“Social Movement Self-Governance: The Contentious Nature of the Alternative Service Provision by Brazil's Landless Workers Movement.”

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My mother always told me that this dissertation was my baby. She said that writing it was, in a sense, like creating life. When I reflect on her words, I also think that my time as a graduate student contains the elements of a life-cycle. In my first year, when
my close friend Andy Dickinson died, I lost a confidant, colleague, and companion. My grandfather also passed away only one month before completing this project. As death and life are inextricably connected, my daughter – Lisa Yatzil Betty Pahnke-Rojas – was born only last year. Her mother, the inspiring, courageous, and beautiful Marlene Rojas-Lara, is among the most important women in my life. I have had the privilege of being raised and surrounded by strong, independent women. Marlene shares these qualities, and together, we will raise our daughter with them as well. The birth of my daughter and the beginning of my family mark the end of my dissertation. I thank them for dealing with me while I was finishing it.
To my Grandparents Robert and Betty Wellnitz,
who taught me the true
value of agriculture
Abstract

This puzzle is at the core of my dissertation: the coexistence of movements demanding change and establishing a form of order. Contemporary scholars do not include “governance” in the definition of what social movements do, as they consensually define social movements and contentious politics as non-state actors engaging in activities that challenge existing forms of economic, political, and/or cultural order (McAdam: 1988; 1996; Tarrow: 1998; Aminzade, et al: 2001; McAdam, et al: 2001). These studies focus on how opportunity structures are relatively "open" or "closed," but cannot tell us the ways movements develop when they see an opening, nor the sorts of organizational or institutional forms a movement adopts upon pursuing an opening. They also, typically, focus on movements such as the U.S. Civil Rights Movement or Environmental Movement that sought inclusion for previously marginalized communities into the exercise of formal, official power relations. Discussions of social movement-led counter-orders and service administration would explain these developments as part of a revolutionary situation, dual power, or breakdown of state authority (Tilly: 1977; Sirianni: 1983). Yet movements that govern are not revolutionary, because they seek recognition by state authority in their right to administer services like education and security, normally the prerogative of their governments, but as they see fit. I demonstrate this new form of social movement resistance – what I call self-governmental – through a case study of the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra (Brazilian Landless Workers Movement or MST) and their variable success in governing agrarian reform, educational, and economic policy. Besides postulating this alternative mode of resistance, I develop a new social movement theory to explain successful mobilization and institutionalization that is rooted in the concept of strategy.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Horseback Riding and Health Care

My leg was cut open in the Brazilian countryside. I was horseback riding in the agreste region of Pernambuco state, led by two members of the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (Landless Workers Movement or MST) who were showing me the entirety of the ranch they had occupied just two months before I arrived. While navigating a steep, rocky incline on my not-so-trusty-steed, I managed to scrape up against a brush-covered, barb-wire fence that was hidden from view. I pulled the weight of the horse away from the fence to see blood running down my leg. Fear set in. I looked up, not greeted by worried looks, but by laughs from my MST escorts. Pointing at my leg and smiling, they joked, “oxi, agora você tem uma lembrança! (Oh man, looks like you got a souvenir)! I laughed along with them, trying to show that I was not scared.

I was in the middle of nowhere and miles away from any kind of city. Where were the doctors, hospitals, and medicine? What would I do if my leg got infected?

After the ride, I went to one movement member’s tent in the “acampamento (encampment).” This encampment was like a dozen others I had visited, and lived in, during my two years of fieldwork in Brazil. The smell of cooking beans and meat floated between the hundred or so black tarp tents lumped together in an area no larger than a football field. A few mangy horses and run-down cars moved women, children, and men to work, movement meetings, and church. A red MST flag – not the Brazilian – flew above everything. In addition to its color, its imagery of a working man and woman served as a reminder of the movement’s socialist identity. Below the flag, people moved
with determination, in spite of the mud that made walking difficult. Some were on their way to harvest, while others were organizing other land occupations at different sites. One “brigade” – a term used by the MST to denote a certain kind of group - of members was leaving to repair buildings at a movement-run school. Some members were attending classes to learn about the movement's history. At night, people told stories, played music, and drank. The hustle and bustle made me think of Tocqueville's description of township life in *Democracy in America*, with the MST version fueled by Marxism, samba, and cachaça.

The political significance of the encampment is hard to capture. Juridically, the encampment exists in a kind of “limbo.” According to the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 and the Estatuo da Terra (Rural Land Statute) that inaugurated official Brazilian agrarian reform policy in 1964, land not serving a “social function”¹ can be expropriated by the government for redistribution. Despite this legal backing, only 67 cases of de jure redistribution took place between 1964 and 1985 (INCRA: 2010). Because of the virtual non-existence of agrarian reform pre-1985, yet the existence of the legal mechanism sanctioning it, the MST considers land occupations a means to do what the government won't. In occupations of hundreds, sometimes thousands, of people organized by the MST, the movement targets the land of large ranchers, farmers, companies, and sometimes even the government. The movement claims that the landowner is breaking the law. The encampment that follows the occupation functions as a means to re-appropriate land and indicate what the government ought to expropriate. In this movement-led “agrarian

¹ I discuss the political and environmental conditions of social function further in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
reform from below,” hundreds of squatters build a community from scratch, fearful of police and landowner evictions, while they wait de jure recognition.

A strict juridical understanding of the encampment, despite giving us a formal, governmental view of agrarian reform, misses the organizational and deeper political complexity of the relationships that the MST engenders in areas destined for agrarian reform. For example, as I was sitting in the tent after my horseback riding adventure, a woman entered and brought me ointment, iodine, and bandages. She was a member of the “setor de saúde (health sector),” who in addition to bringing the medical items, checked on me over the next couple days. A week later, while I was visiting a movement-run training school for early childhood educators, I met someone else who was also a member of the movement's health care sector, not of any particular encampment, but nationally. I was surprised by what she told me: she said that on every encampment there is either a single person or a team in charge of treating people who have accidents or helping find medical attention if required, that the movement works in partnership with Brazilian and Cuban universities to train members to become doctors, and that special courses at various movement-run schools teach people how to use traditional herbs and medicines in opposition to corporate, for-profit health care.

What had seemed at first to be chance on-the-spot care for my wound was actually part of *regularized* activity. The care I received was not only standard, but also characteristic of movement practices on the local, regional, and national levels. The movement, for lack of a better description, was “taking” a service that is typically provided by government. In “taking” it, they also delivered the service. But in delivery,
they alter how it was administered in terms of content and methods of provision. I was beginning to see a pattern: the ways the movement provided health care was much the same as how they conducted land occupations and formed encampments. It was as if the movement occupied land and health care. Or rather, in both health care and agrarian reform, the movement challenged standard practices that dictated the design and implementation of service provision.

The MST receives the most recognition for their land occupations. Images of these actions fill the pages of Sebastião Salgado's 1997 book *Terra* and have inspired scores of ally groups (known as the Friends of the MST) throughout Europe and the United States. Besides this trademark tactic and their immense size – present in 24 of Brazil's 26 states and claiming one million and a half adherents – the MST's struggle for agrarian reform includes more than land redistribution to encompass the implementation of an alternative educational program, development of a peasant-centered approach to health care, and promotion of communal and/or peasant agricultural production techniques.

This dissertation analyzes land occupations and agrarian reform, yet it also broadens how we understand social movement resistance in ways other than coordinating demand-making practices to government. I argue that the MST showcases a kind of social movement resistance – what I call self-governmental – that has neither been previously described nor explained. In this dissertation, I analyze the nature of self-governmental resistance, through a case study of the MST, and explain how it successfully develops. I explain, evaluate, and interpret this form of resistance in what I
call “policy areas.” Throughout this dissertation, I use “policy” and “policy area” interchangeably. When I analyze policy areas, I am referring to the de facto practices, ideas, and laws involving the delivery of a service that is typically considered the prerogative of government. I compare movement efforts in policy areas where I find different levels of success – agrarian reform, education, and agricultural production – in order to understand how the MST has developed.

I believe that the focus on land occupations, while central to the movement's activities, has diverted attention from what the MST teaches us about social movement resistance in general. In English, Ondetti’s *Land, Protest, and Politics: The Landless Movement and the Struggle for Agrarian Reform in Brazil* (2009), is the first social scientific analysis of the movement, followed by Wolford's *This Land Is Ours Now: Social Mobilization and the Meanings of Land in Brazil* (2010). Both, despite the chasm that divides them methodologically, focus on land occupations and territory. Two other descriptive accounts, Wolford and Wright's *To Inherit the Earth: The Landless Movement and the Struggle for a New Brazil* (2003) and Branford and Rocha's *Cutting the Wire: The Story of the Landless Movement in Brazil* (2002), document the history of the MST since its late 1970s inception. Fernandes' work in Portuguese, *A Formação do MST no Brasil* (The Formation of the MST in Brazil (2000)), is likewise a necessary staple in the movement literature, especially for geographers. Multiple other studies and theses, mostly in Portuguese, document movement practices in particular settlements and encampments, as well as efforts in education, cooperative formation, and health care.

What has eluded these studies is a conceptual focus on the nature of the MST's resistance
and the evaluation of their success. My dissertation fills these gaps in the literature.

I intend for the conclusions and concepts generated from my case study of the MST to be applicable to cases in other countries throughout Latin America. From the Zapatistas in southern Mexico to the Piqueteros in Argentina, different social movements on the continent show forms of resistance that require new conceptual frameworks. Like the MST, they contest the design and implementation of services, such as health care and education, which we normally associate with government. They also contest – in demands, as well as in practice – the institution of private property by occupying land and creating collectively-owned and administered cooperatives.

Self-governmental resistance, with the MST as the most illustrative but not the only case, is more than street protests, marches, and organizations. It includes alternative rules and procedures, or rather, modes of conduct. It is the consistent, coordinated resistance to state power – whose precise definition I explain later in this chapter and more in the next – and private property. Self-governmental contention neither showcases a mode of resistance that is geared towards occupying, or replacing, a government, nor a form rooted in seeking inclusion within already-existing structures. Self-governmental resistance divides state power through vying for control of different policy areas normally the prerogative of government. My focus on this new form of contention, in its organized, collective, and sustained challenge to state power and private property, makes us rethink

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2 I say institutions rather than organizations to differentiate myself from other social movement theorists, such as John Lofland, who conceives of organizations as offices, or rather, as the places where you find movement staff answering telephones and doing paperwork (1996). Institutions, for me, do not have this sense of concrete place, but rather include offices, as well as the movement’s rules and ideas they encourage their members to adopt.
the meaning of resistance and the typical roles assigned to movements in “civil society.” My case study of the MST shows us how this is done.

1.1 What's the MST?

When I try to think of a concept that captures my experience with MST health care, I keep coming back to the same notion: governance. It seems as if the movement has adopted certain order and stability-providing functions, mainly for the collective benefit of their own members. Concerning health care, the movement's work with Cuba is regular, as is their emphasis on the use of traditional herbs and medicines, group-managed mode of administration, and demands for further government resources. The encampment, likewise, is a system of well-conceived administration, order, and discipline that exists in the effort to practice a movement-centered version of agrarian reform. Health care and agrarian reform are by no means the only regularized, systematized, or rather, as I develop throughout this dissertation – institutionalized – services designed and implemented by the MST. Children attend schools, businesses are organized, and security is provided – not by state authorities who we would expect to provide these services, but by a social movement.

Order, stability, institutionalization – these are words we normally do not associate with social movements. I mean, governance is the last thing typically considered integral to social movement action. Living in the United States, the idea of a social movement conjures up images of the Civil Rights Movement demanding integration and equality in disruptive activities like marches and sit-ins. Similarly, for
those who live in former Soviet states, one may think of mass demonstrations against
one-party states in the late eighties. People in Latin America probably associate
movement action to mass protests during the transition from authoritarian rule. Such
typical cases of social movement resistance feature mass, collective, and *disruptive* action.
Just as important, we are told that movements are found in “civil society,” normally
conceived of as organizations “between” family and government, without profit-making
or criminal aspirations. This negative definition of civil society exclusively assigns social
movements the role of “demand-makers” – not “demand-implementers.” It also lumps
together “state” and “government” as two potential sites for governance, or rather, order-
providing activities. Such an understanding of movements does not include governance
within their standard practices.

By providing services, the MST forces us to ask two questions: (1) are they a
social movement? and (2) what is the nature of their relationship to the government *and*
the state? At first, I thought they took on service provision because the Brazilian
government could not deliver. This makes sense: MST actions take place in
predominately rural areas where state authority is often thought to exist precariously. The
group also arose during the late 1970s when the then-military government was breaking
down and losing control. In this understanding, the MST would not be a movement, but
something like a mutual-benefit society, like the Amish in North America.

The problem with this portrayal is that the MST challenges the Brazilian
government over *who* has authority concerning service provision and *how* it is exercised.
For example, conflict between the government and the movement has developed
concerning the administration and execution of agrarian reform policy, e.g. how to expropriate land and which land to redistribute. Land occupations trigger reactions from the police, judges, and bureaucrats in various ministries. Far from existing “outside the state,” the MST's form of resistance touches precisely on policy areas that are the concern of government. Educational struggles, likewise, have continued through the present day. As recently as 2010, the Ministerio Público (Public Ministry, a governmental institution that is something like the “Public Defender”) in Rio Grande do Sul shut movement schools for supposedly endangering children.³ Regular conflicts show continued and collective resistance, qualities incompatible with mutual-benefit societies and religious groups.

These dynamics also rule out other rival, non-social movement conceptions for the MST. For instance, they are not a political party (they never run candidates in elections), a proto-state (they have never laid claim to exclusive authority over land), or a business (they do not prioritize profit-making). And while the MST coordinates protests and marches – typical of social movements around the globe – it is their organized contention concerning certain policy areas that shows what I find to be a new form of social movement resistance. The MST is a social movement. What is different is their mode of contention.

Comparing the trajectory of different social movement leaders and their plans with the MST accentuates their different styles of resistance. Various Civil Rights Movement leaders, e.g. Jesse Jackson Sr or John Lewis, after years of coordinating

³ In 2012, the decision was overturned and movement education in certain schools was allowed to continue.
protests and marches, entered government. They became included in the exercise of state power through joining political parties and organizing voters, not activists. In “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” for example, Martin Luther King Jr. references the importance of direct-action, not for seizing governmental institutions to refashion society, but for “integration.” Sit-ins, after all, did not seek to occupy state power or destroy private property, but to ensure the equal participation of African-Americans within existing social, political, and economic structures in the United States. Literally and figuratively, the movement sought a place “at the counter” for people who had been previously excluded. From their leader's trajectory to the nature of sit-ins and marches, we can see that the U.S. Civil Rights Movement sought reform of dominant, status quo social, political, and economic structures.

In a different fashion, leaders of other kinds of movements that we can catalogue as revolutionary remained mostly outside the exercise of formal government until taking or occupying power. While it is true that the Bolsheviks ran candidates in elections, this was not the end of the movement. Lenin's own writings on dual power\(^5\) show a strategic orientation intended to replace already-existing governmental authority in its entirety. Likewise, Castro remained outside of government until the movement he led, the July 26th Movement, took state power and assumed control of government in its entirety. Castro's plans were apparent – not in terms of ideology, but with respect to state power and private property – when one full year before taking power, revolutionary forces

issued “Ley No. 3 sobre Derecho de los Campesinos a la Tierra (Law Number 3 over the Peasant Right to Land),” which established guidelines for all of Cuba's peasants and land (Pino Santos: 1999). Both the Bolsheviks, the July 26th Movement, as well as other revolutionary movements such as Nicaragua's Sandinistas, planned to take state power, as is evident in their strategic plans. Their movements would develop external to existing governments, seek to occupy state power, and dismantle private property.

The MST, since the movement's inception in the late 1970s, has followed a different path. First, their leaders have not chosen to participate within government in the same way as movements like the U.S. Civil Rights Movement. With the exception of a few politicians from Rio Grande do Sul – the late Adão Pretto and the current Dionilso Marcon – most movement leaders and activists work outside government. João Pedro Stédile, has been central to the movement's direção nacional, (national directorate), since the movement's origins, and has never held any kind of political office. Countless other regional and state-level leaders have spent decades with no political party affiliation and outside of formal government, focusing on MST plans and projects. I met many of them, whose names can be found in movement documents on cooperatives, strategy, education, etc., that were published in the 1980s and 1990s. They have spent their time developing movement practices, strategies, and identity. There are essentially no signs that the

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6 It is also worth noting that Rio Grande do Sul seems a little exceptional with respect to movement members becoming involved in government, not only nationally, but also locally. In the municipality of Pontão, for example, the mayor and city council people are all movement members. This municipality, however, does not show a trend. In fact, Pontão is the only municipality that was established due to the creation of agrarian reform settlements, which led to a population increase in the area in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The vast majority of the people in this area are MST.
movement's leadership or members have aspirations to gain formal political power through the ballot box.

So, is the MST a revolutionary movement? The seemingly exclusive nature of the MST's leadership and membership would seem to indicate a grand design to take state power. At a quick glance, this seems like a valid claim. Any visit to a movement encampment or settlement, or conversation with leadership, quickly reveals how Marxism-Leninism is the guiding philosophy. Small movement-led groups that administer health care, education, or security in encampments, also, often take revolutionary movement leader's names like Lenin and Che Guevara for identification.

While doing my fieldwork, I became aware of the late Marxist revolutionary leader, Carlos Marighella, who advocated armed urban guerrilla struggle in Brazil and who died trying it in 1969. I first learned about Marighella during visits to MST-run schools, where students in the morning often would sing the movement's hymn and then conduct their “mística” (a kind of prayer or ritual that typically begins movement activities and features an event or historical figure deemed important to the movement). And it was Marighella, the martyr-revolutionary, and not then-President Lula, who was the periodic subject of student homage in various “mística.” If Leninism and homage to revolutionary leaders are sufficient, then the MST shows strong signs of revolutionary movement activity.

Unfortunately for the sake of coming to a quick and easy definition, the MST is not revolutionary. First, there is no armed struggle. I do not think that revolutionary struggles necessarily feature the use of weapons in their resistance efforts, yet twentieth century revolutionary movements – including Castro's July 26th Movement, the
Bolsheviks, Nicaragua's Sandanistas, and the failed attempt of Peru's Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) – all involved armed contention as a central tactic. The MST, however, has no weapons. I lived for months in various MST encampments and settlements, across the country, and never came across a gun (except a few for hunting). I heard stories of gun fights, but due to petty disputes between members. Organized armed contention is a tactic that draws stark divisions between movement and government. The regular and coordinated brandishing of the means to end life is an extreme existential marker delimiting membership. The MST does not perform its form of resistance in this way. Additionally, its degree of interaction with the Brazilian government, as I will discuss later, is a central element of the movement's strategy. In fact, the movement has integral plans to use resources and seek official recognition. Thus, the absence of weapons and the objective of using government indicate a kind of movement that resists in ways other than those exhibited by revolutionary struggles.

If revolutionary movements strive to establish dual power for taking state power, and reform movements seek inclusion and integration, then the MST represents a form of struggle that *divides and separates* state power and abolishes private property. The administration of education, in both encampments and settlements, shows a form of resistance over *how* education is provided. The movement claims control over pedagogical content, as well as *who* teaches the students. MST health care similarly lays claim to this particular service, coordinating a challenge to *how* provision takes place and *who* delivers it. Likewise, the movement's mass land occupations directly challenge both land tenure and who has the authority to redistribute land. Occupations are a bottom-up,
grassroots version of conducting agrarian reform policy in terms of how to indicate the land that ought to be expropriated. Agrarian reform, regardless of country, involves the re-appropriation of land and the alteration of labor relations concerning food production and/or raw material extraction. Despite the Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária's (National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform or INCRA) history of local-level involvement, state-led agrarian reform consistently privileges expert knowledge and private property. The MST, in conducting land occupations and promoting communal land ownership patterns, redefines what agrarian reform is by contesting how agrarian reform is conducted and by whom.

The MST does not aim to take state power by occupying government, as revolutionary movements attempt, but by dividing it. Despite this crucial difference, many observers get it wrong. One of my interviews with Gilberto Thums, who at the time led the charge in Rio Grande do Sul's Public Ministry to close schools under movement direction, swore that the MST was planning guerrilla warfare “similar to what happened in Vietnam” (Interview, Porto Alegre-RS, 3-15-2011). Likewise, the Brazilian center-right periodical, Veja, published a report on the movement's schools, equating their pedagogical content to Fundamentalist Islamic “Madrassas.” Similar suspicions led the United States Consulate to investigate the movement on numerous occasions, which became known through a Wikileaks report while I was doing my field research. From

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8 See http://wikileaks.org/Brazil-Cablegate-how-the-US-sees.html and http://www.snh2011.anpuh.org/resources/anais/14/1296843706_ARQUIVO_WELCH WikileaksImprensaMstMim2010_ANPUH2011.pdf. I was told by individuals who in the past were frequently interviewed by the consulate that U.S. representatives want to
my observations, the nature of MST resistance challenges such naïve classifications.

MST resistance also calls our attention to the need to analytically separate government from state in social movement theory. From any introductory Political Science textbook, we know that state and government are not the same, despite common usage. Governments are the actual institutions, or units, that exercise state power – often claiming sovereignty – while the state is an “abstraction.” I discuss and explore the nature of this abstraction more in the next chapter. For our purposes here, I use James Scott’s understanding from Seeing Like a State (1998). Specifically, I understand this abstraction we call “the state” as a collection of different power relations. I include within this collection the centralization of decision-making authority, homogenization of culture, and subordination of social actors to governmental elites. The state is power, or rather, an array of different kinds of power that has emerged historically. Through these powers, governments and their institutions dictate the terms of policy. In this dissertation, I am not concerned with the historical patterns of state formation, or with the question of whether certain states have developed differently. Instead, my study focuses on how different contemporary movements like the MST call our attention to a new form of contesting state power. They also organize their resistance through opposing the institution of private property, which many Latin American governments – with the exception of Cuba – also defend, promote, and institutionalize.

Theorists tend to equate state power with government, and in the process, blind us to manifestations of social movement resistance other than marches and protests.

know if the MST is “planning another Cuba.”
Government is not considered the executor of certain powers, but rather an “entity,” or thing that social actors confront. Recent efforts to breakdown this “black box” emphasize how social processes and relations crisscross “public” and “private” (Keck and Abers: 2009; Keck and Hochstetler: 2007). Despite such scholarly interventions, persistent references to the “public sphere,” “public goods,” and “society,” constantly re-inscribe common conceptions of state/society hierarchies, roles, and relations because there is no discussion of power. The simple use of “public” implies assumptions about government, with certain roles and relationships reserved for “social” actors. Rather than presuming these qualities of government, we need to see how they are constituted. I locate their constitution not only in how they relate with non-governmental actors, but just as importantly, in how they are challenged by coordinated social movement resistance.

The MST does not allow us to confuse state with government. Both revolutionary and reform movements, however, allow us to conflate them. Revolutionary movements trouble the distinction between state and government by establishing parallel governmental organizations with the potential to organize social, political, and economic relationships in ways that defy the constitutive elements of state power. Worker councils in the early days of the Soviet Union, for example, decentralized authority by including people into executive decision-making roles and opening governance to democratic deliberation.9 Despite these practices, the kind of governance first seen in dual power contained designs to embrace centralization, homogenization, and the subordination of

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non-governmental actors, often by a single political party.

Self-governmental resistance divides state power. By defying separate institutions and their control over specific services – education, agrarian reform, health care, etc. – the nature of MST resistance neither simply improves the delivery of a service through including previously excluded people (reform movements), nor replaces one government with another to harness state power in its entirety (revolutionary movements).

Governments and state power are opposed differently in reform and revolutionary struggle, yet the state emerges unchallenged in both. In fact, both revolutionary and reform movements actually reproduce state power rather than oppose it. Movements like the MST claim certain policy areas in their coordinated challenges, splintering institutions where state authority is exercised. Their coordinated challenge of state authority in distinct policy areas denies how state power homogenizes identification, centralizes authority, and subordinates social actors. How this takes place in different policy areas is the subject of each of this dissertation's subsequent chapters.

State power, as exercised by government, finds opposition in movements vying for control over the design and implementation of certain policies. Authority in separate policy areas – e.g. education, health care, security, land reform – and not the government in its entirety are the sites of movement contention. MST resistance does not intend to manage all of Brazilian society, or even the practices of all participants within a certain policy area. In this sense, the movement divides state power. In self-governmental resistance, movements provide order for their members in the delivery of a certain service in accordance with their identity and culture. The movement promotes in each service an
alternative mode of identification – its “self” – over the form promoted by government, establishing a barrier between it and singular, often national, ways of identification. The MST reveals a social movement that does not fit either of the kinds of movements previously documented, reform or revolutionary. Rather, the way that the movement engages in resistance shows the development of a new mode of social movement contention. This dissertation focuses on further developing the nature of this new mode of resistance, explaining how it has developed, and evaluating its success.

The last thirty years have also seen the development of a series of social movements in Latin America with qualities similar to those revealed by the MST. In Mexico, the EZLN (the Zapatistas or the Zapatista Army of National Liberation) has jails where movement dissidents are kept if they break movement-created rules, rather than those established by government. Such movement-centered attempts at security are often in accordance with local, indigenous norms. While this is a way of providing order, jails also constitute a form of defiance by challenging state-promoted identities and culture. Other movements, such as CONAIE (Confederation of Indigenous Identities of Ecuador), contain member organizations that use state agencies to implement movement-administered bilingual education curricula in indigenous-run schools. Like the MST's practices in education and agricultural production, CONAIE resistance institutionalizes contention over whom and how policy areas are governed. Additionally, the Rondas Campesinas adjudicate conflicts and mediate punishment through their own courts in the Peruvian countryside, posing an alternative mode of administering justice.

These movements, like their respective governments, provide security, health care,
and education. What makes them different is the way they design and implement these services. MST schools for high school age members have classes ranging from how to start medicinal herb gardens to seminars on historical materialism. Students learn how to care for their crops and how they are members of a common socio-economic class in opposition to large landowners and multinational corporations such as Monsanto. EZLN autonomous schools and CONAIE bilingual education teach students about the centuries of oppression that indigenous people have faced, the prior struggles led by individuals such as Emilio Zapata, and their rights. Educational contention, as these movements show, is over who and how the service is designed and implemented. None of these movements seek to implement their educational vision over all people within their respective countries.

Movements, such as those in the Andes, as well as the MST, have neither established dual bases of power, nor sought inclusion into already-existing governmental relations. The form of their resistance is different. Instead of taking state power in its entirety, self-governmental resistance divides state power through challenging governments over the design and control of various – and separate – policies. While challenging state power, they also contest private property. In their opposition to

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10 It is also worth mentioning that people can leave these movements, despite disciplinary mechanisms. For example, various Zapatista villages left the movement after the 1995 decision not to accept any state resources, only to return years later after having benefited from state agricultural subsidies. MST members that do not agree with tactics such as camping on the sides of roads after they have been evicted from land they attempted to occupy, either develop other landless movements such as the MLST (Movimento de Libertação dos Sem Terra), ally with labor unions seeking agrarian reform, or go back to living on large farms or in cities. The point is that there are always exit options for members.
individual proprietorship, they contest the manner that resources are distributed, administered, and regulated. This makes their form of resistance akin to revolutionary movements. Their approach to state power, however, makes them different. This dissertation takes the phenomena of self-governmental resistance, and through a case study of the MST, deepens our understanding of its dynamics, development, and causes.

1.2 Revised Concepts: Institutionalization and Strategy

During my fieldwork, I became intrigued by the MST's organization. Gaining access, for example, presented various obstacles. Early meetings with movement leaders, at least from my perspective, seemed more like interviews – of me – to find if I really was a PhD student and not a spy. And once “on site” with the movement, a selected leader usually ensured that I was doing my stated objective. Surveillance did not entail control over my research, as various members spoke frankly with me about movement weaknesses and problems. Regardless, from their central offices in São Paulo to remote settlements in Amazonian state of Pará, internal networks of movement activists and leaders both helped me find the people I needed to interview and locate settlements, encampments, schools, and cooperatives. On the one hand, I felt like I was under constant watch. On the other hand, without this organization, I would not have been able to locate the places and people I needed for my project.

How I gained access shows a well-organized movement. It also reveals an internal structure, with certain established rules, procedures, and practices. As I came to find out, it also characterizes the MST's efforts to govern separate policy areas. In the three policy
areas I select and analyze in this dissertation's subsequent chapters – agrarian reform, education, and agricultural production, – I locate such movement-centered rules and practices that simultaneously stabilize an alternative, movement-centered form of order while disrupting the status quo, dominant economic, political, and cultural versions. These regularized, organized, and systematized ways, or rules and practices, comprise the outcome, or dependent variable, that I explain over the course of this dissertation. They reveal, what I call, the movement's institutionalization of contention. The institutionalization of self-governmental resistance is distinct from reform and revolutionary contention, yet the same in so far as all movements regularize and stabilize the ways they challenge dominant, status quo social, political, and/or economic structures.

The concept of institutionalization in the field of social movement studies has previously been under-explored. Tarrow, as I elaborate in Chapter 2, sees the unfolding of social movement resistance as “paradoxical” because destabilizing activities require some sense of stability. The actions around confronting the paradox is described by others in the academic literature as professionalization (Staggenborg: 1988) or deradicalization (Piven and Cloward: 1979), but it is Tarrow who initially introduces the notion of institutionalization (Tarrow: 1998). Institutionalization, in other studies, is synonymous with a decline in coordinated collective action (Kriesi, et al: 1995). Most understandings of institutionalization contain the assumption that in stabilizing their challenge to authorities, movements, in the process, demobilize. I agree that actions become regularized and standardized, but I do not necessarily believe that resistance stops as regularized activity increases. Revolutionary struggles, specifically, show a
pattern of systematization that does not always lead to domestication. In fact, existing studies that link demobilization with the regularization of contention actually focus almost exclusively on reform movements. Regardless of how contention declines among movements that engage in reform-style contention, they also show regular, systematized rules and practices that coordinate their challenges to status quo, dominant powers. Thus, all forms of social movement resistance institutionalize contention. The ways they do so, however, vary between reform, revolutionary, and also, as I elaborate throughout this dissertation, self-governmental collective action.

While the majority of this dissertation is concerned with the dynamics of how self-governmental resistance institutionalizes, I devote the last chapter to a study of reform and revolutionary movement institutionalization. In-depth studies of each, respectively, will have to wait a book-length treatment of the subject. This dissertation is almost exclusively dedicated to exploring the institutionalization of self-governmental resistance because of the novelty of the concept. How movements compare in terms of their different modes of institutionalization is broached, but not fully explored, in the conclusion.

