural farmers with global finance and agri-food chains” (MARGULIS; PORTER, 2013, p. 75). However, while the Voluntary Guidelines are a useful policy tool for protecting smallholders’ tenure rights in theory, they are still voluntary, and hence “toothless”. “It is therefore not about the technical and administrative form of governance instruments that are crucial especially since everyone endorses transparency, consultation, accountability, and the Voluntary Guidelines. The more crucial points are inherently political: the actual interpretation of the meaning and the transformation into authoritative instruments of (inter)national governance mechanisms to tackle the problem of land grabbing” (BORRAS et al., 2013, p.175-176).

120 This was repeatedly described by CSOs interviewed in Nampula province, including: PPOSC-N (April 28, 2014); UPC (June 5, 2014); ORAM (June 20, 2014); Liga dos Direitos Humanas (June 23, 2014); AKILIZETH-ADS (June 24, 2014); UGC (July 1, 2014) and Forum Terra (July 1, 2014). This situation was additionally observed by the author during fieldwork.
Really, there's nothing to protect us here in Mozambique on the land. We have the Land Law, which can protect us, but this law is being regulated...to defend the entry of these companies, these investors.

[...] we are not considered, we are not seen as people, and we're seeing foreigners recolonize Mozambique. We fought to liberate Mozambique, to liberate the people and liberate the land. And now the government is returning our lands to be colonized once more...this will not help us. For this reason we are against this process of ProSAVANA. We want Mozambican agriculture.\textsuperscript{xciv}\textsuperscript{121}

Indeed, despite claims made by ProSAVANA’s implementing institutions (namely ABC, JICA, and Embrapa) and the Mozambican government that no one will be removed from their lands under ProSAVANA, as the case of both AgroMoz and Matharia Empreendimentos (discussed above) clearly demonstrate, land dispossession has occurred and local communities have been adversely impacted.

\textbf{5.3.2 Concerns about labour exploitation, social exclusion and contract farming}

Another premise underscoring the entire ProSAVANA intervention envisions the improvement of peasant livelihoods through contract farming and out-grower schemes that effectively integrate smallholders with large and medium scale agribusiness enterprises. This is presented as a normative, win-win situation—on the one side, “local farmers can expect to benefit from guaranteed markets, obtaining quality agricultural inputs and acquiring improved cultivation techniques”\textsuperscript{xcv}, on the other, “agribusiness companies can expect to benefit from a reduction in initial investment costs and by ensuring stable amounts of products”\textsuperscript{xcvi} (PROSAVANA-PD, 2013b, p. 11). Each of the three key policy texts on ProSAVANA-PD (mentioned in the above section) articulate a vision wherein contract farming is seen as the principal strategy by which to promote the development of smallholder farmers. According to Conceptual Note I:

Contract farming is (notably) essential for small farmers and farmer groups as a first step to become partners of agribusiness, on an equal footing, providing sufficient quantities of quality products, without relying

\textsuperscript{121} Interview conducted with a respondent from UNAC, in Nampula City on July 10, 2014.
on extensive support from businesses\textsuperscript{xcvii} (PROSAVANA-PD, 2013b, p. 18).

The 2015 Master Plan adds:

In this perspective, the growth of local agribusiness and partnerships with the family farmers will play an important role, especially in terms of market development and the promotion of value-added agricultural production\textsuperscript{xcviii} (MASA, 2015, p. 2-35).

With the support of agribusiness it is assumed that peasants who adhere to out-growing schemes will see their incomes improve and will transition from subsistence agriculture to commercial growing, and in the process, become an equal partner with agribusiness. In the key policy texts for ProSAVANA this process is presented as a harmonious transition, discussed in terms of a peaceful “co-existence” of small and medium-scale farmers with large agribusiness entities and mutually advantageous outcomes.

It is important to note that contracts in and of themselves are neither inherently good nor bad for peasants; their outcome will depend largely on the specificities of each particular contract and the context in which it is defined and implemented. However, the negative outcomes of contract arrangements for peasant families are downplayed in the ProSAVANA policy texts, and the potential benefits are seen to outweigh the potential risks\textsuperscript{122}. This is the view that prevails in the perspective of the paradigm of agrarian capitalism which sees out-growing schemes implemented by agribusiness as the only means of commercialization for peasant farming.

In a speech made at the Triangular People’s Conference (against ProSAVANA), held in Maputo of July 27, 2014, a leading member of UNAC pointed out that this “integration” promoted under ProSAVANA’s outgrowing schemes also poses risks for farmers and represents a form of peasant subordination:

[...] speaking of the first Master Plan...we note that, in some ways, it sought to integrate peasants, yet at the same time, it could be a [form of] exclusion and could be identified, in a way, [as a form of] control by multinational corporations within their own production processes. This

\textsuperscript{122} For a more indepth discussion on the risks of contract farming and ProSAVANA refer to a UN-WIDER Working Paper by Isabela Nogeira entitled, “ProSAVANA and the forgotten risks of contract farming” (NOGUEIRA, 2013b).
could, then, in a way, deny what is the center of production of family farming\textsuperscript{123}.

Although outgrowing systems have much potential to bring benefits for peasants, from the agrarian question perspective the integration of the peasantry into the capitalist market system through contract farming is understood as subordination. The interactive relationship between the capitalist and the peasantry is seen to be characterized by highly unequal power relations that result in the loss of peasant autonomy on the land, the growth of social and economic inequalities, and ultimately, domination of the peasantry by capital. During an interview, a second member of UNAC describes “the ProSAVANA perspective” in the following way:

\[\text{[\ldots]} \text{ProSAVANA is a transformist perspective ... a perspective of a civilized peasant, that is, a peasant who will be a servant to a global chain of agribusiness. So much so that within ProSAVANA, if you look at the five proposed models...you really have a single model...One that is always connected to something of peasant culture, but in a perspective of integrating the peasantry into a global chain of agribusiness, which aims to develop commodities like soybeans}\textsuperscript{124}.

While contracts are indeed widely sought after by peasant farmers in the ProSAVANA target zone (and in Mozambique in general) and can certainly improve peasant incomes by providing a guaranteed market for farming families to commercialize their products, a brief reflection on the tumultuous track-record of contract farming in Mozambique’s recent history is worth considering:

If the public-private partnership that we are talking about is linked to the question of jatropha that, unfortunately, some peasants produced and never managed to see any benefit. If you are talking about the question of how the commercialization of cotton is done today, so that some peasants even end up burning [their cotton] for failing to see the advantage of placing on the market. If we are talking about how tobacco is being produced today, farmers end up losing all of the production costs,

\textsuperscript{123} Excerpt from a speech made by a leading member of UNAC at the Triangular People’s Conference, held in Maputo of July 27, 2014.
\textsuperscript{124} Interview conducted with respondent from UNAC on September 5, 2014.
to pay for the tobacco itself. We would be talking about what is misery in Mozambique\textsuperscript{125}.

The above statement by a member of UNAC reminds us that the social relations produced under contract farming arrangements are shaped by highly asymmetrical relations of power; as a general rule, it is the company, not the peasant, that decides what and how (and often how much) to produce. While contract farming arrangements promoted by small and medium-size local agribusinesses (such as Oruwera) are supported by many local CSOs, contract farming arrangements with transnational agribusinesses are widely seen as the territoriality of agribusiness in peasant territories. Through these arrangements, the hegemonic power of transnational agribusiness is able to exert control over the mode of production and social relations that define (and are reproduced by) peasant territories; and thereby is able to exploit peasant land and labour for its own purposes, not least of which is private gain.

Another concern related to contract farming is that these arrangements tend to promote monoculture farming and mechanization, and generally require the use of a technological package—improved seed varieties, chemical fertilizers and pesticides—thus reinforcing the dependency of farmers on external markets, inputs and pricing mechanisms. Many CSOs are concerned that the mechanism of debt could become a tool aiding in the usurpation peasants’ lands. This possible scenario is described by a one CSO respondent in the following way:

Let’s assume that...ProSAVANA is for small farmers. What are the mechanisms that they will use to finance this producer? They are going to invest money in a producer as credit. Inputs, seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and so on...If [the producer] fails, in an unstable period of climate change, if the rains appears irregularly...the producer gains a debt for the coming year. If he does not pay, we think that his [or her] land will be the guarantee. It is the only resource that he [or she] has of value...This is our fear. The process of land usurpation can occur along these lines\textsuperscript{126}.

According to Mozambique’s current Land Law, land itself cannot be alienated, sold, encumbered, pledged or mortgaged; however, as more that one interviewee

\textsuperscript{125} Excerpt from a speech made by a leading member of UNAC at the Triangular People’s Conference, held in Maputo of July 27, 2014.
\textsuperscript{126} Interview conducted in Nampula with a member of AENA on June 30, 2014.
pointed out: “in Mozambique there are many exceptions to the law”. Thus this process (peasant dispossesion through the mechanism of debt) is not out of the realm of possibility. While land itself cannot be used as a guarantee, physical structures on land, such as warehouses, lodging or irrigation systems, can be. One of the major projects proposed by ProSAVANA is the attribution of individual land titles. Indeed, in the 2013 Master Plan it was proposed that land titles be granted to farmers who adopt intensive (fixed) farming practices. In the case that these same producers are offered financing, and should their production fail, the land use rights of these farmers could indeed be transferred to a third party (their creditor) by means of a simple land transfer process (called a transpase).

As with most development programs that aim to modernize the countryside through the expansion of agrarian capitalism, ProSAVANA will likely provoke an increase in social differentiation among peasant farmers. Although ProSAVANA states that smallholder farmers are the main beneficiary group targeted by the program, medium-scale farmers, or “emergent farmers”, with areas of between 10 and 50 hectares have been specifically selected to lead the agricultural transformation of the region. It is expected that these emergent farmers (also denominated “leading farmers”) will act as intermediaries connecting small-scale farmers with agribusiness and will also aid in the dissemination of new agricultural technologies and information regarding the benefits of contract farming in rural communities. This scenario is described in the 2015 Master Plan as follows:

Besides the fact ... that emerging producers have a prominent role in the process of organization of producers in the community, they should also expand the scale of their agricultural operations through the active use of mechanized agriculture. To achieve stability in agricultural management, contract farming with agribusiness for the production of cash crops such as sesame, cotton and/or soybeans, should be further promoted in ways as to facilitate access to agricultural inputs. In addition, emerging producers act as contractors/facilitators of contract farming for the smallholders, and should become the driving force for the development of the area through the provision of market information and promoting the use of improved farming techniques, seed quality, agro-chemicals and fertilizers (MASA, 2015, p. 3-13, 3-14).
Within this same passage we encounter a further point of contention regarding ProSAVANA that has been raised by national and international CSOs alike: that is, the focus of the program on the production of highly-valued export commodities, such as cotton, sesame, soybeans and corn.

5.3.3 Concerns about food (in) security

In Mozambique, family farmers play a fundamental role in provisioning for domestic food security, especially in the center and northern region of the county. It is estimated that approximately 90 percent of all national food production is done by peasant farmers\(^\text{127}\). An interview respondent from UNAC points out this salient fact and its relevance to the national context of food security:

> The question is that Mozambicans today, these people in the cities, eat food that comes from where? It is food that comes from the production of peasants... And one must also remember that the production of these peasants occurs in the present conditions that we find in the countryside, in small plots of land, with the families’ own resources, their own efforts, without much intervention of the government in the agricultural sector....There is no large company that is producing this food. In Mozambique there is no single large company that is producing 100 hectares of food. We can look across the country, we will not find a single company that is producing 100 hectares of food \textit{and that the food is being produced for the domestic market}...No big company is producing beans, corn, squash etc. for the domestic market. Even the vegetables produced at the national level come from peasant agriculture...Historically, the peasantry has always been a sector that has been marginalized and it is this sector that is responsible for feeding the country\(^\text{128}\).

It is evident, in all of the policy texts related to ProSAVANA, that the program will involve the promotion of a wide range of both food and cash crops\(^\text{129}\). However, there is an overwhelming emphasis on certain agricultural products that are in high demand in international markets, namely corn and soybeans. This is highlighted in the following passage drawn from the 2015 Master Plan:

> The priority crops were divided into the following three groups for the development of agricultural research work strategy.

\(^{127}\) Interview conducted with João Mosca of the Observatório do Meio Rural (OMR) on July 22, 2014. 
\(^{128}\) Interview conducted with respondent from UNAC on September 5, 2014. 
\(^{129}\) Food crops recommended to be grown under the program include: corn, cassava, beans, cow pea and peanut. Cash crops include: soybean, potato, vegetables, cashew, cotton, tobacco seasame, sunflower and tea.
1) Group-1 (priority crops):
Corn and soybeans, including soy use for the improvement of food and
nutrition
Group-2 (secondary priority crops):
Cassava, beans, peanuts, potatoes, vegetables, cashew, sesame and
sunflower
2) Group-3 (crops to be investigated by private companies)
Cotton, tobacco and tea(30) (MASA, 2015, p. 4-8).

A number of reasons are mentioned to justify the prioritization of corn and
soybean crops; the most prominent of which is linked to the recent growth in national
chicken production and the increasing demand for animal feed to fuel this growing
domestic industry. The Master Plan states:

The recent development of the poultry industry indicates that the factors
that constitute constraints [for the commercialization of corn and
soybeans] are gradually being resolved. The agribusiness companies
with verticalized and intensive systems of production, which bring their
products to market, such as chickens and animal feed, are fuelling the
[economic] activity and allowing small producers to enter into the
production system. This development drives the demand for feed and raw
materials, thus expanding the area of soybean and corn crops (MASA,
2015, p. 2-8, 2-9).

The focus of the Master Plan on corn production and its subsequent
commercialization as animal feed has caused significant concern among farmers and
farmer’s organizations in Mozambique, especially since corn is the main food staple in
Mozambique. A member of the General Union of Farmers Cooperatives (UGC) in
Nampula shares his perspective regarding the prioritization of corn and soybeans and
their marketing as animal feed:

I asked: “Why soybeans?” Soybeans and corn...The ProSAVANA team’s
response was: “Oh, you know that there is a significant lack of animal
feed for the production of chicken...” So, here in the Nacala Corridor, we
will devote ourselves to produce soybeans for animal feed? Do the
peasants here live only on chicken? And where are the poultry farms that
have the problem of lack of animal feed? Where are they? Perhaps
they’re in Europe. I do not know where they are..."(30)

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(30) Interview conducted with a member of UGC in Nampula on July 2, 2014.
The Master Plan’s focus on corn production for animal feed, in rotation with soybean crops, raises additional concerns regarding the types of varieties of corn that will be developed and promoted through ProSAVANA. As Schlesinger (2014, p. 27) has pointed out: “Corn for animal feed is not the corn the Mozambican peasants know and produce. It deals with transgenic varieties designed for animal feed that do not taste good, as we were told by family farmers in the Lucas do Rio Verde region [in the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso]”.

Although the Master Plan prioritizes both corn and soybeans, it is evident that the main focus is on the latter, which is much more appealing to international agribusinesses and trading companies than the former. Notably, soybeans were called the “crop of the future” by a representative of Mozambique’s Ministry of Agriculture at the Triangular Peoples’ Conference (on ProSAVANA) in July 2014. This pronouncement underscores the degree of importance that the Mozambican government has put on the expansion of this particular agricultural product. As Hanlon and Smart have noted, in Mozambique, “Contract farming has only been for export crops or for local crops with restricted markets, such as chickens and soya. There has been no contract farming for the main staple crops, maize and rice” (HANLON; SMART, 2014, p. 15) and the price offered for corn (maize) on the local market is well below the international market price which makes it difficult for smallholders to profit from commercializing this crop.

In recent years, a number of international agribusinesses have begun producing soybeans on large farms in the Nacala Corridor; these operations have all resulted in the creation of territorial and social conflicts with peasant farmers. Other companies and NGOs have focused mainly on soybean outgrowing and have run into far fewer conflicts with local communities (HANLON, SMART, 2012; HANLON; SMART, 2014). Presently, private interest in soybean production in Mozambique is catalyzing, and rapidly, gaining visibility under not just ProSAVANA, but also the G8’s New Alliance for

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131 These authors also highlight that: “Staple food crops are highly political in most countries, and Mozambique is no exception. Most countries want to keep the cost of urban food low, and in Mozambique this is reinforced by the 2008 and 2010 price riots in Maputo. As much of the food consumed in the capital is imported from South Africa, the government has tried to keep a high (overvalued) exchange rate of three Meticais to one Rand, in order to keep imported goods cheap. At the same time the price paid to farmers for maize is well below the world market price, further reducing urban good prices. But it creates another problem: it is not worth growing or trading maize. The Ministry of Industry and Commerce admits that sometimes farmers cannot sell their maize” (HANLON; SMART, 2014, p. 15).
Food Security in Mozambique, which has agro-industrial giants such as Monsanto, Bunge and Cargill as some of its major partners.

Although soybean was introduced in Mozambique in 2004, it has not been seen as a profitable crop in the country until only very recently. Hanlon and Smart (2014) point out the pertinent fact that this crop was not developed in Mozambique as a private sector intervention or initiative. Rather:

[...] it was a successful decade-long push of a technological package by donors and NGOs – Clusa, TechnoServe, Gates, Norway, Switzerland, the United States, International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) and others – that turned it into a profitable crop. Unlike many donor projects which only offer information and help to organise associations, the Norwegian funded Clusa/TechnoServe support programme involved people getting their hands dirty – supplying tractors and ploughing, organising seed production, promoting marketing, and training people to see farming as a business (HANLON; SMART, 2014, p. 26).

These same authors also add that:

This is the antithesis of the private sector acting on its own. Instead, what might be called the “international public sector” built the social, technological and market infrastructure. The private sector only showed interest when the public sector had proved soya was profitable (HANLON; SMART, 2014, p. 26).

Both Brazil and Japan have vested interests in the intensive promotion of soybean production in Mozambique under ProSAVANA. Specifically, the Japanese government is interested in importing soybeans for domestic consumption, while Brazilian agribusinesses are interested in expanding production overseas. Currently, Japan is one of the most food-dependent countries in the world, importing over 60 percent of its total food consumption needs (OKADA, 2015). Soybeans are a staple food source in Japan and since the 1970s the country has been importing most of its soybean supply. “After the global food crisis in 1973-4, Japan “bi-polarized” soybeans supply zone to the US and Brazil through PRODECER. After the subsequent global food crises in 2007-8, Japan sought to “tri-polarize” it with ProSAVANA” explains Japanese researcher Okada (2015, p. 11).

As for Brazil, the country is currently one of the world’s largest producers and exporters of soybeans. In the 2014/2015 season, a total of 31,940,300 hectares of the country’s territory was planted in soybean monoculture, and production reached a
remarkable 96,203, 500 tonnes. Of total production, more that 49 million tonnes were exported, mainly to China and the European Union (CONAB, 2015). Although most Brazilian agribusinesses have thus far opted not to expand production in Africa, there are clear aspirations for such expansion in the future, once the profit-and-loss statement for producing crops such as soybeans and cotton on the African continent becomes more attractive than that for producing domestically (ESBER, 2014).