My reason for evoking the language of institutionalization in a study of resistance is meant to correct the overemphasis in the popular imagination and academic literature on the false dichotomy between resistance and order. In a certain way, my research speaks to an old question that has always plagued research on collective action. The name of one of the dominant political parties in Mexico – el Partido Revolucionario Institucional (the Institutional Revolutionary Party or PRI) – captures the contradictory
nature, as well as the strategic dilemma, that movements face when attempting to stabilize resistance. How, after all, is a revolution “institutionalized?” In Mexico, and many other countries like the former Soviet Union, a political party often resulted. For others, typically reform-style movements, they formed interest groups or individually sought political office. In Latin America today, however, social movements such as the MST remain movements while institutionalizing self-governmental resistance. In this sense, my focus on institutionalization is an attempt to answer an old question that is posed once again by new forms of contention.

The MST’s resistance also draws our attention to the need for a different causal account. The dominant school of social movement theory – Political Process Theory – and its major concept – Political Opportunity Structure – focus on protest cycle origins. The focus in this theory is on disruptive, demand-making actions, and their changes over time. Centering research on elite allies, general governmental attributes like facilitation or repression, and pre-existing social networks, these theorists attempt to explain the preconditions for coordinated resistance. There are many other works on social movements, including in-depth studies on culture and emotions, organizations, as well

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13 See Zald, Mayer N., and John D. McCarthy. "Social movement industries: Competition
as research on language or “frames.” Most of these studies reveal new concepts and themes to complement the formal, government-centered approach found in Political Process Theory.

One concept omitted from much research is strategy. Many existing studies poorly explore and apply it to social movement resistance. Jaspers (2006) and Maney, et al (2012) emphasize a focus on social context, time, culture, goals, emotions, dilemmas, symbols, and interactions. Rational choice theorists (Lichbach: 1995) and game theorists (Osborne: 2000; Binmore: 2007) avoid this wide ranging set of factors by focusing on individual actors and utility maximization. My approach attempts to forge a third, middle-way between the former studies' seemingly endless range of concepts and the rationalist's narrow reductionism. My intention is to provide a way to conceive of strategy that is rich and dense, while allowing for measurement and analysis.

My thinking concerning strategy originates from my experiences with the MST. Reading through movement documents with titles like “como se organizam os assentados (how to organize settlers),” and “o que escola queremos (what kind of school we want),” made me realize that the movement leadership spent decades formulating plans. They created documents intended, primarily, for other movement leaders and members to read and study. The documents show a concern over how to organize members, assign roles, and search out allies. An early document – “quem é quem na luta pela terra (who is who and cooperation among movement organizations.” (1979). Davis, Gerald F., ed. Social movements and organization theory. Cambridge University Press (2005).

in the struggle for land)” – elaborates on who are the subjects in the struggle for agrarian reform and what are their roles and attributes, as well as the reasons for the struggle. Within that document and others, tactics, objectives, plans, and identities are described and explored.

We can locate within these documents the central elements that constitute my understanding of strategy. I define strategy as a guiding plan that temporally and logically precedes all actions. The plan contains a movement's objectives and the ways to engage with targets and allies as well as the movement's own self-understanding or identity through which it inculcates the reasons for engaging in collective action. Strategy is about plans to mobilize people, ideas, and resources. Especially with respect to resources, it is only with an understanding of a movement's strategic orientation that we can discern the role that resources play in social movement contention. For example, land and credits are resources for the MST, not because of some kind of innate “resource-ness” they embody, but because of the identity the movement inculcates into its membership. People are taught that they are “landless workers” who deserve land and public policies. The way people see themselves and their targets are mobilized through the movement's work on creating, promoting, and teaching certain kinds of identity.

Personally, I find strategy interesting. But after obtaining various “cadernos (notebooks),” I was surprised to find discussions of the concept quite boring. Indeed, they read like cookbooks. Twenty pages of classroom organization and lesson planning on how to teach Portuguese, Math, Spanish, and other subjects is the opposite of flashy, dramatic land occupations. I came to realize, however, that the two are intricately
connected. Or rather, without a plan, there is no action. The dull intricacies of classroom planning also contained a very radical idea: that the movement could organize education itself. This is part of what I came to realize as the MST's larger direct-action strategy. Yet they do not limit their plans to their own decision-making and implementation objectives. They also, concerning how to access materials and ideas, create plans to use, or what I describe as instrumentalize, governmental actors and resources.

After surveying different strategic plans used by all three kinds of movements, I break social movement strategic action down into three subcategories: direct-action, mediated, and instrumental. I take standard uses of strategy, especially with respect to movement contention, as falling within one of these three broad camps. For example, I classify what some would call electoral strategies as mediated plans. Forming coalitions and alliances is illustrative of instrumentalization. Orchestrated efforts for taking state power are also one example of what I call direct-action strategic planning. The tactics that originate from these strategies is mutable and can change, above all because each of these three subcategories includes various modes of interacting with targets and allies.

What drives movements to change between general subcategories is largely outside the scope of this dissertation, even though I focus on some aspects of change with respect to the MST in the conclusion of each chapter and in the final chapter. Also, because my conceptualization is so encompassing, non-strategic action is next to impossible to conceive. For a movement to act without regard to identity or plans is tantamount to chaos, or spontaneity, which actually would lead us to conclude that what we are observing is not a movement. It is for this reason that I believe my theory of
strategy potentially applies to all forms of collective action. Given space and time constraints, I only focus on self-governmental resistance.

My intention is to provide a way to conceive of strategy that is rich and dense, while allowing for measurement and analysis. I prove over the course of this dissertation that the main causal explanation for self-governmental resistance is strategic planning. More than contextual factors such as elite allies and state capacity, the strength of strategic plans – which contain the elements of coherence, consistency, and preparation that I measure and take as my independent variables – explain both the kinds of institutionalized resistance we see and their levels of success. This dissertation's subsequent chapters are dedicated to exploring how strategic planning, more than other explanations, leads to successful self-governmental contention. My theory concerning strategy, furthermore, potentially applies to all kinds of movements. An application of my theory of strategy to the other modes of institutionalizing resistance – reform and revolutionary – is the concern of the dissertation's conclusion, where I dissect strategy's explanatory potential with respect to movements such as the Zapatistas, the Sandinistas, and recent indigenous mobilizations in Ecuador and Bolivia.

My study of the MST shows how their particular strategic combination – direct-action and instrumentalization – is new. In fact, as I show in each chapter, this has been learned by the movement's leaders who perceived weaknesses, failures, and successes in past movements. In the case of the MST, movement leaders researched and interviewed leaders of prior agrarian reform movements (Stédile and Fernandes: 1999). This means that strategy is situated in a historical context that changes over time. It also means that
what explains the specificity of these struggles to Latin America is not neoliberal adjustment or state strength – contextual factors – but rather historically contingent strategic plans. In this dissertation, I prove how strategic planning – specifically for the MST, a combination of direct-action and instrumental plans – led to different levels of self-governmental resistance. Tilly's discussion of the modular nature of collective action that focuses on how the knowledge of tactics such as sit-ins and strikes can travel from country to country, or movement to movement, shows the transferable nature of tactics, but not strategy (2004). Strategy, especially because it involves identities and ways of engaging targets that previous actors also confronted, e.g. large landowners or government, is far more grounded in country and/or region-specific contexts. After all, the U.S. Civil Rights Movement does not carry nearly the same weight for the MST as do the Peasant Leagues or the Cuban Revolution.

While all theorists recognize that social movements are not riots or mobs, specifically because they are not “spontaneous,” they do not tell us much concerning how to think about social movement resistance that is “non-spontaneous.” I chose the concept of institutionalization because a social movement's resistance creates sets of rules, procedures, and modes of identification, which extend beyond any particular organization or protest. It is the nature of strategy and its strength that causes movement success in institutionalization because action requires planning. If movements are in fact coordinated, and persistent, they demand well-formulated plans of action. This is the rationale for my use of institutionalization and strategy in this dissertation.
1.3 My Case Study Approach

I adopt the case study approach throughout this dissertation, as well as qualitative methodology, given the thick concepts and new practices of resistance I explore. My project deals with concepts that Political Science as a discipline has spent relatively little time, especially of late, exploring. In particular, I am referring to private property, the state, government, and resistance. They are what could perhaps be referred to as “contentious” concepts, for the fact that there is no definitive definition that is readily accepted by everyone in the discipline. They also are difficult to measure and dense in terms of meaning. To develop their meaning and implications in any study requires adequate and ample attention that quantitative, more statistical research, bypasses.

My use of the case study method is meant to develop and explain a new mode of contention – self-governmental resistance. The case study and qualitative methods in general grant social science access to such new developments, allowing us the opportunity to pick apart their meanings, test existing theories against them, and develop tentative hypotheses. In fact, only qualitative methods and case studies allow us to get close to innovative dynamics and empirics. There is no material for research in Political Science without someone doing the work, which means representing and finding the data, often with living people in the field.

The way I design each chapter also warrants a brief description. Besides the elaboration of my theory and concepts in the next chapter, as well as the comparative focus of the conclusion, each subsequent chapter follows the same structure. Specifically, after providing a simple introduction in the first couple pages, the second part of each
empirical chapter focuses on the dynamics of state power, private property, and each individual policy area. This section is followed by a generalized description of the MST's institutionalized resistance with respect to each policy area. I write this section with the goal of presenting the general contours of the movement's project. In that section, I do not explain the causes or evaluate the movement's success. The last section in each chapter features explanation and evaluation. Also, both the third and fourth sections feature a discussion of identity. The difference is that in the third section, I discuss the movement's intended form of identification promoted in their strategic plans, while in the fourth section of each chapter, I evaluate how their efforts actually play out.
CHAPTER 2: THEORY AND CASE SELECTION

The Paradox of Social Movement Resistance

In emphasizing the ways that movements destabilize through collective actions such as marches, sit-ins, and traffic blockades, observers and most academics (McAdam: 1996; Tilly: 2004; Snow, et al: 2008) fail to acknowledge the centrality of order-creating activities in social movement resistance. Noticing order where others see only disorder, Tarrow claims that movements like the United States Civil Rights Movement “institutionalized” contention that challenged the already-existing social, political, and economic order of segregation. For example, in networks of allies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and churches, the Civil Rights Movement in the United States systematized demand-making modes of conduct expressed in lobbying efforts, legislative changes, and protest. In developing stability through regularizing resistance to state power and promoting integration and equality, the movement, simultaneously, led a destabilizing campaign, e.g., from the standpoint of status quo authorities. For Tarrow, in what he calls the “paradox of disruptive resistance,” such practices show how movements regularize action in an oppositional, alternative kind of order (1998). Put another way: social movements simultaneously construct and deconstruct order in institutionalizing resistance.15

Despite this insight, Tarrow, like other social movement scholars, under-develops the nature of state power and collective action. He neglects an extended discussion of

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15 Riots and wartime desertions (Scott, 1990), also count as resistance, but not of the social movement variety. Although collective, these lack relatively consistent order or stability.
different kinds of social movement resistance and how they respectively contest formal, dominant authorities. Theorists that recognize continuity, define movement contention as “episodic,” rather than “sporadic,” with “government as a claimant (Aminzade, et al: 2001; McAdam, et al: 2001).” While drawing our attention to how movement contention involves “government,” they mistakenly conflate it with “the state.” And without differentiating the nature of the resistance to and involvement with such central elements of social movement studies, government and state remain inadequately explored in the academic literature.

This dissertation fills this lacuna concerning state, government, and social movements by making three points. First, after describing two kinds of resistance – reformist and revolutionary – I elaborate on the nature of a third, new form represented by various Latin American social movements such as the Zapatistas in southern Mexico, indigenous groups in the Andes, and the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST) in Brazil. I call the third mode self-governmental, defined as the continuous opposition to state power and private property through institutionalizing movement control over certain policy areas within which members cultivate a movement-centered mode of identification. In a case study of the MST, I take Tarrow’s initial discussion of institutionalization, deepening the concept’s application with respect to this previously unexplored form of resistance.¹⁶ Second, I show how self-governmental resistance challenges theorists’ over-

¹⁶ I disagree with a prominent use in social movement studies (e.g. Piven and Cloward: 1979; McCarthy and Zald: 1977) that takes institutionalization to mean pacification. My use of the concept of institutions comes from the idea that all institutions share common defining qualities, like general rules and procedures that constrain, enable, and regularize action (e.g. North: 1990 or Helmke and Levitsky: 2004). I see no reason
simplified understandings of state power and government. I differentiate state power from
government to develop both for future research. Third, I formulate a theory, rooted in an
understanding of strategy, to explain the successful institutionalization of self-
governmental resistance. I test this theory against rivals in each of this dissertation's
chapters. Self-governmental resistance, I show, is special to Latin American struggles
because movements have learned strategic orientations from prior movements in their
respective countries and/or the region.

This dissertation illustrates the nature of self-governmental social movement
resistance through a case study of the MST. I document the movement's alternative,
oppositional manner of governing members – specifically by contesting private property
and state power – in the policy areas of agrarian reform, education, and agricultural
production. My case study is driven by the following question: how can a social
movement successfully develop a self-governmental mode of institutionalizing resistance?

2.1 The State, Private Property, and Strategy in Self-Governmental Resistance

Self-governmental resistance draws our attention to the different meanings of
state, government, and governance. Theories of state power, in Political Science and
social movement theory, have been abandoned to institutional studies that isolate
governmental units such as individual bureaucracies or that focus on general attributes
like repression or facilitation.\footnote{For institutionalist studies, see Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast, eds. \textit{Positive theories of congressional institutions}. University of Michigan Press (1995).} My focus on state power comes from a belief that as a

why regularization automatically entails conservative trends.
discipline we “have thrown the baby out with the bath water.” Or in other words, that in the turn to government and institutions, we have neglected the state, the nature of its power, and how resistance develops with respect to it. Skocpol's concern in the mid-1980s that Marxist theorists attribute overly general qualities to the state is premised on the idea of states as territorial units, like we see them on a map (1985). How I understand the state relaxes abstract territoriality, focusing on certain kinds of power.

To understand state power, and just as importantly, to give us a way to conceive of it as distinct from government, I turn to James Scott. In Seeing Like a State, Scott walks us through various “experiments,” from urban planning to the giving of last names, revealing a bundle of powers that together form the state (1998). I specify them as the centralization of decision-making authority, homogenization of cultures, and subordination of social actors to governmental elites in a hierarchical administrative division of labor. Centralization, while similar to subordination, differs in so far as it entails a tendency to decrease the number of decision-makers and concentrate executive power, e.g. locating the power to expropriate land ultimately in the hands of a president. Subordination focuses on roles, or rather, how state power rests on establishing stark distinctions – state and society, public and private – that immediately situates certain actors in a passive role, e.g. police as representative of legitimate coercion versus citizens who lack this capacity. Homogenization involves the promotion of a singular, unified mode of identification, usually through encouraging certain practices, e.g. creating nationalism through the pledge of allegiance.

When discussing the state, we are really referring to the co-existence of these different powers. And we – as researchers, policy-makers, and citizens – produce unity in speaking of the state as if it were cohesive and singular. In fact, there is no “the” state, as no empirical entity “is” it. Anything can “perform state” – centralize decision-making, homogenize culture, and create unequal administrative roles, e.g. a king, a republic, or even the mafia or a social movement. Government differs because it refers to concrete units and organizations that make decisions concerning how to provide order.

Governments make decisions, states do not. They represent state power and govern in accordance with it. The ways that order is provided – including the design of policies and the modes of implementation – is governance. Because governance involves “providing order,” any actor, e.g. a movement, a business, etc., may govern in accordance with state power, or against it. Governance is not always exercised by government.

Social movement self-governmental contention calls our attention to these

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conceptual differentiations. In providing order for its members – as well as discipline\(^{20}\) – movements like the MST contest private property, governing in ways that challenge state power and the Brazilian government. This mode of governance differs from others, e.g. corporate, state, etc. It also illustrates a form of institutionalizing resistance that differs from reform and revolution. The movements that exemplify self-governmental contention replace the state/society division with movement-led administration within certain services. In their opposition to state power in certain policy areas, self-governmental movements institutionalize resistance by decentralizing decision-making authority, equalizing administrative roles, and enabling the expression of local and regional movement member needs and beliefs. Reform-style movements desire inclusion into state power, revolutionary movements want to occupy it, and self-governmental movements, divide it. Each chapter in this dissertation analyzes and explains how the MST institutionalizes self-governmental contention, in varying levels of success in different policy areas.

As summarized in the table below, movements vary according to their relationship with state power and private property. Revolutionary and self-governmental movements both challenge private property, while reformist movements leave it unaltered or demand

it. Also, reform and revolutionary resistance both initially confront, yet, as I discuss later in this chapter, reproduce, state power. Self-governmental movements, however, consistently challenge state power as well as private property. Like revolutionary movements, self-governmental struggles challenge private property by demanding and exercising cooperative ownership and administration of resources, e.g. in land use and economic production. They also contest state power in their struggle to control particular services, e.g. education, rather than claim state power overall, like revolutionary movements.

Table 1: Kinds of Movements, Defining Qualities, and Examples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind</th>
<th>Reform</th>
<th>Revolutionary</th>
<th>Self-Governmental</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Initially challenges state power, yet later reproduces it. Seeks inclusion and incorporation into government. Ignores or promotes private property.</td>
<td>Initially challenges state power, yet later reproduces it. Seeks parallel governments and excludes already-existing ones. Demands and abolishes private property.</td>
<td>Continuously challenges state power. Governs particular services and does not desire a dual government. Demands and abolishes private property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examples</td>
<td>United States Civil Rights Movement, LGBT Movement, Environmental Movements, Anti-Nuclear Movement, (Late) Confederación Identidades Indígenas de Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Identities of Ecuador or CONAIE), Cocalere-MAS</td>
<td>Bolsheviks, Early 20th Century Fascists (e.g. Italian and German), Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), July 26th Movement, Sandinistas</td>
<td>MST, Rondas Campesinas (Peasant Leagues), Zapatistas, Piqueteros, (Early) Confederación Identidades Indígenas de Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Identities of Ecuador or CONAIE).</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The “self” in self-governmental resistance comes from movement efforts to localize needs, beliefs, and practices. The MST, the best case of self-governmental
contention, makes constant efforts to create a uniform movement identity through symbols, songs, and rituals. The identity promoted by the movement acts as a bulwark against identifying with state-promoted forms of identification, separating the movement from state forms of order and governance. Like Wolford's recent work that shows how multiple identities coexist within the MST (2010), I also find diversity in movement identification across the policy areas where the MST mobilizes its members. My analysis differs, because I locate identity creation as a contributing factor – or proximate cause – in my theory of strategic action. As I will discuss later, identities are derived from different strategies, which ultimately cause successful movement institutionalization. The identities cultivated in self-governmental resistance, unlike state-centered versions displayed in reform and revolutionary contention, remain grounded in opposing state forms of control and identification.

To explain the dependent variable – successful self-governmental institutionalization – I develop a theory rooted in strategy. In this dissertation, I consider the MST a “pathway case study (Gerring: 2007),” meaning that I generate and test hypotheses for my theory to indicate “paths” for future research. The conclusion of this dissertation, through preliminary comparisons between revolutionary, reform, and other self-governmental movements, reveals some of these future paths. In my theory, I break strategy into two components that I measure and treat as independent variables: (1) the level of consistently iterated and coherently formulated movement objectives and (2) level of preparation of knowledge, or “know-how,” concerning targets and action. I measure the strength of these two components within three subcategories of strategic
action – direct-action, mediated, and instrumental. As I further discuss later in this chapter, the three modes of institutionalizing resistance result from different strategic combinations, e.g. instrumental with direct-action strategies lead to self-governmental movements, direct-action with low levels of mediation strategies lead to revolutionary resistance, and mediation and direct-action strategies, shifting to mediation, lead to reform-style contention. Successful institutionalization depends on the level of strength of the components in each sub-category and the coherence of movement-centered identities. The table below highlights the effects of strategic strength on the institutionalization of resistance, listing the kinds of movements according to the three strategic combinations.

**Table 2: Strategic Components, their Effects, and Combinations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Components</th>
<th>Effect of Component Strength on Level of Institutionalization</th>
<th>Strategic Combinations and Kind of Movement Institutionalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistency and Coherence of Objectives</td>
<td>A consistent iteration of movement objectives to movement members and opponents solidifies movement goals and identity. Rules and procedures can thus be communicated with greater ease because of common themes. Coherent elaboration of objectives in plans makes goals and opponents easy to understand for leaders and members, facilitating the regularization of action.</td>
<td>The combination of mediated strategies with direct-action, and the tendency to shift towards mediation, leads to reform-style movements. The combination of instrumental strategies with direct-action, leads to self-governmental movements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation of Knowledge</td>
<td>High levels of preparation and knowledge acquisition assist movements to create plans on how to implement objectives and promote their self identity. Strong plan preparation allows the movement to acquire knowledge of opponent’s strengths and weaknesses, facilitating successful interaction between movements, targets, and allies.</td>
<td>The combination of mediated strategies with direct-action, as well as the tendency to shift towards direct-action, leads to revolutionary movements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Strategic components qualify as independent variables existing apart from movement actions. I define strategy as a guiding plan that temporally and logically precedes *all* actions. It contains a movement's objectives, ways to engage targets and
allies, and own self-understanding, or identity. Strategy is about plans to mobilize people, ideas, and resources. In my project, I divide the wide-ranging examples of “resources” as used in Resource Mobilization Theory (Edwards and McCarthy: 2008) between my independent and dependent variables. For example, elements such as materials, identity, and knowledge fall into how I understand strategy, while organizational form and structure are better conceived of as components of institutionalization.

Strategy exists logically and temporally prior to resistance, given that no action springs spontaneously from contextual factors like state strength, elites, or the economy. Resources, both in their ideational and material forms, are only intelligible through movement-centered identities and strategic orientation. This characterization establishes the independence of strategy and its parts – coherence, consistency, and preparation – from their causal effects – institutionalization, or self-governmental institutionalization, the particular focus of this dissertation. The learned nature of strategy, as well as its connection to identity, entails an understanding of the concept that is historical and contextual. Also, this theory potentially applies to all movements. My pathway case study of the MST allows me to fine tune the concepts and mechanisms at work in this theory through applying it to the best-fitting case.

How do self-governmental movements continuously contest state power while others reproduce it? Why do some movements confront private property and others ignore it? What makes movements like the Zapatistas and the Bolsheviks different in certain respects yet similar in others? Could movements, such as the U.S. Civil Rights Movement, have developed like Castro's July 26th Movement? In this dissertation, I
answer these questions by describing the self-governmental mode of institutionalizing social movement resistance, explaining the nature of state power, and developing a theory of strategy to explain successful institutionalization. I use a case study of the Brazilian MST to develop my theory and concepts.

My theory explores the explanatory potential of agency by analyzing different subcategories of strategy – direct-action, mediated, and instrumental – and the strength of certain components – coherence, consistency, and preparation. Selecting on the dependent variable in choosing the MST allows me to conceptually deepen the meaning of self-governmental resistance. I document the MST's efforts in institutionalizing resistance in three policy areas – agrarian reform, education, and agricultural production – that constitute this dissertation's subsequent chapters. Observing the movement's efforts in these areas shows variation in success. Explaining variation allows for the opportunity to measure the effect of my independent variables within my case and develop my theory for application to other movements.

2.2 State Power as Problem for Movements and the Self-Governmental Answer

We can derive from existing studies on social movement resistance two modes of institutionalization – reformist and revolutionary. Some scholars focus on forms of resistance similar to the United States Civil Rights Movement in groups such as the Pro-Choice and Welfare Rights Movements (Piven and Cloward: 1977; Staggenborg: 1988). Kriesi, et al. deepen our understanding of reformist contention, describing it as conflict through “established procedures,” where groups “are integrated into political networks in
the administrative and the parliamentary arenas ... abandon[ing] the challenging of authorities by unconventional means (1995, 6).” Standardized, institutionalized “procedures” leave state power in tact. In fact, resistance is for inclusion through organizing, for example, voter registration efforts complimented by direct-action tactics like demonstrations and marches. Reformist movements challenge state power and governments, influencing the latter to include marginalized actors and practices into their dynamics. Contesting private property does not occur – the sit-ins of the Civil Rights Movement sought to assure that everyone had access, i.e. have a seat at the counter. Even movements organized during transitional periods, e.g. the pro-democracy movement during the fall of the Soviet Union, pushed for the embrace, not prohibition, of private property.

The nature of resistance in revolutionary contention institutionalizes differently. This second mode of collective action includes practices such as promoting proto-tax systems, public goods administration, as well as exercising territorial and population control at the expense of already-existing governmental authority. Tilly considers such practices constitutive of multiple poles of sovereignty, or parallel governance, which are integral to “revolutionary situations (1978).” Unlike reform, this form of resistance demands and/or abolishes private property through, for example, promoting extensive land redistribution efforts and forming democratically managed production cooperatives. Revolutionary movements differ from their reformist counterparts by institutionalizing

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21 Examples include worker councils of the Russian and early twentieth century German revolutions that arose independent of and in opposition to their governments (Sirianni: 1983).
rules that divide and exclude – rather than integrate with – governments that wield state power. They initially pose a counter-order in opposition to state power. Revolutionary movements take state power and wield it.

Comparing these two modes of resistance reveals one shared problem: the reproduction of state power. Reform-style movements, from the current environmental movement to the anti-nuclear movement, challenged state power without contesting its defining elements – centralization, homogeneity, and social subordination. Revolutionary movements differ because of their focus on establishing dual power and governance. Yet, they too reproduce state power through demanding and centralizing decision-making authority in some actor like a political party that arrogates power over policy, subordinating non-party actors in an unequal administrative division of labor, and promoting singular, or homogenizing, modes of identification and culture.

Reproducing state power does not mean that reform and revolutionary struggles fail their members; social, political, and economic changes have occurred in terms of policy, access to material goods, as well as empowerment. The problem is that governments have used state power to exclude actors from administrative roles, decision-making authority, and alternative cultural practices. By reproducing state power, reform and revolutionary actors betray general principles of equality, close pathways to form alternative modes of identification, and allow for status quo, decision-making procedures to persist. Both reform and revolutionary modes of movement contention have led struggles that contradict their central reasons for resistance. Centralizing authority, homogenizing cultural practices, and establishing unequal administrative roles constitutes
state power as exercised by governments. They also reappear in reform and revolutionary resistance.

In this dissertation, I identify how the institutionalization of self-governmental resistance defies classification as either reformist or revolutionary by consistently challenging both the institution of private property and the exercise of state power. Such movements, with the Brazilian MST as the best case, challenge the state-form of governance by developing and implementing alternative rules and procedures that enable and constrain, i.e. institutionalize, member conduct against the central elements of state power. Self-governmental resistance builds “publics” not a singular “public,” vying for control of certain areas or policies. To challenge the state form of governance within particular policy areas, self-governance institutionalizes the qualities of decentralization, heterogeneity, and equality in service provision.

Consider the MST’s resistance in education. By documenting best practices and writing tomes for dissemination in regularly held movement-led training seminars, “dialogue” exceeds a random conversation between two people; an institution is born when, as a regularly established procedure, MST teachers learn to refuse to refer to students as “alunos” but as “educandos” when teaching about the movement's history through songs and rituals. Rooting decision-making for educational policy design and implementation in equality occurs by accessing local knowledges and needs, as well as

22 I was told by one movement teacher how “alumno,” often used to refer to students in non-MST schools, is derived from Latin and means “without light.” This presupposes that the teacher, or expert, “gives light,” or knowledge, to the student. To counter this hierarchy and create equality, the movement refers to students as “educandos” and teachers as “educadores.”
sharing experiences through dialogue with students. Focusing on shared, lived experiences focuses on diverse, local conditions, institutionalizing heterogeneous – not homogenous – cultural practices. An educational, “one-size fits all system” is not imposed on movement students. Implementation by “nucleos (small groups),” in each school assures decentralized decision-making procedures that involve teachers, students, and parents. If students fail, they repeat grades or take supplemental classes to discipline inadequate performance. Teachers individually assess and monitor student performance in “pareceres (opinions)”, to evaluate their progress against movement goals found in each school's “Projeto Político Pedagógico (Pedagogical Policy Plan).”

State educational policy cultivates a singular cultural form of national identity, centralizes decisions over curriculum, and subordinates social actors to government. In Brazil, pedagogical guidelines and requirements are centralized by state and federal institutions, with little to no involvement of students in exercising decision-making authority. In the past and currently, dual instruction – known in Portuguese as “sistema dual de ensino” – privileged urban over rural areas in terms of resources and pedagogy (Nagel: 2001; MEC: 2010). In the early 20th century, a national curriculum was forced through the country, resulting in school closings where instruction was in languages other than Portuguese (de Souza: 2008). Despite the decentralizing impetus of the 1996 Lei de Diretrizes de Base (Law of Basic Directives or LBD), national instruction remains promoted in Article 26.23 The LBD recognizes rural education – where the MST inserts

23 Article 26: “Curriculum for elementary and secondary education must have a common national base that will be completed in each system and place of instruction. This national common base, at completion, in each system and place of instruction, may
its project – as “distinct” and “particular,” yet requires that it “complements” dominant norms. Chapter 4 in this dissertation further details the nature of the MST's educational resistance. This comparison outlines how the MST's project opposes the Brazilian government's version delivered via state power. The table lays out the central differences between the kind of governance institutionalized by movements and governments.

**Table 3: Modes of Institutionalizing Governance: State v. Self-Governmental Movements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Self-Governmental Movements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centralizes Decision-making Authority in Unitary Institutions</td>
<td>Decentralizing Decision-making Authority by Incorporating New Actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homogenizes Culture through Promoting Singular Modes of Identification and a Unified Public.</td>
<td>Creates Heterogeneous Publics and Encourages Local and Regional Modes of Identification and Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishes an Unequal Administrative Division of Labor, with Governmental Elites Endowed with Policy Decision-making Prerogative and Executive Power</td>
<td>Equalizes Roles and Endows Social Actors with Executive Decision-making Ability concerning Policy Design and Administration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Self-governmental resistance directly challenges the state manner of service implementation, design, and execution. While every kind of social movement confronts state power, they do so in different ways: reformist movements improve it, revolutionary groups occupy it, and self-governmental movements divide it, vying for the control of certain policy areas. What sets self-governmental actors apart from reformist and revolutionary movements is their institutionalization of resistance according to an alternative mode of conduct in policies usually executed by their respective governments. They regularize practices that oppose centralized authority, the homogenization of allow for a diversified part, given regional and local social qualities, particularly dealing with culture, economy and client.” For more on the history of rural education, see Edla Soares, Parecer 36/2001.
cultural practices, and instantiation of unequal role relations. They also directly confront private property by creating rules and procedures that emphasize redistribution and collective, cooperative management.

2.3 Strategy as Explanation for Movement Institutionalization

Academic studies and common perceptions of movements tend to focus on their disruptive acts like protests and demonstrations, neglecting the systematized rules and practices constitutive of their resistance. Tarrow draws our attention to how social movement resistance is the simultaneous construction and deconstruction of order by institutionalizing opposition to state power as exercised by their respective governments. Prior studies divide movements that confront Tarrow's paradox into two camps – revolutionary and reformist. In this dissertation, I analyze and explain the development of a third kind – self-governmental.

The rationale for conducting a case study of the MST is meant to test an often neglected concept in social movement theory – strategy. My case study is a version of the crucial case study method, what Gerring specifies as a “pathway case study (2007).” I clarify the effect of strategy by focusing on how variation in my outcome – successful self-governmental institutionalization in agrarian reform, education, and agricultural production policies – is dependent on change in my independent variables – consistent and coherently elaborated objectives and knowledge preparation. As I show later in this

24 “[When] we have reason to presume that a causal factor of interest is strongly associated with an outcome, holding other factors constant ... a crucial case serves not to confirm or disconfirm a causal hypothesis (because that hypothesis is already well established) but rather to clarify a hypothesis (Gerring: 2007, 238).”
chapter, existing social movement theories fail to account for the successful institutionalization of self-governmental resistance. This problem leads me to elaborate a new theory.

In this section, I explain how the three modes of institutionalizing resistance result from the combination of different subcategories – direct-action, instrumental, and mediated. The different kinds of movements – reform, revolutionary, and self-governmental – result from distinct combinations of these subcategories. The components of knowledge preparation and coherently and consistently setting objectives are included in each of the three subcategories. In this section, I lay out the reasoning behind how different combinations in variable magnitudes or strengths explain successful movement institutionalization rather than contextual factors such as state strength, neoliberal adjustment, or elite allies.

Strategies are historical and learned. For example, MST leaders researched past agrarian reform movements in Brazil, as well as prior movements and organizations from Cuba to Israel (Fernandes and Stedile: 1999; MST: 2001). Similarly, Zapatista leaders in southern Mexico received training from Catholic Church allies and Maoist organizers, learning from theories and past struggles in adapting them (Harvey: 1998; Barmeyer: 2003). Like Tilly's “repertoires of contention (2004),” strategies are “modular” or adaptable. Unlike repertoires, strategies have historical and contextual roots that make learning, adapting, and altering slower. Tilly's theory of tactics is time-less; my concept of strategy is historically-embedded. The role I assign to leaders is similar to Popkin's understanding of “political entrepreneurs (1979),” yet differs because ways to provide
incentives are learned from prior struggles.

The origins of strategies explain the “newness” of self-governmental resistance, specifically in Latin America. Movements such as the MST have drawn on, changed, and developed prior forms of struggle to avoid past problems. For instance, one reason why we see a lack of revolutionary movements currently can be explained by contemporary movements adopting a strategic shift away from armed struggle. In fact, in one discussion with an MST leader in the national direction, I was told how the “classic, old style of agrarian reform cannot happen today as it occurred in the past” (Interview: MST Sector of Production, 11-8-2010). This “old style” of agrarian reform is a reference to Cuba, where a movement sought power and executed the mass redistribution of land through raising arms against the government. “Objective conditions” for Marxists, or “political opportunities” for social movement theorists, does not explain such self-governmental movement development. Even for revolutionary movements, strategy was key given that struggles often began in the worst possible situations, e.g. Castro’s July 26th Movement began with a dozen ship-wrecked militants. The cause for self-governmental resistance (and reason for a decline in revolutionary contention), lies more with the movements, and in particular, the strategic orientations decided upon by leaders and members.

The rationale for selecting strategy as my explanation is rooted in the idea that action arises first from a guiding plan. Setting objectives temporally and logically precedes all actions.\(^\text{25}\) In reconstructing movement plans, we can locate their objectives,

\(^{25}\) My concept breaks from prior understandings – particularly rational choice and game theorists – who uniformly adopt the heuristic of individual utility maximization to predict behavior (Osborne: 2000; Binmore: 2007). I also specify more than Jaspers
their identities, as well as their knowledge concerning how to engage targets. Social movement resistance – in all its varieties – is *sustained*, not spontaneous, collective action.

I identify three sub-categories of strategy – direct-action, mediated, and instrumental – which in certain combinations, lead to the institutionalization of reform, revolutionary, or self-governmental resistance. In *direct-action* strategies, movements craft their own objectives and lead resistance themselves, retaining decision-making autonomy concerning the collection and preparation of knowledge. Differing from direct-action, *mediated* strategies require another actor other than the movement to implement objectives. The delegation of decision-making power to an outside, non-movement actor removes the burden of assembling people and resources to execute an objective, while at the same time, takes autonomy away from movements in terms of implementation. Like mediated strategies, *instrumental* strategies rely on outside actors. Unlike mediated strategies, however, movements do not delegate decision-making power. In this kind of strategy, movements locate actors that they use for their own objectives and who are indispensable to their plan. Partners may not support, or even oppose, the movement's ultimate goals. In instrumental strategies, movements navigate the ever-present agonistic quality of these relationships and the risk that the coalition falls apart. Design and decision-making resides with the movement, yet execution incorporates another actor.

Sub-categories in certain combinations explain why we see different kinds of movement institutionalization. For example, reformist movements such as the pro-choice (2006) and Maney, et al (2012), who focus on time, culture, goals, emotions, dilemmas, and interactions.
movement in the United States combine direct-action and mediated strategies in their organizing around Supreme Court cases (Staggenborg: 1991). This movement changed the exercise of state power in the United States by including a typically excluded group into the political process – women – and challenging the state's centralization of decision-making concerning reproductive rights. Unlike reform-style movements and their shift to mediation, revolutionary and self-governmental contention shows a persistence of direct-action. Some movements, like Castro's July 26th Movement and Peru's Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), also sought to overthrow their respective governments and abolish private property.

Self-governmental movements, as opposed to both reform and revolutionary resistance, *combine* instrumental strategies with direct-action while neglecting mediated strategies. The pursuit of these two kinds of strategies explains why they do not develop as reformist or revolutionary: revolutionary movements jettison instrumental strategies all together, and while reform movements establish partnerships and coalitions, they ultimately favor mediation. The Rondas Campesinas (Peasant Leagues), a self-governmental example other than the MST, used certain ideas and acquired knowledge from the Peruvian government – specifically bureaucracy, hierarchy, and participatory democracy – to implement an alternative criminal justice system that resisted state power by equalizing access, decentralizing decision-making, and enabling the development of regional, local cultural practices (Starn: 1992). Their instrumentalist strategy was rooted in acquiring and using ideational resources combined with direct-action plans to

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26 While direct-action persists in reformist movements, it gives way to mediated strategies through delegating decision-making to non-movement, often governmental, actors.
institutionalize a form of resistance that challenged the exercise of state power by the Peruvian government. Complementing their opposition to state power, they contest private property in cooperative, communal decision-making and administrating resources.

We can visualize these different strategic combinations in a Venn diagram:

**Figure 1: Kinds of Social Movements and their Constitutive Strategies**

![Venn Diagram](image)

Each circle in the diagram represents a particular mode of institutionalizing resistance, which is constituted by different strategic combinations. Revolutionary movements abolish private property, initially challenge but ultimately reproduce state power, and engage primarily in direct-action strategies. They never follow instrumentalist strategies and only minimally plan mediation. Reformist movements contain all three kinds of strategies, despite gradually privileging mediation. Also, like revolutionary movements – but in different ways – reformist movements reproduce state power through seeking inclusion and leaving intact, or demanding the creation of, private property. Instrumental and direct-action strategies characterize self-governmental movements, which contest private property and state power through implementing alternatives that
oppose the centralization of authority, homogenization of culture, and establishment of unequal administrative roles.

My theory of strategy is agentic and tells a causal story. This, however, does not mean that strategy is endogenous to my outcome – variation in successful institutionalization. Because strategy is rooted in a plan that precedes the manifestation of action, my independent variables of consistency, coherence, and preparation are separate from my outcome.

2.4 Measurement and Hypotheses

The strength of a movement's plans in each sub-category – direct-action, mediation, and instrumentalization – is measured according to the level of: (1) their preparation of knowledge and (2) the consistency and coherence of their objectives. The strength of a movement's identity, and the role it plays in promoting successful institutionalized resistance, is derivative of the strength of these independent variables. Consistently iterating objectives to movement members and opponents solidifies commitment to goals and identity. Such a formulation of strategic plans leads to similar qualities in a movement's identity, which facilitates rule creation. Also, a coherent elaboration of objectives in plans makes goals and opponents easy to understand for leaders and members, aiding the regularization of action by promoting a common identity. High levels of preparation and knowledge acquisition assists movements in the creation of plans detailing how to implement objectives. Strong preparation allows a movement to understand their own, and their opponents, strengths and weaknesses.
The indicators I select to measure preparation and coherence include the quality of time invested in pursuing objectives and the frequency that targets are mentioned by movement leaders and members in documents and interviews. The quality of time invested focuses on the content of specific iterations concerning a target or goal. Frequency is the number of times a target or goal is mentioned, without regard to content. Both more quality time spent on plans and higher frequency of iterations means higher strategic strength. The data I use to assess strategic strength comes from movement documents and texts, information from interviews conducted from two years of field research, and direct observations from participatory observation.

Problems for my theory would occur if we were to see the institutionalization of social movement resistance, specifically of the self-governmental variety, without the central elements of strategic planning listed above. In particular, my theory would be compromised if sustained, successful movement action originated from plans where identities were poorly conceived or in conflict with one another, if objectives were not repeated often in plans, and/or if movements did not privilege coherence in formulating their objectives. Observing the institutionalization of movement resistance upon noting these issues with strategy would spell problems for how I conceive of the causal nature of strategic planning. In the same way, movement resistance ought not to spring from contextual factors such as the presence or absence of elite allies, variable levels of state strength, or changes in the economy.

I use counter-factual analysis to evaluate my analysis of strategic strength. Given a small population of cases with multiple potential explanatory factors, reconstructing
alternative scenarios is necessary in qualitative research (Fearon: 1991). Throughout my case study of the MST, I test rival explanations against my theory of strategy, applying “what-if” scenarios concerning levels of strategic strength to assess if changes affect my dependent variable. For instance, if I measure low strategic strength in the development of a direct-action plan, I imagine what would have happened had the movement spent more time in acquiring knowledge, developing more consistent and coherent objectives, and/or forming elite alliances. I find that successful implementation of self-governance directly involves how MST leaders strategize in each policy area. Alternative explanations would propose that the development of resistance would occur according to variations in state strength, the presence/absence of elite allies, or the incentive structures provided by movement leaders. My use of counter-factual analysis disproves these other potential explanations, showing how strategy – specifically variation in strength – explains successful self-governmental resistance.

From the indicators I select to measure strategic strength, I derive specific hypotheses. First, **Hypothesis 1: Certain combinations of strategic action lead to different modes of movement institutionalization.** This means that for self-governmental resistance, we will see direct-action and instrumental strategic planning without mediated strategies. If however, plans change, then the kind of movement concomitantly changes as well. I also stipulate that there will be various levels of successful institutionalization. Therefore, **Hypothesis 2: Increases in the iterations in movement plans of specific targets and goals, as well as in the time spent researching and documenting targets and goals, results in greater strategic strength and thus a higher potential for successful**
**institutionalization.** If, on the other hand, we see a decrease in iterations and quality time, then we ought to notice a decrease in the successful institutionalization. Furthermore, the two components of strategic action – preparation of knowledge and consistent, coherent objectives – operate independently of one another. Thus, *Hypothesis 3: If a low level of preparation exists with high levels of consist and coherent objective formation or vice versa, then we see a level of institutionalization lower than if both indicators were high, yet higher than if both were low.*

I measure successful institutionalization of self-governmental resistance in a certain policy area by counting and comparing the percentage of instances and members mobilized by the MST with the potential number of sites and participants. Certain academic discussions of resources, including organizational design and form, fall into this area (Edwards and McCarthy: 2008). Thus rather than a cause, resources – as discussed in the literature – are an effect of strategic planning. I locate the total number of participants and their percentages in governmental and movement documents of particular policy areas, as well as by triangulating these sources with interviews, newspapers, and participatory observation. If, for example, I am analyzing the movement's efforts in education, I count the number of movement schools and students. Numbers and percentages of instances and people provide a measure we can use to evaluate variation in success rates.

### 2.5 Rival Explanations

Even though my theory of strategy potentially explains the three kinds of
resistance listed above, I focus on the successful institutionalization of self-governmental resistance. In this section, I address dominant social movement theorists’– cultural, structural and agentic – expectations and show their shortcomings. Alternative, rival explanations suggest various hypotheses that I test my theory against in each chapter of this dissertation.

Political Process Theory and Political Opportunity Structure

Studies that adhere to Political Process Theory and deploy the concept of Political Opportunity Structure (Kriesi, et al: 1995; McAdam, et al: 1996; McAdam: 1999; Tarrow: 1998; McAdam, et al: 2001; Yashar: 2005; Ondetti: 2008) focus on the emergence and/or trajectory of mobilization. Explanations center on a government's – particularly agents – propensity to favor, oppose, and/or repress. If I were to apply such a contextual explanation to my outcome of successful institutionalized resistance, I would have an explanation based on the degree of access and potential facilitation. Access to government resources and a low penchant for repression would lead to successful institutionalization for movements, including self-governmental ones.

While we are given a potential explanatory variable to test – elite proclivity to assist movements – variation in MST success rates in different policy areas reveals trends that disprove the explanatory potential of these theories. For example, we see an absence of movement initiatives to implement educational initiatives in certain states that have elite support, e.g. Paraná (2002-2010). Also, the movement had success in agrarian reform policy during the 1990s when confronting Fernando Enrique Cardoso's openly
hostile government. Lastly, a consistently low level of successful implementation of the movement's vision for agricultural production is uniform in all states, despite variation in governments. An oppositional government in Rio Grande do Sul (2006-2010) openly opposed the MST's objectives, yet as I will show, only partially explains movement decline. In short, variations in elite facilitation and repression do not correspond to variations in movement rates of successful institutionalization.

**Neoliberal Adjustment**

Similar theories that rely on contextual factors target neoliberal transformation, noting how changes in political economy impact movement resistance. Like Political Process Theorists, these scholars discuss the effect of contextual relationships, e.g. cuts in state expenditures or decentralizing policies, on social movement activity. Causal links from scholars that focus on neoliberal changes include how decreases in resources or decentralized governance provide openings for movements to mobilize.

In Brazil, we do not see cuts to state spending – especially in areas where the MST is active – but increases over the last thirty years. Changes in success rates also show variations that budget and policy changes cannot explain, e.g. similar neoliberal

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27 McAdam, et al's (2001) *Dynamics of Contention* also attempts to reappraise agency. I understand my theory of strategy as a continuation of their insights, enveloping and adding greater depth to certain concepts they use, e.g. “brokerage.”

cuts and policy decentralization in the states of Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo and different outcomes in each state concerning the MST's success in governing educational and agricultural production. Theorists that discuss neoliberal transformation also draw our attention to the delegation of decision-making authority to social actors, potentially co-opting resistance. The MST's self-governing project, however, contests state power, conflicts with governmental dictates, and draws opposition. Like theorists who focus on facilitation or repression, explanations that discuss policy change, co-optation, and budget decreases do not explain self-governmental resistance.

Cultural Approaches

Cultural approaches describe alternative modes of movement resistance, often in opposition to forms of conduct encouraged by state power and governmental elites. These studies draw our attention to how cultural resistance is central to movement contention, specifically through proliferating different rules and procedures that organize people's lives. They lack a more detailed analysis of the state that would allow us to isolate the constitutive nature of self-governmental resistance. Cultural studies provide numerous case studies concerning movements in various countries that challenge status quo conceptions of rights and institutional formations but leave out generalizable ways to

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29 Some movements disrupt and redefine the standard meanings of democracy and citizenship (Alvarez, et al: 1998). Others see movements “claiming the right to have rights,” which means the creation of rights (e.g. autonomy) that exceed the juridical conception of citizenship (Dagnino: 1994). Scherer-Warren notes how movements were founded on principles opposed to conventional politics (1987). Urban movements at the end of Brazil's military regime managed public goods because the military gave them a stake in provision (Cardoso: 1992).
understand state power.

Agentic Accounts

The theories I have discussed give primacy, in different ways, to contextual factors. Similar to my focus on strategy, and thus agency, other accounts give movements themselves center stage. Some – particularly rational choice – would explain successful movement institutionalization rates according to incentives for mobilization. In fact, one major enticement for joining the movement is achieving access to land, which is expensive, especially for families in poverty. The movement itself is a kind of incentive, acting as a mediator and facilitator for land acquisition through pressuring governments to expropriate and redistribute. Yet according to this reasoning, the MST's ability to provide land incentives fails to account for variation. Specifically, the number of land occupations and encampments – central elements to the MST's alternative agrarian reform project as opposed to the state-led version – varies despite the movement's ability to present land acquisition as an enticement to join.

My theory of strategy makes analytical distinctions between three categories, each with measurable components to explain strength and variation. Some movements use partners and alliances – sometimes even governments and representatives of state power – in instrumental strategies, while others delegate decision-making autonomy to a non-

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30 Rational choice accounts (e.g. Olson: 1965; Popkin: 1979; Lichbach: 1994) predict that the provision of material incentives by leaders, particularly selective incentives, leads to mobilization. Resource mobilization tends to focus on the amount and kind of funding, professionalization, and kinds of constituencies (McCarthy and Zald: 1977; Jenkins: 1983).
movement actor, or in other words, adopt a mediated strategy. Or in a direct action strategy, neither with partners nor through non-movement representatives, a movement will map out its practices with itself as the primary actor. The form of resistance that I describe and explain in this dissertation – self-governmental – combines only direct-action and instrumental strategic plans.

2.6 Case Selection and Research Design

This dissertation explains the development of self-governmental resistance. My dependent variable is the successful institutionalization of self-governmental resistance, which I measure as the percentage of spaces and members involved, e.g. the number of actual cooperatives and the number of participating MST members out of the potential totals in the policy area of agricultural production. My explanatory variable – strategy – is evaluated in terms of the consistency and coherence of objectives and the level of prepared knowledge for implementation.

Various MST qualities make it an ideal “pathway” case. Its presence in 24 of Brazil's 26 states, with more than one and a half million members, is unparalleled in Latin America. Its territorial presence allows us to compare its development across different states to assess the potential impact of different governments – ally and oppositional – at the federal and state level. Its extensive involvement in multiple policy areas mirrors its size and offers the chance to see variations in success.31 These qualities allow me to test

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31 Movement areas, or sectors, and years created: formação (training, 1988); educação (education, 1988); frente de massa (mobilization, 1989); finanças (finance, 1989); projetos (projects, 1989); produção, cooperação, meio ambiente (production,
hypotheses derived from the literature concerning elites, neoliberalism, and incentives, as well as my theory of strategy.

While the MST is valuable for its size, history, and involvement in multiple policy areas, these qualities also make comparison difficult. To simplify, I focus on the movement in the states of Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná, and São Paulo. These three states were selected because the MST is firmly established in each.\footnote{The movement expanded to the north of Brazil in the mid-1990s, where it has difficulty.} Aside from stability, each state has similar levels of inequality, kinds of agricultural production, and land use (IGBE: 2006; 2007; CIA Factbook: 2012). Each state also has similar agricultural and land use patterns, thus making their rural areas – where the MST bases its operations – economically similar. Trends in agrarian reform, education, and agricultural production show the same patterns in Brazil overall.

My study is theoretical, and a version of a crucial or “pathway case,” because the hypotheses developed are meant for further application (Lijphart: 1971; Odell: 2001; Gerring: 2007). I use the case study method because of limitations to large-n, statistical studies, specifically in developing and deploying “thick” concepts such as strategy, state power, and institutionalization (Coppedge: 1999). I focus on three areas to explain the MST's success in implementing self-governance: agrarian reform, education, and agricultural production policy. These areas show variation on the dependent variable, as agrarian reform displays the highest level of success, followed by educational policy, and
agricultural production policy, in that order. The following table lists the indicators I use to classify the movement's strength in each area.

**Table 4: Different Levels of MST Institutionalization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agrarian Reform</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Agricultural Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td>~50% people mobilized, thousands of encampments and settlements under control</td>
<td>~40% of students in certain areas under control, thousands of schools (not under control) with &gt;50 sites under control</td>
<td>&lt;50 sites under control, 5% - 15% of potential adherents participating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Agrarian Reform*

In Brazil, the centerpiece of agrarian reform policy is the settlement, which is composed of redistributed land and social programs. Both academic studies and official reports indicate the MST's high level of success. As of 2010, there existed 8,562 settlements in Brazil, with 67 – a fraction of a percent – arising pre-1985 (INCRA: 2011). Sergio Leite, who conducted the most in-depth study of settlements to date, finds that if not for movement pressure – specifically land occupations and encampments – led by the MST post-1985, the increase in settlements would not have taken place (2004). Likewise, comparison with other democracies reveals the near unparalleled advances in land reform due to MST pressure (Ondetti: 2008).

While exact numbers of movement-affiliated settlements are unavailable, we can access the number of MST occupations and encampments since 2000 – the first year
documented according to movement. In comparison with other movements in the policy area, MST occupations and encampments are respectively at 51% and 49%. Similarly, the number of families mobilized stands at a total of 494,428 in land occupations, with 311,160 of them – 63% – organized by the MST. The movement has also mobilized the most families in encampments, with over 58% of the total families affiliated with the MST, or 85,205 families out of total 146,295 between 2000 and 2010. From these numbers, and given that 23 other movements currently have organized land occupations, encampments, and settlements, the MST dominates this policy area according to our indicators of numbers and percentages, essentially redefining it, since the policy area's near moribund status pre-1985.

Self-governmental, institutionalized resistance rooted in decentralization, heterogeneity, and equality is practiced by the movement's “nucleos de base (small groups)” in encampments and certain settlements. This nucleo structure, also known as “organcidade,” or “organicity,” is central to MST self-governance in each policy area, yet is best implemented in the movement's management of agrarian reform where groups hold frequent meetings, provide security, provide or help find educational services, coordinate production, and organize cultural events. Consensual decision-making practices featured in the nucleos decentralize decision-making procedures, assuring that members actively participate in administration. In relying on grassroots, conscious-raising, and efforts to indicate lands for expropriation and occupation, the movement also challenges state practices that centralize decision-making in land redistribution by using expert information to select land for redistribution. Centralizing decision-making power –
characteristic of state power in general – is also apparent in the official redistribution procedure, which takes place through executive decree. Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agrária (Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform or INCRA), despite multiple regional offices, retains the function of distributing land and credit to subordinate social actors, showing an unequal division of administration.

Another element of social movement self-governance – heterogeneity – is practiced through the nucleo’s incorporation of diverse local conditions, needs, and practices. The MST fosters a movement-centered identity in this area that privileges a dispossessed, landless member of society who deserves land redistribution. With this mode of identification as a kind of shield, the movement allows for greater heterogeneity in encampments and settlements. Institutionalizing heterogeneity counters the blanket, homogenizing cultural practices characteristic historically and currently of state-led agrarian reform that privileges national identification, security, and development. Movement plans for settlement design also challenge private property by promoting communal use and ownership. MST agrarian reform opposes government policies that favor “emancipation” – granting definitive title and the right to sell land – supporting efforts for settlements to exist as public property without individual owners.

High levels of strategic strength characterize direct-action strategy. Preparation of “know-how” is high, illustrated in the time during encampments that follow occupations when the movement spends months, sometimes years, sending people to seminars to learn ideology, organizing skills, and the MST’s history. Between 1984 and 2002, the movement trained over 100,000 activists – 25 times the number of teachers from MST
normal schools and courses (Plummer: 2008). We also find a high level of knowledge of state institutions, which allows the movement to occupy the best land. Planning and knowledge levels are also high in objective coherence and consistency, apparent in the frequent iterations of targets and time spent solidifying the movement's identity since the early 1980s.

A high level of strategy strength is also found in instrumental strategy. Negotiations between movement leaders and institutional elites, particularly those in INCRA, reveal the movement's plans for the coherent and consistent use of the institution for their own objectives. Comparing INCRA's objectives with the MST's, as well as the ideological positions of various influential INCRA officials, reveals antagonism, which is characteristic of instrumental strategies. Similar kinds of negotiations and conflicts have characterized MST/INCRA relations since the MST began land occupations, showing coherence and continuity in the movement's strategic planning. This relationship grants the movement ample time to acquire knowledge of INCRA's capacity and resources, in their preparation of an alternative mode of institutionalizing agrarian reform. Knowledge preparation is also high with respect to using ideational resources, which have been at the center of the movement's agrarian reform discourse since the early 1980's. The MST combines instrumental and direct-action plans to confront private property and state power in land occupations, encampments, and settlements.

*Education*

Self-governance in education follows – in terms of success – the movement's
implementation of its version of agrarian reform policy. Still, the movement boasts impressive numbers, claiming to have pressured state authorities to construct 2,250 schools where over 350,000 people have learned to read and write, with another 350,000 currently studying all kinds of subjects, from geography to agroecology, taught by 4,000 movement-trained teachers.\(^{33}\) I single out the MST efforts in special elementary education schools and secondary technical schools. Despite a low number of settlement schools,\(^{34}\) MST gains are apparent in the implementation in various states of the “escolas itinerantes (itinerant schools)” in encampments. At their height in Rio Grande do Sul (1998-2009) and Paraná (2002-present),\(^{35}\) a total of 15 schools attended to roughly 1,000 students each year per state (MST: 1998; 2000; 2010). More success is seen in the movement's experiments with secondary education, particularly with technical schools, where in 2010 – one year where we have specific numbers from the movement and the state – roughly 40% of high school age students attending rural technical schools were affiliated with the MST (10,058 students affiliated with the movement out of 24,465 total students (INEP: 2010; PRONERA: 2011)). Since 1985, movement-affiliated high school students have attended 31 different spaces under movement direction (Plummer: 2008). The number of MST students and schools tells us that the movement’s success rate in comparison to agrarian reform is lower.

\(^{33}\) http://www.mst.org.br/node/8302.  
\(^{34}\) Of the 2,250 schools, only a fraction of the elementary schools in settlements (3 in the state of Paraná, 0 in São Paulo, and 3 in Rio Grande do Sul) operate according to the movement's dictates, with even less in the area of secondary education (Fieldnotes: ITERRA Conference, 5-25-2011).  
\(^{35}\) The itinerant schools were closed in Rio Grande do Sul in 2009, and later reopened in 2012. They currently exist in Alagoas, Santa Catarina, and Goiás.
The roots of MST’s pedagogy are in Soviet thinkers Anton Makarenko and Moisey Pistrak, whose theories privilege the importance of collectively managing schools; oppose a strict division of labor between teachers, administrators, and students; and showcase the culturally creative potential of labor. All instances – from elementary to university level courses – incorporate Pistrak’s conception of the pedagogical value of labor through requiring research and work in cooperatives or agroecological sites, allowing the movement to institutionalize local conditions and cultures. The identity fostered in education emphasizes how their exclusion from urban education, and their unique historical experiences, grants the movement a special purview concerning pedagogy and school organization. This counters the homogenizing mode of instruction that promotes a single national curriculum in terms of subjects and methodology that has been implemented since Getulio Vargas’ “Estado Novo” of the 1930s.

The nucleo structure that characterizes agrarian reform encampments and settlements also exists in schools, featuring group management in everything from finishing schoolwork to discipline. These practices reveal the same decentralizing principle that opposes centralized state policies usually made at the state and federal level through the distribution of administrative tasks to students within schools. This institutionalizes contention against the subordination of social actors by state power to government, usually also devalorizing rural schools and concentrating curriculum design with elites. Educational self-governance also opposes privatization and individualization through promoting public schools and group-based instruction.

Direct-action plans are strong in the MST’s self-governmental efforts in education.
Numerous seminars, some in collaboration with university partners, show a high number of iterations on how to administer school programs, from literacy to early childhood development. Since MST’s origins, there have been 13 published notebooks on movement education by the MST private school, Instituto Técnico de Capacitação e Pesquisa da Reforma Agrária (Technical Institute for Training and Research in Agrarian Reform or ITERRA), and 18 from the movement's education sector. Training courses in normal education have created many teachers educated in the movement's pedagogy since the early 1980s. Between 1990 and 2004, the MST reports graduating 10 classes each with between 30 to 50 movement-trained teachers (ITERRA: 2004). In addition to preparation, there is a high level of coherent and consistently formulated objectives in the movement's direct-action plans. Not only do we see this frequently in documents and pamphlets, but also in interviews with long time teachers who have been integral to the movement schools since the 1980s.

Despite the movement's relationship with INCRA and the creation of the Programa Nacional de Educação na Reforma Agrária (National Program of Education in Agrarian Reform or PRONERA), which guarantees access to governmental elites, the movement shows a relatively low level of strategic strength for both indicators in instrumental strategy. The movement has experienced difficulty confronting opposition from Tribunal das Contas da União (National Audit Court or TCU) and officials working in the Ministério Público (Public Ministry or MP), who have cut funding for programs and courses. Their instrumental strategic plans fail with elites in professionalized and bureaucratic institutions, as well as with political parties with divergent ideologies.
Rather than a simple “closing” of political opportunities, as many theorists would contend, the reason for limited success lies in a low level of preparation that places the MST at the mercy of changes in government. There is little in movement documents or testimonies from leaders when we search for iterations of strategies for political parties and bureaucracies. A consistent and coherent way to approach institutions and elites, likewise, is lacking. The movement's plans, not contextual factors, explain the mid-level success in educational policy.

Agricultural Production

The lowest ranking area in implementing self-governance is in agricultural production policy. While the movement flaunts its collective, successful cooperatives as illustrative of an alternative mode of agricultural production, the vast majority have succumbed to heavy debt and bankruptcy. In one interview, I was told that only around 5% of the hundreds of cooperatives initiated in the 1980s and 1990s continue (Interview: Sector of Production-PR, 7-11-2011). Likewise, the movement's turn towards promoting agroecological production techniques rarely sees implementation, with less than 5% of movement members practicing. If compared with the standard tally for movement membership – 1,500,000 people – then only 75,000 people are involved in this area.