In light of the above mentioned facts, CSOs have raised the legitimate question: “Whose food security are we talking about with ProSAVANA?” Furthermore, they question how, exactly, a model of agricultural development that prioritizes large-scale soybean production and soybean outgrowing schemes with smallholder farmers, can translate into food security for the Mozambican people? A number of local farmers’ organizations are highly critical of ProSAVANA’s overwhelming emphasis on soybean production and have criticized the wave of propaganda that is now sweeping the region in order to promote the adherence to this cash crop among smallholders. During fieldwork on ProSAVANA, a number of CSOs, peasant organizations and family farmers shared a similar fear with the author: that the relentless endorsement of soybean farming will result in farmers shifting from the production of food crops for household food security into soybean production instead. As one CSO respondent cautioned:

People can adhere to soybeans now. But it is important to remember that the day that soybeans are not purchased, it is difficult to consume soybeans in natura. We here in the Nacala Corridor, have already been major producers of cotton. But why did people stop producing cotton? It’s because producing cotton does not payoff for the peasant. The cultivation of cotton requires a lot of work and many inputs. The peasant would tend to grow cotton on a larger scale because the market is guaranteed, but with the risk of not having corn for consumption. He trusts cotton so that tomorrow he can buy corn. If the cotton is not purchased, the family has no food. So there are specific crops that require a lot of rigor and work and as a result, the farmer loses his time to cultivate other [staple food] crops. So right now...those who are going to plant soybeans must have another form of income in order to support other things. But the peasant does not have it. He has no choice. If I’m going to dedicate myself this year only to cotton or soybeans, with 2 hectares or 3 hectares of

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132 In 2014/2015 soybean represented 46 percent of the country’s total grain production (estimated at 200.8 million tons) and 55 percent of the total grain-growing area (estimated at 57.8 million hectares) (CONAB, 2015).
soybeans, I'm not going to produce corn, I'm not going to produce sorghum, I'm not going to produce beans. What am I going to eat?\textsuperscript{133}

This obvious preoccupation was exacerbated by the fact that, at the time of research, world soy prices had taken a sharp downturn, resulting in significant losses, not just for smallholders producing on contract\textsuperscript{134}, but for local agribusinesses running out-growing operations\textsuperscript{135}. This situation underscores the dangers of peasants becoming dependent on cash crops, such as soybeans, whose price is determined entirely by international markets; a significant fall in the price of soybeans (or any other cash crop) can mean that peasant farmers and their families go hungry for most of the year, or worse...

5.3.4 Concerns about environmental degradation

An integral element of the agribusiness model promoted under ProSAVANA is the technological package necessary to fuel its expansion. The adoption of “modern” agricultural technologies and “improved” techniques and practices are central to the technocratic vision and the paradigm of agrarian capitalism that underpins the entire program, as evidenced in the three main policy texts related to ProSAVANA thus far. However, the purported “sustainability” and “applicability” of the technological package being developed by Embrapa under ProSAVANA-PI has been seriously called into question by Mozambican civil society:

Just to give you an illustration, in Mozambique agriculture is rain-fed; it is subsistence, with low use of agricultural inputs. We are talking mainly of fertilizers. In every region of the country the use of fertilizers is extremely low. But all of the research being done at the agronomic station in Nampula, by the staff of ProSAVANA, is based on the use of agrochemicals...fertilizers, phosphate, potassium...various fertilizers. The question is: the majority of the population does not use fertilizers. Why? Because they have no access to these fertilizers, because they do not know how to use these fertilizers, because fertilizers are expensive and because it

\textsuperscript{133} Interview conducted with a member of UGC in Nampula on July 2, 2014.
\textsuperscript{134} Interview conducted with an individual farmer in Malema on June 16, 2014, with a Union of Farmers in Malema on June 17, 2014, and an interview with a peasant forum in Ribaué June 18, 2014.
\textsuperscript{135} Interview conducted with a representative of Matharia Empreendimentos in Ribaué on June 18, 2014.
has been proven that fertilizer can pollute the water, which the communities use for their livelihood, for their day to day survival—the river water. But all research that is being done at the level of ProSAVANA is based on chemicals. Who will use these chemicals? Is it the producer who does not use chemicals or the investors who have the power to use chemicals? This is the question. Every technology that is being developed is based on chemicals.

Despite the program’s claim to promote “sustainable” development, or paradoxically, to implement an agribusiness model based on green-revolution technologies sustainably, there is, in fact, nothing inherently sustainable about the technological package on offer by ProSAVANA or the model of agribusiness that requires its perpetual application. The heavy application of fertilizers and pesticides for the modernization of Mozambican agriculture is not in the best interests of smallholder farmers and local communities, as the above passage highlights. Rather, the sale and distribution of agrochemicals in Mozambique will benefit primarily transnational agribusinesses (who will be the main users of these expensive chemical-based products) and a handful of industrial food and chemical giants (which presently control the international trade and supply of these inputs).

Currently, Brazil is one of the largest producers, buyers, and consumers of agrochemicals (pesticides, herbicides, insecticides, and fungicides) in the world. Between 2000 and 2012, the volume of pesticides used in Brazilian agriculture increased by 162 percent (AGRONEWS, 2015), and in 2012, Brazil passed the United States as the world’s largest buyer of pesticides (PRADA, 2015). It is estimated that close to 45 percent of all of the agro-chemicals used in Brazil are for soybean monoculture, most of which is genetically modified (SCHELESINGER, 2014). According to a report by the Brazilian Association of Collective Health (Abrasco), national pesticide consumption amounts to approximately 5.5 kilograms per Brazilian per year (AGRONEWS, 2015). The environmental and public health costs of this highly toxic technological package have been well documented in Brazil (VEIGA et al. 2006; BOMBARDI, 2011; CARNEIRO, 2015), but also globally (SHIVA, 1991; SIGNH, 2000; PATEL, 2012). In the key policy documents for ProSAVANA-PD, no consideration is given to issues such as

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136 Interview conducted in Nampula with a member of AENA on June 30, 2014
soil and water pollution or public health and safety, which are risks undeniably associated with the “modern” agricultural technologies that are being imposed in Mozambique under the auspices of the program. As one farmer and peasant activist states:

What we want is...that Mozambican agriculture is practiced, agriculture that does not destroy our soil, agriculture that does not destroy our health, agriculture that can be sustainable for us, not agribusiness....It’s not that we do not want to commercialize. We want to commercialize, but not in the way of companies...with our way of producing, not a way brought from just any place or company that can harm our health. We want to produce, first to feed ourselves, and we can commercialize as well. What we want is food sovereignty, not food security. We do not want to eat just to fill our belly. We want to eat to be healthy as well...\(^\text{cx137}\)

Similarly, the Master Plan pays little regard to the environmental risks associated with deforestation to expand the area for agriculture. The 2015 version of ProSAVANA-PD states that “the Master Plan does not include any plans for agricultural development that requires the reduction of the current forest area”\(^\text{cx}\) (MASA, 2015, p. 3-20). This recent version of the Master Plan takes a conservationist perspective, affirming that existing forested areas should be protected and agricultural expansion under ProSAVANA should occur only in areas that are already de-forested. This is not surprising since clearing large tracts of brush-and-woodland is costly and time-consuming, and therefore, not very attractive to investors. This particular point was raised by a government official that the author spoke with in Monapo district:

Even the investors that we have today must have financial problems...and to go and clear areas of 1000 or 2000 hectares is not the preference of these investors....It’s an expense that you, an investor will not want to pay...And talking about this issue of investors rushing to Nacala Corridor...Why? Because here, really, there is this advantage of having had these big companies long ago in the colonial era that created these plantation areas, areas that were cleared long ago\(^\text{cx138}\).

\(^{137}\) Interview conducted with respondent from UNAC, in Nampula City on July 10, 2014.

\(^{138}\) Interview conducted with a government official in Monapo on June 13, 2014.
Indeed, these old colonial areas are the primary areas targeted for new large-scale agricultural investments in the region. A government official from Malema district explained:

[...] the [investors] who come here want the old plantations. Those old plantations are large and have been cleared for agriculture. They are already free. But when we [the government] say...this area is free, and has been [only] slightly occupied. Looking where [the lands] are, investors think that the area is small. They want twice as much....I’m not sure that there will be some who have the courage to clear [new areas]...in fact, here there is a lot of land...but investors want [areas] where people are already working, where the population has already occupied\textsuperscript{139}.

What was pointed out by both of these government officials is that these large farms, most of which were abandoned at independence or otherwise since the early 1990s (when Mozambique shifted from a socialist economy to a capitalist economy), are now being scooped-up by investors. Indeed, when a new investor arrives and requests land use rights, local administrators bring the investors specifically to these “abandoned” colonial-era farms to showcase the land. However, peasant families have long occupied these lands, in many cases for decades, and are currently practicing agriculture there. These populations are increasingly being displaced by large foreign companies and are forced to look for land elsewhere to practice their agricultural activities. The continued displacement of local populations from their current areas could very well result in deforestation as displaced peasant families require new lands for subsistence, and may be forced tofellforested areas in order to open them up for cultivation.

Ironically, the 2015 Master Plan attributes increasing pressure on farmland and natural resources (especially water) as well as environmental degradation (including deforestation) in the region primarily to rapid population growth and the traditional agricultural system (itinerant farming and slash and burn practices). For example, the 2015 Master Plan states: “although most family farmers are not aware of the current situation, their farming practices can cause environmental destruction of great magnitude”\textsuperscript{cxiii} (MASA, 2015, p. 2-4). This same document adds:

\textsuperscript{139} Interview conducted with a government official in Malema on June 13, 2014.
The growth of population and the economy in the Nacala Corridor increases pressure on natural resources causing deforestation, erosion and soil degradation. So, to achieve sustainable development in rural areas, it is important to conduct interventions that promote the conservation of the environment.

Therefore, the Master Plan considers elements for the mitigation of negative impacts on the natural environment and its resources. Based on this premise, the Master Plan will promote interventions with an emphasis on natural resource conservation, including forest development in vulnerable areas, thereby enabling the protection of the environment (MASA, 2015, p. 1-7).

Notably, alternative approaches for the development of agriculture rooted in truly sustainable practices, such as those based on agroecology and conservation agriculture, have been given little thought by ProSAVANA’s designers; despite CSOs’ continued demands for a national program based on these alternative approaches.

### 5.3.5 Land and food sovereignty

ProSAVANA is rooted in the assumptions of modernity, idealizing industrial agriculture, the expansion of agrarian capitalism and technology’s dominance over nature. The strategies for rural territorial development proposed by ProSAVANA represent the territoriality of agribusiness and export commodities in Mozambique and require the subordination of peasant farmers to agribusiness as a means for their incorporation into the corporate global food regime. Given the breadth of the development intervention and its triangular nature, ProSAVANA has become an exceptional “indicator of the restructuring of the food regime” and the national “food sovereignty movement”—formed by CSOs such as UNAC, ORAM, ROSA, Justiça Ambiental and ADECRU, to name a few—has mobilized in response. It is “under these circumstances, the strategic question of sovereignty refocuses from asserting the right of states to food policy autonomy to asserting the right of small-scale producers to productive autonomy” (MCMICHAEL, 2015, p. 434). As one CSO respondent put it:
We want development...but we do not want to transplant agricultural crops and techniques all from Brazil. We want to improve our local cultures. We want conservation agriculture; we want agroecology and sustainable practices for local communities. We want to ensure food sovereignty. And food sovereignty is to go to the communities and see what producers want. Not a process of top-down extension, where you decide what you want will deploy as if those who are down here were mere machines to make things happen\textsuperscript{140}.

Building on this perspective, a member of UNAC affirmed:

We are not against development but we would like it to be to our expectations. We [Mozambican society] have an obligation. Just as we have the right to vote, we also have the right to say what we intend [for our country], as a sovereign Mozambican people...

...What we are doing now is trying to reshape reality, in our point of view. Accordingly, we would like if we could also be considered as those who are seeking to contribute to the formation of a more together, united and just Mozambique\textsuperscript{141}.

In the face of the territorial restructuring under ProSAVANA, the civil society movement against it has adopted land and food sovereignty as strategies for resistance. In this formation “sovereignty’ presents as a process of social transformation and a reformulation of states from within” (MCMICHAEL, 2015, p. 438, italics in original). Here, sovereignty involves the formulation of new, more endogenous public policies and strategies for rural territorial development, which simultaneously promote peasant territorialities and protect them from adverse impacts associated with the incessant onslaught of globalized agrarian capitalism and its neo-liberal enactments. However, this social transformation led by CSOs requires state support to fully materialize. Mozambique’s structural problems of poverty and hunger will not be solved by development donors and foreign interests; the Mozambican state has a fundamental role to play in this process. A respondent from the Provincial Platform of Civil Society Organizations in Nampua (PPOSC-N) explained:

[...] since independence until now, our government has never had a strategy of assistance to communities. You have already passed by the

\textsuperscript{140} Interview conducted in Nampula with a member of AENA on June 30, 2014.
\textsuperscript{141} Excerpt from a speech made by a leading member of UNAC at the Triangular People’s Conference, held in Maputo of July 27, 2014.
communities and seen the poverty that exists there. And the question that arises is, what you saw, do you think that in Brazil there is anyone who is really interested in turning around this situation?...The Japanese and Brazilians do not have time to modify that structural aspect of poverty, unfortunately. And not to discuss the development [for our people] with us [civil society] who knows the Mozambican reality and who works in communities, we have been deceived...And this effort will not be done by foreigners, because you do not have time, because you walk by the rationality of time. ProSAVANA is saying that “in five or 10 years we will change the itinerant production attitude of the peasants of the Nacala Corridor region” when this practice has a long history. We need long-term programs deliberated by the government in order to reverse the situation of poverty because it is structural. So courage is required on the part of the Mozambican national government to understand that reality and seek solutions here, local solutions.

Additionally, the ‘sovereignty’ expressed by the movement against ProSAVANA, reflects “a distinct ontology, re-centering farming as an environmental and social necessity for human survival, and requiring an alternative socio-political order, and model of ‘development’” (MCMICHEAL, 2015, p. 437-438). Proponents of the food sovereignty movement in Mozambique advocate for the strengthening of: smallholder production systems, community land rights, peasant-to-peasant networks and knowledge building and exchange, peasant autonomy and organizational capacity, and access to agricultural credit for small-scale farmers. The National Peasants’ Union (UNAC), one of the leading Mozambican CSOs involved in the National Campaign against ProSAVANA, made the following statement in late 2012, in which it articulated its alternative vision for the rural territorial development for Mozambican society:

If there is to be investment in the Nacala Corridor, or in Mozambique in general, we recommend and demand that these investments be made in developing peasant farming and the peasant economy, as a priority, which we, members of UNAC and members of Via Campesina, know is the only kind of farming capable of creating dignified and lasting livelihoods, of stemming rural exodus, and of producing high-quality foods in sufficient quantities for the entire Mozambican Nation, all of which will lead us towards the realization of Food Sovereignty.

We remain firmly committed to peasant farming and the agroecological

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142 Interview conducted in Nampula with a member of PPOSC-N on June 24, 2014.
production model—the foundations of Food Sovereignty—as alternatives to the development of the agricultural sector in Mozambique (UNAC, 2012).

Thus far, the demands of UNAC and the other CSOs actively involved in the food sovereignty movement in Mozambique have not yet been heeded by the Mozambican, Brazilian, or Japanese governments with regard to ProSAVANA, and it remains to be seen, whether ProSAVANA will shift course or not and what the eventual outcomes and territorial impacts of the program will ultimately be.
Chapter 6
PAA Africa

In order to broaden our discussion on the discursive politics, paradigmatic drivers, and territorial strategies related to Brazilian development cooperation in agriculture in Mozambique, I have chosen to conduct an additional case study on the PAA pilot-project implemented in the Tete province. Promoted by Brazil under the modality of humanitarian cooperation, PAA-Africa represents a drastically different approach toward rural territorial development than ProSAVANA, allowing for a more comprehensive analysis of the competing narratives, models and paradigms of Brazilian agricultural development cooperation in Mozambique. An examination of the PAA-Africa project is an ideal case study to highlight the ways in which the agrarian dualism and the paradigm debates inherent in Brazil’s domestic agrarian context have been incorporated by, and are reflected in, the Mozambique-Brazil agricultural development encounter.

This chapter will first describe the general research site, the district of Angónia, located in the central province of Tete. In particular, it will describe the historical and actual significance of Angónia to regional food security as well as highlight the local development matrix and the role played by different actors involved in agricultural production and/or development initiatives in the district. I will then outline the methodological framework for the research conducted on PAA, followed by a discussion of the program’s early political discourse and genesis. The organization, structure, and logistics of the project and its mode of operation are then presented and insights from fieldwork conducted in Angónia in July 2014 are discussed. Finally, I critically question the extent to which the PAA-Africa pilot program represents a model for agricultural development and contrast the initiative and the discourse surrounding it with that of ProSAVANA.
6.1 Research site context: Angónia, Tete province

In Mozambique, the PAA pilot project is being implemented in three districts—Angónia, Changara and Cahora Bassa—located in the central province of Tete (see Map 7). The program works with 20 first-level (“small”) farmers’ associations in Angónia for the procurement of corn and beans, and four first-level farmers’ associations in Changara and Cahora Bassa for the acquisition of horticultures (fresh vegetables). On the supply side, FAO is primarily responsible for the capacity development of the 24 small associations that participate in PAA, providing technical support and training in improved production practices and post-harvest handling and conservation. On the demand side, WFP is responsible for drawing up contracts with the associations, effectuating purchases, ensuring local processing and, finally, distributing the products through the School Transition Feeding Program in Changara and Cahora Bassa.

Map 7: Tete Province showing the three districts that are involved in PAA Africa

For this thesis fieldwork was only carried out in the district of Angónia (see Map 8), where the majority of the associations participating in the PAA program are located; hence this section will contextualize this district only. Angónia is located in the northern
part of Tete province and is bordered by Malawi in the Northeast, the Macanga district in the West and the Tsangano district in the South and East.

Map 8: Location of the Angónia district in Tete province

With a total population of about 349,000, Angónia district covers a total land area of 3,259 km² (325,900 hectares) and has a population density of 107 persons per km² (INE, 2012) (see Table 12). The district comprises two administrative posts (Ulongué and Domué) and 18 localities. Ulongué, located about 230 km from the provincial capital (Tete City), is both an administrative post and one of four municipalities in Tete province (the others are Tete City, Moatize and Nhamayábué). With an area of close to 121 km² and a population of 48,832 (according the 2007 census), Ulongué is the district center of Angónia (CARLOS, 2015a).

Table 12: Land area in km², total population and population density for Angónia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>District/Province (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land area</td>
<td>3,259</td>
<td>100,724</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>348,989</td>
<td>2,228,527</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>107.1</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>484.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Located at a high altitude, between 1000 meters and 2093 meters at its highest point (Mount Domué), Angónia has a humid temperate climate, with an average temperature of 23.1 Celsius and plentiful rain fall (between 400mm and 1000mm) (GoM, 2008; INE, 2012). About 90 percent of total annual precipitation occurs between November and May (GoM, 2005). Due to its temperate climate, good rainfall and favourable highland topography, Angónia is one of the most productive agricultural districts in Tete, but also in Mozambique. Hanlon and Smart (2014) estimate that one quarter of all of Mozambique’s 68,000 small and medium commercial farmers live in the Angónia Plateau, which comprises the district of Angónia along with three others—Chifunde, Macanga and Tsangano. These latter three share similar geographic and climatic conditions as Angónia and are located in the northern part of Tete province (refer to Map 7 above).

In 2010, a total area of 125,645 hectares was cultivated in Angónia, mostly with food crops, on a total of 64,720 farms, almost all of which were small or medium-holdings (between 0 and 50 hectares). At that time, the area cultivated in Angónia represented 20 percent of the total area cultivated in the province (623,014 hectares) and the district’s farms-holdings accounted for approximately 17 percent of the total number of farm units (376,150) in Tete, respectively (INE, 2012) (Table 13). As of July 2014, the District Services for Economic Activities (SDAE) confirmed that there is no large farm run by a foreign investor in Angónia. The majority of the district’s farmers cultivate between 2-3 hectares on average, while approximately 40 producers farm areas of between 25-100 hectares, according to SDAE.

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143 The authors classify ‘small commercial farmers’ as those which earn a median income of at least 17,000 MT (567 $US) per family per year while ‘medium commercial farmers’ earn a median income of 40,000 MT (1330 $US) or higher, per family per year. The median income of most rural families in Mozambique is 3,400 MT (113 $US) per year (HANLON; SMART, 2014, p. 21).

144 Interview conducted with SDAE in Angónia on July 8, 2014.
Table 13: Total number of farms and total area cultivated in Angónia district and Tete province, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District/Province %</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>District/Province %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of farm units</td>
<td>Area Cultivated</td>
<td>No. of farm units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small and medium farms</td>
<td>64,702</td>
<td>125,215</td>
<td>376,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large farms</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>64,720</td>
<td>125,645</td>
<td>376,150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The district is a significant regional producer of several food products including corn, beans, potatoes, cassava, groundnuts and a diverse array of vegetables. The most important cash crop for farmers is tobacco, followed by soybean. According to information obtained by the author in July 2014, the district produced 363,056 tonnes of food crops during the first half of the 2013/2014 agricultural season, planting on 162,119 hectares. For the second half of the 2013/2014 growing season, currently underway at the time of research, a total area of 6,504 hectares had been planted by farmers, from which the district expected to produce an additional 73,824 tonnes of food products. Angónia is self-sufficient in both corn and bean production, with surpluses destined for Tete city and the southern districts of the province which do not produce enough of either crop to meet local demand.

During this same period (2013/2014), Angónia also produced 24,085 tonnes of cash crops—13,944 tonnes of tobacco and 10,141 tonnes of soybean, respectively. The total area planted with these two cash crops was 16,891 hectares. At the provincial level, the projection for total agricultural production for the 2014/2015 growing season was more than one million tonnes of diverse cultures, planted on 780,000 hectares by a total of 365 peasant families (CARLOS, 2015b).

Despite Angónia’s considerable potential as an agricultural producer, access to markets for its family farmers remains a major problem. As Hanlon and Smart have described: “Angónia has some of the best of Mozambique’s small and medium commercial farmers, yet even they face a ubiquitous problem of lack of markets.”

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\(^{145}\) Information obtained by the author during a meeting with SDAE on July 8, 2014 in Ulongué.
Although there are several buyers for soybean\textsuperscript{146} and a guaranteed market for tobacco\textsuperscript{147}, there are very few buyers (internally or externally) for the food products produced by smallholders. When buyers do appear the prices they offer are often so low that farmers do not make a profit from selling their produce. Still, in desperate need of cash to buy basic household necessities—like clothing or cooking oil—many farmers have little choice but to accept a profitless (or only marginally profitable) sale in order to put just a couple of dollars in their pockets. This is a situation repeatedly described to the author by farmers who now see the programs like the WFP’s Purchase for Progress (P4P) and PAA as the best avenue through which to commercialize their products.

6.2 Convergence among development programs and donor initiatives with PAA

It is important to note that the PAA pilot-project is not an isolated or stand-alone development program in Angónia. Rather, it is linked (both directly and indirectly) to a number of other donor-led development initiatives ongoing in Tete, in particular in the three districts of Angónia, Changara and Cahora Bassa, which focus on combating regional food insecurity and poverty. Specifically, the 2012 funding agreement between the Government of Brazil, FAO and WFP states that the pilot-project will implement local food purchase initiatives “that complement work already being done by WFP through P4P” (GoB et al., 2012, p. 11) and ensure “the availability of locally produced and accessed nutritious food...for ongoing WFP programmes, such as school feeding” (GoB et al., 2012, p. 43). Synergies are created by the PAA pilot project by creating linkages and working in tandem with other programs, projects and development efforts that have coalesced in the region, involving a myriad of different organizations, institutions and actors. Table 14 (below) highlights the different programs that converge with the activities of the PAA in Tete.

\textsuperscript{146} The primary buyers are Novo Horizonte, Clusa and Abino Antunes, as well as a number of itinerant buyers.

\textsuperscript{147} Mozambique Leaf Tobacco has an effective buyer’s monopoly over all of the tobacco produced in Angónia by smallholders.
### Table 14: Convergence among development programs and donor initiatives with the PAA pilot-project in Tete (Angónia, Changara and Cahora Bassa districts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Area of Actuation</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Implementing Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAA pilot program</td>
<td>2012-2015</td>
<td>Tete (Angónia, Changara, Cahora Bassa)</td>
<td>“To contribute to the food security and income generation of small-scale farmers by implementing local food (cereal and legume) purchase initiatives that complement the work already being done by WFP through P4P. WFP will be responsible for procuring surplus produce from FAO-supported small-scale farmers' organizations and its distribution to the most vulnerable households” (GoB et al., 2012, p.11).</td>
<td>WFP and FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase for Progress - P4P Program</td>
<td>2008-2014</td>
<td>Tete (Angónia, Macanga districts); Nampula five districts; Zambézia (three districts); Sofala (two districts); Manica (four districts)</td>
<td>To develop the capacity of farmers' organizations (FOs) and encourage smallholders to increase production, productivity and quality of corn and beans in order to improve their sales value and overall income. The P4P offers a reliable and profitable market for these crops to boost the confidence of farmers to increase production areas and invest in improved techniques. To date, 20 FOs have benefitted from P4P, two of which are located in Angónia. WFP has procured commodities with a total value of nearly US$ 3.6 million.</td>
<td>WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRONAE Pilot Project (1)</td>
<td>2010-2012</td>
<td>Nampula, Tete, Manica, Gaza (12 schools, in 10 districts, including one school in Changara and one in Cahora Bassa)</td>
<td>To identify and test different modalities of local food purchasing and the productive potentialities of different agro-climatic regions to promote the construction of a National School Feeding Program in Mozambique.</td>
<td>WFP, MINED and other Mozambican ministries and agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Feeding Transition Program PRONAE Pilot Project (2)</td>
<td>2012-2015</td>
<td>Tete (Changara and Cahora Bassa districts), initially.</td>
<td>To transition the management of school-feeding programs in 175 schools in Changara and Cahora Bassa from the WFP to the local government of each of the two target districts. The Pilot Project aims to decentralize WFP resources and support the districts to assume responsibility for purchasing the four base products used in the WFP school feeding programs (corn meal, beans, vegetable oil and salt). Of these four products, only corn and beans are presently able to be sourced locally.</td>
<td>WFP, MINED and other Mozambican ministries and agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Supply Chain Program ‐ Building Commodity</td>
<td>2009-2011</td>
<td>Nampula, Zambézia, Sofala</td>
<td>Joint program implemented by WFP and FAO in partnership with IFAD, to strengthen supply chains for corn and</td>
<td>WFP, FAO, IFAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Chains and Market Linkages for Farmers' Associations&quot;</td>
<td>Manica, Tete (including Angónia district in Tete).</td>
<td>beans by improving post-harvest handling, (to ensure better quality of final product), increasing storage capacity and facilitating access to credit for both investment and commercialisation purposes. The program reached approximately 17,000 farmers from 14 farmers' associations and constructed (600 Gorongoso silos and 370 metal silos) in the target area.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMDG1 – &quot;Accelerate progress towards MDG 1c in Mozambique&quot; - (funded by the EU)</td>
<td>Manica, Sofala, Tete, Zambézia, Nampula, Niassa and Cabo Delgado (45 districts, in these provinces incl. Angónia)</td>
<td>EUMDG1 aims “to improve the livelihoods, food security and nutritional status of people in the intervention areas and will address the three dimensions of food security (access, availability and utilization) in the country. Enhanced agricultural and fisheries production, increased access to food and improved nutrition form the three pillars of the program.” Total funding for the program is US$ 67 million (UN, 2013).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Chain Program (implemented under the EUMDG1 program)</td>
<td>Tete (Angónia, Tsango, Macanga)</td>
<td>To strengthen local supply chains for corn, beans and fresh vegetables by improving technical capacity of family farmers in boosting production, improving business management and storage, increasing access to credit and facilitating local procurement of farmers’ food products through the WFP’s P4P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table elaborated by author using information from interviews with WFP and FAO Mozambique as well as: (WFP, 2008; 2014b; GoB et al., 2012; UN, 2103; OLIVEIRA, 2013; FAO, 2013).

The above mentioned development initiatives have converged to shape the present development context in Angónia (as well as Changara and Cahora Bassa) and have made substantial contributions to improving local conditions of food security and smallholder livelihoods. A brief explanation of some of these vital linkages is necessary in order to comprehend the over-arching development matrix within which the PAA pilot now operates. In particular, four programs and their complementary relationship to PAA need to be understood: the WFP’s Purchase for Progress (P4P), the PRONAE pilot project, the School Feeding Transition Program (Programa de Transição da Alimentação Escolar) and the United Nation’s Supply Chain Program (Cadeia de Valor), of which the Farmer Field Schools (FFS) implemented by FAO is but one componential project.
The first of these programs, the P4P, is a five-year pilot project launched by the WFP in October 2008, and financed by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Inspired by Brazil’s Food Acquisition Program (PAA), the idea behind P4P is that, considering the enormous purchasing power of the WFP on a global scale, the organization can effectively use that power (and should!) to help poor smallholder farmers by purchasing their produce, then distributing products through disaster relief and humanitarian food aid programs operated by the WFP globally. Since 2008, the WFP has been purchasing corn from 20 farmers’ organizations (FOs) in Mozambique through the P4P. Some of these farmers’ organizations, including the Tilimbique and Chiguirizano associations, are located in the district of Angónia in Tete. After the conclusion of the initial pilot in 2013, the P4P has received continued support through a joint grant by the European Union to FAO, IFAD and WFP. “All food purchases are financed by donations to WFP’s regular operations” (WFP, 2014b). The experience gained, and lessons learned by the WFP through the P4P program have been incredibly valuable for the development of the PAA pilot, especially given that the majority of the associations that PAA works with are located in Angónia. With the PAA a new modality for food purchasing has been introduced that allows for a more participatory form of development. In this case, PAA works directly with the small associations that comprise the umbrella (or “mother”) associations rather than bypassing the smaller associations and dealing with the mother organization.

Another initiative is the PRONAE pilot program (hereafter referred to as PRONAE Pilot Project 1), a tripartite initiative between Brazil, represented by Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) and the National Development Fund for Education (FNDE), the Mozambican government, represented by the Ministry of Education (MINED), and the WFP. Initiated in 2010, the program aims to test different modalities for sourcing food locally in various agro-climatic and agro-ecological regions of the country to better understand the possibilities and challenges for local purchasing in these different regions. Through the pilot two different models for conducting decentralized local food purchasing (i.e. purchasing done by schools and by districts) are being tested in 12

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148 Aside from Mozambique, P4P pilot 46 projects have also been implemented in more than 20 other countries worldwide. Only the projects in Africa were funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.
schools, in 10 districts located in four provinces—Gaza, Manica, Nampula and Tete (OLIVEIRA, 2013, p. 8). One school in both Changara and Cahora Bassa participate in the program.

A third related program is the School Feeding Transition Program (hereafter referred to as the PRONAE Pilot Project 2), a shoot-off from the PRONAE pilot program, being implemented in five priority districts since 2012. Again, Changara and Cahora Bassa are among the districts prioritized by the Mozambican government. The program is a bilateral partnership between MINED and WFP that seeks to transition the responsibility of implementing school feeding programs from the WFP, which has been implementing such programs in the country since independence in 1975, to the government. Presently, WFP manages all phases of school lunch programs implemented in various regions in Mozambique—from food purchase and storage to quality control, transport, processing and distribution. Through the School Feeding Transition Program the WFP provides training in food procurement and distribution processes to MINED and local schools, working with them to reinforce the logistics and know-how necessary for the government to effectively take over from WFP. In 2013, the procurement of 270 metric tons of corn in Angónia through the PAA was used in the School Feeding Transition Program to provide daily meals for approximately 74,520 students, covering all of the 175 primary schools located in the Changara and Cahora Bassa districts.

Finally, there’s the Supply Chain Program (Programa de Cadeia de Valor) which was launched in three districts in Tete—Tsangano, Angónia and Macanga— in November 2013. The program is being implemented under the broader, EU funded program denominated “Accelerate progress towards MDG 1c in Mozambique”, also known as EUMDG1, which aims to support the Mozambican government as it works towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), specifically MDG 1c, related to combating poverty and hunger. In specific relation to the Supply Chain Program in Angónia, three organizations of the United Nations (UN)—FAO, WFP and UN Women—partner up to implement the program. FAO is responsible for implementing the program’s production component, primarily through the Farmers’ Field Schools (FFS)
project; WFP purchases surplus from producers which it distributes to food vulnerable populations (in Mozambique or internationally) through P4P; and UN Women works to empower rural women by ensuring greater participation in farming associations and equal access to agricultural inputs, training and markets through P4P and PAA, among other specific projects with a gender-based component.

In addition to these four key programs, the PAA pilot-project also works in tandem with the efforts of NGOs such CLUSA (the United States National Cooperative Business Association) and World Vision which support smallholders in Angónia (GoB et al., 2012).

6.3 Methodology for PAA Africa fieldwork

For the purpose of this chapter, I will look at the discursive politics related to the specific multilateral program in question, PAA Africa, and examine the policies and strategies promoted by Brazil through the implementation of the PAA pilot-project in Mozambique. To address these central issues, I will analyze the construction of the PAA Africa program, from its early ideological imaginings to the present, with the aid of the available literature on the program and complemented with data obtained during field research in Mozambique. In addition to an examination of official program documents and the literatures on PAA Africa, the study is based on fieldwork conducted in July 2014 and 18 formal and informal interviews with stakeholders (such as local

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149 The FFS project being implemented in the three aforementioned districts consists of groups of farmers that come together to study topics related to agriculture, including soil management, conservation agriculture, use of organic and conventional fertilizers, organic composting and mulching techniques, post-harvest handling and conservation, pest control, agro-ecological and agro-climatic conditions, and other related income generating activities. “FFS provide opportunities for learning by doing” in which farmers gain “basic agricultural and management skills that make [them] experts in their own farms” (SUSTAINET EA, 2010, p. 1). In the FFS approach farmers are considered “experts conducting their own field studies” and “the field” is understood as “the learning place where farmers working in small groups collect data, analyze and make decisions based on their analyses then present the decisions to other farmers for refinement” (SUSTAINET EA, 2010, p. 2). In all three districts targeted by the Supply Chain Program a total of 1550 farmers are being trained in FFS; of these beneficiaries 52 percent are women. Members from two of the associations that participate in the PAA have received training through the FFS and are currently putting their training to use in their respective communities.

150 Clusa has been working with smallholder farmers in Angónia for over six years to support the production of soybeans, now a highly popular cash crop among smallholders. Compared to tobacco, the traditional cash crop, soybean production requires less work and is much more profitable. Hence, a number of farmers are presently expanding their current soybean areas, while others are increasingly switching from producing tobacco to soybeans. Both the Tilimbique and Chiguirizano umbrella associations have contracts with Clusa to commercialize soybeans. These umbrella associations say that many new small associations seek their membership specifically to gain access to the soybean contracts offered by Clusa.
government representatives, FAO and WFP officials, and peasants and peasant associations) in the district of Angónia, in Tete province, and in Maputo city (see Appendix).

The majority of interviews (15 out of 18) were conducted in the Tete province in the district of Angónia. Of the 18 interviews in Angónia, 12 were conducted in the administrative post of Ulonguè and three in the administrative post of Domuè. The remaining three interviews were conducted in Maputo (one of which was conducted via Skype) (see Table 15). Specifically, in Angónia, the author interviewed local government representatives for agriculture (District Services for Agriculture—SDAE) and two local FAO representatives. Eight farmers’ associations were also visited and several of their members interviewed.

### Table 15: Geographic distribution of interviews conducted related to research on PAA Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>District/Administrative Post</th>
<th>Number of interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tete</td>
<td>Angónia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ulongué</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domuè</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo</td>
<td>Maputo Cidade</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to SDAE there are four large farmers’ associations, also known as umbrella associations or ‘mother’ associations (associações-mãe), in the district of Angónia. Two of these umbrella associations, Tilimbique in Ulonguè and Chiguirizano in Domuè, were visited by the author. As previously mentioned 20 first-level farmers’ associations participate in PAA-pilot project in Angónia; of these, 10 are located in Ulonguè and are part of the umbrella Tilimbique Association. The remaining 10 associations that participate in the PAA are part of the umbrella Chiguirizano Association and are located in Domuè (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: First-level associations participating in PAA in Angónia and their respective mother associations

Figure elaborated by author based on information shared by a FAO representative in Angónia.¹⁵¹

These first-level associations, often referred to as ‘business clubs’ (*clubes de negócios*) by FAO, WFP, SDAE and the associations themselves, are quite small in terms of membership, and hence will be referred to throughout the rest of this thesis as “the small associations” or otherwise as first-level associations. In total, six of the 20 small associations participating in the PAA were visited by the author—five in Ulonguè and one in Domuè (see Table 16). Additionally, I was a participant observer at a session of the Farmers Field School (FFS) course being led by FAO in Ulonguè on 10 July, 2014.

Prior to arriving in Mozambique, I did not have much information regarding the PAA Africa pilot-project—the exact locations where the program is being implemented and in what phase of the implementation process PAA was operating, for example, were both unknown. Initially, the idea was to conduct a general reading of public opinion and knowledge of PAA Africa in Mozambique in order to more clearly understand the

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¹⁵¹ One first-level association that participates in PAA (Titokule Ulimi association) and which was visited by the author was not included in the official association list shared with the author by FAO representative. This discrepancy is likely due to the association adopting more than one name or having informally changed its name.
ways in which the program is perceived by different organizations and learn what their thoughts and expectations with respect to the program are.

In late April, 2014 new information regarding and PAA Africa was acquired in Mozambique via a series of introductory meetings, interviews and informal conversations that took place in Maputo. Information shared during conversations played a crucial role in the redefinition of the research goals and fieldwork agenda for PAA Africa in Angónia. Rather than simply carrying out a public opinion reading of the program as was initially proposed, it was decided that a more comprehensive fieldwork investigation of PAA in the province of Tete would be possible. The necessity of conducting a case study on PAA (as opposed to simply a public opinion survey) further became apparent during fieldwork conducted by the author related to ProSAVANA in the Nampula province, where only three interview respondents had ever heard of PAA; of these, only one was familiar with what the program was all about.