Another measure for movement involvement in agricultural production is the number of families accessing state policies for small holder, typically organic, agricultural production. From numbers available in 2009 and 2010 in the Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos (Food Acquisition Program or PAA), the percentage of finances
went from 8% to 12%, ($R 28,699,236 of $R 363,381,941 to $R 44,643,666 of $R 379,735,466) while participating families in settlements went from 7% to 11% (7,444 of 98,340 families to 10,440 of 94,398). We can extrapolate from these numbers – because we know that roughly 50% of land occupations and encampments in Brazil are under MST influence – that only thousands of MST families receive assistance. These figures as well as the number of instances of cooperative economic ventures show lower percentages of people and spaces than in agrarian reform or educational policy.

MST agricultural production governance institutionalizes contention in all the same ways as education and agrarian reform. Nucleos characterize both the movement's sector of production and internal management of cooperatives, challenging the centralized development and execution of state economic policy. Likewise, agroecological production incorporates local conditions, thereby placing heterogeneity in economic practices by focusing production on local conditions and “peasant” farming techniques that privilege each farmer and their relationship to their land. Decision-making abilities are sufficiently dispersed throughout the movement members, equalizing skills and knowledge and decentralizing decision-making while challenging the state's form of economic management, which grants expertise to institutional elites and favors individualized – not cooperative – modes of production.

The movement shows a level of low success in preparing for economic endeavors because this area involves engaging with markets and specialized technical production knowledge, areas to which the movement has only recently devoted time and energy. Preparation of “know-how” in direct-action strategies, specifically in terms of quality
time spent on research, is low. The movement has only recently begun pursuing means to access production policies to support their agroecological project. INCRA remains a partner with the movement, yet increasingly agricultural programs are administered by more professionalized institutions like the Ministério de Agricultura, Pecuária, e Abastecimento (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply or MAPA). And similar to problems in education, MAPA does not respond to instrumentalist strategies. The movement's ability to use elites for production fails to appeal to these officials who favor large-scale monocultural production for export and individual entrepreneurship. Again, it is not context where we find the problem in movement institutionalization, but rather in the strength of their strategic planning.

Furthermore, the MST direct-action plans have changed radically over time, showing problems with respect to consistency and coherence. This has resulted in a persistent tension between “peasant” and “working class” identities, apparent in interviews and documents. Rooted in different acts and practices, this tension prohibits the movement from developing consistent strategies with common objectives. Second, the recent acceptance of peasant production into the movement's discourse requires dedicating time and energy to acquire agroecological production techniques, which forces the movement to devote resources and search out knowledge in new areas. The iteration of these direct-action plans shows low levels of frequency and time investment. Institutionalizing a form of agricultural production that challenges state power and the monocultural agro-export model promoted by governmental elites shows an overall low level of success due to low levels of direct-action and instrumental strategic strength.
Table 5: The MST's Levels of Strategic Strength and Success Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Area</th>
<th>Strategies and their Strengths</th>
<th>Level of Institutional Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct-action</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian Reform</td>
<td>High C &amp; C, and P</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>High C &amp; C, and P</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Production</td>
<td>Low C &amp; C, and P</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: C & C = Coherence and Consistency. P = Preparation

The above table shows the three policy areas, different strategies with their strengths, and levels of institutional strength. Because the MST is a self-governmental movement, the mediated strategy column is blank. The far right column of institutional strength shows corresponding variation due to different strategic orientations and strengths. Also, note the high levels in both strategic categories in agrarian reform, while low levels in one sub-category results in a mid-level of institutionalization in education. The last category – agricultural production – is characterized by low levels of strategic strength in both indicators, and thus, as predicted, we find a low level self-governmental institutionalization.

I conducted archival research, participatory observation, interviews, and textual analysis in my analysis of the MST. The first involved participatory observation and interviews in Brazil. For three months in 2009, I did pre-dissertation research in the states of Pernambuco, Pará, and São Paulo. In the fall of 2010, I returned to Brazil, where I stayed until November of 2011. This last time I did extensive fieldwork in São Paulo, Rio
Grande do Sul, and Paraná, while also staying three weeks in the capital, Brasilia. I conducted over 100 interviews with movement and former movement leaders, sympathizers and opponents, governmental elites and personnel, and individuals in political parties. Archival research was carried out in Centro de Documentação e Memória (Center for Documentation and Memory or CEDEM) in São Paulo, which houses an archive of all things leftist, from the Communist Party to the MST. Textual work includes analysis of MST newsletters and bulletins (from 1981-2008) as well as internal documents.

To research strategy, I use semi-structured interviews with politicians, movement leaders, and movement members. I also collected information from institutional and movement websites, as directives describing particular mandates are published and described there. I rely extensively on secondary sources and state documents from the MEC, different departments of education, INCRA, TCU, MAPA and MP. I analyze these documents to understand the different plans and projects, comparing them with interviews of elites from these institutions. My data is also derived from participatory observation methods. I attended movement-run secondary and primary schools, participated in classroom lectures, and even on occasion, helped teach. On settlements, I lived with various families where I conducted my research, kept field notes, and participated in various movement meetings and assemblies. I sometimes helped with typical family activities like doing laundry or milking cows. At all sites, I found the time to conduct in-depth interviews with movement members and established leaders.

I triangulate field notes and interviews with textual analysis of movement and
state documents, training manuals, statistical studies, census data, and newsletters in order to craft my independent and dependent variables. While in the field, and also when I returned, I collected newspaper stories that dealt with the MST’s self-governmental practices. My research is qualitative and exploratory; the innovative nature of my study requires close to the ground attention and conceptual development, necessitating qualitative methods.

Implications and Plan

The MST is one of (if not the) largest social movement in Latin America in terms of territorial presence and people mobilized. Aside from the importance of the MST in Latin America, Brazil itself has been the center of many studies of experimental governing patterns for over thirty years. The return to democracy in the mid-80s saw mass demonstrations that helped topple the dictatorship, the development and creation of mass parties such as the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers Party or PT) – an anomaly in Latin America, – and the implementation of creative new decentralized participatory governance arrangements at the municipal level. Brazil has been a site for governance studies and innovative resistance for decades, with a variety of social actors sharing, disputing, and challenging political power in exciting and innovative ways.

Besides methodological and theoretical considerations, the implications of my research point to a discussion of alternative social formations. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the closely following neoliberal era represented a turn to a technocratic and expert-oriented, i.e. apolitical time period. As one of (if not the most important) worldwide
transformation in discourse and political organization, neoliberalism has ushered in a view that there is no alternative. The MST is not absolutely successful, but allows us to think about alternatives in practice.

I discuss the MST's attempts to institutionalize governance in this dissertation's five chapters. My next three chapters are each devoted to movement efforts in particular policy areas – agrarian reform, education, and agricultural production. Chapter 3 focuses on agrarian reform policy and discusses the MST's success in organizing and administering encampments and settlements. Chapter 4 accounts for the MST's medium level of success in educational policy, focusing on the movement's itinerant elementary schools and high schools. I also discuss the challenges faced by the movement given the TCU and MP's opposition. In Chapter 5, I discuss the movement's low level of success in agricultural production after explaining the movement's economic vision of forming cooperatives to practicing agroecology. I highlight their desire to engage with different social programs run by different state institutions and the problems the movement faces from a divided identity. In the conclusion, I comment on how the concept of self-governmental resistance and my theory of strategy apply to other self-governmental cases, as well as reform-style and revolutionary movements.
CHAPTER 3: SELF-GOVERNMENTAL RESISTANCE IN AGRARIAN REFORM

Institutionalizing Opposition to State-led Agrarian Reform

MST-led land occupations usually take place late at night, when hundreds, or sometimes thousands, of people load buses with destinations only known to a few leaders. When they reach their stop – usually a large ranch or farm of an unaware landowner – they squat there for months, often years. Immediately after “taking” the land, the families set up black-tarp tent communities, known as the “acampamentos (encampments).” On the one hand, families live in these spaces with little or nothing, having unreliable access to water, food, and sanitation as they await de jure recognition of their land claims by state authorities. Yet on the other hand, members show a surplus of ingenuity when building these nascent communities with their collective knowledge. From providing security in group-based patrols, to dedicating lands to religious buildings and sporting events, movement members carry out a de facto form of agrarian reform by re-appropriating lands according to new economic, social, and cultural uses. Even though official expropriation and the legal recognition of settlements characterizes governmental agrarian reform policy, the MST already implements an alternative version from the moment member families occupy land.

This chapter focuses on explaining the MST’s institutionalization of self-governmental resistance in the policy area of agrarian reform. Land occupations are often only considered destabilizing, especially of mono-cultural, agro-export economic production, and status quo, governmental agrarian reform practices. While recognizing this quality, I also understand how they, along with establishing encampments and
managing relations in settlements, show stabilizing qualities. Land occupations reveal a manner of executing agrarian reform that involves masses of individuals, countering the official, governmental mode of agrarian reform that is rooted in executive decree and elite knowledge. As I discuss in this chapter, various MST practices, such as land occupations, are well-organized and systematized efforts to re-appropriate land. Recognizing their disruptiveness, I also acknowledge how occupations provide stability, order, and rules for movement members. I argue that they simultaneously disrupt status quo, dominant authority and provide a movement-guided alternative in its place as they vie for control over agrarian reform policy.

In self-governmental resistance, the MST resists through governing policies normally the prerogative of governments that exercise state power. In this chapter, I discuss how the movement's land occupations, encampments, and in certain cases, settlements, are central elements in their institutionalization of an alternative mode of governing agrarian reform. Through challenging initiatives to privatize land, planning communal production and living arrangements, and administering resources collectively, the MST implements a version of agrarian reform that counters state power and private property. Because of these qualities, the MST's resistance qualifies as self-governmental, not revolutionary or reformist.

In addition to discussing what constitutes the MST's mode of self-governmental

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36 My discussions of organization are mainly focused on fieldnotes and interviews with participants in encampments. In fact, one contemporary issue the movement is facing concerns regaining control of administration and governance in settlements. This problem, as well as the declining numbers of encampments, is addressed more in the concluding section of this chapter.
resistance in agrarian reform policy, I also explain how it has developed. I focus on how two sub-categories of strategy – direct-action and instrumentalization – cause the movement's institutionalization of this novel mode of social movement contention. As will become apparent in this dissertation's other chapters, their success in mobilizing participants for their version of agrarian reform exceeds their accomplishments in educational and agricultural production policies due to a comparatively higher level of strategic strength.

I begin the chapter by discussing how the centralization of decision-making authority, homogenization of singular cultural practices and modes of identification, and implantation of unequal social relations – the defining qualities of state power – have characterized agrarian reform policies not only in Brazil, but in various other countries. After this broad exploration of agrarian reform in the first section, I analyze how the MST's practices both contest the state manner of conducting agrarian reform, as well as the institution of private property. Comparing the dominant, Brazilian form of agrarian reform with the MST's practices reveals how the movement's project is, in fact, oppositional. The final, third, section of this chapter explains and evaluates MST success by using my theory of strategy – focusing on the preparation of resources and knowledge, as well as the level of objective coherence and consistency. I show how my theory provides a better causal explanation for the movement's efforts to institutionalize self-governmental resistance in agrarian reform than alternatives that would attribute the MST's success to contextual factors like state strength or governmental allies.
3.1 State Governance in Agrarian Reform and the Construction of Private Property

The General Contours of Twentieth Century Agrarian Reform

Land redistribution through the formation of rural settlements was an essential component to all twentieth century agrarian reform efforts, from Africa to Latin America. A central reason was to transform overly exploitative semi-feudal, feudal, or simply non-capitalist, rural forms of production into more equitable modes of capitalist production, depriving communist organizers of the chance to mobilize grievances (DeJanvry: 1981; Theissenhausen: 1989; 1995). Redistributing land is central to, but does not exhaust, an adequate definition of agrarian reform. Agrarian reform, and the policies, ideas and laws that constitute it, deal fundamentally with how people re-appropriate land. This entails systematic changes to already-existing ownership or tenure patterns, e.g. share-cropping, tenant-farming, and/or wage-labor, as well as forms of redistribution and acquisition, e.g. top-down state forms and/or through land occupations. In general, agrarian reform is the coordinated, planned set of actions to reconfigure patterns of land ownership, modes of organizing labor for food production and/or raw material extraction, and class relations.

Agrarian reform policies also reveal the intersection of private property with state power. State-led modes of agrarian reform that changed previous ownership patterns often took place by establishing individualized forms of private property. They erected

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37 Agrarian reform in Cuba and Soviet Union did not promote the creation of capitalism or private property. Policies between countries, however, still centralized state power, established unequal administrative roles, and promoted homogeneous cultural identities behind developmental ideologies and/or nationalism.

38 For example, the indigenous tenant-farmers in the pre-agrarian reform Ecuadorian
coherent – what James Scott calls – “grids” that “rendered legible” diverse populations and cultures for elites who centralized and concentrated the means of social control and violence (1998). In grid-making, governmental elites had greater ease establishing systems of taxation and police. With fence posts established, taxes were collected, and security assured, often, through granting governmental authorities the power to protect (and as a byproduct, privileging) individual proprietorship. Exercising force over and through territory becomes institutionalized apart from landowners, who were deprived of police and semi-sovereign powers. Agrarian reform policies make landowners “private,” i.e. social, actors.

In addition to usually promoting private property, state power in agrarian reform policies also centralizes authority and subordinates social actors to government elites. As written into many constitutions, eminent domain reserves government the right to potentially take the land of any owner for whatever reason, often, for a price. This prerogative, in terms of redistribution, provides a base-line difference between expropriation and stealing; the former is conducted with state power, while the latter by non-state, private groups, or individuals. Centralizing the actual process of expropriation also creates unequal state/society relations. For instance, certain authorities or institutions exercise roles like surveying territory, expropriating property, and monitoring ownership rights and responsibilities. When such roles are performed by representatives of state

“Huasipungo” tenure system were granted land on certain expropriated, large plantations where they previously lived in debt peonage. Concerning the relationship between private property and state governance, the Huasipungo arrangement – characteristic of share-cropping, tenant-farmer, and other general “peasant” forms of production – kept families “off the grid,” requiring no state-recognized deed for their land, subjecting them to the landowners' oversight and punishment.
power, they subordinate social actors who lack such authority.

The final quality of state power – in addition to centralization and inequality – in state-led agrarian reform practices is cultural homogenization, which takes place as a result of enforcing private property arrangements. First, demarcating specific lots and spaces allows for the construction and proliferation of singular national identities, e.g. through solely allowing or privileging access to land by people with citizenship status. Second, in the United States as well as through Brazil and other countries in Latin America, the process of creating and expanding private property meant the displacement of indigenous peoples and their forced subjection to a sedentary form of agriculture. Different cultural appropriations of land – nomadic, for example – become subject to the “grid” imposed by state-enforced private property arrangements. This grid and construction of private property effectively outlaws, or at least makes exceedingly difficult, alternative modes of property ownership and their accompanying cultures and identities. From cultural homogenization to private property, we can see the general economic and political contours of state-led agrarian reform. Such qualities, furthermore, constitute the targets of MST self-governmental resistance.

Agrarian Reform in Brazil

Brazil's official agrarian reform policies, even though differing from the majority of other Latin American countries' experiences, still illustrate the general qualities of the state power. In Brazil, state-led land distribution takes place through periodic expropriations of farms and ranches with the goal to establish rural settlements. Public
land is also re-appropriated by governmental authorities and redistributed to other social actors after discovering fraudulent land claims and occupancy by large landowners, known as “grilhagem.” Governmental policies and practices concerning agrarian reform in Brazil contrast with more extensive and effective cases, e.g. Cuba, as well as with less-successful examples, e.g. Ecuador, in the sense that these others took place through dividing all territory into “reform” and “non-reform sectors.” The former is constituted by rural areas subject to redistribution according to certain land size or level of productivity requirements, while the latter is exempt (Kay: 1998; Rosset: 2006; Borras Jr, et al: 2007).

The Brazilian experience, initiated with the passing of the Estatuto da Terra (Land Statute) in 1964, never developed in such stark terms with respect to sectors that classified all land at one time for potential redistribution. Regardless, the evaluative measures for distributing land according to size and level of productivity found in the Land Statute and other laws establishes the criteria through which redistribution occurs. State-led agrarian reform has not taken place in Brazil by means of creating stark divisions of territory. It has, nevertheless, resulted over time in wide ranging re-appropriations of land and fundamental changes in rural labor patterns.

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39 “Grilhagem” is the name given to taking lands fraudulently, which took place historically when lands that were under public domain – known as “terras devolutas (returned lands)” – were occupied by landowners. They would write false deeds and then place them in desk drawers with crickets (grilhos, in Portuguese) that would nibble the papers, turning them into fragments and making them appear old. The term “terras devolutas” comes from colonial times, when Brazil's independence from the Portuguese king “returned” lands to the Brazilian king. The MST legitimates its struggle, at least originally, through claiming how large landowners, “latifundiarios,” were illegally using land – practicing “grilhagem”.

40 The 1964 legislation effected agrarian reform through colonization programs, sending poorer rural workers and landless peasants to other areas in the country, particularly
Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agrária (Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform or INCRA) – the MST's main interlocutor and target – is the officially recognized governmental institution in Brazil responsible for executing agrarian reform policy. It also showcases state power's constitutive elements. First, concerning the subordination of social actors, INCRA's main task, as I was often reminded by its workers in my interviews, is “fiscalização da função social na constituição (supervising (or ensuring) that the social function clause in the constitution is enforced).” The tasks involving social function are mighty; INCRA ought to ensure that landowners adhere to labor laws, respect environmental legislation, and monitor levels of economic production on all of Brazil's 5,175,489 agricultural operations (see Law 4504/1964; the 1988 Constitution, Articles 170-174; Law 8629/1993; Agricultural Census 2006). INCRA is also in charge of regularizing land claimed “irregularly,” i.e. claimed or occupied by individuals or companies with fraudulent documentation. Through these attributes, INCRA assumes a police function. In subordinating social actors to the government, the Institute assures that it – alone – assesses land according to the appropriate criteria in the event of expropriation. Irregular and economically unproductive holdings are subject to INCRA's purview. Such land is also the main target of MST occupations.

INCRA's regulatory or police function relies on verifying and assessing levels of land productivity, subordinating social actors in a hierarchical division of labor. Only the Institute's officials can conduct studies to ascertain levels of economic productivity and verify if land is suitable for expropriation. Furthermore, recent efforts to track and

the Amazon, to diffuse potential land conflicts (dos Tavares: 1993).
document land with GPS technologies assists INCRA officers to classify all properties in Brazil, providing elites with privileged, exclusive information that erects a barrier between representatives of state authority with exclusive access to this data and social actors, like the MST, who lack it (Interview: Richards, INCRA-Brasilia, 2-10-2011). INCRA is also responsible for distributing initial credits for houses and production – known as “creditos de fomento” and “instalação” (respectively, formation and installation credits) – that distribute material resources (to be repaid at a later time) to families once they have usufruct rights. Together, GPS, credit distribution, and economic assessment tests subordinate social actors to governmental elites. State power establishes this division, or separation, between governmental elites who deploy it and social actors who do not.

Official, governmental agrarian reform policy is marked by social subordination as well as by centralization, another defining quality of state power. Centralization is apparent in the use of executive decree in the final decision to expropriate land. MST occupations and encampments, as I discuss in the next section, present an alternative version. In the movement's oppositional, yet rule-based and systematized, resistance in the policy area of agrarian reform, they both decentralize and equalize agrarian reform policy through including more individuals and contesting the government's hierarchical administrative division of labor.

Despite INCRA's decentralized façade in the past and present, with regional “superintendências,” or offices in each state, state power still acts in a centralizing manner. Historically, INCRA officials worked closely with families who acquired land,
particularly during the military government. Various officials I interviewed who had worked at INCRA during this period actually lived with families during the implantation and construction of settlements (Interview: Agneur, INCRA – RS, 2-28-2011). Now, internet access and the use of transportation supposedly enable officials to interact with families. Such new technologies grant INCRA officials power to keep information, document families, and give assistance if needed, despite their persistent complaints of insufficient finances and staff (Interview: Jurindir, INCRA-PR, 8-1-2011; INCRA: 2010). Yet no matter if operating through a regional office, capital city, or on site, general policy directives and budgetary issues are formulated by few elites. Emanating from the capital in Brasilia, decision-making authority is centralized in the hands of the executive who expropriates property and the few officials who create directives.

Lastly, the Brazilian government's version of agrarian reform – through the executive and INCRA – homogenizes a singular, national culture. Historically, rural settlements were part of “colonização (colonization)” projects, integral to the military government's campaign for national security and integration (Interview: Paulinho, INCRA-Brasilia, 2-8-2011). Even before this, settlement projects established during Getulio Vargas's era (1930-1954) intended to disperse immigrants from various countries into rural areas to avoid the chances of forming cultural enclaves (dos Santos: 1993). And the first rural settlements in the 19th century outside of Rio de Janeiro were also established to “Europeanize, whiten, and civilize Brazil (Neves: 2008).” The settlement and efforts to redistribute land have always carried homogenizing racial and nationalist culture characteristics and favored modes of identification.
The nationalist thrust continues because only Brazilian nationals are allowed to access agrarian reform policies. Privileging Brazilian families, historically as well as currently, connects property to citizenship. Nomadic, indigenous, and specifically, non-individualized or communal cultures find little to no support, seen in the limited recognition and support for extractive reserves for indigenous communities and quilombo settlements for descendants of runaway slave communities. Both, in addition to certain MST practices, challenge private property and promote alternative identities. The norm, historically and currently, however, is the promotion of a singular, nationalist culture that hinders the development of alternative, non-sedentary, and communal livelihoods in rural areas.

In addition to how INCRA and the executive centralize, homogenize, and establish unequal social roles – together the qualities characteristic of state power – they also promote private property. Institutional directives and external pressure brought by recent congressional audits particularly contribute to its continued development. For instance, many INCRA directors and workers told me of the tension between “emancipating” and “consolidating” the settlements. Emancipation, a general term used to describe one of the institution’s overall directives, comes from Fernando Enrique Cardoso’s administration (1994-2002). The goal – which some call neoliberal because of the emphasis placed on privatization (Wolford: 2005; de Medeiros: 2007) – involves families receiving definitive title to their land. This replaces their initial usufruct rights, “freeing” (emancipating) them from INCRA’s oversight, programs, and policies (Cardoso: 1997). Government support is intended, from the emancipation perspective, to create self-
sufficient, individualistic proprietors who eventually own their land and exist independently of social programs and services. Since its mid-1990s origin, this view of property has found opposition from the MST and their implementation of alternative forms of settlement, which I detail in the next section.

The official alternative to emancipation is consolidation. I was told by officials appointed during the center-left Lula administration how consolidation encapsulates the government's shift, from “freeing” families, to building adequate infrastructure and production capacities. Consolidation de-emphasizes emancipation's impetus to form individualized, private landholdings. Focusing on infrastructure and development means that prior to issuing titles, priorities include building roads, making viable economic production, and establishing working sanitation systems (Olivera: 2010). The credits distributed, as well as the land, became during the last ten years considered “fondo perdido (lost funds),” meaning that families who were distributed resources (land, credit, infrastructure) were not expected to repay (Interview: Kiel, INCRA-Brasilia, 1-31-2011). The apparent effect is that state policies promote a redistribution of wealth to poorer, agrarian reform beneficiaries, de-emphasizing private proprietorship.

Despite consolidation, private property and emancipation remain dominant. In particular, INCRA has come under pressure from Tribunal das Contas da União (National Tribunal Court or TCU) to emancipate settlements after Congressional Inquiries both of the MST and INCRA stressed the need for greater transparency in agrarian reform policy and cost reduction. INCRA has been audited and pressured by the TCU to end consolidation by issuing definitive ownership titles, charging families for the credits, and
establishing payment plans for land (TCU: ACÓRDÃO Nº 557/2004; TCU: Relatório e Parecer Prévio sobre as Contas do Governo da República Exercício de 2009; CPI da Terra: 2005). Preferences for emancipation over consolidation were voiced in interviews with TCU officials in charge of crafting institutional reforms for INCRA. I was told how INCRA's practices of land acquisition and credit distribution were “inefficient” methods that created “social dependents” (Interview: TCU Lawyers, 9-13-2011). TCU authority is grounded in the 1988 constitution and guiding legislation – its “lei organica (organic law)” – that grants the institution the ability to compel other institutions to improve costs and adhere to constitutional guidelines. With respect to agrarian reform, the TCU uses this authority to pressure INCRA to issue definitive title and require that families pay for land and credit. Emancipation and not consolidation is the norm.

Agrarian reform is about changing – or rather, re-appropriating – previous tenure patterns, modes of organizing labor for food production and/or raw material extraction, and class relations. A state-directed mode of implementing agrarian reform policy is characterized by centralizing authority, homogenizing culture, and establishing unequal state/society relations. In Brazil, INCRA executes agrarian reform policy according to these three defining qualities of state power. Agrarian reform policy also shows, even though state power and private property are distinct, that the two can potentially support one another. Specifically, establishing an easily decipherable “grid” that legally enforces individualized, private property relationships, allows elites to document, find, catalogue,
and thus control, populations. INCRA assists in the creation of private property – often indirectly because of pressure from other state institutions such as the TCU – while also contributing to efforts to homogenize culture, establish unequal state/society relationships, and centralize decision-making authority. In the next section of this chapter, I show how the MST challenges private property and the central qualities of state power in their institutionalization of self-governmental resistance.

3.2 The MST's Institutionalization of Self-Governmental Resistance in Agrarian Reform

Self-governmental movements, with the MST as an example, resist through designing and implementing policies normally the prerogative of governmental authorities. This mode of resistance distinguishes them from reform and revolutionary movements. Specifically, they continuously contest state power and private property through vying for control of government-controlled services on behalf of their members. That is, they take a policy that governments usually exercise and redevelop it by practicing it in ways that directly challenge state power. This mode of resistance does not challenge the state by pressuring for greater inclusion (like reform movements), or by replacing it (as revolutionary movements). Like social movement resistance in general, self-governmental contention is not spontaneous or sporadic, but rooted in systematized practices and rules – what I see as indicative of institutionalization. In this section, I lay out the MST's mode of institutionalizing self-governmental resistance through an examination of how the movement implements an alternative mode of agrarian reform that challenges both private property and state power.
The MST opposes state-led agrarian reform policies by creating an oppositional movement identity and promoting ways to decentralize decision-making power, equalize administrative roles, and produce diverse cultures. I observe two ways that the movement institutionalizes their alternative agrarian reform project: (1) in their encampment and settlement organization and (2) mobilization of land occupations. While usually considered solely disruptive acts – especially land occupations – both also play integral roles in the MST's mode of implementing their vision of agrarian reform.

Nucleos and the Challenge to Administrative Subordination

One central element of the MST's mode of self-governmental resistance – with respect to both equalizing administrative roles and decentralizing state power – is their “nucleo” or small group structure of administration. Also known as “organicidade,” or “organicity,” this mode of arranging administrative roles characterizes the movement's internal structure overall, including their institutionalization of other areas such education and agricultural production. In agrarian reform policy, nucleo administration is clearest in the encampments the MST establishes immediately after occupying land.\textsuperscript{42} Early movement documents tell how the movement's internal organization originates at this level – in the actual space where a movement occupies land – and includes regional, state, and then the national level (MST: 1985). Nucleos, or small groups of members, exist within each of the movement's sectors and levels. Each nucleo, from the encampment to

the national level, is ideally led by one man and one woman who are elected for two years terms. Together, with the rest of their group, they decide collectively on matters in a consensual manner (Stédile and Fernandes: 1999; Martins and Carter: 2010).

The division of labor within the encampment contests state power's subordination of social actors. INCRA's role, as discussed in the previous section, involves expert knowledge when assessing land for expropriation and the distribution of credits deemed necessary for beginning a viable settlement. These actions create an unequal relationship, placing an impermeable barrier between governmental institutions and social actors in terms of administration. From the perspective of governmental authorities, agrarian reform begins when officials negotiate with families and movement leaders in the encampment, begin to divide lots, and grant the formal property rights to the encamped families.

For the MST, agrarian reform begins long before the distribution of credits and de jure recognition of the encampment. From the moment the land is occupied, nucleos are created, each with different tasks that correspond to movement sectors, including day-to-day activities concerning health, education, production, and culture. Each also potentially constitutes the movement's contention of specific policy area. But considered together, they provide the general governing structure for encampment affairs.

Requirements for belonging to a nucleo are minimal, if non-existent. In one encampment where I lived, identifying land for production and preparing it was organized by various families, many of whom had no prior experience in agricultural

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INCRA also distributes “cestas básicas,” subsidized food rations, to families in the encampments.

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production (Fieldnotes: Encampment 2 Outside Londrina, Paraná, 7-3-2011). In another, the requirement for participation in the education nucleo was having children. Their primary work involved finding transportation for children to the municipal school and guaranteeing that the children were well-received (Fieldnotes: Encampment 1 Outside of São Paulo, São Paulo, 8-10-2009). In two other encampments in different states – Paraná and Pernambuco – I participated in nightly patrols that functioned to assure security, especially if the need arose to notify families in case of a police (or private security) eviction (Fieldnotes: Encampment 1 Outside Londrina, Paraná, 6-20-2011; Fieldnotes: Encampment Outside Arcoverde, Pernambuco, 9-10-2009). Regardless of region or state, as well as activity, I found similar small group administration with minimal knowledge requirements organizing encampment affairs. Such standardization of social movement activities, despite connotations implying conservativization or accommodation, is central to the MST's resistance.

Re-appropriating land according to the knowledge that each individual and family brings to the encampment directly opposes the mode promoted by governmental authorities. The MST’s equalizing efforts to institutionalize their manner of conducting agrarian reform distributes roles between different nucleos in the encampments, as well as in certain settlements. Like Paulo Freire's understanding of dialogue and knowledge – which I further discuss in the next chapter on education – the members are all experts (or seen as capable of becoming so) in a variety of ways, from providing security to leading meetings. A “lack” only exists from the standpoint of governmental authorities, who consider the execution of agrarian reform policy as depending on credit, expert
knowledge, and de jure land redistribution. State power's subordination of social actors is challenged by the MST systematically equalizing roles amongst members, rather than reserving them for governmental elites. Agrarian reform according to the Brazilian government, and in particular INCRA, rests on an unequal division of administrative labor that is premised on re-appropriating land involving governmental officials policing – understood in a broad sense – territory.