In Angónia the author was warmly received by the local government and two representatives of FAO (both Mozambicans) responsible for implementing the PAA Africa pilot-project and the Farmer Field School (FFS) training, respectively. Interview subjects in the district were selected by snowball sampling. The above-mentioned contacts facilitated subsequent contacts with the presidents of the two umbrella associations, Tilimbique and Chiguirizano. Given that all of the first-level associations that participate in PAA are affiliated to either Tilimbique or Chiguirizano, it was essential to utilize contacts from the umbrella associations in order to gain access to the communities where the small first-level associations are located. Additionally, rural areas and communities are difficult to navigate without a guide from within the community or locality/district itself, largely because there are little or no road signs or visible markers of addresses.

All interviews with the eight associations visited were carried out in groups, although a few additional interviews were conducted with individual association members or leaders. The president or vice-president of each of the associations was contacted by the author at least a day prior to each interview so that meetings could be scheduled at the convenience of each association. Setting up interviews in advance allowed association leaders to inform other members of the association about the
meeting. Thus, most interviews were conducted in groups ranging from two to fifty-three members of a given association (see Table 16).

Table 16: Interviews conducted in group and number of association members present at each group interview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Administrative Post</th>
<th>Association</th>
<th>Members Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angónia</td>
<td>Ulongué</td>
<td>Tilimbique</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chissangolalo</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Canhanja</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Titokule Ulimi*</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hamba</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Folopia</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domuè</td>
<td>Chiguirizano</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chicodana</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* One first-level association that participates in PAA (Titokule Ulimi association) and which was visited by the author was not included in the official association list shared with the author by FAO representative. This discrepancy is likely due to the association adopting more than one name or having informally changed its name.

The president of each association was present during interviews, and the author asked questions both directly to the president as well as to the group (comprised of members of the association) as a whole. As a significant number of the association members did not speak or understand Portuguese, during most interviews the president of each association translated the questions asked by the author for the group as well as the respective responses to question or any additional comments made by individual members. All of the presidents spoke fluent Portuguese.

The interviews were structured to learn about how each of the associations experienced participation in the PAA, their commercialization strategies, and their own production model. Interviews followed a semi-structured format in order for the associations to reveal their own experience with the program focusing of the benefits and challenges associated with participation in PAA. All names have been changed to ensure the anonymity of individual interview respondents. Only the name of the association (or institution) to which each individual respondent is affiliated will be mentioned. The author transcribed all interviews from audio-recordings with the assistance of a close confidant and translations of the interviews were done by the
author. The interviews are meant to complement existing literature and data on the topic and should be seen as the opinions and perspectives of the stakeholders themselves.

6.4 Genesis and formation of PAA Africa in Mozambique

The PAA Africa pilot program in Mozambique was inspired by Brazil’s Food Acquisition Program, known as PAA. The PAA was first created in Brazil through Law no. 10696 on 2 July 2003. The program is connected to the Brazilian Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger (MDS) and the National Secretary of Food and Nutritional Security (SESAN)\textsuperscript{152}, and is an extension of the goals of the federal government rural credit bank, PRONAF (National Program for Strengthening Family Farming) which began in 1996. Introduced under the Lula government’s umbrella Zero Hunger Program, the PAA represents a dramatic shift in the framework and focus of Brazil’s national public policies, most notably in the area of family farming and food security.

This shift, away from the predominant neoliberal approach to rural development policies, reflects, in part, the changing attitudes of the Brazilian State and the growing middle class regarding the respective roles played by peasant farmers and agribusinesses in provisioning for domestic food security needs. The introduction of PAA also responded to the longstanding demands of Brazilian peasant movements, such as the Landless Rural Workers’ Movement (MST), which has been advocating for public policies to support peasant farming and smallholder production models since the 1980s.

The agribusiness-led model that has historically dominated development policy and discourse has resulted in the further concentration of land and resources—and while making an important contribution to Brazil’s positive trade balance and Gross Domestic Product, has proven to be unable or unwilling to address the needs of local, regional and national markets and meet domestic food security demands. In contrast, family farming is responsible for producing 70 percent of all food consumed by Brazilians and

\textsuperscript{152} SESAN is overseen by the MDS and is responsible for planning, implementing, coordinating and monitoring public policies regarding issues of food security, in accordance with the National Food and Nutritional Security policy (SAN). SESAN’s Department for the Support of the Acquisition and Commercialization of Family Farming Produce (DECOM) is tasked with overseeing the PAA program.
employs 74 percent of the total work force in the agricultural sector using just 24 percent of all of the agricultural lands and 14 percent of credit (Graph 2).

**Graph 2: Contributions of peasant and agribusiness models in Brazil**

As the graph above highlights, despite the hegemony of agribusiness (in terms of territory and agricultural credit), the peasantry is hegemonic in Brazil when it comes to important social aspects of farming, that is food production and the creation of jobs and income.

With the Zero Hunger Program the Brazilian government proposed new policies, like the PAA, aimed at strengthening rural economies, actively fostering (and publically funding) the creation and expansion of institutional markets and decentralized local food supply systems as a means to create rural employment and reduce household food vulnerability. Since the introduction of the Zero Hunger Program, Brazil has witnessed a significant decrease in poverty; between 2003 and 2009, the rate of poverty fell from 28.1 percent to 15.4 percent. In the same period the average income earned by family.

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*Legend to Graph 2 in English: the left-hand side of the table shows data for peasant farming (agricultura camponesa) and data for agribusiness (agronegócios) is shown on the right-hand side. The categories measured by the bar graph from left to right are: agricultural credit (shown by yellow bar); land use (brown bar); amount of total national production (green bar); amount of food produced for internal market (orange bar); and amount of labour used for production (red bar).*
farmers also witnessed an increase of 33 percent (SILVA et al., 2011). The public policy initiatives implemented under the Zero Hunger Program are inseparable from the broader global discussions around issues of food security and poverty, including their principle causes and possible solutions and the roles of the State, civil society, and family farming in addressing them.

Seeking to strengthen its partnership with African countries and exchange ideas on agricultural development cooperation and combating hunger, in May 2010, at the end of former Brazilian president Lula’s final mandate, Brazil hosted the Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food Security, Fighting Hunger and Rural Development. At the event the former president highlighted the potential of Brazil’s Food Acquisition Program (PAA) as a possibility for expanding Brazilian cooperation efforts on the African continent\(^\text{154}\), drawing attention to the importance of the program in reducing rural poverty and food insecurity in Brazil.

Subsequently, a set of guidelines were drawn up and Brazil’s General Coordination for International Action Against Hunger (CGFome) was tasked by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) with coordinating efforts to provide methodologies, operational tools and Brazilian experience for the implementation of food purchase programmes in five African countries—Senegal, Ghana, Niger, Malawi and Mozambique (GoB et al., 2012). The 2012 funding agreement states that:

In order to instil international projects with the principles and guidelines underlying Brazil’s food and nutrition security policies, which have achieved significant success in reducing poverty and hunger, the project will include a partnership with Brazil’s Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger. Based on its experience, the Ministry will contribute to the exchange of experiences, capacity development for consultants, and monitoring and assessment of the project as the agency with primary responsibility for overseeing Brazil’s food and nutrition security policies in partnership with CG-Fome (GoB et al., 2012, p. 41).

In February 2012, the PAA Africa Program was formally approved under the project title: “Promoting local food purchases for food assistance on the African continent—Purchase from Africans for Africa”. FAO and WFP were selected by Brazil as the program’s main implementing institutions. The central idea was that:

By channelling its humanitarian assistance through FAO and WFP, the Government of Brazil benefits directly from partnership instruments that help consolidate an operational network between countries and prioritize the engagement and experiences of both agencies in Africa (GoB et al., 2012, p.11).

Funding for the overall program—for all five beneficiary countries—is provided by the Brazilian government (approximately 80 percent) and the DFID (approximately 20 percent). In its first phase, an 18 month period running from March 1, 2012 to August 31, 2013, the Brazilian Government and DFID contributed over US$ 4.5 million to developing small-scale PAA pilot projects in the five aforementioned African countries; of the total volume of resources allocated to the Program, FAO received US$ 2,233,371 and WFP received US$ 2,351,314 (PAA AFRICA, 2015a). According to the 2012 funding agreement, for Mozambique alone, the total budget was approximately US$ 567,000 during its first phase (GoB et al., 2012, p. 47). For implementation of the second phase in Mozambique, which runs from January 2014 until August 2015, a second round of funding, approximate to that provided for the project’s first phase, was allocated to the initiative155. Exact data about the total cost of PAA in Mozambique has not yet been made publicly available. However, based on available information it can be estimated that the funding was approximately US$ 1.2 million.

While the ProSAVANA program (discussed in chapters three, four and five) was designed entirely behind closed doors and has been implemented without support from Mozambican civil society, PAA, from the outset, has explicitly sought to incorporate Mozambican CSOs, recognizing civil society agents and organizations as integral to the success of the program. As the funding agreement states: “Projects should identify a lead civil society organization to represent smallholders in order to guarantee their participation in the formulation, execution and follow-up of projects” (GoB et al., 2012, p. 41). In Mozambique, UNAC was the civil society organization to take the lead on PAA Africa. According to one member of UNAC:

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155 Interviews conducted by the author with the WFP representative and FAO representative for the PAA program in Maputo on July 22, 2014 and July 23, 2014 respectively.
...our participation began from the time of conception of the first model of local purchases of the WFP, which came with a clarity that it would not be a replica of a Brazilian model in any way, because it was necessary to look at the local context here, in Mozambique, and devise an initial proposal. As UNAC, we knew that participation in this process was important not only to ensure that this program was well implemented, but more from the perspective that this program will serve as an incentive from which something bigger could emerge. That is why we, UNAC have participated in PAA Africa\textsuperscript{156}.

In addition to UNAC, the Network of Organizations for Food Sovereignty (ROSA) and the Rural Association for Mutual Support (ORAM) have been involved in official policy discussions on PAA with FAO and WFP in Maputo. The importance of civil society involvement in the PAA is described by UNAC as follows:

...the idea of the civil society is to take this example [of PAA] that could be used for advocacy of an alternative model, a peasant model, that serves as a resistance to the hegemonic model of agribusiness, but could also serve as an influence within the government of Mozambique, so that such a program could be born on a national scale and with national public funds\textsuperscript{157}.

In contrast to ProSAVANA, PAA has faced no resistance from civil society. To the contrary, its implementation and expansion is widely desired by Mozambican CSOs and peasant farmers involved in and/or aware of the program. The program is viewed by CSOs as an important initiative that strengthens the predominant system of family farming in Mozambique and promotes not only food security, but potentially, food sovereignty.

6.5 Organization, structure and logistics

As previously mentioned, FAO and WFP are responsible for implementing all aspects of the PAA pilot-project in Tete. The pilot-project works with 20 first-level associations in Angónia for the procurement of corn and beans, and four first-level farmers’ associations in Changara and Cahora Bassa for the acquisition of vegetables. On the supply side, FAO is primarily responsible for the capacity development of the 24

\textsuperscript{156} Interview conducted by the author with UNAC on September 5, 2014.

\textsuperscript{157} Interview conducted by the author with UNAC on September 5, 2014.
small associations that participate in PAA, providing technical support and training in improved production practices and post-harvest handling and conservation. On the demand side, WFP is responsible for drawing up contracts with the associations, effectuating purchases, ensuring local processing and, finally, distributing the products to 175 schools in Changara and Cahora Bassa through the School Transition Feeding Program.

Of the 20 farmers’ associations that participate in PAA in Angónia, 10 are located in Ulongué and are part of the umbrella Tilimbique Association. These 10 associations are comprised of a total of 225 members. The remaining 10 associations that participate in the PAA are part of the umbrella Chiguirizano Association and are located in Domué, comprising a total of 272 members. All of these associations participate in the WFP’s P4P program and were selected for PAA in order to maximize synergies between these two programs.

The umbrella associations Tilimbique and Chiguirizano were both formed in 2008, the same year that P4P was introduced. Since then the membership of both associations has grown significantly. The presidents of these large associations attribute the rapid growth of their respective membership largely to the introduction of P4P and PAA. Beginning with only 100 members coming from 18 different associations, Tilimbique now boasts almost 5000 members from 100 associations (see Photo 3). From 2013 to 2014 alone, Tilimbique’s membership grew by almost 50 percent, from 2440 farmers (60 associations) to 4862 farmers (99 associations). In 2013/2014, Tilimbique planted more than 9000 hectares of corn and approximately 2,500 hectares of soybean.
The farmers’ organization Chiguirizano (see Photo 4) in Domué currently comprises 130 associations and a total of 4296 members. In 2013/2014, Chiguirizano planted around 6000 hectares of corn and 4000 hectares each of beans and soybean. Many of the members of both Tilimbique and Chiguirizano have extra land in their smallholdings, but are only able to cultivate around one hectare without machines to till the soil. Members of these umbrella associations currently till and harvest virtually all of the respective areas planted by the associations by hand, using just a hoe. The average farmer does not have enough additional cash income to pay day labourers in order to expand crop areas. If the members of Tilimbique and Chiguirizano had access to some form of mechanization, the overall area planted could be greatly expanded. The productive capacity and potential of these mother associations and their member associations cannot and, indeed, should not be underestimated.
Since 2012, the PAA has provided training and conducted seminars on agricultural production practices with the members of the associations that participate in the program. Topics covered are: soil preparation, planting, pest and plant disease management strategies and the application of fertilizers. Training seminars in leadership and business plan development have also been carried out. Each year a new round of training and seminars is conducted and an evaluation of the previous year’s activities is completed. Additionally:

To support increased agricultural production, fertilizer and seeds will be provided to farmers’ organizations, who will in turn distribute these to their members. Priority will be given to members with the potential to produce some surplus for sale. Maize and bean seeds will be supplied, as these are commodities that are within WFP’s food basket (GoB et al., 2012, p. 45).
For the 2012/2013 crop season, each of the 20 participating associations in Angónia received an agricultural input package, which included: two different varieties of improved corn seed (certified) and fertilizers, along with all of the logistical support necessary for their use. Seventy percent of the cost of fertilizers was subsidized by FAO; the associations were responsible for paying the remaining 30 percent. In the pilot-project’s first phase, only corn was purchased through the PAA, but for the 2014/2015 season beans were also procured and training and seminars specific to bean production were administered in Angónica.

The training and capacity building aspect of PAA has also included training in post-harvest handling and conservation practices, including de-husking and cleaning corn, organizing and treating the produce and storing the product in silos. Members from several of the associations have been specifically trained in the construction of Gorongoso-style silos, which contribute to household food security. In the silos grain is completely protected from the typical hazards, namely weather exposure, pests, rats and petty theft, significantly reducing the family’s food losses and increasing food security. Close to 100 of these silos have been constructed, divided roughly evenly between the associations located in Ulongué and in Domué158.

WFP deals with everything post harvest: the negotiation of price, drawing up contracts, ensuring that a quality control check is conducted, purchasing of the product and making payments to associations. The WFP also provides training to the associations that covers topics such as how to sell in a group, how to aggregate produce and how to ensure the quality of produce. Each association is given a kit that includes equipment for grain selection and various tools for testing the quality/grading of the product. Finally, ensuring local processing and fortification of corn (which is done by

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158 Each silo holds one ton of grain and costs about 1500 meticais (just under 50 $US) to build. The structures are extremely durable and are made almost entirely using traditional materials, aside from a few pieces of rebar for the foundation and a small amount of cement for the lid. This makes them easier and more cost efficient for poor farmers to replicate. All of the material is donated by PAA and special tool kits are provided to all of the members trained by FAO. Many of the farmers trained, including several women, have since constructed a number of additional silos for their family, neighbours and other members of their association, and in the process, have imparted their knowledge and demonstrated the building process to others who are keen to learn. Owners of the new silos were eager to show them off and explain the construction process, while families who did not yet possess one expressed their hopes to soon be owners of a silo. One farmer that was visited had built as many as five of the silos on his own family’s farm since he had been trained by FAO.
a local company in Tete city), and its distribution in the form of cornmeal flour in schools in Changara and Cahora Bassa is also part of the WFP’s mandate.

In the 2012/2013 season when WFP arrived in Angónia to negotiate price, the organization brought with them a team from the Mozambican Ministry of Education (MINED) who participated in the negotiations, as a form of preparing for procurement processes that will (hopefully) take place through PRONAE in the future. The negotiation of price marks the first phase in the procurement process. WFP uses direct contracts in the PAA. Direct contracts, for corn, for example, are established just before harvest time, at the beginning of the commercialization period for the crop. At that time, farmers know what they are going to harvest, more or less, and what the price for the product is during that period. It is at this time that WFP negotiates the price (which is fixed in the contract), the quantity to be purchased and the date of delivery. The WFP only purchases what surplus farmers are willing to sell, after their family’s food security needs have been accounted for.

Following the negotiation of price the ten associations in Ulongué aggregate their corn and transport it to the umbrella association, Tilimbique. The ten associations in Domué do the same, bringing their corn to the other umbrella association, Chiguirizano. The first cleaning of the product takes place at the level of each of the individual associations, and the final cleaning is undertaken at the umbrella associations once all of the produce has been dropped off. From there, an inspection team, accredited by WFP, is called in to ensure the quality of the product and samples are taken by the team to a lab for inspection. Once the lab confirms the quality, the WFP is able to pick up the product at the umbrella associations. The corn is then transported to a company in Tete city to be milled and fortified as corn meal. Through the School Feeding Transition Program the products that farmers in Angónia produce are guaranteed a market and are able to find their way to a large number of food vulnerable consumers, school children.

Table 17 shows the main components of the PAA pilot-project and highlights the division of responsibilities between FAO and WFP.
Table 17: Production, purchasing and distribution components of the PAA pilot project, showing the division of responsibilities among FAO and WFP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAO</th>
<th>WFP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Component 1. Production (Angónia):</strong></td>
<td><strong>Component 2: Purchasing (Angónia)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of actuation 1: Angónia district</td>
<td>Area of actuation 1: Angónia district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target groups: 20 first-level associations</td>
<td>Target groups: 20 first-level associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities:</td>
<td>Activities:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Technical Assistance for Production:</td>
<td>a) Post-harvest Activities:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Purchasing of seeds and fertilizers and their provision to associations at a subsidized cost (via voucher);</td>
<td>Training course on quality control, product handling, conservation and storage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Training seminars on pre-harvest techniques;</td>
<td>b) Marketing Activities:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assisting with soil preparation (fertilizer application) and planting;</td>
<td>• Defining the modality of purchase;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monitoring of production</td>
<td>• Negotiation of contracts;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Technical Assistance Post-harvest:</td>
<td>• Negotiation of purchase;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Capacity-building training course and the construction of individual silos, type Gorongoso</td>
<td>• Sending product for quality control check;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of actuation 2: Cahora Bassa and Changara districts</td>
<td>• Sending corn to Tete to be milled into corn flour, and fortified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Support activities for WFP and PRONAE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table elaborated by author.
6.6 Insights from the field

To date, 497 peasant families have benefited from subsidized agricultural inputs and training (pre-and post harvest practices) for corn through PAA; in the 2014/2015 growing season most of these same families also received support and training for the production of common beans as well. As of 2014, 270 metric tons of corn has been purchased from these smallholders through PAA and corn flour had been distributed to 175 schools in Changara and Cahora Bassa, benefitting 74,520 students. One farmer from Titokule Ulimi association in Ulongué explained: “The PAA provides development in our communities because it helps us to produce a greater amount of food for our own families, but also for regional areas”xx159.

For many of the associations that participate in the PAA, the contracts signed with WFP were their first formal contracts. In the P4P, the WFP signs contracts with the umbrella associations Tilimbique and Chiguirizano only and the smaller member associations are able to commercialize some of their corn indirectly through this program by aggregating surplus product and bringing it to their respective mother association where it could be purchased. With the PAA, the WFP introduced a new modality for local food purchasing that works directly with small associations which are typically overlooked by agricultural development programs.

When the PAA was launched in 2012, none of the 20 small associations in Angónia had yet been formalized (registered). In Mozambique, this is not uncommon, as the legalization process is time consuming, costly and complicated for small associations. Further, a NUIT (a number registered with the Mozambican Tributary Authority) is not needed in order for a donor organization to provide technical training or agricultural inputs. In order to purchase produce through formal avenues for a program such as P4P or PAA, however, an association must be registered, and a NUIT and bank account are required. This is one of the primary challenges in working with small farmers associations as opposed to larger, more consolidated ones, in programs that involve a procurement component. The legalization process was cited by all parties

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159 Comment made by a member of association Titokule Ulimi in an interview conducted by the author on July 9, 2014 in Ulongué, Angónia.
(FAO, WFP and the presidents of the associations visited) as being the most significant of the challenges faced by the pilot project in its first 18 months.

In order to assist the associations with the legalization process, the local FAO representative worked in coordination with SDAE, which is responsible for dealing with the registration process, providing information to each of the associations regarding what documents are needed and how to go about the process. Presently, all 24 of the small associations are registered as legal associations, possessing NUITS and bank accounts. Of the total 99 associations which comprise Tilimbique only 10 are formally registered and of the 130 comprising Chiguirizano, only 10 have been registered. All of these 20 associations are those that participate in the PAA.

During fieldwork, in several instances, farmers reported an increase in income, productivity per hectare and area cultivated in comparison to before PAA. One farmer of the Canhanja association (Ulongué) explains that since his family began producing for PAA, they have increased the area they plant in corn in order to supply the program\textsuperscript{160}. The family typically plants one hectare of corn every year for household consumption. In addition to this, in the program’s first year the family planted 3.5 hectares to sell to the program. For the second year (2013/2014 season) the family increased the area planted for the program by 1.5 hectares to 5 hectares to take advantage of the guaranteed market and good prices offered by PAA. At least three members of the farmer’s family toil in the fields and do most of the planting and harvesting for the household. To help specifically with the 5 hectares planted in corn for the PAA, the family had to hire on as many as 15 farm labourers at different times throughout the season. Much of the area that is now used to plant corn was previously used to produce tobacco. The family also plants one hectare of soybean and one hectare of other crops. With the increased income earned selling to the PAA, the family has purchased two head of cattle to add to their small, but growing herd, and a cart for transporting goods and produce. Photo 5 shows a member of the Canhanja association showing the author the corn that he hopes to sell to PAA. The president of the Canhanja

\textsuperscript{160} Interview conducted with PAA farmer from Canhanja association on July 8, 2014.
association and his wife said that they used their additional cash income to purchase solar panels for their home, since electricity has not yet reached their community\(^\text{161}\).

**Photo 5: Canhanja association in Ulongué, Angónia**

![Photo Credit: Elizabeth Clements, fieldwork on July 8, 2014.](image)

Several other farmers also reported small increases in income since becoming involved in the PAA and said that they had increased the size of the areas that they cultivate in order to produce surplus corn to sell to the program. These small increases to income have allowed farmers to invest more in their agricultural production the following season, using the money to acquire more inputs and hire more labour to plant larger areas, not just in corn but in other crops as well. Fieldwork visits further revealed that the PAA’s subsidization scheme for fertilizers has been met with much satisfaction by producers; most farmers said that without the assistance of PAA they would not otherwise have been able to acquire the vital inputs. Farmers interviewed expressed satisfaction with the certified corn seed provided through the program, indicating that when coupled with the fertilizers they experienced a notable improvement in overall productivity\(^\text{162}\). Both the P4P and PAA programs are highly popular among farmers in

\(^{161}\) Interview conducted with the president of the Canhanja association on July 8, 2014.

\(^{162}\) Interviews conducted by the author with PAA farmers on July 8, 9, and 10, 2014.
Angónia, in part, because the prices offered are slightly above the local averages. In the 2012/2013 season the WFP purchased corn through P4P and PAA for 9.5 meticais, a price consistently described as “good” and “fair” by all the participating associations members interviewed, who added that other buyers had offered as low as 5 meticais.

At a meeting at Chiguirizano in Domué, a number of members who participate in the PAA described how, since the introduction of P4P and now PAA, many of them have been able to send their children to the secondary school in Ulongué (there is no secondary school in Domué)\textsuperscript{163}. Regardless of whether they were in Ulongué or Domué, the members of all of the associations visited expressed satisfaction with the program and hope for its continuation. A member of Hamba association commented: “Now, what we want is support for this program to continue in order to further stimulate our agriculture”\textsuperscript{cxii164}. Similarly, all interviews highlighted one very important point—how proud the members of the associations were to be producing for a program that feeds the “sons and daughters” of Mozambique, supporting them to get an education and improve their lives, along with the living conditions of their families and the future of the country. “When PAA purchases our corn it helps in schools in Changara and Cahora Bassa, so we are very happy with this program because our products will help others too, the children in that area”\textsuperscript{cxii165} explains one PAA farmer.

As previously mentioned, PAA involves synergies with other development programs in the region, including the Farmers Field School (FFS) being implemented by FAO. One member of Hamba-Hamba was trained in the FFS methodology and has been disseminating his knowledge to members of his association through 3 different field school sites in Hamba-Hamba. In addition to these three, this trained farmer has developed five additional field schools located in two other nearby communities. Photo 6 below, shows the Hamba-Hamba association standing behind one of their field school sites in Mangane where they are experimenting with different techniques for vegetable production as well as learning about making organic fertilizer.

\textsuperscript{163} Interview conducted with members of Chiguirizano association on July 9, 2014.
\textsuperscript{164} Comment made by a member of Hamba-Hamba association in an interview conducted on July 10, 2014.
\textsuperscript{165} Comment made by a member of Hamba-Hamba association in an interview conducted by the author on July 10, 2014 in Ulongué, Angónia.
Photo 6: Hamba-Hamba association in Ulongué, Angónia

A member of Titokule Ulimi association also participated in the FFS course and is shown in Photo 7 (below) sharing techniques learned through the training with members of his association. In Titokule the group meets once a week to work in the field school site and cultivates cabbage, kale, onion, carrot, sweet potatoes and tomatoes.

Photo 7: Titokule Ulimi Association, Ulongué Angónia

A member of Titokule Ulimi association also participated in the FFS course and is shown in Photo 7 (below) sharing techniques learned through the training with members of his association. In Titokule the group meets once a week to work in the field school site and cultivates cabbage, kale, onion, carrot, sweet potatoes and tomatoes.
6.7 But is it a development model in Mozambique?

Compared to ProSAVANA, the PAA has received far less attention and resources (human and financial) from the national government and foreign donors alike. This point was noted at the Triangular Peoples’ Conference (against ProSAVANA) held in Maputo on July 27, 2014, where a leading member of UNAC urged the government of Mozambique “to take up PAA Africa...as a national public policy”. This same speaker explained that while an “avalanche of euphoria” and “enthusiasm” is evident when the government speaks of ProSAVANA, unfortunately there is not “the same degree of enthusiasm when it comes to PAA Africa”\textsuperscript{cxxxii}\textsuperscript{166}. One interview respondent from UNAC describes the contradictory paradigmatic presuppositions underpinning each of these two respective development interventions as follows:

[... there is a clear distinction [between the case of the PAA and ProSAVANA] in the sense that the models that are proposed and their assumptions are clearly differentiated. On the one hand, we have a premise of integration, but within the logic of peasant agriculture, an endogenous process of building from the bottom up and a process of high-growth and development, which is the case of the PAA. On the other hand, we have ProSAVANA which...aims to integrate the peasant into a global chain of agribusiness to produce commodities such as soybeans and cotton etc. But it is necessary to highlight which type of peasant we are talking about [with ProSAVANA]. It is an emergent farmer...that is integrated within an overall chain of agribusiness and within large-scale investments of foreign companies\textsuperscript{cxxxiv}\textsuperscript{167}.

This same interviewee adds that:

The major limitation that exists with the PAA...is not that it is just a pilot-project...but that it is a pilot-project that has no “ownership” or appropriation within the Mozambican government itself, in the sense that it is not a priority [for the government]. For this reason the PAA ended up being run by FAO and WFP with only residual participation from the government...It is also necessary to clarify the context. In the Brazilian context you have a much broader policy, that is the PAA within an overall strategy of Brazil Sem Miséria [Brazil Without Misery], but here in Mozambique you have the ProSAVANA program that forms itself as a public policy at the national level while the PAA is a project, which is

\textsuperscript{166} Excerpt from a speech made by a leading member of UNAC at the Triangular People’s Conference, held in Maputo of July 27, 2014.

\textsuperscript{167} Interview conducted by the author with UNAC on September 5, 2014.
something occasional, short-term. So much so that the PAA has resources for only 18 months and at any time can stop, if it fails to get further resources for the remaining months$^{168}$.

Although the second phase of PAA’s implementation process initially included a further sub-phase which was planned to begin after August 2015 and run until August 2018, the funding for PAA was not renewed beyond August 2015, and the program has now officially come to an end in Tete$^{169}$. Despite the PAA’s short duration and extremely limited budget, its positive impact for smallholder farmers and consumers has been noteworthy. Hence, the abrupt ending of the PAA will likely have profound and negative impacts for a significant number of Mozambicans who currently benefit from the program (including both producers and consumers). Following the termination of funding in August 2015, it may be possible for the 20 associations in Angónia that currently participate in PAA to continue to sell their produce to WFP through its P4P program, but what happens when P4P eventually comes to an end? How will farmers commercialize their food products then? Any genuine and lasting solution to rural poverty and food insecurity in Mozambique needs to be structural and oriented towards the long-term.

UNAC has been participating in the policy dialogues on PAA from the outset and feels that it would be inappropriate to say that PAA constitutes a development model in Mozambique at this point, especially given the limited geographic scope, budget and government appropriation of the pilot-project. According to UNAC:

It is necessary to clarify that PAA Africa is not necessarily an endogenous agricultural development model....And we must also remember that PAA Africa, here in Mozambique, does not exist as a model in itself. There is a set of presuppositions based on the Brazilian reality, from which it is planned to build a model of the Food Acquisition Program in Mozambique....What we can say is that we are in a process of construction, of designing a model, inspired by a Brazilian reality that has worked in the sense that PAA has improved the lives of peasants in Brazil. Now what we are trying to understand, in the Mozambican context, is how we can build our own model of the Food Acquisition Program.

$^{168}$ Interview conducted by the author with UNAC on September 5, 2014.
$^{169}$ During fieldwork conducted in July 2014 local representatives from FAO and WFP and a number of beneficiaries of the program expressed hope that the Brazilian government and DFID would renew funding beyond August 2015 to support the continuing development of the program. However, in April 2015, the author received unfortunate news from FAO personnel on the ground in Mozambique, confirming that funding for the program will indeed end in August 2015 and will not be renewed.
Because it is not the Brazilian [people] who have to bring money to feed Mozambican children, but the Mozambican government that has this responsibility....For this reason we are involved in this program, in the hope that from this Brazilian experience, we [Mozambican society] might draw inspiration to create our own program of national dimension that would actually be supported at the government level and could be one of the contributions in the construction of an alternative model of agricultural development

Indeed the continuation of local food purchasing in Mozambique and any success that it might result in (if adopted by the Mozambican government as a public policy and model for agricultural development) is inextricably linked to the expansion of the PRONAE policy. Continuing and expanding the school feeding program through PRONAE is vital to the future of any program based on local food procurement, such as the PAA. The reverse is equally true. Thus, a budget urgently needs to be allocated to the recently approved national PRONAE policy and an implementation plan drawn up and presented. Only once a budget is allocated and an implementation plan is put in place can the policy begin to be implemented and can food procurement from family farmers through PRONAE, under the government’s own oversight, be initiated. The expansion of a national school feeding program would greatly increase the demand for locally produced corn, beans and fresh vegetables, thereby providing a significantly larger market for local farmers to supply.

The creation and consolidation of institutional markets represents a structural and long-term strategy for stimulating local economies, improving rural incomes, increasing food production and reducing food insecurity. Given that foreign agribusiness has little interest in producing food in Mozambique to supply local markets, peasant farmers have a crucial role to play in ensuring national food security. Based on fieldwork and research conducted in Mozambique, it is evident that the PAA, in conjunction with the PRONAE (school lunch) policy, has considerable potential as a public policy to alleviate rural poverty, create rural employment and reduce food insecurity and malnutrition.

\[170\] Ibid.
Chapter 7
Conclusions

The hegemony of the current neoliberal food regime is predominately advanced and maintained by a host of transnational agro-industrial giants and a relatively small contingent of wealthy international elites with tremendous economic and political clout. Rooted in an uncritical orthodox approach to development—understood primarily in terms of economic growth—this globalized food regime and the ideologically laden policies of its proponents have failed to create sustainable and dignified livelihoods for the vast majority of the world’s peasants and rural poor.

When development is primarily equated with growth, little consideration is given to questions of social justice, equality and access; however, growth does not necessarily equal development. When the benefits brought about by development are distributed in a highly inequitable way or come at the cost of destroying the natural environment or as a result of the oppression of one group or class over another, it is not development. When used as a means to achieve greater economic growth, development generally entails the concentration of wealth, power and resources in the hands of a few. When the result of development is greater inequality, it is not development. In many countries, including Brazil and Mozambique, rural poverty and hunger remain persistent problems that have only been exacerbated by the expansion of modern agriculture and the territoriality of agribusiness.

This thesis has presented and examined two distinctly different Brazilian development interventions in Mozambican agriculture: ProSAVANA, a trilateral technical cooperation program; and PAA, a multilateral humanitarian cooperation program. The strategies for rural territorial development that each of the programs respectively entails, their influence on national policymaking, the impacts and implications on peasant livelihoods, and the paradigmatic and ideological conceptions that underpin the contradicting Brazilian initiatives have also been discussed. I contend that Brazil’s dualistic agrarian structure and contradictory agrarian dynamics influence the country’s approaches to international development cooperation in Mozambique. As is evidenced by the case studies presented, particular Brazilian models of development and their
ideological underpinnings play a substantive role in the planning and decision-making process for agriculture development projects abroad. 

Our analysis shows that both ProSAVANA and the Nacala Fund expose distinct ruptures between Brazil’s development discourse and its practice. The case of ProSAVANA confirms that Brazil’s South-South model of technical cooperation does promote private interests and that the same neo-liberal agribusiness model, which has hegemony in Brazil, is clearly being implemented through ProSAVANA and will be imposed by the Nacala Fund. The model being promoted is underpinned by the perspective of the paradigm of agrarian capitalism, which sees poverty and hunger as conjunctural problems of capitalism that can only be solved by capitalist solutions such as the unquestioned integration of peasants into global agri-food supply chains and hence the neo-liberal global food regime.

In contrast, PAA Africa operates in conformity with Brazil’s international development cooperation principles and discourse and strengthens the predominant model of peasant agriculture in Mozambique by supporting smallholder farming systems and the production of food products destined for local consumption, rather than global commodities for export. In Brazil, the PAA actively promotes the creation and expansion of institutional markets and new decentralized local food supply systems as a means to simultaneously generate rural employment and reduce household food vulnerability. By sourcing food locally through the PAA, the Brazilian government at the Federal, State and Municipal levels has chosen to support its family farmers, recognizing the vital role they play in ensuring the country’s future food security. With the success of the program the government has recognized that addressing rural poverty and food insecurity at the local level depends largely upon local actions, strategies and solutions, not illusory Ricardian notions of comparative advantage, competition and free markets. The consolidation of sustainable development models that produce lasting results takes time. With the PAA, it has taken Brazil a decade, but the results of the sustained effort speak for themselves.

In Mozambique, as in Brazil, the PAA (which involves coupling local food procurement with the development of local institutional markets) is promoted from the perspective of the agrarian question paradigm and seeks the construction of a more just
and equitable society. A peasant centered model has been repeatedly demanded, and explicitly advocated for Mozambican civil society, yet neither the Mozambican nor the Brazilian government have prioritized this model.

The definition of development, cited in chapter one of this thesis, is worth reiterating here:

Development entails human emancipation, in two senses of the word: liberation from the vicissitudes of nature, through greater understanding of the earth processes followed by carefully applied technology; and self emancipation, control over social relations, conscious control over the conditions under which human nature is formed, rational and democratic control over the cultural production of the human personality (PEET; HARTWICK, 2009, p. 3).

With this definition in mind, it is evident that while ProSAVANA seeks to promote human emancipation in the first sense of the word (the application of technology to liberate people from the toils of nature), it completely neglects the latter, that is, the self emancipation of peasant farmers. Rather than strengthening peasant territorialities and peasant autonomy over the reproduction of social relations within peasant territories, ProSAVANA represents a highly technocratic vision of development and is based on peasant subordination to agribusiness, the unquestioned imposition of capitalist social relations and the territoriality of agribusiness in peasant territories. Thus far, the demands of UNAC and the other CSOs actively involved in the food sovereignty movement in Mozambique have not yet been heeded by the Mozambican, Brazilian, or Japanese governments with regard to ProSAVANA, and it remains to be seen, whether ProSAVANA will shift course or not and what the eventual outcomes and territorial impacts of the program will ultimately be.

On the other hand, the territoriality and development advanced through PAA promotes both forms of human emancipation (as highlighted in the citation above), and demonstrates that a bottom-up strategy for development could bring significant results in Mozambique if given the chance and the appropriate allocation of resources. The PAA is not a burden or an unnecessary expense for the government and donors, it is an opportunity to invest in the Mozambican people (both food producers and consumers), build human capacity and improve the material living conditions in a concrete way for a
significant part of the population, while also tackling structural issues of inequality, poverty and hunger.

Finally, development cannot be imposed on one group or country by another; it must be desired by those who are being targeted by development. The “beneficiaries” of development must participate in the development process, from decision-making to implementation, and decide for themselves what kind of development they need and want, or indeed, if they need or want it at all. As a history of failed investments in agriculture in Mozambique show, bigger is not always better. Large-scale agricultural investments are not an effective means to reduce poverty or create food security, and often have the opposite effect. The Mozambican government needs to change the way that it looks at agricultural development policy and recognize the benefits of supporting family farming not just in its discourse, but in practice. Similarly, the Brazilian government needs to reconsider ProSAVANA and recognize the voices of CSOs and peasants in relation to what kinds of models and strategies are best for Mozambique.

**Recommendations for future research**

This comparative study of ProSAVANA and PAA revealed several paths for further research. In the case of ProSAVANA, the program is still in an early phase of its development and the official version of the Master Plan for the Development of the Nacala Corridor (ProSAVANA-PD) was only published in May 2015; therefore the situation on the ground in the ProSAVANA target area is constantly changing. Further research is necessary to monitor ongoing activities implemented under the program, some of which have been mentioned in this thesis, but also to identify and monitor new activities that have been implemented since field work was conducted in 2014 and which will be implemented in the near future. In particular, in-depth quantitative surveys exploring the socioeconomic impacts on farmers participating in ProSAVANA would be a complement to this exploratory qualitative study. Given the breadth of ProSAVANA and the wide geographic distribution of the districts targeted by the program, focused ethnographic studies based on either specific districts in the target area, or specific
zones (I, II, III, IV, V, and VI) would be useful. Also, very little research has been conducted covering ProSAVANA’s activities in Niassa province, making this an important area for additional studies on program.