There is also a disciplinary side to the MST's self-governmental resistance in agrarian reform policy. For example, dealing with problems within certain encampments like stealing, fights, and drinking, usually results in movement leaders expelling rule-breakers after discussing the issue in assembly with the rest of the encampment (Turatti: 2005). Some encampments and settlements have completely banned alcohol following incidents with certain members (Fieldnotes: Settlement Outside of Caruaru, Pernambuco, 9-1-2009). Families become subjects trained to form groups, work together, and punish one another, with movement leadership prepared to step in only if necessary. The disciplinary function in the MST encampment stresses community forms of punishment, opposing the state-form of practicing discipline that is rooted in a separate, “public” institution, i.e. the police. Government police, however, are usually called for larger crimes such as murder (Fieldnotes: Encampment 2 Outside of São Paulo, São Paulo, 8-5-2009). Despite delegating security in extreme cases to state authority, most movement work on promoting their own protection in encampments constitutes a challenge to completely entrusting governmental police forces with control over encampment spaces. Defiance to state power is located in security provision and discipline that groups supply
themselves, without particular knowledge requirements that would subordinate them to governmental elites.

The Challenge to Culture

The institutionalization of MST self-governmental resistance also cultivates a movement-centered identity\textsuperscript{44} that challenges the state-directed, homogenizing alternative. Most movement activities, including the school day for children and national level meetings of leaders, showcase a display of movement symbols, called the “mística.” Each mística usually is centered around a ritual that involves the MST’s flag, references to past – usually deceased – leaders or members, and allusions to common movement demands for agroecology or land reform. Nowhere is the mística’s effect more salient than in the encampment. I attended, as well as participated in, numerous misticas.\textsuperscript{45} Of all those I attended, the ones I observed in encampments were the most organized and disciplined. In one encampment, once a week, everyone in the encampment lined up single file to sing the movement hymn (and not the Brazilian) while each nucleo’s leaders would report on issues pertaining to their area (Fieldnotes: Encampment 1 Outside Londrina, Paraná, 6-25-2011). I was told in another encampment how the children learn the movement’s hymn and attend místicas to cultivate a sense of belonging to the movement (Fieldnotes: Encampment 2 Outside Londrina, 7-5-2011). Songs, chants, and the regular use of

\textsuperscript{44} For more on identity, see Fanelli, Luca, and Sarah Sarzynski. ”The Concept of Sem Terra and the Peasantry in Brazil.” *Journal of Developing Societies* 19, no. 2-3 (2003): 334-364, and also Chapter 1 and 2 in Caldart’s “Pedagogia do Movimento” (1999).

\textsuperscript{45} I will discuss more particular “místicas” and their contents in other chapters, especially as they relate to each of the areas where the MST attempts to gain control.
symbols promoted in misticas constitute mainstays in the MST’s work to instill their identity around the movement, and specifically, their connection to agrarian reform.

The identity created solidifies member allegiance in opposition to homogenizing efforts promoted by the state. In some encampments, one usually sees more MST imagery than Brazilian. Entrance points are typically identifiable by the movement's flag and guarded by members at checkpoints often wearing the movement's easily identifiable red shirts and hats, giving the impression that one is entering an area under the MST’s control rather than the government's. Even though the “mistica” and symbolism appear at all events and sites, their roles in encampments are especially salient because many people in these spaces are new to the movement. As a result, the movement takes great care and time to inculcate a sense of belonging. This work, particularly in the encampment, connects the MST to the land and meaning of the struggle for agrarian reform.

While in a sense uniformly applied to all areas where the movement is active, the MST's cultivation of their own form of identification also allows local, diverse cultural formations to develop with respect to land use. In one collaboration between an engineering firm and the movement in Paraná, I was told how movement leaders were integral to certain settlement designs, deciding where to place schools, churches, and recreational areas (Interview: SENGE Engineer, Curitiba, 10-15-2011). Rather than imposing one form of settlement, the movement has embraced multiple forms of settling land (especially recently), including circular arrangements known as “agrovilas,” individualized settlements where families live apart, as well as the organization in long
lines known as “agrolinhas.” Fully communal areas are also promoted, especially in settlements. Encampments, where there are no real property divisions, show de facto communal land arrangements despite families usually living in separate houses. Furthermore, the MST's nucleo structure in place in encampments and settlements relays information to all levels of the movement about previous problems in settlement and encampment design. These regularized practices contribute to debates and allow for flexibility concerning the best arrangement of production, culture, and domicile spaces (ANCA: 2002). Movement-centered identity – what I identify as a proximate cause to institutionalizing resistance – functions as a barrier between movement and government. In agrarian reform, this division acts as a way to enable different cultural appropriations of land to develop.

Governmental alternatives – historically and currently – promoted developmental ideologies and nationalism, homogenizing the meanings and practices around land use. Organicity and connections with the movement's “base,” or grassroots, regularly provide the movement the ability to adapt and change according to local conditions, needs, and demands. This opposes the single, homogenous project promoted through the exercise of state power. While the citizenship requirement for receiving usufruct and definitive title remains in effect with the MST settlements, the institutionalization of the nucleo arrangement enables the proliferation of multiple land use patterns. Furthermore, the formation of private property through emancipation policy directives and the relatively recent TCU efforts to streamline agrarian reform policy reduces the ways land can be owned and re-appropriated. The MST's settlement design variations allow for multiple
formations, opposing singularity by attempting to empower local actors in organizing the spaces where they live.

**Decentralizing Practices as Opposition to State Centralization**

In addition to challenging subordination and homogenization, MST institutionalized resistance also contests how state power centralizes decision-making power. One way the movement practices decentralization in opposition to state power is through charging compliance through service or “tax.” While visiting one encampment in the state of Paraná, I was told that “acampados (families in the encampment)” each pay a $R 3 contribution per month to the movement, while others who do not live in the settlement, but who want land, pay $R 90 (Field Notes: Encampment 2 Outside Londrina, Paraná, 7-12-2011). The monetary charge is often complemented by a service charge, e.g. attendance at protests and political trainings or activities to manage the encampment, such as security patrols. In another visit to an encampment, but in São Paulo, I was told that all these activities earn potential land reform beneficiaries “points” (Field Notes: Encampment 2 Outside of São Paulo, São Paulo, 8-10-2009). Concerning land distribution, the “points” earned by members put them on a list that local movement leaders keep in order to rank who is most deserving of land. This practice is called the “sorteio,” which the MST uses to negotiate with INCRA officials concerning who gets settled and where (ANCA: 2002). The movement thus moves families to certain states and areas, depending on open slots in abandoned spaces on existing settlements or new encampments awaiting official recognition. In this sense, the movement controls the land
at the center of agrarian reform policy, taking power away from the government. This example illustrates decentralization: the movement establishes itself as an additional actor with decision-making authority.

MST-led land occupations also decentralize the selection, as well as the execution process in agrarian reform, by involving hundreds and sometimes thousands of people. Rather than waiting for selection of lands and actual expropriation to take place through executive decree, the movement selects areas in a variety of ways: sometimes based on their own studies, local hearsay concerning criminal behavior of certain landowners, and/or perhaps notifications from INCRA officials themselves. The movement's expropriation process decentralizes activity by involving many new, previously uninvolved, social actors in decision-making. Collectively, families and leaders decide where to occupy, indicating the land for later official expropriation.

Occupations themselves are well-organized, systematized affairs. Apparent spontaneity is betrayed by months of door knocking where organizers recruit families from rural workers and people who live in the urban periphery for what is sometimes called a “festa (party).” This lighthearted language represents the occupation as fun – not as potentially dangerous. The location of occupations is shrouded in secrecy, with the destination known only to a few leaders. For example, in one occupation, not of land but of a government building, I was never told the destination. When I asked other members where we were going, I found they were just as confused. Secrecy constitutes a rule or procedure, regularly practiced in organizing occupations. In a sense, it centralizes decision-making in the hands of a few movement leaders. This feature is temporary,
however, as the true dynamics to carrying out the occupations involve many families in actual re-appropriation (Fieldnotes: Encampment in INCRA Office, Belem, Pará, 7-1-2009; Frontline: “Cutting the Wire,” 2005).

In addition to secrecy and the incentive “point” structure, regularized or institutionalized practices integral to occupations include working the land and constructing tents for the families to live in immediately after arrival. These efforts serve both symbolic and practical goals: on the one hand, families need to live somewhere and grow their food, while on the other hand, the movement legitimates many of their occupations as cultivating “unproductive lands.” Immediately working on occupied land shows the movement as the productive agent as opposed to the landowner. For these reasons, land occupations are at once destabilizing and stabilizing, i.e. they challenge the dominant socio-economic relations in the countryside, while their regularly established internal conduct establishes an alternative mode of organizing and implementing agrarian reform policy.

Resistance to Private Property

The MST's institutionalization of contention in agrarian reform – opposing centralized decision-making, promoting a more equal administrative division of labor, and enabling multiple cultural land uses to proliferate – also challenges private property. In particular, the MST's goal is to create settlements where families have usufruct rights, not definitive title that would allow individual families to sell their land (MST: 1995). The movement opposes land sales and insists that title ultimately remains with INCRA,
rather than with the individual families. Living on government-owned land removes the ability of movement members to individualize land holdings though sales or rent. This gives the movement a way to retain members because sales could facilitate individuals leaving the movement by selling their land. With the institution private property in general, individual owners have their holdings recognized and protected by a separate public authority. By vying for control of encampment and settlement design, the movement selects families and organizes land use, opposing the divide between public and private spheres.

By refusing the right to alienate property, the MST places a barrier for members to exit the movement, while also continually providing a target for complaints (the government). The idea that the movement converts itself into a permanent ward of the government is actually only a concern during the initial two to three years following de jure recognition. At this time, credits and loans for houses and production implements are first distributed. This period is when INCRA is most involved, with any sudden changes seriously placing in danger the settlement process (Interview: Robert Kiel, INCRA-Brasilia, 1-31-2011). After the distribution of these resources, however, interaction with the government is minimal. The logic behind the demand is not to remain on public land per se, but to remove the public/private distinction when it comes to property rights. And remaining on government-owned land provides the movement a scapegoat for problems, placing blame on the government for not executing agrarian reform to the fullest of its potential.

The movement challenge to private property also occurs through simple acts of
ignoring public officials and making preliminary designs for agricultural production. In one interview concerning the problems INCRA faces in emancipating settlements, one official pointed to boxes of titles sent to MST members that were returned blank to the INCRA office (Interview: Jurindir, INCRA office Curitiba, Paraná, 8-1-2011). I was also told of the lack of progress in privatizing settlements in São Paulo state, where one experience was mentioned (Interview: Jose Bocarim, INCRA office in São Paulo, São Paulo, 11-1-2011). The government encourages privatization and the MST challenges it. Also, communal production – the dynamics of which I will explore more in Chapter 5 – is planned in certain encampments and settlements. This involves collective land ownership where there is no clear divide between individual families. The MST's resistance to private property is apparent in their refusal to establish individual property arrangements and promotion of collective land ownership.

The MST's self-governmental resistance institutionalizes a series of rules and procedures in the area of agrarian reform policy. They counter state power through decentralizing the authority to make decisions in land occupations, resisting potentially homogenizing modes of land re-appropriation and land use, and challenging the unequal distribution of administrative roles promoted by INCRA. The sense of movement identity created in encampments offers a bulwark against attempts to propagate national forms of belonging. The movement's efforts, as we will see in the next section, are their most successful attempts at institutionalizing self-governmental resistance. In comparison to other areas – education and agricultural production – the MST's institutionalization of resistance in agrarian reform policy shows higher levels of success. The reason, which
becomes apparent in the next section and in the chapters on education and agricultural production, is a relatively high level of strategic strength.

3.3 Explaining and Evaluating the MST's Resistance in Agrarian Reform

The preceding section analyzed the MST's alternative mode of governing agrarian reform that opposes state power and private property. That section answered the question, what is social movement self-governmental resistance in agrarian reform policy? In broad brushstrokes, I explained the contentious nature of the MST's encampments and occupations vis-a-vis state-led agrarian reform in the Brazilian context. In that section, I explored the nature of the MST's institutionalization of self-governmental resistance without documenting its overall level of success.

This section explains how the movement has developed self-governmental resistance. This dissertation's guiding question – how can a social movement successfully develop a self-governmental mode of institutionalizing resistance? – is answered in this section, specifically through an analysis of movement strategy. Here, I provide empirical indicators that I use to explain the movement's development and evaluate their success.

As a measure of success, I focus on the number of occurrences and participants involved in actions particular to agrarian reform such as land occupations, encampments, and demonstrations. Land occupations and encampments, like I discussed in the previous section, illustrate the MST's brand of self-governmental resistance in agrarian reform policy because they simultaneously stabilize a movement-centered form of order while destabilizing the government's alternative. Their coordinated, rule-based opposition to
state power and private property illustrates their self-governmental qualities.

Demonstrations or marches, which I discuss more in the conclusion, reveal consistent levels of mobilization, but also potential changes in the MST's strategic strength and approach.

I explain the movement's level of success through applying my theory of strategy as laid out in Chapter 2. First, I discuss how the movement's combination of strategies explains self-governmental resistance in agrarian reform. Second, I measure each subcategory's strength. The particular subcategories I document are direct-action and instrumental strategies, which I argue, cause self-governmental resistance as seen in the MST's alternative agrarian reform project. To support my argument, I use counter-factual analysis to rule out alternative explanations. In general, this section tests my three hypotheses: (1) that certain combinations of strategic action lead to different modes of movement institutionalization, (2) how increases in the iterations in movement plans of specific targets and goals, as well as in the time spent researching and documenting targets and goals, results in greater strategic strength and thus a higher potential for successful institutionalization and (3) if a low level of preparation exists with high levels of consistent and coherent objective formation, or visa versa, then we see a level of institutionalization lower than if both indicators were classified as high, yet higher than if both were low.

*The MST's High Level of Self-Governmental Success in Agrarian Reform*

The empirical indicators that I use to document the MST's success in agrarian
reform policy come from the academic literature, databases assembled by other social organizations, and official state reports. The main indicators I use to measure my dependent variable – institutionalization of self-governmental resistance, which in this chapter is confined to agrarian reform – include the number of occurrences relevant to the policy area (occupations, encampments, and settlements) and the percentage of people mobilized.

We see that at the end of 2010 there were 8,562 settlements in Brazil, with 67, or a fraction of a percent, existing pre-1985 (INCRA: 2010). Sergio Leite, who conducted the most in-depth study of settlements to date, correlates the upsurge in movement activity led by the MST post-1985 with the increase in agrarian reform settlements (2004). Since 2000 (the first year reliable data for occupations has been kept according to movement), the MST has conducted roughly 50% of all land occupations in Brazil, organizing 1,757 out of the 3,563 total land occupations. Similarly, the number of families mobilized stands at a total of 494,428 in land occupations, with 311,160 of them – or 63% – organized by the MST. The movement has also mobilized the most families in encampments, with over 58% of the total families affiliated with the movement, or 85,205 families out of total 146,295 since 2000. From these numbers, and given that 26 other movements currently have organized land occupations, encampments, and settlements, the MST dominates this policy area and mobilizes more participants than any

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46 First, we cannot know from the existing data how many settlements are actually “MST settlements” because sometimes the movement conducts occupations and the families chose not to continue affiliation. And second, given the numbers on occupations, we do not know if an occupation leads to a settlement, as the families are possibly evicted and forced to go occupy elsewhere.

Most other movements that struggle for agrarian reform emerged following the MST's success in the 1990s. Some movements, such as the Movimento de Libertação dos Sem Terra (Movement for Landless Liberation or MLST), emerged over disagreements with MST strategy (Ondetti: 2008). Others, such as indigenous organizations located primarily in the Amazonian region, noticed the effect of the MST’s successful use of occupations and copied them. The participation of various labor unions, such as Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura (National Confederation of Agricultural Workers or CONTAG), Federação dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura Familiar (Federation of Workers in Family Farming or FETRAF), and Central Única dos Trabalhadores (Unified Workers’ Central or CUT) can be explained much in the same fashion. The MST is special because they are the only movement with a national scope. Most others, besides indigenous movements or groups like the Organização de Lutas no Campo (Organization for Struggle in the Country or OLC), are regional and confined to one or two states. Furthermore, the MST is not only the largest and most dominant, but it also has the reputation for being the most disciplined.

The MST's ability to mobilize participants is also apparent in the number of demonstrations they have organized for agrarian reform. As we can see in Figure 3 in Appendix 1, the movement has conducted over 58% of all demonstrations calling for agrarian reform since 2002 – not land occupations, but practices like marches and traffic blockades – (1,354 out of 2,326 total actions). Similar to land occupation trends, the movement shows dominance in this area by mobilizing the most participants as compared
to other movements with similar objectives. What stands out, however, when comparing demonstration and occupation trends is the apparent reversal. As displayed in Figure 4 in Appendix 1, a steady decrease of land occupations has occurred simultaneously with an increase in agrarian reform manifestations. This trend, which I will discuss in this chapter's conclusion, indicates a change in the movement's direct-action strategic orientation. This presents a way to test my first hypothesis concerning the effect of different strategies on modes of movement institutionalization. I claim that rather than showing a movement demobilized or weak, this trend reveals how the struggle for agrarian reform has taken on what may be considered more conventional forms of contention.

From this collection of sources, there is sufficient evidence to support the claim that the MST has achieved a high level of success in institutionalizing self-governmental resistance. The three different movement-led actions – land occupations, encampments, and manifestations – provide concrete examples of the MST alternative project, allowing us to measure their level of success. The movement has gained recognition in studies that acknowledge their efforts as the primary reason for the upsurge in land redistribution. Over the course of this dissertation, I document the movement's success in each area, i.e. agrarian reform, education, and agricultural production policy, by comparing the policy area's potential participants with those mobilized by the movement. Of all the policy areas where the MST is active, agrarian reform is where we see the movement's highest level of success.
Instrumental and Direct-action Strategies in MST Self-Governmental Resistance

I identify two subcategories of strategy – direct-action and instrumentalist – that explain how the MST has achieved success in institutionalizing its alternative agrarian reform project. Each subcategory contains the independent variables of consistent and coherent formulation of objectives and level of knowledge preparation. They also incorporate the MST’s plan to form an identity to guide their practices. Together, they cause the institutionalization of self-governmental resistance. A strategic approach to the study of how social movements institutionalize resistance focuses on specific movement plans concerning how they establish objectives and prepare knowledge, or “know-how.” Other agentic approaches, e.g. rational choice, also emphasize the decision-making abilities of actors, but apply a singular, de-contextualized way of representing action. The problem with this approach is that we cannot observe the effect of different kinds of plans. We also miss the role of identities in strategic planning, which I find as a proximate cause in explaining self-governmental resistance. Furthermore, variables that solely deal with contextual factors – like state strength and implementation of neoliberal programs – fail to account for MST rates of success rates. My theory of strategy explains how resistance unfolds and allows us to evaluate its success.

Instrumentalization, which I identify as one sub-category of strategy, involves the movement's plans to use another actor for achieving a certain objective. This kind of plan locates decision-making squarely with the movement, yet requires the presence of another actor for the movement to institutionalize. The relationship, instead of being characterized by some kind of symbiotic or synergistic relationship, is fraught with
tensions and the persistent possibility for collapse. This contrasts with mediated strategies, exemplified by interactions with legislators who are delegated ultimate decision-making power. With respect to my theory, general discussions of alliances and coalitions fall into the strategic subcategory of instrumentalization.

One instance of the MST's use of an instrumental strategy is in their development of their nucleo form of administration. Nucleos, as discussed in the previous section, constitute resistance as well as structure. This form of administration at once defies state power and provides an alternative form of order in its place. It arose as a result of movement created plans. Rather than appearing spontaneously, the MST used INCRA – a governmental institution – to develop its organicity to coordinate its challenge to status quo agrarian reform policy. Comparing current INCRA institutional directives and some of their documents on the role of social actors in settlement formation during the 1970s – before the existence of the MST – with the movement's current objectives, reveals where the MST plans to take, i.e. instrumentalize, knowledge and where it plans to institutionalize resistance.47

Common goals and the proposed organization in the MST's and INCRA's vision of agrarian reform detail where the movement took its plan for small-group administration. Prior to the MST's emergence, INCRA planned to settle families according to a 12 step program. The steps, or goals, included running schools,

47 The “Comunidades Eclesiais de Base (Ecclesiastical Base Communities)” were also important at this time, with movement members connected to the Catholic Church and liberation theology. Such base communities are similar to INCRA's nucleos, yet the former explicitly concerned functions and agrarian reform.
administering health care, and establishing cooperatives. One retired official also included how “cooperation” and “self-management” were to be encouraged between the settlers, in addition to organizing “small groups” with specific “functions” (Ramirez: 2006, 68). INCRA plans and designs for small groups in settlements existed prior to the MST's formation in the early 1980s. MST members, particularly in the early days of the movement, became aware of these goals and objectives after living in INCRA organized settlements (MST: 2002; Smith: 1982). That these plans and objectives existed prior to the MST shows a temporal gap with their proposal and the movement's origins. Close interaction during these initial stages allowed MST leaders to take INCRA for its designs.

MST strategic plans, rather than conceiving of action entirely apart from the Brazilian government like revolutionary contention, include plans to strengthen INCRA. The movement's official position is to demand that INCRA become directly connected to the presidency and receive more funds (MST: 2008). This does not mean, however, a switch to mediated strategic planning and thus reformist contention. To strengthen INCRA would entail more resources for use by the MST, specifically their nucleos. For example, technical assistance cooperatives formed by the movement benefit by receiving steady pay, a portion of which is taxed by the movement. Also, the knowledge

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48 The 12 programs, in their intended order for implementation, were: distribute land, plan territory, set administration organization, distribute initial credits, distribute initial production credits, build infrastructure, create means for education, administer health care, set up housing, create cooperatives, distribute another round of credits, and assist in commercializing production (Ramirez: 2006, 65-71).

49 The clearest example is COPTEC (Cooperativa de Prestação de Serviços Técnicos em áreas de Reforma Agrária or Service Cooperative for Agrarian Reform) in Rio Grande do Sul. Other cooperatives exist in other states, or members are trained and then serve communities with no official affiliation. Giving a portion of their pay and knowledge constitutes practices characteristic of all of them.
technicians acquire is shared with fellow activists in order to decentralize knowledge concerning settlement design. Additional material knowledge resources distributed to movement families in the form of credits to build or improve houses, as well as purchase food or implements, provide minimal resources upon which families can subsist. Thus, despite the MST's coordinated challenge to state power, the movement plans for INCRA to exist. In fact, the MST needs INCRA, yet the two remain relatively autonomous from one another, with the MST using INCRA for its own ends. In the past, the movement planned to use INCRA for its structure. Currently, the movement's instrumentalization strategy continues through devising ways to use government resources for their own ends.

The relative autonomy is apparent from observing the contentious relations – illustrative of instrumental strategies – that occur between the MST and INCRA. In the pre-MST era, “all the programs were the direct responsibility of INCRA,” whose implementation required social actors’ participation, yet with implementation ultimately requiring INCRA oversight (Ramirez: 2006, 70). Similarly, the claim to ultimate responsibility is established in current INCRA norms and directives, subordinating social actor's participation to ultimate state oversight. For example, directives for INCRA's Diretoria de Obtenção de Terras e Implantação de Projetos de Assentamento (Land Procurement Division) explicitly states that it, alone, is responsible for acquiring, obtaining, and planning land expropriation, as well as selecting families, while the Diretoria de Desenvolvimento de Projetos de Assentamento (Division of Settlement Development) claims final authority for coordinating, monitoring, and authorizing alterations in sustainable development, economic production, and social justice in
agrarian reform policies.\textsuperscript{50}

Tense relations are seen in different opinions concerning the appropriate roles of the movement in organizing agrarian reform policy. For some, the roles are defined with state actions insulated and separate from social actors (Interview: Richards, INCRA-Brasilia, 2-10-2011), while others see movement policy execution in a positive light (Interview: Clarice, INCRA-Brasilia, 2-1-2011). Divisions internal to INCRA, which potentially could lead to a breakup of the partnership, also include multiple positions concerning privatization. Some officials with whom I spoke expressed support of the movement's opposition of private property (Interview: Robert Kiel, INCRA-Brasilia, 1-31-2011) while others felt that property ought to eventually devolve to individual actors through sales (Interview: Cesar, INCRA-Brasilia, 2-9-2011). The MST's instrumental plans for INCRA are central to the development of their resistance but are always in danger of breaking apart.

Counter-factual analysis shows that if not for the relationship with INCRA, the MST's self-governmental resistance would have developed differently, perhaps not at all. We can understand the special nature of the relationship between INCRA and the MST when we compare the Brazilian and Cuban experience of implementing agrarian reform. Cuba represents one of the most extensive cases of the implementation of agrarian reform policy, as well as one that many MST leaders and members seek to emulate. Comparing the two, however, shows that the Cuban experience did not involve social actors in the ways we see them involved in Brazil. “Cooperation” figures into the Cuban experience,

\textsuperscript{50} Taken from website, www.INCRA.gov.br.
but only in the narrow emphasis placed on economic production (see Chapter 5 of the First Agrarian Reform Law of 1961). Cooperation was central to both INCRA’s and the MST's plans. In Cuba, the notion is peripheral to centralized state-led action.

Furthermore, Cuban efforts in agrarian reform represent the coordinated, systematized efforts of a revolutionary as opposed to a self-governmental movement. This is apparent in how Castro’s July 26th Movement, one year before actually seizing power, declared “Law 3,” which called for expropriation of land (Pinto Santos: 1999). That a movement would declare a law for the entire country shows aspirations to occupy state power. MST efforts are not based on passing laws that arrogate to itself the sole legislative power to expropriate land. In Cuba, before and after seizing of power, implementation focused on redistribution and nationalization by centralized state authorities without social participation (O’Connor: 1968; Alvarez, et al: 1995). The Cuban experience, also, shows no instrumental relationship with other actors or institutions. This quality, as displayed in the Cuban case, is indicative of the revolutionary institutionalization of resistance. Even though the MST draws on Cuba for inspiration, their institutional relationship with INCRA shows self-governmental – not revolutionary – qualities.

The MST’s plans to appropriate INCRA’s organizational structure shows the origins of the movement’s administrative structure that is integral to their institutionalization of self-governmental resistance. It also reflects strategic learning on the MST’s behalf concerning how to conduct agrarian reform struggles. At the time of their origins, leaders researched prior agrarian reform movements and discussed with
their leaders tactics and strategy. From their dialogue, conclusions adopted by the MST included retaining autonomy from political parties and unions, as well as avoiding presidentialism, i.e. centralizing decision-making power in one or two leaders (Stedile and Fernandes: 1999). In other words, the success or failure of their resistance, as understood by early MST militants, involved the form of the movement itself. They adopted the nucleo form as a means to not centralize power in single leaders, but to decentralize it. Movement leaders understood how not to organize from past struggles. They kept these ideas in mind when crafting plans to use INCRA's organizational design for their own purposes.

Rival explanations concerning how the MST has developed would attribute causal forces either to neoliberal policy reforms or low levels of state strength. Concerning neoliberalism, the timing of the MST's development and adoption of the nucleo arrangement occurs prior to any kind of neoliberal economic policy implementation. Given the timing, neoliberalism is not a cause or a condition for nucleo development. Cultural theorists, most notably Cardoso, noted that the military government involved social organizations in governance because of their own weakness and desire to gain social legitimacy at the end of their regime (1992). These cases, however, are not indicative of resistance, but rather synergy or collaboration. The MST's tense relationship

51 Movements included o Movimento dos Agricultores Sem Terra (MASTER) of the 1950s and the Ligas Campesinas (Peasant Leagues) of Pernambuco in the 1960s.
52 Likewise, especially historically, communism led to the organization of peasants under the banner of working class consciousness, which in Brazil and other countries, usually led to the formation of alliances between workers and peasants that did not treat the two on equal footing. Welch hints at this, noting how prior movements to represent the peasantry during the cold war were often performed by unions (1999, 2006).
with INCRA and state power shows a different kind of relationship, one distinct from collaboration, delegation, or synergy.

Another potential rival explanation – one that focuses on state strength – would explain the movement's development as a consequence of state absence or lack of capacity. INCRA, given its history of leadership changes and lack of resources, could be considered ideal for a social actor to dominate. In fact, Wolford has already made a version of this argument, claiming that MST actions in agrarian reform comprise a form of “participatory governance by default” (2010).” From the perspective of social movement theory, an institution's limited capacity to repress also could provide the opportunity for mobilization (Tarrow: 1998). Governmental weakness, however, does not explain the nature of the MST's resistance (self-governmental versus reform or revolutionary) because the movement's nucleo structure per se is not derivative of governmental absence. Or rather, absence does not, on its own, trigger the development of small group management. My account, focusing on strategy – specifically instrumentalization – absorbs Wolford's discussion of INCRA's limitations by showing where the MST's practice of governance, itself, comes from initially.

Another example of the movement's instrumental strategic orientation, which particularly ties into the movement's efforts to foment their identity in agrarian reform, involves their appropriation of ideational resources. The principle of social function laid out in the Brazilian constitution,\(^{53}\) legitimates the MST's use of land occupations – their

\(^{53}\) For more on the MST and legal struggles concerning land, see Meszaros, George. "Taking the land into their hands: The landless workers' movement and the Brazilian state." \textit{Journal of Law and Society} 27, no. 4 (2000): 517-541
way of challenging the centralization of state decision-making power. Evoking rights assists the movement in making the claim that occupations are a “last resort” for landless families that have tried surviving and working in all other possible ways – in cities and/or with welfare programs (Jornal Sem Terra: 1985). In this fashion, the movement represents its members as having exhausted all other available means to eek out a living. Because there is a right to land, however, and all other options fail, they have no choice but to develop their own form of access through occupations. This is a central part of the movement's “landless” identity: it carries with it some sense of economic deprivation, but also the idea that no other option for survival is available for its membership. The place of agrarian reform in the social function clause in the Constitution reinforces their claim with an appeal to justice, given that the laws exist but governmental elites do nothing.

If there were no use of ideational resources, then the movement would not have the same legitimacy. The appeal to rights and the Constitution grants the movement an absolute standard – regardless of the cost of land or programs – to support their actions for agrarian reform. This provides the movement an unassailable appeal, what in social movement literature would be considered a “master frame (Bedford and Snow: 2000),” or in other words, language that is difficult to question. Without the “landless” identity and its connection to rights, the movement's call for agrarian reform would weaken, and most likely so would member identification with the movement. In their use of rights, members see agrarian reform and land as owed to them – for their work, suffering, etc., – with landowners illegally taking land (e.g. through grilhagem) and exploiting it. The instrumentalization of rights simplifies the demand and easily differentiates friend from
With identities so stark, the reasons for agrarian reform are easier to communicate and mobilize. The simplicity of their message, the reasons provided for the struggle, and identification of enemies, provides means to solidify identities, which in turn, facilitates mobilization. Furthermore, the way that the “sem-terra” identity is constructed in plans situates the movement subject as the only willing actor in the struggle for agrarian reform. The MST's construction of the “landless” identity in agrarian reform policy both captures direct-action and instrumentalist qualities. Concerning the former, the movement is required to occupy lands because no other option is available. And for the latter, the government owes them, especially after decades of unfulfilled promises and failed interactions. Adherents to the MST consider themselves as deserving of land and willing to use government resources to gain it.