In the case of PAA, further research should be conducted in order to assess the program’s impacts and outcomes in the 2014/2015 growing season, looking both at the process of production and procurement of corn and bean crops. Available studies only cover the period from early-2012 to mid-2014 and do not include beans. Given that the PAA pilot-project has now formally come to an end, a comprehensive survey on how the PAA affected the socio-economic status of smallholder farmers is recommended. Similarly, a follow-up survey should be conducted which examines the impact of the project’s discontinuation on smallholders who formerly participated in the project. Such a study would examine the current means of commercialization for smallholders, in particular, of corn and beans, and whether or not socio-economic improvements made during the PAA have been maintained and pre-and-post-harvest techniques are still being applied in these farmers' production practices.

I would also contend that in-depth research should be conducted on the School Feeding Transition Program in Cahora Bassa and Changara and its intersection with the PAA pilot-project and with P4P. Research on this important topic would allow for a better understanding of the opportunities and challenges associated with expanding local-purchasing and school-feeding programs, such and PAA and PRONAE, in Mozambique. Finally, the new PRONAE government policy is a notable area of research that has remained largely unexplored. The current lack of academic studies on PRONAE necessitates additional quantitative studies and surveys.
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## Apendices

### Appendix 1

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Appendix 2:

Annex: List of Interviews – PAA Africa

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<td>Associação Folopia</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>5 September, 2014</td>
<td>Maputo Cidade, Maputo (via Skype)</td>
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End Notes – Original speeches (in Portuguese)

i “Nosso país se recusa a crer que a história se desenvolve necessariamente em benefício de uns e em prejuízo de outros (Emilio Médici, cited in CERVO; BUENO, 2011, p. 412)

ii “ [...] assumir uma posição de liderança na busca de um novo paradigma [...]” (Celso Amorim, in a seminar given at the XV Forum Nacional on the “Global Insertion of Brazil” on May 21, 2003).

iii “ [...] ampliar a geografia das relações externas do Brasil, atualizando o conteúdo de nossa vocação universalista; e adotar uma postura firme e ativa nas negociações multilaterais, inclusive regionais, com vistas a assegurar um espaço regulatório internacional justo e equilibrado. Subjacente a essas prioridades está o imperativo de preservar a nossa capacidade soberana de definir o modelo de desenvolvimento que desejamos para o País” (AMORIM, 2005)


v “...essa relação que Brasil pretende manter com os países da África não é uma relação de um país imperialista com vocação de hegemonia. Nós já estamos cansados, já fomos colonizados, já nos libertamos do hegemonismo. Nós, agora, queremos parceria, queremos companheirismo, queremos trabalhar de braços juntos, para a construção de uma política internacional equânime, para organismos multilaterais, democráticos e para que tenhamos igualdade de oportunidades” (Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in a speech given at a dinner with Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano in Maputo on November 5, 2003a).

vi “A África é uma nova fronteira comercial para todo o mundo. Com um crescimento forte, todos os países estão correndo para [investir] lá e temos que estar presente (André Alvim, cited in ROSSI, 2013b)

vii “Oferecemos aos nossos parceiros africanos financiamento e tecnologia, que ajudarão a mitigar carências em setores cruciais como a agricultura e a saúde. Propus a realização, no Brasil, de encontro entre ministros da Agricultura de toda a África para discutir parcerias para fomentar, em solo africano, a revolução verde que o Brasil conheceu nas últimas décadas. A experiência brasileira em matéria de tecnologia e políticas públicas voltadas para o pequeno e médio agricultor estará a serviço dessa cooperação” (Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in a speech given during a visit from Mozambican President, Armando Guebuza, to Brazil on 21 July, 2009b).

viii “A experiência de desenvolvimento político, econômico, tecnológico e social do Brasil é bastante relevante para a África e, é com satisfação que vemos a cooperação...
do Brasil...como prioridade do governo brasileiro” (Joaquim Alberto Chissano, at the Aula Magna event at UFRGS in Brazil in 2004: “Africa and Brazil Cooperation in the context of NEPAD”).

ix “Necessitamos...de projetos de grande envergadura, que sirvam de âncora ao nosso relacionamento econômico”. Por isso tenho procurado apoiar o interesse de algumas empresas e, sobretudo, da Vale do Rio Doce” (Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in a speech given at the closing ceremony at the Seminar “Brazil-Mozambique: Business and Investments” in Maputo on November 5, 2003b).

x “[...]contribuir de forma decisiva para o crescimento da agricultura de Moçambique” (Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in a speech given at a dinner with Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano in Maputo on November 5, 2003a).

xi “...a Embrapa tem tecnologia para Moçambique...[e] os empresários do campo brasileiro têm muito para contribuir” (Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in a press statement given to the press in Brasília on August 31, 2004, on the occasion of the visit of Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano to Brazil).

xii “A maior demonstração de um país...é ele ter a capacidade de produzir todo o alimento necessário para o seu povo, e nisso o Brasil tem acúmulo de experiência, assistência técnica e resultado pra partilhar com Moçambique” (Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, cited in MONTEIRO, 2010).

xiii “Criar novos modelos de desenvolvimento agrícola, tendo em conta os aspectos ambientais e socio-económicos, buscando o desenvolvimento agrícola rural e regional orientado para o mercado e com vantagens competitivas” (GoM, 2015a)

xiv “...estabelecer uma linha de crédito concessional para o financiamento de exportações brasileiras de máquinas e equipamentos destinados à agricultura familiar e fornecer apoio a projetos de desenvolvimento rural para o fortalecimento da produção da agricultura familiar por meio da cooperação técnica e do intercâmbio de políticas públicas” (MDA, 2015b).

xv “Capacitar agricultores familiares, técnicos e lideranças da África do Sul e Moçambique, em procedimentos de resgate, multiplicação, armazenamento e uso de sementes tradicionais/crioulas” (TECCHIO et al. 2012).

xvi “Pode ser muito importante para algumas empresas brasileiras investir em Moçambique para atingir o mercado sul-africano” (Celso Amorim, cited in Rangel, 2003)

xvii “Com a ajuda das empresas privadas brasileiras, Moçambique poderá ingressar nessa revolução energética. E o povo moçambicano se beneficiará da modernização de sua agricultura e da consequente criação de renda e de empregos” (Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in a speech given at a lunch with Mozambican President Armando Guebuza in Brasília on September 6, 2007).

xviii “Para compreender os interesses, ações, relações e conflitos entre as instituições e os diferentes territórios, consideramos insuficiente a compreensão do território apenas como espaço de governança” (FERNANDES, 2009, p. 199).

xix “As dimensões [de território] são formadas pelas condições construídas pelos sujeitos em suas práticas sociais na relação com a natureza e entre si...A dimensão une espaço e relação construídos pelas ações e intencionalidades” (FERNANDES, 2009, p. 202).
xx “...uma classe miserable, retrograda e vacilante, um entrave à superação do modo capitalista de produção” (ALMEIDA; PAULINO, 2000, p. 115).

xxi “...a segurança alimentar como um pilar de soberania, a questão da equidade social e territorial como elementos de estabilidade política esocial [e] a eliminação da pobreza como um imperativo nacional e não apenas por razões humanitárias mas também de natureza económica” (MOSCA, 2012, p. 10).

xxii “...durante o processo de edificação da nova sociedade...tornou-se claro que a independência política não teria um sentido real para o Povo...se a terra continuasse nas mãos de um punhado de latifundiários” (Preamble to the 1979 Land Law, cited in SERRA, 2013, p. 58).

xxiii “...depois da usurpação e espoliação das melhores terras, feita ao longo de quinhentos anos pelo colonialismo português...devolvendo-a [terra] ao Povo Moçambicano era uma...condição de uma independência real e efectiva” (Preamble to the 1979 Land Law, cited in SERRA, 2013, p. 58).

xxiv “...a actual lei é geral e cheia de omissões e lacunas, permitindo o exercício de poder discricionario...” (MOSCA, 2011, p. 207).

xxv “...estamos diante de uma situação em que a Lei de Terras não encontra correspondência na realidade prática...revelando-se completamente desajustadas das dinâmicas de mercado de terras que, ainda que não tenha sido em algum momento algum institucionalizado, contribui uma prática (SERRA, 2013, p. 62).

xxvi “...enfraquecimento progressive do papel do Estado na administração da terra e à tenência crescente para situações de açambarcamento de terras, por parte de uma elite bem colocada na esfera do poder político” (SERRA, 2013, p. 64).

xxvii “...infelizmente, é duro verificar essa realidade quando tu tens um índice de pobreza do nosso país na ordem de 54% da população, que se mantém nos últimos 5 anos, apesar de mantermos também um grande nível de crescimento econômico, a nível de 7 - 7.5%. E que tu perguntas é quando é que vai acontecer o trickle-down desse crescimento para o desenvolvimento das comunidades, para o bem-estar das comunidades? ...Quando é que veremos a começar uma abordagem do social para essas comunidades que estão excluídas?” (Interview conducted by the author in Nampula with a member of PPOSC-N on June 24, 2014.)

xxviii “Segundo o especialista da Divisão África da FGV Projetos, Frederico Paiva, os estudos mapearam a totalidade do território dos países e indicaram a viabilidade para a produção de cana-de-açúcar e outras culturas como capim elefante, palma, pinhão manso e eucalipto. A FGV, como contribuição adicional, incluiu culturas alimentares nas análises, como milho, feijão, mandioca e soja, entre outras. Além de apontar a viabilidade das culturas, os estudos indicam a melhor localização para projetos de cana-de-açúcar, incluindo refinarias, além de fazer uma análise acerca do marco regulatório e dos impactos ambientais e sociais de investimento nos países africanos” (UNICA, 2014).

xxix “Eu penso que o ProSAVANA tem outros objetivos, diferente daquilo que pretende advocar publicamente...Hoje em dia, pouco gente, poucos moçambicanos sabem sobre ProSAVANA, até governantes não sabem explicar o que é ProSAVANA....E se ouvir três ou quatro governantes, vão te dar opiniões diferentes. A única coisa que eles podem dizer é que este programa veio para revolucionar a agricultura, mais de que
maneira? Quais são os modelos? Qual é a estratégia? Ninguem sabem explicar, ninguem. Ainda acima disso, é que uns dizem que o ProSAVANA está apenas a ser concebido, que ainda não existe, que ainda não começou a ser implementado, mas dentro destas mesmas pessoas, há aqueles que dizem que ProSAVANA já está a produzir efeitos positivos. Que graças ao ProSAVANA, os camponeses já sabem fazer isso, fazer aquilo....Eu acho que aqui, vemos claramente uma imagem de que o ProSAVANA é algo que ninguem sabem, pelo menos os que estão a defender, não sabem exatamente o que querem fazer com o ProSAVANA‖ (Interview conducted by the author with a member of ORAM in Nampula on June 20, 2014).

xxx “Os agricultores brasileiros têm experiência acumulada que é muito bem-vinda. Queremos repetir em Moçambique o que eles fizeram no cerrado 30 anos atrás” (José Pacheco, cited in MELLOS, 2011).

xxxi “A presença brasileira é extremamente importante” ... “Queremos reafirmar nosso empenho para que os empresários brasileiros encontrem um campo fértil‖ (Aires Bonifácio Baptista Ali, cited in EXMAN, 2012).

xxxii “Moçambique é um Mato Grosso no meio da África, com terra de graça, sem tanto impedimento ambiental e frete muito mais barato para a China” (Ernesto Augustin, cited in MELLOS, 2011).

xxxiii “Moçambique tem localização muito especial, não só em relação ao mercado africano, mas também ao Oriente Médio, além de China e Japão para direita e Brasil e América Latina para a esquerda” (Kátia Abreu, cited in CASTRO, 2010).

xxxiv “De acordo com o chefe da Secretaria de Relações Internacionais da Embrapa, Francisco Basílio de Souza, um componente importante dos projetos de cooperação técnica com viés estruturante é a atração de investimentos‖ (SANTANA, 2011)

xxxv “A Embrapa fornece a base tecnológica, que garante tranquilidade aos investidores...eles sabem que o que plantarem, vai nascer” (Francisco Basílio de Souza, cited in SANTANA, 2011).

xxxvi “O objetivo da Missão é promover visitas na região norte (Projeto ProSavana) [e]... na região agrícola do corredor de Nacala...[para] fomentar o segmento agrário em Moçambique, desenvolvendo e promovendo parcerias entre o Brasil e Moçambique” (CCIABM, 2011a)

xxxvii “Em vista deste contínuo crescimento de investimentos no país, a Missão da CCIABM buscou alinhar os objetivos dos participantes às oportunidades que estão surgindo decorrentes deste desenvolvimento interno‖ (CCIABM, 2011b).

xxxviii “Agora, nós queremos levar os nossos agricultores brasileiros, aqueles brasileiros que tem pouca terra, jovens brasileiros que querem realmente...praticar agricultura moderna poderia mudar para moçambique e abrir a savanna africana‖ (Luiz Nishimori, interview on Palavra Aberta, 2012).

xxxix “O seminário...tem como objetivo demonstrar ao setor do agronegócio brasileiro as oportunidades de interagir com pares moçambicanos” (RODRIGUES, 2012).

x “O Fundo Nacala está alinhado às estratégias de atração de investimentos privados do programa ProSAVANA-JBM, realizado no âmbito da cooperação trilateral entre Japão, Brasil e Moçambique e segue as diretrizes do ProSAVANA-PD, Plano Diretor para o Desenvolvimento da Agricultura do Corredor de Nacala” (FGV, undated).
“Trata-se de um projeto sólido, com bom retorno de longo prazo, voltado à produção de alimentos” (Cleber Guarany, cited in BATISTA, 2012a).

“ Já estamos em negociações com associações de produtores de soja, algodão, etc” (Cleber Guarany, cited in BATISTA, 2012a).


“A comitiva de produtores rurais retornou ao Brasil muito motivada...e disposta a investir em Moçambique. A partir de agora, iniciam-se os trabalhos da CCIABM em conjunto com os participantes para se desenvolver o plano de negócios e investimentos” (CCIABM, 2013).

“Investimos no Brasil tanto por arrendamento quanto comprando terras. A área arrendada seria equivalente a uma área de concessão. Porém, mesmo que na concessão não se tenha que pagar, o imóvel não é teu. Quando você compra uma terra e vai plantar nela você agrega valor no patrimônio da empresa. Se o imóvel é concedido, você estará agregando valor em um imóvel que nunca vai ser teu. Então, a maneira de se olhar a rentabilidade vai ser diferente. Uma exploração em ativo próprio garante também um ganho imobiliário. Já quando você olha para uma exploração na África, o estudo de viabilidade é diferente, baseado somente no retorno da operação agrícola. E o grande problema lá, hoje, é os países africanos estão muito atrás do Brasil em questão de infraestrutura, mão-de-obra e estrutura jurídica, para permitir a uma empresa estrangeira investir pesado. O setor agrícola é muito intensivo, utiliza muito capital. Então isso configura um risco alto” (Gustavo Lunardi, in ESBER, 2014).

“...em Moçambique há muitas propriedades disponíveis para o plantio de soja, mas não em terras contínuas, como se vê em Mato Grosso” (BAZANI, 2012).

“ProSAVANA foi concebido apartir de fora, com interesses de fora, e o governo de Moçambique simplesmente respondeu para satisfazer estes interesses” (Interview conducted by the author with a member of ORAM in Nampula on June 26, 2014).

“Desenvolvimento e transferência da tecnologia agrária adequada na Região do Corredor de Nacala” (GoM, 2015b).

“Aumento da produção agrária em diferentes áreas de cultivo por via da adoção de modelos de desenvolvimento agrário nas áreas-alvo do ProSAVANA” (GoM, 2015c).

“Formular um Plano Director com vista ao Desenvolvimento Agrícola, que contribua para o desenvolvimento social e económico, no sentido de promover um sistema de produção sustentável e reduzir a pobreza na região do Corredor de Nacala, com especial atenção aos pequenos produtores” (GoM, 2015d).

“Essa talvez seja a melhor área para desenvolver agricultura no continente, com retornos estimados entre 18% e 23% ao ano” (Cleber Guarany, cited in ZAIA, 2012).

“Você tem uma configuração de um novo mapa, um novo mapa de avanço de ocupação nos territórios dos camponeses, sem um processo de consentimento e numa situação praticamente de recolonização das pessoas” (Interview conducted by the author with UNAC respondent on September 5, 2014).