Constant relationships with INCRA and repeated use of rights-language allow us to evaluate the MST's instrumental strategy in taking the nucleo form of organization and ideational resources. Movement bulletins and documents criticizing large landowners and their abuse of power in the early 80s, reveals the early movement's efforts to connect the violation of the social function clause with large landowner unproductivity (e.g. Jornal Sem Terra: April, 1984; Jornal Sem Terra: December 1984 and January 1985). As is apparent in current movement documents and statements (e.g Jornal Sem Terra: July 2004; Jornal Sem Terra: August 2009), evoking the social function clause of the constitution and specific laws to challenge large, unproductive landowners by calling on INCRA to redistribute land, remains unaltered. While difficult to measure the use of ideas,
an electronic search for “reforma agrarian (agrarian reform)” in the movement's two major internal publications for circulation to membership – A Jornal Sem Terra and o Boletim Sem Terra – yielded 7,789 hits. “Sem terra (landless)” also appeared 6,639 times. Such a high iteration of terms indicates coherence and consistency in strategic planning.

In addition to coherence and consistency, multiple interactions since the late 1970s with INCRA officials has resulted in the movement acquiring knowledge, or “know-how,” concerning how to build nucleos and self-govern. In fact, the first settlers that began the MST in the late 1970s were families returning from failed attempts in the Amazon who had participated for years in INCRA settlements (dos Santos: 1993).

Regardless of fluctuations in levels of occupations and manifestations (see Fig. 1 in the Appendix), they both trigger regular responses and engagement with INCRA officials more than any other governmental actor. Routine meetings, visits to encampments, and protests at INCRA regional offices are some of the activities that characterize the movement's interactions with INCRA. Regular interactions with INCRA since the 1970s have granted the movement a high degree of knowledge concerning the state's organizational structure. Such frequent contact with INCRA provides the MST with time to learn from prior practices and to craft ways to use INCRA in the institutionalization of their alternative mode of agrarian reform featuring land occupations and encampments.

Combining with the movement's instrumental strategy to implement its version of agrarian reform is its direct-action strategic plan. While the form of the MST's nucleo organization comes from plans to instrumentalize INCRA, the content concerning how the nucleos decentralize decision-making authority, equalize administrative roles, and
promote localized, heterogeneous cultural formations, is conceived in the movement's own direct-action strategic orientation. Movement documents that detail how to organize and administer encampments and settlements (MST: 1985) were, in part, systematizations of prior direct-action practices from early encampments like Nova Ronda Alta and Macali e Brilhante (Jornal Sem Terra: May 1982; Jornal Sem Terra: June 1982). These experiences, implemented according to the nucleo model, generated lessons, as well as actual leaders, for future struggles. In nucleos, movement members learned to debate, discuss, and arrive at decision themselves, independent of allies. These experiences became elaborated in documents that focus on how to hold movement-led meetings and make collective decisions through them (MST: 1999; 2009).

MST direct-action strategic plans privilege the movement's own decision-making efforts in implementing and designing agrarian reform without outside influence. For example, as I was visiting two encampments, I noticed how an adjacent one was completely vacant. I was told that the campers were out at a political training exercise and that this was common to all encampments (Fieldnotes: Encampment 1 Outside of São Paulo, São Paulo, 8-10-2009). Political training serves, as I was told, to inculcate an MST and socialist identity into the movement's new recruits. I also attended a political training retreat set up by the movement's grassroots organizers, a Frente de Massa (Mass Front), to debate the recent decline in land occupations and devise strategies for future efforts (Fieldnotes: Settlement outside of Porto Alegre RS, 6-5-2011). Older activists, many of whom have worked in the MST for decades, attended these strategy meetings to elaborate plans for future action and dissect current problems. Both of these events, even though
independent of one another, showcased well-organized and planned attempts by the movement to set future action plans. They also, regardless of member experience levels, emphasized actors planning to rely on themselves to execute agrarian reform, rather than involve some outside actor. In fact, other than me, only movement members attended.

Workshops, meetings, and seminars also train movement members for conducting meetings and leading land occupations. The number of movement documents meant for internal distribution and debate concerning planning different kinds of movement activities and practices — 35 cadernos de formação (training notebooks) were published between 1986 and 2000 as compared to 17 in the area of education — show a relatively high level of knowledge preparation. Complementing movement materials, workshops at multiple times throughout the year at various places disseminate the knowledge concerning political theory and grassroots organization to movement members and allies. One study documents 29 “centros de formação (training centers)” that have trained over 102,180 movement members in direct-action tactics, on the movement's identity, and on reasons for their struggle (Plummer: 2008). The number of documents shows how the movement iterates their direct-action plans often, while the high number of graduates and training centers displays their commitment to spending quality time in creating self-reliant members with a strong movement-centered identity.

Direct-action plans show consistent and coherently elaborated objectives. We observe such qualities in comparing the practice and planning of nucleo administration in

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54 As I will show in the other chapters, political training in agrarian reform, on nucleo organization, and administration, as well as how to conduct land occupations, outpace the other areas in terms of members trained and materials disseminated.
encampments at Nova Ronda Alta in the 1980s with current cases. The small group
division into nucleos, decentralization of leadership, and consensual decision-making
efforts, were qualities of these early MST encampments (Carter: 1997; Jornal Sem Terra: June 1982). From security patrols, to small “voluntary” work groups sent around the
country as part of the movement's service contribution, the encampments I visited in 2011
retained the same nucleo organization and governance as described by scholarship and
early movement accounts. Furthermore, documents from the 1980s are still used for
training members in seminars and workshops in encampments and settlements, providing
further evidence of consistency in the movement's direct-action plans. Lastly, many of the
original movement militants remain in top leadership positions. While this has been
critiqued by some for creating a movement hierarchy (Banford and Rocha: 2002), this
older cadre serves a crucial role for the movement's direct-action efforts by often
speaking at movement events to remind people of the past struggles, emphasize the
importance of continuing resistance, and show that the movement can lead its own efforts.

Thinking in counter-factual terms reveals how the MST would have developed
differently if direct-action plans were different or absent. The nucleo structure, while
coming from INCRA, requires constant ideological maintenance in the MST's adaptation.
Or rather, the INCRA's small group administration did not oppose private property and
appeal to the Cuban Revolution – these qualities come from the MST's efforts to fuse the
nucleo organization in agrarian reform with their identity. Without the direct-action plans
and training, these qualities would be absent. I was also told by one of the MST's
agricultural technicians how encampments and settlements that developed a rigorous and
well-planned nucleo format were more likely to remain cohesive, produce economically, and stay in the movement, versus those that were less organized in terms of group administration (Interview: RS MST/COPTEC, 3-9-2011). Thus, without the high level of knowledge and planning, membership identity and sense of belonging would be lower. Land occupations are not only risky but have often, in many states, turned violent. If families chose to stay, they often wait years and remain vulnerable to police evictions and vigilante violence. For many, the risks are quite real, and without the well-thought out plans for how to carry out agrarian reform themselves, and a clear identity, many individuals would leave.

Without these materials and planning, members would have little instruction to follow, risking the implementation of the MST's self-governmental resistance in agrarian reform policy. Allies, such as the unions and the church, helped organize members in the early years and continue to attend marches or demonstrations, but they have not shown the will or the means to provide day-to-day efforts at assuring effective grassroots organization. The MST had to create their plans, mostly, through consulting prior Brazilian movements and researching other examples of agrarian reform. The level of preparation and energy devoted to creating new leaders and training members in nucleo organization, as well the tax or service contribution alluded to in the previous section, also produce a high level of discipline. If not for this movement-created discipline, as well as time spent on creating strategic plans, the movement would not have lasted this long or achieved their current level of success.

Existing theories have difficulties predicting the level and kind of
institutionalization we see in the MST's efforts to control agrarian reform policy. Political Process Theory (McAdam: 1999), or scholars who focus on opportunity structures (Tarrow: 1998), would see the relationships established with INCRA as evidence of “openings” within official institutions. For these theorists, levels of repression, the proclivity to assist, or help from elite allies are factors that explain mobilization. These potential explanations are also independent of a movement's plans or objectives. While contextual factors may account for the origins of protest waves, they do not provide a way to connect the outcome – self-governmental movement resistance – with an input that explains kinds of resistance, i.e. reformist struggles or self-governmental. For an explanation that differentiates between kinds of movements, we need to focus on the movement's own perspective and plans. Agentic theories, e.g. rational choice, would collapse the kinds of strategic approaches and plans followed by the MST into the one, broad category of utility maximization. And like structural approaches, they miss the chance to explain variations.

Furthermore, trends particularly in land occupations, trouble the repression/facilitation hypothesis. In one study of the MST, Ondetti notes that an unfavorable government actually led to, with favorable media coverage, an increase in movement mobilization (2006). The recent decline in occupations and encampments, furthermore, problematizes the connection between facilitation and mobilization given the presence of a favorable center-left government. What a focus on strategy reveals is that a movement's actions, vision, and plans are just as important – if not more so – than

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55 Ondetti's explanation for the variation in level of land occupations relies on this kind of explanation (2008).
context. It is not the elite as much as what the movement does with them that is relevant in determining movement courses of action and resistance. While Ondetti's account does not explicitly focus on strategy, if it were not for the persistent direct-action plans of the MST to occupy land and form encampments, the media would have had nothing to cover. The current decline is not a result of contextual factors, but as I will discuss in the conclusion, a result of strategic changes.

Even though strategy is the main factor at work in explaining the MST's institutionalization of self-governmental resistance, the way the movement would have devised its plans would have changed if the left-leaning President Lula had lost in 2002. Ondetti considers the time following FHC's second term (1998-2002) as one of the most difficult in the movement's history (2008). The government coordinated opposition to the MST by outlawing the creation of settlements from lands acquired through occupations, eliminating technical assistance programs, and cutting the special credit program from agrarian reform beneficiaries. At this time of extreme vulnerability and relatively low levels of mobilization, the Lula government signaled a positive change for the movement. Accordingly, the MST continued their combination of direct-action and instrumental strategic planning. In an alternative scenario without an allied government in power, the movement would have had to make adjustments during an already difficult time. As we will see in education in the next section, the MST has difficulty instrumentalizing oppositional governments. If José Serra, instead of Lula, had won the presidency, we could expect a significantly lower level of institutionalization – especially in agrarian reform. The reason is not context per se, but the MST's strategic problems in
instrumentalizing certain kinds of authorities.

Cultural approaches, e.g. Alvarez: 1998, would discuss the movement's appropriation of rights. They could also, particularly where contextual and existing agentic theories encounter problems, potentially differentiate between kinds of strategies and movements. Studies included in this camp focus on describing movements without providing empirical indicators that show levels of implementation or mobilization. In other words, while these studies document cases, they do not provide a rationale to explain variation in movement success.

My focus on instrumental strategies pinpoints where the administrative basis for the MST's self-governance originates. Noting the movement's historical development and contentious relationship with governmental institutions provides an explanation based on strategy. Both indicators of strategic strength – knowledge preparation, and consistent and coherently elaborated objectives – were high for strategic subcategories of instrumentalization and direct-action. We observe a high level of institutionalization, as well as a movement-centered identity in both strategic orientations, proving all three of my hypotheses.

The best explanation concerning how the MST has developed self-governmental resistance lies with the movement's strategic orientation. Both actors – INCRA and the MST – had similar plans and visions for conducting agrarian reform policy. Given that the MST developed after INCRA, and given the differences with key cases like the Cuba, there is little doubt that the MST plans took INCRA's institutional structure and resources, vying for control of agrarian reform policy. Their use of resources also has contributed to
success in institutionalizing their mode of governing agrarian reform. They have managed to use legal discourses in creative ways to show how they – and not some other actor – must carry out agrarian reform. While an instrumental strategic orientation explains the form of self-governmental resistance, the content, or how self-governance is conducted, lies squarely with the MST's own work and preparation. In this way, direct-action and instrumental strategies combine in the formation of the MST's alternative, oppositional agrarian reform project.

3.4 Conclusion: A Change in Resistance?

My goal in this chapter is to illustrate that the MST's practices of self-governance in agrarian reform policy challenge both the institution of private property and state power. In self-governmental resistance, movements remain contentious because movement-led order contests both private property and already-existing state forms of governance that emphasis centralization, homogeneity, and the establishing of unequal administrative roles. The MST's approach to establishing self-governance in agrarian reform policy contests each of these forms of state conduct, specifically in the way they organize land occupations and encampments. They have successfully – as seen in the numbers of land occupations, encampments, and settlements – institutionalized an alternative – and oppositional – mode of agrarian reform. To institutionalize this vision, they have crafted instrumental and direct-action strategic orientations. With high levels of knowledge preparation, and consistently and coherently formulated objectives, the
movement shows a high level of strategic strength, which means high levels of success in institutionalizing resistance.

Movement efforts at institutionalizing a form of self-governmental resistance have not been a total success. Opposition to the movement's plans not only comes in direct ways, but also from the same institutions that they use in their projects. Certain interviews with officials called INCRA a “state within a state” that “does too many things” while taking on “responsibilities other institutions ought to (Interview: Clarice, INCRA Director, Brasilia 2-1-2011; Interview: Cesar, INCRA Director, 2-6-2011). Such comments hint at problems both for INCRA and the MST. I was also told that “of course I will attend to the movement's demands. However, I always tell them that we can not give them a lot. If they want bigger changes they need to go confront bigger institutions (Interview: Clarice, INCRA Director, Brasilia 2-1-2011).” Ironically, the same institution (INCRA) that facilitates the development of movement governance stymies it through limited resources and capacity. The effect is that the movement has regular access to resources and allies. The problem, however, is that repeated interactions potentially provincialize the struggle, removing it from the wider public's attention.

Also, the movement's shift from land occupations to protests shows a shift to more conventional social movement forms of contention. Specifically, if land occupations and encampments disappear, then the MST potentially becomes a reform-style movement. This, in itself, is not a problem for the movement. It does mean, if we follow Tarrow's work, that the movement will become further professionalized and eventually stop disruption. Some in the movement have already noticed this trend, issuing a letter before
leaving at the end of 2010 about worrisome conservative trends. Many movement
members also recognized the current state of “crisis” the movement was in given the
decrease in more confrontational actions.

Now, as more recent movement documents show, the struggle has entered a phase
the MST calls “accumulação de forças (accumulating forces).” The idea, from what I
heard from members and read in documents, is to accumulate resources (material and
ideational) in order to conduct more confrontational struggles in the future. The danger,
obviously, is that the future never arrives. And if the tendency for the movement to
organize peaceful demonstrations instead of land occupations continues as part of their
efforts to accumulate forces, then agrarian reform policy self-governmental resistance
will simply be replaced by demands.

My hypothesis concerning the institutionalization of social movement resistance
involves a substantive understanding of strategic strength. A lower level of self-
governmental resistance, therefore, would come about through changes in strategy. And
in fact, as the discussion above concerning “a accumulação de forças” illustrates, we are
seeing such changes. The shift, in this example, is a decreased effort in direct action
planning – especially with respect to conducting land occupations. Demonstrations
continue, but they take the form of demanding another actor, either a political party or
institution, to do the work of agrarian reform on the movement’s behalf. For this reason, a
strategic shift is taking place to mediated strategies – delegating decision-making power
and authority over the dynamics of agrarian reform policy. The land occupation is a
policy instrument in terms of decentralizing land access and creating the conditions for
encampments. In many ways, the contestation of private property is also inextricably connected to occupying lands. If these end, the movement continues. Yet the way it persists is as a reform-style social movement.

I had the feeling while I was doing my research that the movement rested too much on its laurels, or in other words, it sought glory and recognition for actions and successes that have long passed. I was told frequently of the success at Fazenda Annoni, which was occupied in the mid-1980s, and how the largest occupations ever were led in Paraná, which occurred in the 1990s. These events, while key to the movement's successes, have not been reproduced in the last ten years. If the strategies concerning agrarian reform – essentially the policy area that has made the movement – continue to shift to a more mediated approach, then so does the innovative nature of the MST.
CHAPTER 4: SELF-GOVERNMENTAL RESISTANCE IN EDUCATION

The MST's Alternative Educational Project

Early in my fieldwork I visited the MST's school and centro de formação (training center), the Escola Nacional Florestan Fernandes (Florestan Fernandes National School or ENFF). The school is impressive: four dormitories, cafeteria, bookstore, communal garden, multiple classroom buildings, and various smaller houses for staff. This veritable village rests on seven acres and is administered by twenty or so permanent movement staff, various temporary movement-member assistants, and the students who attend classes. Together, they execute the school's daily activities – from providing meals to implementing pedagogical goals – in small groups comprised of five or six people. This “núcleo (team),” mode of managing the ENFF also characterizes the form of conduct the MST has developed to institutionalize their mode of resistance within other policy areas. As I illustrated in the previous chapter on agrarian reform and núcleos in encampments, these teams provide the means for the movement to challenge state power through resisting the subordination of social actors to governmental elites. In this chapter, while the policy area is different, the form through which the MST conducts its resistance is much the same.

The MST garners most attention for its dramatic land occupations, where families occupy and squat on publicly or privately owned land. Land occupations, and their ensuing encampments, are key elements of the movement's way of institutionalizing an alternative agrarian reform project. In addition to changing the ways land is re-

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56 For more in-depth analysis of the ENFF, see Silva (2005).
appropriated, the movement has also managed to institutionalize resistance in both
educational and agricultural production policy. The former, which is the focus of this
chapter, has gained fewer adherents than in agrarian reform, yet more than in agricultural
production. Despite this lower level of success, the reasons for which I explain later in
this chapter, the MST’s self-governmental resistance in education is integral to their mode
of resistance. Their actions in this policy area also draw the attention of activists and
scholars, having earned the movement multiple domestic and international awards.\footnote{International actors such as the United Nations’ Childrens Fund (UNICEF) recognized
the movement in 1995 and 1999 with awards for their educational endeavors. Within
Brazil, the MST has earned awards from Teachers’ Unions, i.e. Sindicato dos
Professores do Rio Grande do Sul (Sinpro-RS), for their efforts at another of their key
schools, Instituto Técnico de Capacitação e Pesquisa da Reforma Agrária (Technical
Institute for Training and Research in Agrarian Reform or ITERRA), and from
Ministério de Educação (Ministry of Education or MEC) for their work in Educação
de Jovens e Adultos (Education for Young People and Adults or EJA).}

In this chapter, I show that one of the reasons why the MST has been recognized
for their educational efforts is their systematic and oppositional nature. The movement’s
educational projects, with the ENFF as one – but by no means the only – example of
success, draws our attention to two perplexing qualities of social movements in general
from the standpoint of both common depictions of movements and representations in the
academic literature. The first perplexing quality is how this actor – a social movement –
which we typically associate with disrupting order can also establish it. Characterizing
this order – this mode of institutionalization as I call such regularization of movement
contention – we find rules and practices that constrain, as well as enable, member
activities in service provision. This chapter focuses on the MST’s institutionalization of
self-governmental resistance in the policy area of education.
The second surprising quality about the MST concerns how its form of institutionalization is oppositional. Simply because “movement” is in their name, does not automatically entail contention. The MST's territorial presence, number of members, and multiple areas of involvement reveal grandeur. Yet the possibility remains that their service provision either is either complicit in dominant social interests, or unintentionally supportive of them. Collective resistance – a defining quality of a social movement – has to be sustained and engage some power structure that is cultural, political, and/or social in nature. I ground this dissertation in how the MST challenges state power and private property. This chapter focuses on how they oppose these targets through designing and implementing an alternative mode of education.

The MST's institutionalization of education, as I will describe in this chapter, remain contentious. The Brazilian government exercises state power by designing and executing educational policy that homogenizes cultures, centralizes decision-making authority, and creates an unequal division of administrative roles. The movement's opposition to state power in educational policy is observed in how they encourage cooperation in decentralized small groups and focus on local cultural practices. They also challenge private property through educating students on cooperative living and economics in the classroom. For these reasons, the MST's institutionalization of educational practices is the same mode of resistance – self-governmental – that I introduced in Chapter 2 and illustrated in the previous chapter on agrarian reform. To isolate how social movement self-governance constitutes resistance in educational policy, I draw attention to how the movement has attempted to gain control of elementary and
secondary schools. I compare the movement's practices with those of the Brazilian government to highlight their differences and where we observe contention.

In the first part of this chapter, I discuss the central elements of the state mode of governing education in general, and in Brazil. After establishing how state power is exercised in educational policy, in the second section, I present the MST's educational designs and instances of implementation. I also illustrate how they challenge the central elements of state power – centralized decision-making, cultural homogenization, and an administrative unequal division of labor – as well as private property. The third, and final, section of this chapter evaluates and explains the MST's efforts. Like in the previous chapter on the movement's attempts in agrarian reform policy, I document the number of potential participants and compare that number with the movement's results. I find that the movement's achievements, with respect to potential adherents, are less than what we find in agrarian reform. I explain and evaluate these results with reference to my theory of strategy, comparing it with potential accounts from Political Process and Rational Choice Theory. The movement's level of success is less in this area given certain strategic problems, especially adequately preparing to instrumentalize governmental authorities.

4.1 The Intersection of State Power and Education Policy, Generally and in Brazil

State Power and Education

Education potentially encompasses, in different ways, each of the other two policy areas – agrarian reform and agricultural production – that I use to document variation in the MST's institutionalization of self-governamental resistance. For example, movement
member training seminars on how to conduct occupations could qualify as educational. Likewise, agricultural production necessarily involves learning agroecological or conventional methods either in a school or from one's own family. If we equate learning and instruction to education, then no area is untouched. Thus, to pinpoint the nature of MST resistance in education, we need to first detail, in a general sense, how state power and education function together.

Education and state power intersect in the promotion of national cultures, centralizing decision-making power, and subordinating social actors. Fukuyama sees education as central to state-building, despite considering it secondary to other services such as security (2004). Historical works, such as Weber's discussion of France, present the nation-building effects of institutionalized instruction in disseminating norms and language (1979). Marxist analysis highlights the policy area's broadly construed economic dimensions. As an “apparatus,” educational policy, for instance, assists in capital accumulation (Althusser: 1971). Thinking in Althusserian and Gramscian terms, Apple discusses how despite existing relatively autonomous from dominant class interests, educational policy functions to generate consensus around the hegemony of capitalist production (1995). State power facilitates capital growth and accumulation through particular educational policies and initiatives. Similarly, other studies show how neoliberalism and educational policies intersect by training social actors to work at the bottom of a hierarchical economic division of labor (Green: 1997; Olssen and Peters: 2005). Training workers also bolsters private property by better qualifying wage-labor.

These studies reveal general themes that connect state power to education. First,
state power and educational policy often coalesce around fomenting uniform cultural identities. Whether explicitly favoring certain languages over others, or encouraging students to sing the national hymn at the beginning of the day, state power fosters the creation of a singular national identity. Second, educational policy is directly involved in favoring certain forms of economic behavior over others. Training and developing skill sets subordinates certain citizens in a capitalist hierarchy. And lastly, governments have worked to centralize the guidelines for instruction and curriculum in specific bureaucracies. Educational policy instills a national identity, develops and delivers particular directives from a singular, hierarchical governmental institution, and subordinates social actors – economically and administratively – in the process.

State and Education in Brazil

In Brazil, we can observe the development of state power through educational policy at two distinct periods of time. The first takes place prior to Getúlio Vargas' “Estado Novo (New State)” in the 1930s. Before Vargas, in what is referred to as “dualidade structural (sistema dual de ensino (dual instruction))” education was an elite privilege, not a right. Class and administrative inequality was institutionalized through governmental elites securing for their own progeny – often through establishing rigorous and selective exams – the means to enjoy a liberal arts education in secondary schools and universities, leaving “the masses,” or rather, everyone else, with little or no schooling (Nagel: 2001). Rural populations, which the MST claims as their base, were denied
access to education at this time. Centralized practices were weak – yet existent – given the sparsity of access to education overall.

The Vargas-era Constitutions of 1934 and 1937 attempted to replace elite education with more centralizing, homogenizing efforts to establish a uniform curriculum grounded in nationalism. As part of nation and government-building efforts, primary education was guaranteed free, as a right for all. Right replaced privilege, regardless of actual enjoyment. Curriculum design shifted towards implementing one national model for all Brazilians in subjects such as Portuguese, Science, and Math (Freitas and Biccas: 2009). Indicative of the effort to instill a national identity, 800 private German schools were closed, and then reopened, but as 900 public schools with instruction exclusively in Portuguese (Dalbey: 1970). Homogenizing practices of curriculum design under the banners of “rationality” and “standardization” brought more than 991,000 additional students into a national system to “erradicate ethnic, cultural, and national identities” and create one singular Brazilian identity (De Souza: 2008).

Also at this time, decision-making concerning the administration and oversight of curriculum and pedagogy was centralized in one, singular institution – Ministério da Educação (Ministry of Education or MEC) – created in 1930. Other actors, e.g. the Catholic Church and large landowners, retained a certain level of control over schools within their spaces of influence, yet ultimately were subordinated to governmental elites (Marin and Marin: 2008; Caíres: 2008). In a way, these social actors continued exercising a certain governmental prerogative until mechanization of agricultural production led rural workers to leave for cities in the 1960s and 1970s. Even though these economic
changes came after Vargas' time, his institutional redesigning of the Brazilian government provided the groundwork for the increased exercise of state power. We see this in MEC's centralization of decision-making power.

Relatively recent Constitutional reforms with respect to education continued to subordinate social actors and homogenize cultural differences. The impetus behind granting municipalities greater governmental powers during the creation of the 1988 constitution was absent in educational policy (Samuels and Kingstone: 2000; Pierce: 2013). While elementary education remained enshrined as obligatory and free in the Constitution, specific laws involving education were shelved for later elaboration. Only in 1996, with the Lei de Diretrizes de Base (Law of Basic Directives or LDB), does education receive particular policy guidelines. Even with the LDB's recognition of the devolution of pedagogical autonomy to state-level and municipal governments, Article 26 still ensures uniformity in instruction through promoting a single, national curriculum.

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58 In 2013 the constitution was amended to guarantee free and obligatory secondary education. Prior to that most recent reform and the 1996 LDB, the most discussion of education is found in the “emendas transitorias (transitional amendments),” located at the end of the 1988 constitution and the 1971 LDB. The vast majority of educational policy discussions in the 1988 constitution focus on the distribution of tax money for expenses.

59 Article 26. “Os currículos do ensino fundamental e médio devem ter uma base nacional comum, a ser complementada, em cada sistema de ensino e estabelecimento escolar, por uma base nacional comum, a ser complementada, em cada sistema de ensino e estabelecimento escolar, por uma parte diversificada, exigida pelas características regionais e locais da sociedade, da cultura, da economia e da clientela. (Curriculm for elementary and secondary education must have a common national base that will be completed in each system and place of instruction. This national common base, at completion, in each system and place of instruction, may allow for a diversified part, given regional and local social qualities, particularly dealing with culture, economy, and client).” For more discussion on the history of rural schools, see Edla Soares, Parecer 36/2001.
The LBD recognizes rural education – where the MST inserts its pedagogical project – as “distinct” and “particular,” yet ultimately intending it to “complement” dominant, centralized directives. The place of rural education is clear; alternative education projects are welcomed, as long as they are subordinate to governmental direction. Such direction, furthermore, implicitly favors schools in urban areas. The subordination of rural to national (read *urban* education) simultaneously homogenizes cultural practices in schools.

Exams within the Brazilian education system also continue to institutionalize dual instruction. Before and after the 1960s military government, these exams – known as “vestibulares” – institutionalized a way to assure that only students who attended the best high schools and/or paid for special preparatory classes entered universities (Romanelli: 1973). Access has expanded over the last ten years, particularly due to the growth of private schools, but mainly for wealthy elites (McCowan: 2007). In spite of this growth, in comparison with other Latin American countries, Brazil still ranks low in average years of school attendance (7.2) and high in secondary school dropout rates (25%). The persistence of dual instruction institutionalizes both class and state/social hierarchies through exams: the wealthy tend to pass the exams as the state administers them. Exams also show social subordination through subjecting poorer segments of the population to governmental elites.

Recent efforts to professionalize technical education insert schools into a global division of labor, yet in a narrow, economic fashion that privileges private property. Governmental priorities mirror aspects found in the MST's own pedagogical program –

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60 Study and report available at [http://g1.globo.com/educacao/noticia/2013/03/brasil-tem-menor-media-de-anos-de-estudos-da-america-do-sul-diz-pnud.html](http://g1.globo.com/educacao/noticia/2013/03/brasil-tem-menor-media-de-anos-de-estudos-da-america-do-sul-diz-pnud.html).
addressing historical inequities of access to secondary education, including social actors to resolve social problems, and breaking down the division between mental and physical labor (MEC: 2006a; MEC: 2010a). MEC documents on this renewed attention to technical education, particularly in high schools, also mention the “pedagogical value of labor” in technical education, as well as its base in “social justice (MEC: 2010b).”

Despite these initiatives, government-led initiatives in technical education for secondary education still suffer from limited resources (MEC: 2010; Interview: Valtier, Ex-Director Instituto Federal Paraná, 8-2-2011). More importantly, these efforts are oriented around training the Brazilian workforce for competition in the global economy. While providing more opportunities for students, particularly from rural spaces, these programs insert students as individuals – not collective or group actors – into the labor market where they ought to receive better wages. The techniques intend for instruction to better qualify wage-labor, not to question its existence or practice, thereby supporting private property.

The three central elements of state power – centralizing decision-making authority, homogenizing cultures, and creating an unequal administrative division of labor – all characterize Brazilian educational policy. Such elements also constitute the main targets for MST self-governmental resistance. Decision-making authority concerning curriculum design shows signs of centralization specifically through concentrating power in official, governmental institutions. The promotion of urban over rural schools and the system of exams place a barrier between social actors and governmental elites. The exams are crafted by governmental actors and limit the entry of usually poorer segments of the population. Technical schools, notwithstanding the government’s recent socially-
conscious attempts to change instruction, remain wedded to qualifying wage-labor and do not question wage-labor itself. Or rather, they assist in advancing private property. Historically and currently, we also see the homogenization of cultures through closing private German schools in the promotion of Brazilian identity, and the reorganization of the curriculum according to standardized, mainly urban-based subjects.