“Aqui em Nampula, ou aqui em Moçambique já temos muitas empresas [estrangeiras]. Estão a explorar, estão a tirar as terras das pessoas sem nenhum
consentimento...É um problema sério....E nós assistimos... principalmente eu, e mesmo as pessoas, passávamos muitas zonas onde as empresas ocupam [terras], não há nenhuma comunidade que está satisfeita com a empresa. Não há” (Interview conducted by the author with an UNAC respondent in Nampula on July 10, 2014).

iv “O ProSAVANA resulta de uma confluência de um conjunto de interesses diversificados; está dentro de uma estratégia muito mais global de avanço sobre os territórios africanos, de tal ideia de que a África é a nova fronteira agrícola” (Interview conducted by the author with an UNAC respondent on September 5, 2014).

lv “[...] atendia aos interesses expansionistas...Foi o ‘modelo’ de expulsão do trabalhador do campo e pequenos produtores, que por não disporem de capital suficiente para se adaptar ao modelo de modernização da agricultura, também foram obrigados a migrar para as cidades, engrossando as fileiras do subemprego ou mesmo do desemprego, ocasionando sérios problemas socioeconômicos” (INOCÊNCIO, 2010, p. 94).

lvii Desde seu lançamento, o ProSavana é acusado de tentar destruir a agricultura moçambicana por meio de uma “invasão de megaprodutores brasileiros”, que “se utilizariam de financiamento japonês”, em uma “repetição do processo que destruiu o Cerrado brasileiro”. A lista de acusações e infindável, e, obviamente, há equívocos que devem ser esclarecidos [...]. Uma deles é que o ProSavana é a repetição do Prodecer, realizado a partir do fim dos anos 70, levando a JICA a ser acusada de promover em Moçambique as mesmas práticas que promoveu no Brasil há mais de trinta anos. Há três décadas, a Eco 92 estava longe de ocorrer, e o governo brasileiro financiava desmatamentos nas propriedades rurais do Brasil. A estrutura fundiária brasileira é diferente da moçambicana. E o mundo mudou. Moçambique possui uma legislação ambiental adequada, e tanto o Brasil, quanto o Japão aplicam rígidos controles ambientais nas atividades executadas no Corredor de Nacala.” (PAIVA, 2013, p.15).

lviii “Uma crítica recorrente é acerca de uma suposta invasão de agricultores brasileiros em Moçambique. Engano. Não há dentro do Estado brasileiro nenhuma política pública de apoio à internacionalização do seu agronegócio. O ProSavana é uma cooperação técnica, que envolve sobretudo transferência de tecnologia. Advogar a ideia de que o Programa apoia uma invasão de agricultores brasileiros, que, por sua vez, ocuparão terras dos agricultores moçambicanos, é, digamos, desinformar. Não há crédito nem qualquer tipo de apoio a esse suposto processo... [...] Sendo a maior intenção da cooperação prove Moçambique de uma tecnologia adequada para atingir uma soberania alimentar, o ProSavana pode, ao contrário do que propalam os críticos, fornecer os parâmetros ideais para uma revolução verde sustentável, não apenas para os moçambicanos, mas para toda a África, quiçá para o mundo” (PAIVA, 2013, p.15).
lix “...há na literatura a construção de três mitos ao redor do ProSAVANA: 1) que o ProSAVANA é uma réplica do PRODECER; 2) que ProSAVANA almeja usurpar terras e; 3) que o ProSAVANA cria conflitos entre o agronegócio e os pequenos agricultores. Esses mitos normalmente estão alinhados a um claro discurso ideológico, que vincula qualquer investimento de agronegócio ou conflito ao Programa... [...] Na seção seguinte [deste tese de doutorado]...espera-se mostrar o que realmente ocorre no ProSAVANA, desmistificando a ideia de que há um plan preconcebidio, por parte do governo brasileiro, para usurpar as terras de Moçambique...” (FINGERMANN, 2014, p. 132).

lx “Não menos importante que as reivindicações relacionadas com o diálogo, a transparência e a acessibilidade à informação, deve ser o debate sobre o modelo de desenvolvimento subjacente ao ProSAVANA. Este programa, possui na sua origem a filosofia/ideologia da implantação de explorações privadas de média e grande dimensão, com utilização de tecnologias intensivas em capital, cujo objectivo é a integração nos sistemas de agronegócios internacionais com a produção e exportação de commodities, configurando um padrão de acumulação dominado pelos interesses das multinacionais de factores (sementes, fertilizantes, pesticidas e equipamentos). Se este modelo for implantado, os riscos acima referidos e que motivam os posicionamentos da sociedade civil, poderão ser uma realidade” (MOSCA, 2014, p. 3).

lxı “O discurso do ProSAVANA é um discurso que está a ser adaptado, momento após momento. Acho que podemos contar talvez mais de 5 ou 6 discursos desde que o ProSAVANA foi concebido, até hoje em dia. Na medida que há pressão contra alguma coisa, os discurso do ProSAVANA muda” (Interview conducted by the author with a member of ORAM in Nampula on June 26, 2014).

lxıı “O processo de evolução da concepção do ProSAVANA é muito estranho, porque dentro de Moçambique este processo evoluuiu de forma muito escondida, nunca foi público, até muito recentemente...estamos a falar de 2012 quando o ProSAVANA saiu ao público...foi como se foi uma bomba explodiou. Por esta razão as pessoas reagiram imediatamente e reagiram de forma muito espantada. ‘O que é isso, ProSAVANA?’ ‘O que é isso?’ Ninguem sabia explicar, mais nesta altura o programa já tinha se dado um passo bastante significativo, na elaboração de um Plano Director. Mas este Plano Director também nunca foi partilhado publicamente, andou nas escondidas. Até que a partir do primeiro semestre do ano passado [2013], por força da pressão da sociedade civil, o Plano Director saiu, mas já completo... É importante destacar que saiu não foi por via oficial, foi por via de amigos, amigos do Japão, amigos do Brasil que fizeram parte da equipa técnica...Isso para mim também é muito estranho, se ProSAVANA é um programa que se pretende que tenha espaço em Moçambique, como é que o processo de elaboração deste Plano Director deste programa não evolve os próprios moçambicanos, não consulta os próprios moçambicanos?” (Interview conducted by the author with a member of ORAM in Nampula on June 26, 2014).

lxııı “...em função desse reconhecimento...era preciso alargar esta luta para juntar as organizações da sociedade civil do Japão e do Brasil. E foi assim que começamos este diálogo multinacional com nossos correspondentes no Brasil e do Japão, para que de fato houvesse essa pressão coletiva com uma campanha internacional dessa dimensão, que conseguíssemos travar o processo tendo em conta essas 03 frentes.Mas isso também chamou-nos atenção na necessidade de haver uma solidariedade
internacional, muito ampla que envolva maior pressão internacional....Mas solidariedade com palavras não basta, porque aí temos que partir para ações práticas. E já se mostrou que o governo moçambicano não tem apertura de mudança, assim como o governo brasileiro e japonês querer avançar com o modelo que foi proposto. E obviamente aí teremos que recorrer a ações, incluindo mecanismos extrajudiciais para conseguirmos fazer uma maior pressão‖ (Interview conducted with UNAC respondent on September 5, 2014).

lxiv “O evento...mudou o jogo que até há pouco tempo era amplamente favorável às corporações do agronegócio brasileiro e às transnacionais‖ (MELLO, 2013).

lxv “Se há informação escondida, há algo que não está certo. O que nós queremos é detalhes certos. Até hoje nós não tivemos acesso ao Plano Diretor do ProSAVANA. Então, o que está por detrás disso? Por que nós não estamos a ter acesso? Ou é porque não se tem ainda a visão do que se pretende, ou é porque não nos querem entregar a visão deles‖ (Interview conducted by the author with a member of AENA in Nampula on June 30, 2014).

lxvi “…a estratégia de comunicação que foi adotada [foi] de não abrir o pacote do ProSAVANA [ao público], precisamente para que a gente não soubesse‖ (Interview conducted by the author with a member of PPOSC-N in Nampula on June 24, 2014).

lxvii “O modelo do ProSAVANA é um modelo indesejável, um modelo que não corresponde aquilo que são as reais necessidades de Moçambique e por isso que nasce essa campanha, Não ao ProSAVANA. Não ao ProSAVANA é não ao modelo, que é um modelo destrutivo, um modelo colonial e imperial. Não ao ProSAVANA é não à usurpação de terra que está por trás desse modelo e não à exclusão do campesinato dentro de um modelo que não se integra, que não coexiste com modelos já existentes dentro da cultura camponesa. Então, o objetivo é de travar este modelo do ProSAVANA e buscar modelos alternativos, modelos que podem suportar a agricultura camponesa. Este é o grande objetivo da campanha Não ao ProSAVANA, no sentido de que ele não serve, este modelo não responde às demandas e necessidades dos camponeses‖ (Interview conducted by the author with UNAC via Skype on September 5, 2014).

lxviii “elos criarão parcerias de negócio com as novas cooperativas modernas organizadas para desenvolver ainda mais a logística agrária e as oportunidades de mercado” (MASA, 2015, p. 3-15)

lxix “Resultado1: As organizações (associações, cooperativas e outras organizações locais envolvidas no agronegócio) apoiados por Prosavana-PEM estabelecem atividades de valor acrescentado e começam a ganhar lucros apartir dessas atividades....Resultado 2: Comércio local de PMEs (empresas agrícolas,distribuidores, comerciantes, lojas, etc) tornam-se mais ativos do que antes da intervenção do Prosavana‖ (MINAG, 2014, não página).

lx “Toda aquela área era do povo, mas um português chegou e falou com o governo colonial e depois ele começou a afastar as pessoas. Todos abandonaram as suas machambas e deixou o português fazer seus negócios. Depois que o dono morreu, as pessoas voltaram para as suas terras e a população continuavam ali. É esta população que até ainda agora eles estão a excluir. A população, quando vai até ali, continua de fazer as suas machambas que tinha deste o período colonial. Mas agora não
é possível porque o branco ocupou a terra, comprou toda a área e expulsou o povo” (Interview conducted by the author on 18 June, 2014 in Ribaué with members of a community affected by Matharia Empreendimentos).

“...quando Moçambique alcançou independência, ele [João Ferreira Dos Santos] ficou aqui como um moçambicano com seus filhos e fez certas atividades – comércio, agricultura, agropecuária. Então quando esta guerra civil apareceu, este conflito armado com o Renamo, ele abandonou aqui para viver na cidade, e deixou a sua plantação com as guardas...quando a guerra acabou, ele morreu e os filhos tomaram a conta dos negócios e toda a fortuna que era do pai. Então eles ocuparam a área e já começaram fazer as suas atividades” (Interview with a representative of Matharia Empreendimentos conducted on 18 June, 2014 in Ribaué).

“E ele [Santos] tem sido ocupando toda a terra sem propósito, ele não está a fazer nada lá. Ocupou toda a área mas só usa um pequeno canto” (Interview conducted by the author on 18 June, 2014 in Ribaué with members of a community affected by Matharia Empreendimentos).

“Era exclusão de vez...e até agora [a empresa] está a excluindo...cada pessoa deixou a sua casa, mas algumas inscreveram-se como um trabalhador...Todos que recuaram [da área] foram das suas casas e ninguém ficou [morando] ali. Toda a população que ficava ali foram excluidos. Agora há somente alguns trabalhadores que ficaram para fazer serviço do patrão” (Interview conducted by the author on 18 June, 2014 in Ribaué with members of a community affected by Matharia Empreendimentos).

“Praticamente existe uma guerra com os residentes... eles tentam vão num sitio, faz desmatação das machambas, então nós fizemos barulho com eles assim como a Agricultura [SDAE] e a administração [do governo local] para que poder nos ajudar, para aquelas pessoas a sair, porque nós temos grandes planos, programas, para produção agrícola e criação de gado. Então neste momento existe algumas comunidades que ainda tornam residentes e sem sair” (Interview with a representative of Matharia Empreendimentos conducted on 18 June, 2014 in Ribaué).

“Todos tinham casa lá, e foram dito que não poderia continuar morando ali, mas somente produzindo...” (Interview conducted by the author on 18 June, 2014 in Ribaué with members of a community affected by Matharia Empreendimentos).

“...por enquanto todas as pessoas continuam fazendo as machambas lá....onde havia a aldeia” (Interview conducted by the author on 18 June, 2014 in Ribaué with members of a community affected by Matharia Empreendimentos).

“O Forum já entregou o plano de produção para a GAPI e GAPI deu um crédito pequeno para apoiar com a legalização das nossas armazens. Foi depois deste pequeno financiamento que o GAPI vinha com o equipe do ProSAVANA e nos informou que o dinheiro que temos do GAPI é de ProSAVANA” (Interview conducted by the author with a representative of Forum Iapaca on June 16, 2014 in Malema).

“Quando gerenciamos com pouco crédito os lucros não valem uma pena. Por exemplo, com o 51 mil [meticais de financiamento que o Forum Iapaca recebeu de GAPI anteriormente], o Forum ganhou quasi 38 mil [meticais] de lucro, mas sofremos algumas alterações a este retorno, pois tínhamos que comprar bicicletas para ir ao campo para supervisionar o credito e fazer outros viagens” (Interview conducted by the author with a representative of Forum Iapaca on June 16, 2014 in Malema).
Este ano entramos em um novo acordo com a GAPI por um valor maior, mas [o Forum] precisava de um penhor, então nossa penhor são as nossas três armazens. [...] A finalidade do financiamento é para comercializar gergelim e o valor [do empréstimo] é de até 3 milhões de meticais, com juros de 10 per cento anual. Estamos a pensar em comercializar 100 toneladas de gergelim, e já negociamos com [a empresa local] IKURU para vender.....Em cada dez associações, selecionamos dois membros para beneficiar este fundo para produzir gergelim, para criar os campos escolas. Depois os outros membros das associações vão participar nestes campos escolas e aprender juntos. Todos [dos membros do Forum] vão vender produto, mas quem vai gerenciar o crédito são estes [two] associações.....Temos muito esperança sobre o que pode ser feito com este valor...." (Interview conducted by the author with a representative of Forum Iapaca on June 16, 2014 in Malema).

“nós não temos ajuda nenhum do governo...porque apoiar significa falar alguma coisa e depois cumprir...” (Interview conducted by the author with a representative of Forum Iapaca on June 16, 2014 in Malema).

“Temos que deixar claro, nós podemos fazer um percurso ao longo do distrito...não vamos fazer 10 kilometres sem encontra ocupações. Em cada 2 kilometres vamos apanhar algumas comunidades, a terra a ser explorada.... não deve ser assim como eles [o ProSAVANA e o governo] querem, desalojar o povo, mas sim fomentar e trabalhar com as comunidades” (Interview conducted by the author with a representative of Forum Iapaca on June 16, 2014 in Malema).

“AgroMoz já prejudicou [a população] e vai continuar prejudicando as pessoas. Prejudicou as pessoas porque tirou as pessoas das suas terras com um valor de indemnização nós consideramos insuficiente e está a practicar a agricultura, mas demitiram a mão de obra da pessoas.... E pelo visto, como tu viste, a empresa é muito grande que trabalha com maquinas. Então, para cria mão de obra, como a empresa prometeu, parece que é uma mentira, pelo aquilo o que eu tinha visto até agora. E as próprias comunidades podem ter mais outras problemas para alem de indemnização [inadequada] e a perca das suas terras...podem ter problemas de saúde porque vem uma avião para pôr químicos na machamba que são toxicos que podem afetar as comunidades. Resumidamente, podemos dizer que a área da empresa é uma área muito grande que nem sabemos dizer quantos hectares são. Você parar num lugar e olhar e nem se anota até onde termina” (Interview conducted by the author with a representative of Forum Iapaca on June 16, 2014 in Malema).

“Ainda o ProSAVANA não começou a fazer nada aqui em Malema. Já tínhamos identificado umas áreas...mas estamos a ter dificuldades porque todo o Corredor já está cheio de população. Mas o objetivo do ProSAVANA é para trabalhar com a população, apoiar a população. Não porque o ProSAVANA vai abrir uma parcela de terra, não é isso que é a ProSAVANA. Vai apenas apoiar algumas comunidades e alguns investidores. Mas ainda o programa não começou a atuar no terreno” (Interview conducted by the author with a government representative in Malema on June 17, 2014).

“Depois de anúncios sobre ProSAVANA alguns brancos [japonesas] chegaram que queriam 27 mil hectares num regulado aqui em Mutuali para a produção de algodão. Como nós tivemos a informação sobre isso, sentamos e discutimos e decidimos que...
não queríamos este investidor. Então eles [a empresa] não conseguiram [terra]. Quando não conseguiram em Mutuali, o governo de Malema levou a empresa para [o posto administrativo de] Chiulo e foi enganar o povo lá. Lá eles disseram que nós em Mutuali negamos esta empresa porque em Mutuali já há uma empresa de fomento de algodão. "Por isso vocês devem aceitar". E lá a população aceitou e os brancos [japonesas/donos ou representantes] daquela empresa despediram aquela comunidade e disseram que irão para a Maputo para tratar o DUAT para aquela zona a favor deles. Então, eu pergunto, o que é um DUAT? Para o que e para quem serve o DUAT?"

(Interview conducted by the author with a farmer in on July 16, 2014 in Mutuali).

lxxxv "O grande problema é que estas grandes empresas vão se estabelecer, obviamente, dentro dos territórios dos próprios camponeses. Isso significa expropriação de terras, significa usurpação de terras que pertencem aos camponeses, para dar lugar a grandes projetos de investimentos...Os investimentos são do setor do agronegócio e os investidores querem plantações..." (Interview conducted by the author with UNAC via Skype on September 5, 2014).

lxxxvi "Estamos preocupados com a forma de desenvolvimento que está sendo implementada...no caso do ProSAVANA. Por quê? Bem, porque o desenvolvimento que o programa se pretende implementar não é claro e, para nós, não é realístico. Há várias versões do ProSAVANA que contradizem-se. O ProSAVANA quando começou tinha o objectivo de desenvolver o agronegócio. É bom desenvolver o agronegócio. Mas onde é que vai desenvolver o agronegócio? O programa vai desenvolver o agronegócio na terra dos mais pobres. Qual é a modalidade? Dizia-se que o programa vai trabalhar com os pequenos produtores. Mas o que temos visto até agora é que há usurpação de terra. Está a tirar terra dos produtores. Here [em Moçambique] nós não temos produtores capazes de produzir 200 ou 300 hectares. O máximo que nós temos, um produtor nacional, são 10 hectares, 20 hectares....Então, não é realística a versão do ProSAVANA que diz que vai trabalhar com os produtores do setor familiar. Porque nenhum investidor joga dinheiro fora. Ninguém vai entregar dinheiro para um produtor para produzir num meio hectare e para produzir com o sistema de produção que o produtor já tem" (Interview conducted by the author with a member of AENA on June 30, 2014).

lxxxvii "A transição da agricultura de pousio para uma agricultura fixa é a principal premissa para o aumento da produtividade através da introdução de tecnologia da agricultura intensiva" (PROSAVANA-PD, 2013b, p. 8)

lxxviii "...esses projectos, tais como ProSAVANA, quando vêm ao Moçambique têm sempre um olhar de que as terras estão vazias, que são terras desocupadas. Então aí, ao entender que as terras estão desocupadas, o que eles estão a dizer é, "vamos fixar as pessoas ao sítio onde neste ano elas estão a produzir". Mas quando tu estás a "fixar" as pessoas a um lugar, tu estás a sufocar as pessoas. Também há os programas de reasseentamento, que provocam a desintegração das comunidades, sobretudo, porque...uma comunidade é uma coisa dinâmica, que vem da história e das tradições antigas e que se continua numa perspectiva de sustentabilidade. As comunidades tem relação com os antepassados, tem relação com as terras de em pousio, as terras de expansão, as terras reservas da comunidade, etc. Terra que, hoje, estes investimentos estrangeiros consideram que são terras vazias ou improdutivas, desconhecendo essa
realidade tradicional. Então a política de abertura do país ao investimento, atraindo grandes investimentos que querem grandes áreas terras, rompe completamente com os esquemas e modos de vida de sociedades tradicionais. O que tu tens é a imposição a um modelo às comunidades que não vai fazer outra coisa se não perpetuar e piorar a condição de pobreza. Infelizmente, essa que é a realidade” (Interview conducted by the author in Nampula with a member of PPOSC-N on June 24, 2014).

“Os produtores da região estão num ponto crucial e precisam de mudar a prática da agricultura familiar, por forma a sobreviver....É preciso que se perceba que não haverá vastas áreas disponíveis para a agricultura caso o cultivo extensivo actualmente predominante continue a ser praticado...” (MASA, 2015, p. 2-4).

“...a área não utilizada ocupada pelo actual sistema de cultivo de pousio, que se estima tenha pelo menos a mesma extensão da área cultivada anualmente, pode ser usada para o aumento da área de cultivo após a transformação” MASA, 2015, p. 4-5).

“...promovida no âmbito do consenso geral com os membros da comunidade por sua livre e espontânea vontade. Um espaço de terras ociosas definido durante a transformação deve ser reconhecido como parte das terras da comunidade e esta terra deverá ser efectivamente utilizada numa base sustentável pela comunidade” (MASA, 2015, p. 3-26).