4.2 Institutionalizing Resistance in Elementary and Secondary Education

*MST Self-Governmental Contention in the Schools*

In the previous section, I illustrated how state power exists in general and within Brazilian educational policy. This chapter's focus is on how the MST's educational project constitutes self-governmental resistance, rather than revolutionary or reformist. The key qualities of self-governmental resistance include coordinating rule-based procedures that challenge state power and private property. To identify such resistance, I focus on instances of movement contention in specific policy areas – like education – where governments deploy state power. In vying for service control, we observe in the practice of self-governmental resistance the institutionalization of the precepts of decentralization, heterogeneity, and role equality against the exercise of state power.

In this section, I begin by first explaining the meaning of a concept central to the MST's pedagogy – “reality” – and illustrate how curriculum and pedagogy designed from it challenges the homogenizing imperatives of state power and private property. I illustrate how the movement institutionalizes its vision in certain elementary schools, specifically in the schools known as the “escolas itinerantes (itinerant schools).” These
schools highlight the movement's work on institutionalizing “reality” as a means to inculcate a particular brand of MST identity around education. Second, I discuss how cooperation – both inside and outside the schools where the MST exerts influence – contest the centralization of decision-making authority and social subordination. I focus on secondary education as an example of how cooperation challenges state power with respect to centralization and social subordination. Specific MST high schools also reveal unique ways to challenge private property.

“Reality,” Resistance, and Private Property

The movement's educational project involves a creative, movement-centered understanding of production and context. In one document, the movement explains that “labor generates all wealth, identifies us as a class, and makes us capable to construct new social relations and consciousnesses,” with movement-administered schools “not having one sole objective to create laborers, but being a privileged place to analyze the labor process (MST: 1996, 169).” “Construction” is not ex nihilo, or from abstract principles, but as explained in another movement document, rooted in “diagnosing problems within already-existing social relations to change them (MST: 1995).” The focus on problems and relationships ultimately revolves around the oft-repeated concept of “reality.” The term is vague enough to fit nearly any content within it, yet specific enough to guarantee that the movement is the only actor that knows its contents.

MST instruction is intended to remain wedded to local knowledges and practices, which the movement grants itself the power to determine. Labor, in this regard, is not a
form of work that reproduces social relations. Rather, labor-as-construction grounds educational processes in creativity, cultivating in students a sense of their role in producing social, economic, and political relations. This broad meaning of labor construed by the movement in their understanding of “reality” opposes being limited to professional development for specific occupations. It also involves educating students in a way that raises a critical awareness concerning private property. In how the movement teaches “reality,” students see themselves as producers, as well as exploited by dominant class interests. Already, at a young age, students begin to develop a class consciousness that is critical to private property and capitalism. Movement education places students, of all ages, in a classroom where instruction promotes the formation of politically-conscious students that understand labor as creative power rather than simply action involving wages.

Culture and Order in MST Elementary Education

While all schools in their application of the movement's pedagogy focus on production and “reality,” the itinerant schools institutionalize these precepts particularly well. Their distinctive quality arises from their direct role in collective action – they conduct class in marches and protests, rather than the other schools that remain fixed in particular locations. Student participation in marches and protests directly incorporates into instruction movement demands – at times the police abuse of power, and at others, demands for agrarian reform – meanwhile making the children into protesters (MST:
"Reality" in this case involves direct-action and struggle, two key elements the movement instills in their membership overall. Itinerant school rules orient students to both direct participation and reflection about their role in the movement, connecting the reasons for action with practice.

The movement also institutionalizes, especially within the itinerant schools, a counter-state identity. We can understand one aspect of how identity creation is advanced through their efforts to inculcate the movement's hymn. At one school, before the school day began, the children recited the movement's hymn instead of the Brazilian (Fieldnotes: Encampment 2 near Londrina, 6-30-2011). I was told afterword that because the children are younger, they need to become familiar with basic MST symbols and songs, such as the hymn, which doubles as a device to discuss the importance of the movement's struggles. The hymn's particular words also function to teach children how to read and write, rather than using abstract, didactic materials featuring pictures of apples, airplanes, or balloons that have no direct ties with the student's lives.

Cultural identity within the MST's itinerant elementary schools opposes state power's efforts to homogenize cultures, creating a movement-centered identity that enables local demands and practices to develop. The repetition and pedagogical value inherent in teaching the movement's hymn shows a certain circularity immanent to the

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61 Itinerant schools serve the children of movement members who reside in encampments prior to acquiring land title.
62 Organized in what the MST calls “mística (mystic)” prior to any movement event, this practice often showcases movement symbols, stories about MST leaders, poems and/or music. One movement member told me that the mística has roots in the MST early days of mobilizing with the Catholic Church, and so should really be considered a morning prayer. For more detail, see Brava Gente chapter on the mística (1999).
production of movement self-governance: the movement produces its own “reality” through organizing protests, while teaching its members the meaning of those practices. This leads members to adhere to the movement’s ideals, symbols, and identity. The movement's identity acts as a buffer between members and state power's promotion of nationalism.

Such seemingly homogenizing practices inculcated by the movement are balanced by the movement's regular practice and promotion of “generative themes” in instruction. The Freirian concept of “temas geradores (generative themes)” instills within students recognition of their immediate surroundings and practices. The MST has long written and systematized instruction based on the Freirian concept (MST: 1992). When asked to provide an example, one teacher told me how the content of his classroom discussions came from students' own understanding of the encampment's needs, which at one time concerned access to water, and another, the need for literacy (Interview: Teacher, Encampment 1 Near Paraná, 6-21-2011). This aspect of the movement's pedagogy uses local needs, practices, and beliefs. Generative themes allow for local practices to shape instruction, allowing for multiple modes of identifications and culture to develop. Not uniformity, but localization and diversity are encouraged within spaces where the MST attempts to instill its own identity within members.

I attended a training course organized by the MST's sector of education and the State University of Londrina, Paraná, concerning “generative themes” and early

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63 Generative themes, as developed by Freire and applied by the MST, seeks to disrupt the abstract instruction that remains divorced from students' lived experience For further elaboration of the concept, see Pedagogy of the Oppressed.
childhood education. At the course, teachers from all 10 itinerant schools received instruction on how to incorporate lived experience into literacy education (Fieldnotes: Itinerant School Training, 7-31-2011). The seminar, as well as various movement documents used to refine the concept, reveal how incorporating context and reality through generative themes is not periodic, but a regular, systematized – in other words, an institutionalized – mode of conduct within the MST's alternative educational project.

Itinerant schools also institutionalize discipline. For example, families in the encampment must sacrifice food for the school's daily snack (Interview: Encampment 1 near Londrina, 6-21-2011). There is nothing forcing families to do this. However, this “voluntary contribution” improves the families' reputation within the movement. This connects to the movement practice of “sorteio” referenced in the previous chapter on the MST's institutionalization of an alternative way of conducting agrarian reform policy. As I elaborated in that chapter, the movement contests state power in the “sorteio” because it decentralizes the means to select families and redistribute land. Educational activities also figure into this practice. Through regularly contributing to movement schools (sending food, helping construct buildings, monitoring student performance) members increase their chances to be identified by the movement leadership as “good settlers” who deserve land from INCRA. The discipline here uses a state service – land redistribution – that movement leaders coordinate with INCRA to compel members to contribute provisions for MST schools.

64 This relationship involves what in the previous chapter I discussed as the “sorteio,” through which the MST controls the land selection process in certain states. In the way mentioned above, education also factors into the selection process and “points acquisition.”
Discipline also functions in the classroom. While I did not hear of consequences for students if they do not sing the movement hymn or attend class, all students receive an individual “parecer (opinion)” that charts their progress and that allows teachers to adjust. Rather than failing students, some repeat grades in order to meet generally established requirements in areas like literacy (Fieldnotes: Encampment 1 near Londrina/PR, 6-20-2011). Students are disciplined by having to follow performance standards created by their teachers rather than standardized tests that are typical of state education practices. Such discipline within schools, as I discuss more in the context of secondary education, also takes power from the Brazilian government. Or rather, the movement itself administers what is normally a public service – not for all Brazilians – but for its members. Order and discipline challenge state power's subordination of social actors to an unequal administrative division of labor. All MST schools show this quality in some fashion. MST high schools display it at a more advanced level.

_Cooperation, Decentralization, and Equality in Secondary Education_

Another core tenet of the MST's mode of challenging status quo, dominant educational policy involves cooperation. Similar to the manner in which the ENFF is governed, movement nucleos inside and outside each school design and execute the movement's pedagogy. Like other sectors, its leaders negotiate with state officials, supervise, design policies, and administer the movement's educational practices at local, state, and federal levels (Carter and Martins: 2010). Overall, across 24 of the 26 states where the movement is active, the MST's sector of education cooperates with local,
regional, and national levels of the movement and membership to perform these activities. Specifically, the sector ensures the collective management of schools through establishing community-wide and internal meetings. They monitor the educational process, acquire and distribute political materials, evaluate development, and assure the presence of the movement's vision and symbols in instruction (MST: 1999; 2001). If “reality” guides the content of the MST's educational vision and project, the cooperation of different movement nucleos within the movement's educational sector provides its form.

No matter the level of the school – elementary, secondary, or university – administrators, students, and teachers form groups that debate, evaluate, and decide on everything from who cleans the classroom to how to incorporate agroecology into a course. Within each school, students form nucleos that elect coordinators that form another group for each grade or course. These groups then organize into another group that represents the entire school with administrators and teachers. This pyramid-like structure, especially in schools, has been described in movement documents as “ascending and descending democracy.”
As discussed in the pedagogical statement of the MST's sole private high school, the Instituto de Educação Josué de Castro (Institute of Education Josué de Castro or IEJC),65 “in ascending democracy, each nucleo debates and makes proposals at each level... [while] decisions that are ultimately decided upon are implemented, and responsibilities distributed for execution, in descending democracy (ITERRA: 2004, 37-39).” This structure is best seen in schools, with hit-or-miss applications in other areas (Campigotto: 2009). It is also rooted in Lenin's and the Bolshevik's organization of democratic centralism.

The decision-making practices in this form of administration militate against how state power promotes centralization. By allowing individuals to express concerns and problems in the “ascending” phase, MST rules decentralize implementation and design-making through distributing responsibilities within each school's student body. The active involvement of students in both the initial implementation phases decentralizes the design

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65 The IEJC is housed within the other of the MST's flagship educational institutions, the Instituto Técnico de Capacitação e Pesquisa da Reforma Agrária (Technical Institute for Capacity-Building and Research for Agrarian Reform or ITERRA)
and execution of educational policy – key components of self-governmental resistance. In “descending” also, execution is shared by many members, rather than remaining with a few. This design and elaboration in documents show the regularized, systematized nature of decentralization in MST education, particularly amongst high school students. Centralization in the exercise of state power concentrates decision-making in the hands of a few individuals or elites, as I discussed in the prior section with respect to MEC in the Brazilian government.

Additionally, the allocation of roles among students, administrators, and teachers challenges the unequal administrative division of labor forwarded by state power and executed by the Brazilian government. Other schools, like the ENFF, feature internal school cooperation that involves everyday management. For example, every high school I visited in São Paulo, Paraná, and Rio Grande do Sul organized daily meal time preparation and clean-up with different “nucleos (teams).” Study times and many in-class assignments were also coordinated by groups. In the movement's “Instituo Educar (Educate Institute)” where I spent a month, I became a member of one nucleo, participated in classes as a student, assisted in a class project on local agricultural production practices, served breakfast, and helped in the daily farm chores where students practiced agroecology techniques. My participation in management activities included periodically meeting with all nucleo leaders and the school administration. At one meeting, the topic concerned how to organize the school’s day-to-day maintenance during holy week when many students returned home (Fieldnotes: Instituto Educar, Pontão, Rio Grande do Sul, 3-30-2011).
My time in Instituo Educar illustrates how the movement contests state power's tendency to subordinate social actors in a hierarchical division of labor and to centralize decision-making. The collective management of everything from studying to maintenance challenges centralizing state practices that ground decision-making in top-down authority structures. The breakdown into small nucleos ensures that prior to taking a decision concerning implementation or proposing an issue, students have the chance to discuss and communicate preferences. Decentralization, here, disperses decision-making power to more actors. The distribution of tasks, furthermore, challenges the unequal administrative division of labor that has normally remained the prerogative of specific bureaucracies. The very separation between “public” and “private” in common speech assumes this hierarchical division of administrative labor that subordinates social actors. What self-governmental resistance reveals is how government does not have a monopoly on governance, especially in educational policy.

Internal school cooperation also constrains member activity, specifically in terms of problem resolution. All schools, for example, prohibit alcohol consumption. While I was at one, a student was expelled by the administration after repeat violations. The school's permanent administrators at this time called a series of meetings with the students to explain the suspension. This is different than simply handing down punishment and expecting that people accept it, as police power typically functions according to state power. While providing discipline, the administration explained its actions to the students and asked for input. At the same school, but with respect to a different incident, a stolen item was returned after pressure brought by school-wide
meetings. Rather than punishing the students by accusing suspected individuals, periodic meetings were held where the problem was discussed and everyone was told to leave the missing DVD player in the school basement. After multiple meetings, and through playing on guilt, the DVD player was found without any guilty parties claiming responsibility (Fieldnotes: Instituto Educar, Pontão, Rio Grande do Sul, 4-5-2011). These disciplinary practices show the other side of self-governmental resistance: to live and abide by collective rules and norms in the school, one is subject to dismissal and expulsion by the group. Group discipline shows movement-created order, but one that equalizes the administration of punishment throughout the membership.

*Alternancy and Contentious Curriculum Design*

Cooperation also connects each school to the movement outside it, which in the process contests the state-sanctioned unequal division of labor. To ensure that students have multiple opportunities to implement their collective living and management experiences, the movement implements the “pedagogia de alternância (alternating pedagogy).” Alternancy allows students to remain updated on developments at home and incorporate into their studies the concrete needs of the places where they live, facilitating the cooperation between movement nucleos inside and outside any particular school. During a visit at a different movement high school in Paraná state, I was told by students how they learn “what it means and how to live in the collective” so that they can

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66 In alternancy, students go back and forth for the entire duration of the course – usually between two or three years – “alternating” between three months at school, “tempo escolar (school time),” and three months in their encampment or settlement, “tempo comunidade (community time).”
later “take that [knowledge] back to the settlements to practice it (Interview: Nucleo, Milton Santos, 7-6-2011).” Alternancy allows for back and forth updating between the school and the places where movement members live, allowing for local beliefs and needs to enter instruction. The student's comment also shows how the school functions to spread knowledge of how to live in groups to families in encampments and settlements.

Alternancy also connects tangible needs of students' communities with certain political objectives of the movement, challenging who designs and has power over course curriculum. For their Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso (End of the Course Project or TCC) students frequently elaborate projects that economically benefit a cooperative or a group of families from their respective communities. Examples I discussed with students included an organic milk operation, a distillery for liquor production, and a community garden for a settlement school (Interview: Nucleo 1, Instituto Educar, Pontão, Rio Grande do Sul, 4-15-2011; Interview: Nucleo 2, Instituto Educar, Pontão, Rio Grande do Sul, 4-17-2011). Themes that orient entire courses at ITERRA also arise from the movement's cooperative networks. Every Técnico em Administração de Cooperativas (Technician in Cooperative Administration or TAC), – which in 2010 was in its 10th course, each respectively graduating 30 students – has featured different needs considered essential to the MST, such as training movement members in health care practices or in the layout of settlements (Interview: Sector of Production, Paraná; ITERRA: 2001). Instead of emanating from governmental elites, the content discussed and learned in courses arises from the movement itself. The standard subordination of social actors, especially rural populations, is resisted by movement practices that regularly propose their own needs
Another effort supported by the movement to challenge historical subordination is Programa Nacional para Educação na Reforma Agrária (National Program for Education in Agrarian Reform or PRONERA). This program creates openings in higher education for movement-affiliated, college age students. Just as importantly, through the program, students are not required to pass a general standardized exam (vestibular) to enter University like typical entrance policies. PRONERA specifically challenges the historically exclusionary selection process through guaranteeing slots in secondary and high school education to children of rural families who historically have been marginalized from access to higher education (PRONERA: 2004; 2012). Financing comes through the periodic distribution of INCRA resources, while implementing pedagogical decisions and managing day-to-day course activities falls on the shoulders of specific universities or private places of instruction and the movements involved (Interview: INCRA-RS, Maria de Lourdes, 3-23-2011). As I will elaborate the movement's instrumentalization strategy in the next section with respect to PRONERA, through such programs, the movement uses state resources in order to bring historical excluded individuals into education. PRONERA is representative of efforts to dismantle “public” spaces, which subordinates social actors according to class.

The content and mode of instruction in secondary schools also contests private

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67 PRONERA funds went for the movement to administer classes in 43 public universities for over 10,000 students in secondary and post-secondary education in 2010 (INCRA: 2011).

68 The problems and opposition to this program by the TCU and Public Ministry are discussed in the next section, specifically with respect to how they show the contested nature of instrumental strategic orientations.
property. In addition to adopting the critical understanding of “reality” that grounds all pedagogical materials, high school students in the state of Paraná learn about agroecology in the “Dialogo dos Saberes (Dialogue of Knowledges).” The oppositional nature of the practice of agroecology will be discussed at length in the next chapter on agricultural production. The pedagogy surrounding it, also, challenges status quo technical education's promotion of private property and wage labor. Specifically, students learn how to convince movement members to stop producing with purchased inputs, e.g. seeds, pesticides, etc. Another focus is to create groups – not individuals – that guide families in their respective settlements to produce agroecologically. (Unpublished Dialogo dos Saberes Document: July 2011).

Rather than inserting students into the global economy, students are asked to teach one another and others in the places where they live. In the process, they are taught to “socialize,” or disseminate without charge, education (Fieldnotes: Escola Milton Santos, Maringá, Paraná, 7-6-2011). The pedagogy promoted in the “dialogue,” and also in PRONERA courses, decommodifies access to education. Students, when they go to their communities, spread what they learn without a price. The content of their studies goes towards creating more self-reliant producers who do not purchase inputs – private property or technical training – for their operations.

Like we saw in the previous chapter on agrarian reform, state power subordinates social actors through making knowledge the province of certain institutions. In educational policy, MEC grants itself, as well as state and municipal authorities, the authority to design curriculum and pedagogy. INCRA’s multiple regional offices share
with Brazilian education the façade of decentralization and localized distribution of knowledge. Social subordination continues through both of these governmental institutions, no matter if state power is exercised nationally, at the state-level, or in specific municipalities. A real coordinated challenge to the function of social subordination that characterizes state power is apparent in the MST's efforts to socialize knowledge. Disseminating agroecological production techniques and socializing knowledges place the movement in a position to produce knowledge. This takes power from the government and relocates it in the hands of MST members and teachers.

MST educational practices challenge the subordinate role that state power reserves for social actors. The movement also challenges the unequal distribution of the means to govern by opposing the LDB's subordination of rural education to a national, uniform project. Movement-led secondary schools especially reveal this, as the standard, “public” goods nature of education assumes and relegates “private” actors to the administrative sidelines. Furthermore, institutionalizing the principle of cooperation in educational provision contests state power centralization by placing decision-making power in the movement's hands inside and outside each school. Movement efforts to decentralize educational policy involve more actors in the process. Pedagogical practices, from the movement's understanding “reality” to socializing knowledge, also contest private property. The MST's alternative educational project rivals the state version that is represented by the Brazilian government. The constitutive elements of self-governmental resistance – decentralization, heterogeneity, and equality – appear in the movement's focus on “reality” and cooperation.
4.3 Explaining and Evaluating the MST's Resistance in Education

In this section, I analyze overall figures on schools and students to explain how they indicate the movement's mid-level success rate in institutionalizing self-governmental resistance in educational policy. I find that in terms of percentages of potential adherents, the data shows that the movement has a lower level of success than what we see in the area of agrarian reform. The reason for this lower performance lies, as I will discuss, with a lower level of strategic strength in instrumental strategic planning.

I have three hypotheses that guide my project and that I test in this section: (1) that certain combinations of strategic action lead to different modes of movement institutionalization, (2) how increases in the iterations in movement plans of specific targets and goals, as well as in the time spent researching and documenting targets and goals, result in greater strategic strength and thus a higher potential for successful institutionalization and (3) if a low level of preparation exists with high levels of consistent and coherent objective formation, or vice versa, then we see a level of institutionalization lower than if both indicators were classified as high, yet higher than if both indicators were classified as low. This chapter illustrates not only how different strategic combinations lead to movement self-governmental resistance, but also how a low level of strength in one strategic sub-category (instrumental) when paired with a high level of strength in another (direct-action) leads to a mid-level of strength in overall movement institutionalization.
The MST’s Mid-Level Success in Self-Governmental Resistance

Self-governance in educational policy follows – in terms of success – the movement's ability to administer agrarian reform policy. The MST has received international awards, including a prize in 1995 from UNICEF for their ability to pioneer federal programs such as Programa Nacional de Educação na Reforma Agrária (National Program for Education in Agrarian Reform or PRONERA) and involve multiple state-level Departments of Education in their educational project. They also boast impressive numbers, claiming to have pressured state authorities into constructing 2,250 schools where over 350,000 people have learned to read and write, and another 350,000 currently study all kinds of subjects from geography to agroecology, all taught by 4,000 movement-trained teachers.

The MST's efforts in education are more dispersed and fragmented than what these figures portray. While the movement periodically implements its pedagogy in elementary schools in certain settlements, there are only a few of these experiences. Some of the best known cases include the elementary school “Nova Sociedade (New Society)” in the municipality of Nova Santa Rita near Porto Alegre in Rio Grande do Sul and “Iraci Salete,” near Rio Bonito in Paraná. In Paraná, I was told that of the 21 elementary schools in the state on movement settlements, only three are “of the movement” and “implementing the movement's pedagogy (Interview: Sector of

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69 http://www.mst.org.br/node/8302.

70 If we compare the number of settlements in each state – there were 353 in existence in PR in 2010, 135 in RS in 2003, and 149 in SP (INCRA: 2012) – and assume that for each settlement we find a school, even then, the percentage of movement schools as opposed to non-movement rural schools would be small.
Education PR, 8-5-2011).” The climate in São Paulo is worse, where the movement claims to control no primary or secondary schools (Interview: Sector of Education SP, 11-8-2011). At a conference on MST secondary education, I was told that there were a total of 50 high schools built on all MST settlements with none under MST influence (Fieldnotes: ITERRA, Secondary Education Conference, 5-5-2011). Of the 2,250 schools identified by the movement, only a fraction operates according to the movement’s dictates.71

The schools that the movement has pressured governmental authorities to construct, but does not control internally, are not the focus of this chapter. Those instances benefit the communities, and without MST influence, it is most likely that they would never have been built. However, they do not show successful institutionalization, and they do not qualify as movement schools. To study the prevalence of movement education as exercised by the MST, I focus on itinerant and integrated high schools outside of the settlements that exist in greater numbers than the experiences in settlements. I focus on these two kinds of schools because of all the kinds of schools where the MST institutionalizes resistance, itinerant elementary schools and integrated high schools are the most systematized and regular instances where we can observe trends and actual implementation. My analysis of trends in the states of Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná, and São Paulo allow us to test claims in the social movement literature

71 The movement has a wide definition of school, by no means restricting their tally to those that are officially recognized. Training centers count as schools, for example, and they number at least 31 (Plummer: 2008). Courses often organized by the MST in public universities with state assistance numbered 39 in 2010, and given that these programs have been in place since the end of the 1990s, we can extrapolate these figures to hundreds of schools attended by thousands of students.
concerning allied and oppositional government. They also, more than other states, show the most continuous experiences with secondary and primary education.

Thousands of students have passed through schools that the MST has controlled in terms of internal administration and pedagogy. In absolute terms, this is a lot of people. But in comparison to both rural schools overall and schools on agrarian reform settlements, the MST has gained relatively little control over students and their schools. At their height in Rio Grande do Sul (1998-2009) and Paraná (2002-present), the itinerant schools attended to roughly a thousand students each year per state in 15 schools (MST: 1998; 2000; 2010). The MST counted 5 schools in encampments with 952 students at the itinerant schools' peak in 2003 in Rio Grande do Sul. The highest number of students attending schools in Paraná was 1,255, spread among 10 encampments in 2010 (MST: 2003, found in Meurer, et al: 2006; MST: 2010). The percentage of rural schools and students in each of the states where I conducted my field research, when compared to the number of elementary education age children in the MST, are a fraction of a percent.

More success is seen in the MST's experiments with secondary education, 

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72 The itinerant schools were closed in Rio Grande do Sul in 2009, later reopened in 2012. They currently exist in Alagoas, Santa Catarina, and Goias.

73 The other numbers for itinerant schools come from movement documents during the schools' existences in 2000, when there were 13 schools and roughly 600 students (MST: 2000).

74 To compare with non-movement elementary education, the number of elementary schools in each state are as follows: in Rio Grande do Sul in 2003, 4,447 movement schools out of a 10,790 total schools officially classified as rural, with 256,517 students enrolled out of 2,644,743 students total; in Paraná in 2010, 1,688 movement schools out of 9,112 total rural schools, with 160,853 students enrolled out of 2,687,406 total students; in São Paulo in 2010, 1,469 movement schools out of 26,888 total rural schools, with 112,695 students enrolled out of 5,985,884 total students.
particularly in the area of technical schools. In 2010 – one year for which we have specific numbers from the movement and the state – roughly 40% of high school age students attending rural technical schools were affiliated with the movement (10,058 students affiliated with the movement out of a total of 24,465 students (INEP: 2010; PRONERA: 2011)). Since 1985, movement-affiliated high school students passed through 31 different schools under movement direction (Plummer: 2008). At the time of my research, there were approximately 134 movement high school age students in São Paulo, 220 in Paraná, and 280 in Rio Grande do Sul (INCRA: 2010). The numbers by state in Figure 1 of Appendix 2 allow us to see the MST and government efforts for select years for which data is available. Figure 2 in Appendix 2 shows the total number of agrarian reform beneficiaries, many MST, who received education through PRONERA financial assistance. The movement has also emphasized nationally, and at the state level, the establishment of “educação do campo (countryside education)” curriculum within

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75 These numbers only include high school students whose courses received PRONERA funding. There were a total of 10,580 students, not only from the MST but from other rural movements, receiving some form of instruction. Many of them were in the MST and also practiced the pedagogy of the movement. I do not include them in the numbers listed above because they had already graduated from high school and were participating in university level programs.

76 For each state, the numbers of high school/professional education students in federal institutions – the specific educational area where we find MST involvement – were in São Paulo, 1,188, in Paraná, 3,013, and in Rio Grande do Sul, 4,602, including private, state, and municipal schools. The total numbers by state for joint high school/professional education students in both rural and urban technical schools were: SP, 28,873, PR, 28,240, and RS, 5,491 (INEP: 2004; INEP: 2010) These numbers seem to show that movements pedagogical involvement and successful implementation in federally-supported, joint high school/professional education courses is a fraction of the overall number, yet given that the vast majority of integrated high schools in each state are urban – SP, 21,026, PR, 26,672, and RS, 4,402 – the MST maintains a significant presence in rural technical high schools (INEP: 2010).
Departmentos de Diversidade (Departments of Diversity).

Land occupations, encampments, and demonstrations are the main indicators of movement success in agrarian reform. Together, they also show how the MST dominates the policy area of agrarian reform. The movement has success in education, but comparatively less than in agrarian reform. As I show in the next chapter, this is more than what we find in agricultural policy. The indicators I establish to judge success represent instances of actual institutionalization, e.g. schools, and percentages of members involved, e.g. students. As shown by the available data, as well as efforts by the MST to forward institutional changes within certain Departments of Education throughout the country, the MST’s level of success in education lies approximately between its levels of success in agrarian reform and agricultural production.

*Instrumental and Direct-action Strategies in MST Self-Governmental Resistance*

Self-governmental movements do not accept the standard state/society distinctions, but challenge them. We observe resistance in opposition to centralization, homogeneity, and administrative inequality, specifically contesting the subordination of “social” interests to one singular “public.” I hypothesize that strategy drives the development of self-governmental resistance. The reason is that prior to any action there must be a guiding plan or set of objectives. Strategy is this plan that also involves a movement's self-understanding or identity. More than structural variables like state strength or neoliberal adjustment, strategy explains *how* resistance institutionalizes. I evaluate each subcategory of strategy involved in self-governmental resistance—direct-
action and instrumental – in terms of (1) coherence and consistency of objectives, and (2) preparation of knowledge, or know-how. Direct-action plans detail the movement's role in executing a particular policy area. Different from direct-action strategy, instrumental strategic planning uses and requires another actor for policy execution. This differs from mediated strategic planning, which is defined by the delegation of decision-making power to a non-movement actor. Because the MST institutionalizes self-governmental resistance, they do not use mediated strategies.

The MST successfully governs educational policy, according to its vision, but at a lower rate than what we observed in the prior chapter concerning agrarian reform. For this reason, I claim the MST shows a mid-level of success in education, especially when we compare the number of sites and people mobilized with those for agrarian reform and agricultural production. The reason for the mid-level success in education is a high level of strategic strength in direct-action strategic planning combined with a low level in instrumental.

The movement's direct-action strategic plan shows high levels of consistency and coherence. We can discern the movement’s strategy's coherence in its protest demands. When we survey protests for education since 2002 (when reliable numbers for different movements become available), we find 242 events led by the MST out of a total number of 375 documented events, or 64% of all events led by movements organizing to advance rural education. As we can also see in Figure 3 in Appendix 2, the number of protest

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77 The CPT has maintained numbers on social movement protests according to type since 2001. Only since 2005, however, have they consistently differentiated protests for some kind of education-related demand from “other” protests.
actions has increased since 2002, even as the MST is sharing the field of struggles for education with unions and indigenous movements. In newspaper articles that routinely document MST protests for education, we find consistent and coherent demands aimed at state departments of education or INCRA (Agencia Brasil: 7-18-2005; Folha de São Palo: 8-22-2005; A Folha de São Paulo: 6-11-2008; O Globo: 2-19-2009; Agencia Brasil: 6-8-2009). In multiple interviews, I was also told of movement leaders' lack of respect for state agencies, of state agencies' inability to deliver resources, and of state agencies’ sporadic attention to movement demands (Interview: Sector of Education-PR, 7-31-2011; Interview: Encampment 1 Near Londrina, PR, 6-21-2011). Comparing interviews with newspaper reporting shows how movement messaging and goals are clear and simple, often including access to more resources and more movement control. We see coherence in the movement's representation and selection of their targets, as well as in the content of their demands. The regular nature of the movement protests and demand-making over time also shows a high level of consistency.