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“Impactos negativos podem ser esperados durante a transformação do cultivo extensivo” (MASA, 2015, p. 4-5)

“Realmente não tem nada que nos proteja aqui em Moçambique sobre a terra. Nós temos a Lei da Terra, que pode nos proteger, mas essa lei está sendo regulamentada...para defender a entrada dessas empresas, desses investidores....nós não somos considerados, não somos vistos como pessoas, e nós estamos a ver as pessoas fazer de novo a colonização de Moçambique. Nós lutamos para libertar Moçambique, libertar o povo e libertar a terra. E agora o governo está a devolver mais as nossas terras para serem colonizadas... isso não vai nos ajudar. Por isso nós estamos contra este processo do ProSAVANA. Nós queremos agricultura moçambicana‖ (Interview conducted with a respondent from UNAC, in Nampula City on July 10, 2014),

“...os agricultores locais esperam se beneficiar com mercados estáveis, obtendo insumos agrícolas de qualidade e adquirindo técnicas de cultivo melhorado..." (PROSAVANA-PD, 2013b, p. 11)

“...as empresas de agronegócio esperam se beneficiar ao reduzir custos de investimentos iniciais e assegurando quantidades estáveis de produtos”(PROSAVANA-PD, 2013b, p. 11).

“Agricultura sob contracto é (notadamente) essencial para os pequenos agricultores e grupos d agricultores como um passo inicial para se tornarem parceiros dos agronegócios, em situação de igualdade, fornecendo quantidades suficientes de produtos de qualidade, sem depender do extensivo apoio das empresas” (PROSAVANA-PD, 2013b, p. 18).
“Nesta perspectiva, o crescimento do agronegócio local e das parcerias com os produtores familiares terá um papel importante, principalmente em termos do desenvolvimento do mercado e da promoção do valor agregado à produção agrícola” (MASA, 2015, p 2-35).

...falando do primeiro Master Plan...notamos que, de certa forma, isso pretendia intergrar os camponeses, mas, que ao mesmo tempo, poderia ser uma exclusão e poderia ser identificado, de certa forma, um controle por parte das corporações multinacionais dentro dos próprios processos de produção. Então poderia, aí, de certa forma, negar aquilo que é o centro de produção da agricultura familiar” (Excerpt from a speech made by a leading member of UNAC at the Triangular People’s Conference, held in Maputo of July 27, 2014).

“...o ProSAVANA é uma perspectiva transformista...uma perspectiva de um camponês civilizada, ou seja, um camponês que vai ser servidor de uma cadeia global do agronegócio. De tal forma que dentro do ProSAVANA, se você olha os 05 modelos propostos....você realmente tem um único modelo... Um que está ligado sempre a algo de cultura camponesa, mas numa perspectiva que visa a integração do campesinato numa cadeia global do agronegócio, que visa o desenvolvimento de commodities como soja” (Interview conducted by the author with UNAC via Skype on September 5, 2014).  

“Se a parceria pública-privada que estamos a falar está ligada à questão do jatropa que, infelizmente, alguns camponeses produziam e nunca conseguiram de ver nenhum benefício. Se estamos a falar da questão de como é a comercialização de algodão hoje, que até alguns camponeses acabam queimando [seu algodão], por não ver a vantagem de colocar no mercado. Se estamos a falar de como o tabaco está sendo massificado hoje, os camponeses acabam perdendo todos os custos de produção, a pagar o próprio tabaco. Estaríamos a falar do que é miseria em Moçambique‖ (Excerpt from a speech made by a leading member of UNAC at the Triangular People’s Conference, held in Maputo of July 27, 2014).

“Vamos a supor que...ProSAVANA é para pequeno produtor. Quais são os mecanismos que vão usar para financiar esse produtor? Vão investir dinheiro num produtor a título de crédito. Insumos, sementes, fertilizantes, pesticidas e tudo mais. Se [o produtor] falhar, num período instável de mudanças climáticas, se as chuvas aparece de forma irregular...o produtor ganha uma dívida para o próximo ano. Se ele não pagar, nós pensamos que a terra dele [ou dela] seja o garante. É o único recurso que ele [ou ela] tem de valor....Aí é que está o nosso medo. O processo de usurpação de terras pode vir nessa vertente” (Interview conducted by the author in Nampula with a member of AENA on June 30, 2014).

“Além do fato...de que os produtores emergentes tenham um papel proeminente no processo de organização dos produtores na comunidade, eles também devem expandir a escala de suas operações agrícolas através do uso activo da agricultura mecanizada. Para alcançar uma estabilidade na gestão agrícola, a agricultura por contrato com o agronegócio para a produção de culturas de rendimento, tais como gergelim, algodão e/ou soja, deve ser ainda mais promovida de maneiras a facilitar o acesso a insumo agrícola. Além disso, os produtores emergentes actuarão como contratantes/facilitadores da agricultura por contrato pelos produtores familiares, devendo se transformar na força motriz para o desenvolvimento da área através do
fornecimento de informações sobre o mercado e da promoção do uso de técnicas agrícolas melhoradas, sementes de qualidade, agro-químicos e fertilizantes” (MASA, 2015, p. 3-13, 3-14).

cv “A pergunta é que os moçambicanos hoje, estes homens da cidade comem comida que sai de onde? É uma comida que vem da produção do camponês .... E é preciso lembrar que esses camponeses também dão produção que surge nas actuais condições que nós encontramos no campo, em parcelas pequenas de terra, com os meios próprios das famílias, esforços próprios, sem a intervenção do governo forte no setor da agricultura .... Não há nenhuma empresa grande que está a produzir essa comida. Em Moçambique não existe uma única empresa de dimensão maior que esteja a produzir 100 hectares de comida. Podemos olhar em todo território nacional, não vão encontrar uma única empresa que está a produzir 100 hectares de comida e que a comida está a ser produzida para o mercado nacional.... Nenhuma grande empresa está a produzir feijão, milho, abóbora etc para o mercado interno. Mesmo as hortícolas produzidas a nível nacional, venha da agricultura camponesa...Historicamente o campesinato sempre foi um setor que foi marginalizado e este setor que é responsável por alimentar o país” (Interview conducted by the author with UNAC on September 5, 2014).

cv “As culturas prioritárias foram divididas nos seguintes três grupos para o desenvolvimento de estratégia de trabalho de investigação agrária. 1) Grupo-1 (culturas prioritárias): Milho e soja, incluindo o uso da soja para melhoria da alimentação e nutrição. Grupo-2 (culturas prioritárias secundárias): Mandioca, feijões, amendoim, batata-renho, hortícolas, caju, gergelim e girassol. 2) Grupo-3 (culturas a serem investigadas por empresas privadas) Algodão, tabaco e chá” (MASA 4-8)

cvi “Eu perguntei: Por que soja? Soja e milho....A resposta do equipe do ProSAVANA foi a seguinte: “Ah, vocês sabem que há muita falta de ração animal para a produção de galinha...” Então aqui no Corredor de Nacala, vamos nos dedicar a produzir soja para ração animal? Será que os camponeses aqui vivem só de frango? E onde que estão os aviários que têm problema de falta de ração animal? Onde é que estão? Talvez lá na Europa, eu não sei onde que estão...” (Interview conducted by author with a member of UGC in Nampula on July 2, 2014).

cvii “As pessoas podem aderir à soja agora. Mas é importante lembrar que o dia que a soja não for comprado, é difícil consumir a soja assim mesmo. Nós aqui no Corredor de Nacala, já fomos grandes produtores de algodão. Mas por quê as pessoas a deixarem de produzir algodão? É porque produzir algodão não recompensa ao camponês. A cultura do algodão requer muito trabalho e muitos insumos. O camponês tenderia se cultivar algodão numa escala maior devido que o mercado é garantido, mas com o risco de não ter milho para seu consumo. Ele confia o algodão para que amanhã pode comprar o milho. Se o algodão não for comprado, a família não tem comida. Então há culturas específicas que exigem muito rigor e trabalho e em consequência, o camponês perde seu tempo de fazer as outras culturas [alimentares]. Então neste momento...quem vai fazer soja tem que ter outro maneira de receita para suportar outras coisas. Mas, o camponês não tem isso. Não tem alternativa. Se eu vou me dedicar esse ano só a algodão ou soja, com 2 hectares ou 3 hectares de soja, não vou
fazer milho, não vou fazer mapira, não vou fazer feijões. Vou comer o que?“ (Interview conducted by author with a member of UGC in Nampula on July 2, 2014).

cviii “Só para lhe dar uma ilustração, em Moçambique a agricultura é de sequeiro, é de subsistência, com baixo uso de insumos agrícolas. Estamos a falar principalmente de fertilizantes. Em toda região do país o uso de fertilizantes é bastante reduzido. Mas, toda investigação que está sendo feita no posto agronômico de Nampula, com o pessoal do ProSAVANA, é baseado no uso de agroquímicos. Fertilizantes, fósforo, potássio, vários fertilizantes. E a pergunta é, a maior parte da população não usa fertilizantes. Por quê? Porque não tem acesso a esses fertilizantes. Porque não sabe o manuseio desses fertilizantes. Porque os fertilizantes custam caro e porque os fertilizantes provaram que podem poluir as águas, pela qual a comunidade usa para o seu sustento, para o seu dia a dia, a água dos rios. Mas toda investigação está sendo feita, a nível do ProSAVANA, é na base de químicos. Quem vai usar esses químicos? É o produtor que não usa químicos ou são os investidores que têm o poder para usar químicos? Essa é a questão. Toda tecnologia que está sendo feita é à base de químicos” (Interview conducted by the author with a member of AENA on June 30, 2014).

cix “O que nós queremos é...que seja feita agricultura moçambicana, agricultura que não destrói o nosso solo, agricultura que não destrói a nossa saúde, agricultura que pode ser sustentável para nós, não agronegócio....Não é que nós não queremos comercializar. Nós queremos comercializar, mas não de uma forma de empresas...com a nossa maneira de produzir, não uma maneira trazida de qualquer lugar ou empresa, que pode prejudicar a nossa saúde. Nós queremos produzir, primeiro para nos alimentar e podermos também comercializar. O que nós queremos é a soberania alimentar, não segurança alimentar. Nós não queremos comer apenas para encher a barriga. Nós queremos comer para ter saúde também...” (Interview conducted by the author with respondent from UNAC, in Nampula City on July 10, 2014).

cx “...o Plano Director não inclui qualquer projecto de desenvolvimento agrícola que exija a redução da área actual de florestas” (MASA, 2015, p. 3-20).

cxi “Mesmo os investidores que nós temos hoje devem ter problemas financeiros...E ir destroncar áreas de mil hectares ou 2 mil hectares não é preferência destes investidores....É um gasto que você, um investidor, não vai querer pagar...E a falar desta questão de corrida de investidores para Nacala Corridor...Por quê? Porque aqui, realmente, houve essa vantagem, de ter estas grandes empresas há muito tempo no tempo colonial que criaram estas áreas de plantações, áreas que foram destroncadas há muito tempo” (Interview conducted by the author with a government official in Monapo district on June 13, 2014).

cxii “...os [investidores] que chegam aqui querem as antigas plantações. Aquelas antigas plantações, são grandes, e foram destroncadas para agricultura. Elas já estão livres. Mas quando nós [o governo] dizemos que... essa área está livre, e foram [apenas] pouco ocupadas. Olhando onde [as terras] estão ali, os investidores pensam que a área é pequena. Querem duas vezes mais. Não tenho a certeza que haverão alguns que têm coragem de destroncar [novos areas]...na realidade, aqui tem muita terra...mas investidores querem [areas] onde já esta a trabalhar pessoas, onde a população já
ocupou‖ (Interview conducted by the author with a government official in Malema district on June 13, 2014).

cxiii “A pesar da maioria dos produtores familiares não estarem conscientes sobre a situação actual, as suas práticas agrícolas correntes podem provocar uma destruição ambiental de grande magnitude...” (MASA, 2015, p. 2-4).

cxiv “O crescimento da população e da economia no Corredor de Nacala aumenta a pressão sobre os recursos naturais causando desmatamento, erosão e degradação dos solos....Assim, para alcançar o desenvolvimento sustentável nas zonas rurais, tornam-se importante a realização de intervenções que promovam a conservação do meio ambiente. Portanto, o Plano Director considera elementos para a mitigação dos impactos negativos no ambiente natural e seus recursos. Com base nesta premissa, o Plano Director promoverá intervenções com ênfase na conservação de recursos naturais, incluindo o desenvolvimento florestal em áreas vulneráveis, permitindo assim a protecção do meio ambiente‖ (MASA, 2015, p. 1-7).

cxv “Nós queremos o desenvolvimento...mas não queremos transplantar culturas agrícolas e técnicas tudo do Brasil. Queremos melhorar as nossas culturas locais. Queremos agricultura de conservação, queremos agroecologia e práticas sustentáveis para as comunidades locais. Queremos garantir a soberania alimentar. E soberania alimentar é para andar nas comunidades e consultar o que é que os produtores querem. Não um processo de extensão top-down, em que se decide o que se quer e vai se implantar, como se esses que estão aqui embaixo fossem meras máquinas de fazer acontecer as coisas‖ (Interview conducted by the author with a member of AENA on June 30, 2014).

cxvi “Nós estamos contra o desenvolvimento mas gostaríamos que fosse aos nossos expectativas. Nós [a sociedade moçambicana] temos uma obrigação. De tais maneiras que temos o direito de ir votar, temos também o direito de dizer o que nós pretendemos [para nosso país], como um povo moçambicano e soberano....O que nós estamos a fazer atualmente é tentar reformular a realidade, na nossa ótica. Portanto, gostaríamos que também pudéssemos ser considerados como quem está procurando contribuir para a uma formação de um Moçambique mais junto, mais solidária e mais justa‖ (Excerpt from a speech made by a leading member of UNAC at the Triangular People’s Conference, held in Maputo of July 27, 2014).

cxvii “…desde a independência até hoje, o nosso governo nunca teve uma estratégia de atendimento às comunidades. Tu já passastes pelas comunidades e vistes a pobreza que anda por aí. E a questão que se coloca é, do que tu viste, achas que no Brasil há alguém que esteja realmente interessado em virar aquela situação? ... Os japoneses e os brasileiros não têm tempo para modificar aquele aspecto estruturante da pobreza. Infelizmente. E ao não debater um desenvolvimento [para nosso povo] com a gente [a sociedade civil] que sabe a realidade moçambicana e que trabalha nas comunidades, nós fomos enganados...E esse esforço não vai ser feito por estrangeiros, porque vocês não têm tempo, porque andam pela racionalidade do tempo. O ProSAVANA está a dizer que “em 5 ou 10 anos vamos mudar a atitude de produção itinerante dos camponeses da região do Corredor de Nacala”, quando essa prática vem de uma historia longa. Precisamos de programas deliberados do governo de longo prazo, para inverter a situação da pobreza, porque é estrutural. Portanto, é preciso coragem da
parte do governo nacional moçambicano de entender aquela realidade e buscar as soluções aqui, soluções locais” (Interview conducted by author in Nampula with a member of PPOSC-N on June 24, 2014).

cxviii “...a nossa participação começou desde a altura da concepção do primeiro modelo das compras locais do PMA, que vinham com uma clareza de que não seria uma réplica de um modelo brasileiro de forma alguma, porque era preciso olhar para os contextos locais aqui, em Moçambique, e conceber uma proposta inicial. Como UNAC, nós sabemos que a participação nesse processo era importante não só no sentido de assegurar que este programa fosse bem implementado, mas mais na perspectiva de que este programa sirva de incentivo para que surja algo maior. E por isso que nós, UNAC, temos participado do PAA África” (Interview conducted by the author with UNAC on September 5, 2014).

cxix “...a ideia da sociedade civil é pegar este exemplo [do PAA] que podia servir para advocacia de um modelo alternativo, um modelo camponês, que sirva de resistência ao modelo do agronegócio hegemônico, mas também que podia servir como uma influência dentro do governo moçambicano, para que nasça um programa desse de dimensão nacional e com recursos públicos nacionais” (Interview conducted by the author with UNAC on September 5, 2014).

cxx “O PAA proporciona um desenvolvimento nas nossas comunidades porque ajuda a produzir uma maior quantidade de alimentos que serve para nossa própria família, mas também para as áreas regionais” (Comment made by a member of association Titokule Ulimi in an interview conducted by the author on July 9, 2014 in Ulongué, Angónia).

cxxi “Agora, o que nós queremos é apoio para que este programa continue de modo a estimular mais a nossa agricultura” (Comment made by a member of Hamba-Hamba association in an interview conducted by the author on July 10, 2014 in Ulongué, Angónia).

cxxii “...[a sociedade civil] apela-se [o governo de Moçambique] também à tomada da experiência do PAA África...como uma política pública nacional. Nós já vemos uma avalanche de euforia, um ânimo quando falamos do ProSAVANA, mas infelizmente nunca vi a mesma dimensão de ânimo quando falamos do PAA África...‖ (Excerpt from a speech made by a leading member of UNAC at the Triangular People’s Conference, held in Maputo of July 27, 2014).

cxxiii “...também é clara a diferenciação [entre o PAA e ProSAVANA] no sentido de que os modelos que são colocados e seus pressupostos são claramente diferenciados. Por um lado, temos um pressuposto de integração, mas dentro de uma lógica da agricultura camponesa, um processo endógena de construção de baixo pra cima e um processo de alto crescimento e alto desenvolvimento, que é do lado do PAA. Por outro lado, temos o ProSAVANA que...prevê a integração do camponês numa cadeia global do agronegócio para produção de commodities como soja e algodão etc. Mas é preciso ressaltar o que camponês estamos a referir [com o ProSAVANA]. Está um agricultor
emergente...que se integra dentro de uma cadeia global do agronegócio e dentro de investimentos de grande escala das empresas estrangeiras” (Interview conducted by the author with UNAC on September 5, 2014).

“A grande limitação que existe com o PAA África...não é que é apenas um projeto-piloto...mas que é apenas um projeto-piloto que não tem um “ownership” ou uma aprovação dentro do próprio governo moçambicano, no sentido de que não é uma prioridade [para o governo]. Por isso, o PAA acabou ficando sediado no FAO e PMA com somente uma participação residual do governo....É preciso também clarificar o contexto. No contexto brasileiro você tem uma política muito mais ampla, que é o PAA dentro de uma estratégia global, do Brasil Sem Miséria, mas aqui em Moçambique você tem o programa ProSAVANA que se enquadra como uma política pública ao nível nacional enquanto o PAA é um projeto, que é algo pontual, de curto prazo. De tal forma que o PAA tem recursos para apenas 18 meses e a qualquer momento pode parar, se não conseguir os recursos para os meses restantes.” (Interview conducted by the author with UNAC on September 5, 2014).

“É preciso esclarecer que o PAA África não é necessariamente um modelo de desenvolvimento agrícola endógeno....E é preciso também lembrar que o PAA África, aqui em Moçambique, não existe como um modelo em si mesmo. Existe um conjunto de presupostos, que participa da realidade brasileira, que se pretende construir um modelo do Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos em Moçambique....O que podemos dizer é que estamos num processo de construção, de concepção de um modelo, inspirado numa realidade brasileira que tem funcionado no sentido que o PAA tem melhorado as vidas dos camponeses no Brasil. Agora estamos tentando perceber, no contexto moçambicano, como podemos construir um modelo próprio do Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos. Porque não é o [povo] brasileiro que tem que trazer dinheiro para alimentar as crianças moçambicanas, é o governo moçambicano que tem dessa responsabilidade....Por isso estamos envolvidos nesse programa, na esperança de que a partir dessa experiência brasileira, nós [a sociedade moçambicana] possamos nos inspirar para criar um programa próprio, de dimensão nacional que de fato seja ajudado a nível governamental e seja uma das contribuições na construção dum modelo alternativo de desenvolvimento da agricultura” (Interview conducted by the author with UNAC on September 5, 2014).