Evidence for preparation in the MST's direct-action strategy for education is in their implementation plans, and in particular, the number and quality of movement documents. The movement's collection of notebooks serves to systematize experiences and concepts for internal distribution and instruction. Since MST’s origins, there have been at least 13 notebooks on MST educational precepts published through ITERRA and 18 by the movement's education sector. From how to teach geography to what is the meaning of cooperation, movement notebooks assemble concepts and experiences for members to study the movement's principles and philosophy. Every movement school I
visited, from elementary to secondary, had a library stocked with various didactic materials, yet always showcasing MST-published manuals and texts. These movement materials serve as the basis for training teachers. For example, at one training seminar on early childhood education, I studied with members how to teach generative themes with nursery rhymes in kindergartens and used the publication “MST Escola,” which is a collection of movement educational documents (Fieldnotes: Caruarú-Pernambuco, 8-1-2009). At other schools I attended, including São Paulo, Paraná, and Rio Grande do Sul, the movement's notebooks were regularly assigned readings in class.

Knowledge preparation in direct-action strategic planning is used to train teachers. Since the movement's inception, the movement has had plans to train teachers from its own ranks rather than contracting “those from the outside (MST: 1991).” Between 1990 and 2004 in normal education, the MST reports graduating 10 classes from movement-run schools with between 30 to 50 movement-trained teachers in each class (ITERRA: 2004). Other courses at the university-level also train movement members on their pedagogy, specifically the “licenciatura em educação do campo (undergraduate course in countryside education)” with over 100 students enrolled in 2010 (INCRA: 2010). The movement itself plans in their documents and in their courses how to execute educational policy itself. Developing courses, and training movement teachers in these courses, propagates knowledge of the MST's pedagogy and the means to implement it. The number of teachers trained by the movement in their distinct pedagogy is evidence of a high level of direct-action strategic planning.

When we analyze the strength of the movement's direct-action efforts counter-
factually with respect to the outcome of institutionalized self-governmental resistance, we can see how different levels of strategic strength would have contributed to lower levels of movement success. For example, a hypothetically less coherent implementation plan would have deprived the movement of implementing its educational vision, for without the plan, there is nothing to institutionalize. Low levels of teacher preparation, similarly, would have left the movement with no one to practice it. And with the already-existing high turnover rates amongst non-movement trained rural teachers (Interview: Sector of Education-PR, 7-31-2011), rural schools would most likely be left with few to no educators. The MST calls on the Brazilian government to construct schools for the movement to run. And while we see many schools constructed, this is not a result of strategic planning focused on mediation because the movement plans to execute policy through them.

Already-established theories have trouble explaining the MST's mode of institutionalizing self-governmental resistance because they lack a focus on strategic plans and initiatives. Political Process theorists would explain levels of movement success in terms of elite facilitation or repression. Yet, when we look to MST institutionalization in certain states, and the political parties in their respective governments, the variations in allies/opposition lead us to search out other explanations. Specifically, in the state of Paraná, itinerant schools have been successfully organized while implementing the movement's pedagogy in schools on settlements has not. Roberto Requião, who is considered by movement leaders an ally, was governor from 2002 to 2010. Because Secretaries of Education at the state level are nominated by governors and
they mainly direct educational policy overall for their respective states, variations among kinds of schools where the MST has success in Paraná cannot be deduced from governmental allies. In fact, comparing the low number of elementary schools across states with oppositional governments (Rio Grande do Sul, 2006-2010) and ally governments (Paraná, 2002-2010) shows low levels of implementation regardless of who is in office.

São Paulo, however, seems to suggest the opposite, especially in comparison to states like Paraná or Rio Grande do Sul. In fact, Paraná's Department of Diversity within the Secretary of Education actually published MST's didactic materials, while the director of pedagogy in São Paulo had never even heard that the movement had a distinct pedagogical project – “educação do campo” (Interview: Eduardo – Department of Pedagogy, SP, 11-21- 2011). While this seems to suggest a potential governmental “opening” in Paraná, it does not explain the lack of institutionalizing education in settlement schools in Paraná. I account for the variations above when discussing the dynamics to the MST's other strategic approach – instrumentalization.

Instrumentalization, even though weak, still characterizes the movement's planning. Evidence for the MST’s plans to instrumentalize governmental actors for their own project includes their use of the language of rights and desire for continuous schooling for children. When asked why the movement in Rio Grande do Sul sought to certify the itinerant schools, I was told how “students were learning to read and write, yet had nothing to prove their skill levels. When they went to state schools, they had to take tests, many times having to repeat grades (Interview: MST Sector of Education-RS, 3-9-
2011).” I was also told how the movement's project is meant to “assure access to their right to education (Interview: MST Sector of Education-PR, 7-31-2011).” The itinerant schools, furthermore, use resources from state departments of education. First appearing in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul in 1996, authorized by the Conselho Estadual de Educação (State Educational Committee or CEE)78, roles for all actors – the MST and the state Department of Education – are specified in the 1996 Parecer 1.313. In 2003, Paraná’s CEE legalized itinerant schools in that state through Parecer 1.012. In each parecer, the Department of Education is in charge of supplying financial and physical materials for the schools, while elaboration and execution of the pedagogical proposal remains with the movement, as does the selection of professors, and the majority of evaluating procedures.79

The language of rights shows explicit recognition of state authority, as does the desire of continuous school attendance. Rather than establishing a parallel educational system, as we would expect in revolutionary struggles, the movement retains pedagogical

78 Every CEE in each Brazilian state has norm making, deliberative, and consultative powers for their respective state’s educational policies, within the limits set by the Lei de Diretrizes de Base (Basic Legal Directives in Education) of 1996 (the prior version, 1974).

79 All itinerant schools have an “escola base,” in a movement settlement which acts as the pedagogical and administrative center for each itinerant school in each encampment. The itinerant and base schools differ given that the itinerant schools do not have a permanent structure, which the base schools have because they are located on settlements. Both, however, follow similar pedagogies and fit within the overall movement’s educational vision in the same way. While the associated base school handles the pedagogical elements of the itinerant schools, a separate non-governmental organization (NGO) takes charge of resources from the state to the individual schools. In Rio Grande do Sul, the NGO was Instituto Preservar, and in Paraná, the Associação de Cooperação Agrícola e Reforma Agrária do Paraná, (Association of Agrarian Cooperation and Agrarian Reform of Paraná).
autonomy while using ideational and material resources for its own ends. The MST claims and implements their own educational vision, unlike reform-style movements that would demand inclusion into already-existing governmental relations backed by the exercise of state power. Plans to use resources and rights in movement-led implementation reveals how MST resistance includes vying for control of the educational policy area.

Consistent and coherent messages connecting the movement's identity in education appears regularly in movement publications. In both Journal dos Sem Terra and Boletim dos Sem Terra, “education” and “school,” respectively appear 1,845 and 1,216 times. In comparison, “land” and “agrarian reform,” typical of agrarian reform policy, are in these movement's publications 10,999 and 7,734 times. The content of many of these references to education often includes the current and historical deprivation suffered by movement members, particularly in rural areas. It also includes how the “reality” of the countryside and the movement's own history of struggle require the design and implementation of a movement-led pedagogy. In addition to these meanings, movement members also frequently mention how urban schools discriminate against landless students. Discussions are primarily oriented around how governments provide education and public schools, but the education and schools are organized without taking into consideration the specificity of the countryside.

A common slogan heard at movement events – educaçao do campo, direito nosso, dever do estado! (countryside education, our right, the state’s duty!) - showcases the idea that the MST exercises the right to provide education with the government providing the
means. Or rather, we see the idea of instrumentalization present in the kind of identity represented in movement chants that simultaneously recognize state power and promote the idea that movement ought to use it. The kind of identity the movement promotes is primarily geared towards the movement member's own abilities to manage their schools and pedagogy. This shows attempts in their strategic planning to create a specific identity in the area of education that requires movement-led initiatives. The strength of the movement's identity in education, in comparison to their efforts in agrarian reform, is similar but weaker. Additionally, the movement has more problems in the development of their instrumentalist strategy.

As displayed in the relatively recent closing of the movement's itinerant schools in the state of Rio Grande do Sul in 2009, the MST faced a concerted effort by the Ministerio Publico (Public Ministry or MP) to official end the movement, repression from the state-level government of PSDB Governor Yeda Crusius, and hostility from the then Secretary of Education, Mariza Abreu. The MP sought to “declare the MST illegal,” in the name of “protecting children” from the movement's alleged “disruption of public order,” and “use of public resources for criminal behavior (Public Ministry, Act 1.116, 2007).” One MP official told me how the movement was “terrorist,” employing tactics “similar to those used by guerrillas in the Vietnam War,” with children in movement schools “never learning to read or write anything but the name Karl Marx (Interview: Gilberu Thums, 3-15-2011). At the same time, the PSDB Governor Yeda Crusius (2006-2010) earned a reputation for repressive actions against social movements and unions, drawing mass protests, federal investigations, and low approval ratings (Carta Maior: 6-12-2008; Folha de São Paulo: 3-6-2009; Radioagência NP: 8-9-2008). In the area of education, the then Secretary of Education, Mariza Abreu, told me how in the countryside “everything is difficult and isolated – it’s no wonder people move to cities for culture, rural life is not all that great,” and also remarked how she “continued to negotiate with the movement, even when members would appear with their children in protest (Interview: Mariza Abreu, Porto Alegre, 3-11-2011).”
movement's tactical choices – including protesting, occupying buildings, and involving children – while showing resolve and coherence, continued despite the unfavorable conditions. Increased police actions and unusual violence towards the movement were documented early in Crusius' regime (Instituto Humanitas Unisinios: 4-17-2007), yet did not result in any change by the movement in terms of their actions. In fact, INCRA was occupied by the MST on various occasions to make demands, as well as various large ranches that have been targeted repeatedly by the movement for over ten years (MST: 8-9-2009; 9-9-2009). In this way, direct-action tactics rendered difficult any kind of instrumentalist relationship.

Prior to the Crusius administration in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, the movement's plan – discerned in the low number of pareceres and the belief in Constituinte Escolar during Dutra's time in office (1998-2002) – included ways to use the government for the movement's objectives. Remaining relatively autonomous from the government, the MST planned to use their resources despite the risk that the relationship would break down. Conflict – a key element to instrumental strategies – ultimately led to the breakdown of the relationship. In terms of preparation, the movement knew of the government's position, yet consistently led protests – at 7 per year in Rio Grande do Sul – and occupied ranches and offices as if no change in governmental administration had occurred (CPT: 2006-2010). Or in other words, the movement showed a low level of knowledge preparation in terms of how to engage with non-allied governments. They knew that the Crusius regime was not friendly to the movement's cause, as well as being unfriendly to the movement itself, yet did not conceive of a different mode of interacting
with government.

The persistence shows, on the one hand, resolve, while on the other hand, difficulty adjusting plans to changes in the political climate. We can compare within the movement their efforts in Rio Grande do Sul and Paraná to observe the differences in terms of institutionalization. Instrumentalist strategic efforts between the MST and various Department of Education leaders in solidifying resolutions and institutional supports with the government in Paraná created a series of resolutions and decrees that have made the closing of schools tedious and difficult (Interview: Ex-Departamento de Diversidade, Curitiba-PR, 8-20-2011). These agreements in Paraná, however, do not apply to settlement schools, only to itinerant schools.

In Rio Grande do Sul, the movement did not invest time and resources in working with state officials, as is apparent in the lower number of resolutions and lack of an official countryside education department within the state-level Department of Education. Rather, the movement banked on the government's “constituinte escolar (constituting the school)” program, which actively involved social actors in crafting individual school directives and internal rules (Interview: Ex-CRE, Bagé-RS, 5-17-2011; Mendes: Unpublished). The program did not last and did not materialize in multiple protective legal mechanisms for movement schools. In Paraná, the MST better balanced instrumental strategies with a direct-action. The movement planned differently in Rio Grande do Sul, where state-level leaders favored direct-action over instrumentalization. As a result, the movement's efforts were repealed easier in Rio Grande do Sul than in Paraná. Indeed, in the latter they continue to this day, despite a government deemed
unfriendly according to many movement members.

The problems the MST faced in Rio Grande do Sul are indicative of general problems facing the movement in instrumentalizing governmental institutions for their educational project in São Paulo. In Paraná, the movement had more success, especially with respect to establishing more agreements and itinerant schools because of a better development of an instrumentalist strategic orientation. Similarly, comparing the movement's efforts in Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo – where the movement's institutionalization of education has seen no success – shows similar problems in elaborating a lack of strategic strength in their instrumental approach with governmental actors. While one government official I interviewed had never heard of the movement, I was also told how other attempts to reach out to regional officials were always met with the same rejection (Interview: MST Sector of Education, 8-11-2011). Movement actors make appeals, but have not adequately prepared knowledge concerning how to use governmental elites in São Paulo. These differences between states reveal that the movement inconsistently approaches state-level Departments of Education for instrumentalization. And as consistency is an indicator in my theory of strategy, the movement's plans in this regards can be classified as low.

An alternative counter-factual scenario for the MST in Rio Grande do Sul entailed stopping protests and the involvement of children. This tactical retreat would potentially have saved the movement for a time, given that Public Ministry officials claimed that the movement's involvement of children in protest provided grounds to remove them from their parents and stop protests (Interview: MP-Luis Teichneir, 3-15-2011). I was told how
the movement began to become aware of such systematized practices concerning children as well as the documenting of all individuals in protests by the police with the change in administration (Interview: Leandro Scalabrin, Rede Nacional de Advogados e Advogadas Populares, Renaap, 4-3-2011). This hypothetical switch could have sped up the inevitable— in 2010, a large group of militants left the movement due to what they considered a lack of the movement's resolve in conducting confrontational actions (see “Carta de Saída (Resignation Letter)” from Spring 2011 where 50 influential leaders left the MST and other left-wing Brazilian movements). Yet, rather than these leaders leaving due to the perceived loss of radical resolve, a movement-initiated “cease-fire” could have allowed these individuals to remain in the movement with the idea that the lull in action was both the movement's own choice and would end eventually. Time and effort could have been placed on devising new methods or new alliances with social actors to pressure governmental authorities.

Despite these issues in strategic strength and planning at the state level, the movement has succeeded in instrumentalizing federal-level resources and institutions through PRONERA. While the itinerant schools existed through contracts with local state-level departments of education, MST high schools have their juridical identity established through the federal government. Through the network of Institutos Federais (Federal Institutes) in each state, the movement establishes relationships to certify their courses and issue diplomas. The other federal connection that these high schools possess is funding through Instituto Nacional de Colonização de Reforma Agrária (National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform or INCRA), and in particular, PRONERA.
The movement's instrumental strategy includes accepting and using state money from PRONERA for courses that the movement administers. PRONERA funds went for the movement to administer classes in 43 public universities for over 10,000 students in secondary and post-secondary education in 2010 (INCRA: 2011).

While instrumental strategic planning has characterized MST efforts in institutionalizing movement-led secondary education, their level of strength is lower than what is prevalent in agrarian reform policy. Specifically, preparation has been lacking in creating and sustaining alliances. For example, in one interview with a former bureaucrat in the Department of Education in Paraná, I was told how some members during negotiations did not know the potential resources of the department (Interview: Ex-Departamento de Diversidade, Curitiba-PR, 8-20-2011). I was also told in another interview, how, “if the movement knocks on my door, well, I will answer, yet they have to realize that if they want real change, INCRA is just too small to make that happen (Interview: INCRA-Brasilia, Clarice Aparecida dos Santos, 2-1-2011).” Both of these comments – the first from Paraná during a time when the movement felt the government was favorable and the second from an important ally at the national level – reveal strategic problems concerning the movement's use of government. In terms of preparation, the way the MST has used government for its own ends could be greatly improved and changed. And while PRONERA shows a successful case of instrumentalization, even there, INCRA officials see the movement's efforts as weak.

The MST engages in instrumental strategic planning. For this reason, and combined with direct-action strategic planning efforts, the movement's struggle for
control over educational policy for their members qualifies as self-governmental resistance. Yet, because of problems with their instrumental approach, the movement has a weak level of strength on the indicators of consistency and preparation. When contrasting with the movement's instrumental plans in agrarian reform, their attempts to conceive of ways to use government or social actors for their own purposes is not as developed. For this reason, the movement's institutionalization of self-governmental resistance in educational policy measured in number of occurrences and percentage of people mobilized is less than their efforts in agrarian reform.

Different instrumental plans and orientations would have resulted in alternative patterns of institutionalization. A change in favor of solidifying non-government alliances in educational provision would potentially have benefited movement self-governance. Even as the number of non-MST social movement actors involved in educational initiatives including unions and indigenous groups has grown over this last decade, the movement has under-utilized alliances in institutionalizing resistance in educational policy. This would place the movement more at risk of losing decision-making power to other movements, but would also enable them to have more autonomy to challenge governmental efforts in educational policy. As their efforts on settlements show, they need to strengthen strategic plans. Movement leaders know this, currently referred in certain movement documents as the need to “re-take control” of schools in the settlements (Fieldnotes: ITERRA, Secondary Education Conference, 5-5-2011; Interview: MST Sector of Education-PR, 7-19-2011). Keeping state resources and institutions at bay could solidify greater social bases of support, as well as potentially granting the
movement's greater autonomy. Instrumentalizing other movements, however, could mean that the movement loses consistent access to funds and recognition.

Similarly, differences in institutionalization could have arisen from a different mode of knowledge preparation for instrumentalizing governmental resources. Despite the strategic relevance of thinking of education as a right, the movement could construct arguments akin to how they institutionalize agrarian reform. In particular, the rhetorical moves to show how the MST has exhausted all possible efforts to practice education has not been deployed as it has been for agrarian reform. Claims of discrimination, the desire for school stability, and recognition of historical specificity, all go into the MST educational identity. However, the recognition of the Constitutional right to education is rarely mentioned as part of their identity in this policy area. Rather, the right to land typically “trumps” education demands and actions, in the past and currently. I was even told in one case how the movement's attempt to insert an alternative pedagogy into secondary schools created a rift currently between leaders who feel education is essential and those who disagree (Fieldnotes: Escola Milton Santos, 7-6-2011). Even since the movement's early origins, many families thought that they were first involved in the struggle for land, and only upon receiving it, were schools to be considered.

A re-focus on identity could promote the idea that only the MST can deliver the right to education in the countryside, versus some other actor, and that other options for education provision have been exhausted. An essential part of the movement's conception of “reality” contains this premise. Clearly elaborating and illustrating it strategically would allow the movement to deal with state-level departments to grant the MST and
potential allies more prerogatives over the use of state resources.

In terms of social movement theories, the movement's problems in developing strategic plans concerning instrumentalization could be explained by Political Process Theorists and studies that deploy the concept of Political Opportunity Structure. Their arguments would discuss how opponents of the movement closed off avenues for cooperation and access to resources, and at the same time, repressed their activities. This, at best, is a partial explanation. The agentic side of the equation, particularly with how the movements engaged state authorities needs consideration. Governmental authorities perceived the MST as a threat and made this clear in repressive activities. Yet, as shown in Rio Grande do Sul, the movement knew of the administration's designs. Without adjusting, their direct-action approach led to relations with governmental actors that closed off any instrumentalist possibilities. This also shows a greater problem in the MST strategic efforts in education, especially when we consider how they have no approach when dealing with governments that challenge their project.

Comparing efforts in all three states reveals the glaring absence of any state-level project in São Paulo, as opposed to initiatives in Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul. Again, it is easy to attribute the cause of this to governmental actors that “close” access to social actors. However, when I interviewed bureaucrats working in the state's Department of Education, they did not express hostility, but a general lack of knowledge that the MST even had an alternative project. Likewise, after interviewing movement leaders in the Pontal de Paranapanema, I was told how repeated efforts since the 1990s in the region at discussing the pedagogy of the movement with state elites have not resulted in any
inroads. One would expect a change in plan or approach when dealing with this lack of facilitation. This has not taken place. Re-thinking strategy and crafting of the movement's identity with respect to education administration could help in re-approaching governments. The comparison of Rio Grande do Sul and Paraná in terms of resolutions and pareceres shows that the movement, in latter, planned to instrumentalize authorities better than in other states.

Rational Choice theorists would focus the explanation on incentives. Concerning movement problems in instrumentalization, this theory would conjecture that a mid-level of institutionalization arises from the movement's inability to provide incentives for elite and/or member collaboration. Incentive provision, for members, would entail greater provision of material resources. We see this in a high level already distributed in various states, from PRONERA, to specific resources allocated for movement-initiatives in their itinerant schools. The high level of resources already-distributed indicates that the movement's problems here lie elsewhere. Concerning incentives for elites, the movement could make more appeals to force their respective governments to collaborate. Added pressure through protests could raise awareness, thereby providing “incentives.” The problem is that increased pressure, especially in states like Rio Grande do Sul, did not result in a favorable response from the government. In fact, just the opposite resulted. A proposed explanation based on incentives for members and elites has been proven incorrect by actual events.

4.4 Conclusion: Lessons
In this chapter, I show how the MST has achieved a mid-level success rate in mobilizing participants for their alternative educational vision. The reason for this level of success, as I illustrate in the last section, is a high level of strategic strength concerning their direct-action approach combined with a low level in instrumentalization. According to my hypotheses, this mix of strategic levels results in a mid-level of movement institutionalization. We still can observe the presence of instrumentalist practices and aspirations, clearly seen in relationships with INCRA and PRONERA. This mode of strategic planning does not show the same level of strength as in the movement's efforts for agrarian reform. Without a steady level of instrumental strategic strength, the movement remains at the mercy of governmental elites who can close off avenues if they so choose.

The MST has received much international attention – not only for their dramatic land occupations, but also for their efforts in education. The movement is seen as a success, if not an example for emulation worldwide. Despite this attention, a disciplined, social-scientific analysis of the movement's efforts in educational policy has escaped most research. This chapter attempts to fill this void: first, by developing and testing a theory against rivals; and second, through accounting and measuring movement efforts. Both, together, have not been conducted previously.

It is difficult to easily transport the MST's project into other contexts, especially to derive implications. My study of strategy in part leads us to the conclusion that movement action primarily revolves around plans, not static, seemingly impermeable variables like state strength or neoliberalism. To focus on strategy ought to spur activists
and academics alike to consider that how a movement organizes itself matters as much as external factors. Implications also include particular conceptions we have about what are state and social roles. The movement challenges common sense understandings of the actors that assume the position of executing educational policy. The MST contests the public/private divide and shows us that resistance can take place through institutionalizing oppositional action. The movement shows how an actor unlikely to disrupt order – a social movement – can build its own in schools, a typical place where we find cultural, economic, and social forms of power at work.

Like the movement's efforts in agrarian reform, the trend in increased demonstrations is a sign that the movement could be changing focus. In the area of education, this does not pose the same problem as we discussed in the last chapter on agrarian reform. However, the evidence on demonstrations does highlight what can be understood as a change to a more conventional reform-style mode of institutionalizing resistance. Many schools, however, continue to exist and promote the movement's pedagogy. I often heard how movement schools were to train members to become “técnico-militante (militant-technicians)” who were to have technical expertise in a certain area, but also a commitment to the movement's struggle. Despite this claim, 2012 TCU decisions on changes for PRONERA explicitly mention how the “técnico-militante” program needs to end as a goal in movement education. Whether or not this changes practices internal to schools will be seen in years to come.
CHAPTER 5: SELF-GOVERNMENTAL RESISTANCE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

“Without Cooperatives, the Settlements do not Survive”
- MST Director, Sector of Production- Paraná State, 8-11-2011

Music permeates MST marches and rallies. One song – “só sai reforma agrária” (loosely translated as “approve, or pass, agrarian reform”) – that I came to memorize after hearing it more times than I care to remember, lays out some of the central reasons for the movement's struggle. Its third stanza, specifically, refers to the importance of agricultural production. Usually sung in a jovial manner, the passage – “nossa terceira tarefa é produzir, no trabalho coletivo, colher muito, e repartir (our third task is to produce, work collectively, harvest a lot, and share)” – reminds MST members of the need not only to work in agriculture, but to do so collectively. Emphasized especially in the early days of the movement, while also continuing through the present day, collective work usually centers on cooperatives of dozens of families that design and implement production plans together. Entire settlements were (and many still are) organized around their cooperatives, connecting the fate of the movement's efforts in agrarian reform with their success in agricultural production. “Só sai reforma agrária” draws our attention to the vital relationship between agrarian reform and agricultural production, albeit in a light-hearted manner.

Occupations and the ensuing encampments at the center of MST agrarian reform policy are not intended to be campsites or resorts. The movement breaks up prior land holdings and re-appropriates property, resisting status quo, dominant governmental policies to construct an MST-centered alternative in their place. This dynamic of
institutionalizing resistance characterizes agrarian reform policy, as well as the other policy areas where the MST actively vies for control, such as in agricultural production. Developing cooperatives, as I discuss in this chapter, is one alternative proposed by the movement to challenge state power and private property and the prescriptions, plans, and practices encouraged by governmental elites. Many cooperatives were born during the encampment phase of the movement's efforts to implement an alternative version of agrarian reform. Despite overlapping temporally, the actual plans and institutionalization of resistance differs in ways that I explain and explore in this chapter.

I analyze in this chapter the different ways that the MST has institutionalized agricultural production policy. I show how the MST attempts to govern agricultural production in ways similar to their activities in education and agrarian reform through opposing state power and private property. Crafting and institutionalizing ways to make members economically viable, while remaining oppositional to large-scale landowners and governmental elites, has been a key priority since the movement's inception. In addition to cooperatives, other practices that count as concrete examples of the MST's institutionalization of self-governmental resistance in the formation of a kind of oppositional economy include attempts to foment agroecology and to informally incentivize cooperation between producers through using governmental policies. Cooperation, both inside and outside of actual production cooperatives, contests governmental policy prescriptions that promote individualistic, profit-generating operations.

This chapter grounds the MST's institutionalization of self-governmental
resistance in agricultural production policy. Even though agrarian reform, as a policy area, is distinct from agricultural production and education, their fates are inextricably connected. Because most agrarian reform settlements feature land parcels that are relatively small, working together in any fashion, such as in pooling scarce resources and exchanging knowledge, is necessary. Isolated producers, living far removed from the means to transport their goods and market them, also often have limited means to pressure governmental authorities to create production policies for agrarian reform beneficiaries. The fear is that if the cooperatives fail, so do the settlements. After all, with no economic opportunities, people leave the areas they initially occupy in the name of agrarian reform. Regardless of the number of schools or health care clinics, or even amount of land distributed, agrarian reform hinges on the ability for rural inhabitants to earn a living. For these reasons, as I was told by one movement leader, without cooperatives, the areas where movement member families live – the settlements – are in jeopardy.

This chapter addresses the tensions, the problems as well as the successes, surrounding the nature of MST resistance in the policy area of agricultural production. I focus on the movement's efforts to institutionalize agricultural cooperatives and agroecological production techniques – i.e. craft and follow regularized rules and procedures. I claim that movement efforts in the area of agricultural production, like I have already discussed in previous chapters on education and agrarian reform, also illustrate self-governmental resistance. With respect to agricultural production, however, the level of success is lower than what is displayed in the two other areas. This chapter
reveals how one major problem that has plagued movement efforts in agricultural production concerns strategic strength – with respect to the ability to plan ways to instrumentalize governmental elites and resources as well as to coherently design their own direct-action approach. Like previous chapters, I showcase the importance of movement identity as a contributing factor in institutionalizing self-governmental resistance. A low level of strategic strength has created problems, in fact, divisions, within the MST's identity concerning agricultural production.

This chapter has three sections. In the first section, I elaborate on the meaning of state power in contemporary Brazilian agricultural production policy. I also document how neoliberal economic policy dictates have come to permeate prescriptions made by official, governmental elites to small rural producers. The first section presents the targets that the MST resists. In the second section, I describe the MST's coordinated efforts – not only in demands but also in implementation and design – to organize agricultural production in opposition to the dominant form encouraged by state authority. I concretize this discussion by grounding it in the development of production cooperatives and the movement's relatively recent promotion of agroecology. In the third and final section, I explain how the movement has institutionalized resistance in agricultural production and evaluate their success. Despite various success stories and achievements, I show how the MST's efforts in production have lagged significantly behind other efforts in education and agrarian reform. Here, I discuss that more than contextual factors, such as elite allies or state strength, the reason for the movement's limited success is due to flawed strategic planning. This, in turn, has created problems for the movement's identity, which has
further impeded institutionalizing self-governmental resistance in agricultural production.
I conclude with a discussion of ramifications of these problems for the MST.

5.1 Neoliberal Orthodoxy and State Power in Brazilian Agricultural Governance

The Combination of Neoliberalism with State Power

Over the last thirty years, dictates central to neoliberalism have become fused with state power overall, including in the area of agricultural policy. This combination has complemented the central qualities of state power – centralization, homogeneity, and inequality – rather than erase them. In this section, I discuss the key, identifiable elements of neoliberalism and how they buttress state power. I first explain how state power and neoliberalism are connected, and then, I concretize their dynamics through a focus on agricultural policy development in Brazil. This section's purpose is to explore the practices that the MST opposes in their cooperatives and agroecology initiatives, which are taken up in this chapter's third section.

We see the development of neoliberalism occurring in two time periods. The first time period, commonly referred to as the “Washington Consensus,” runs from the late 1970s and early 1980s through the mid to late 1990s. The subsequent “Post-Washington Consensus” continues through to the present day. This division is rooted in differences between macro-economic reforms focused on privatizing state-owned enterprises, reforming monetary policies, and removing import tariffs (Williamson: 1990) and subsequent efforts grounded in promoting local actor participation in social programs and granting greater autonomy to national governments to craft development strategies.
(Weber: 2002; Stiglitz: 2008; Birdsall and Fukuyama: 2011). Peck and Tickell summarize this shift as “roll-back” versus “roll-out” neoliberalism (2002), with the shift a direct response to perceived failures by the practitioners who led the charge for the first round of reforms.

The central elements of state power – promoting a singular culture, subordinating social actors, and centralizing decision-making power – are supported by neoliberal economic policy. First, the practices encouraged in both “roll-back” and “roll-out” neoliberalism emphasize what Burchell calls “an enterprise form of conduct” that encourages actors such as individuals, families, and governments to consider themselves as isolated, autonomous, cost-benefit calculators (1996). Burchell’s recognition of “conduct” highlights the cultural component of neoliberalism. Promoting business practices also facilitates the creation of a singular mode of identification, specifically to the market. Neoliberalism is not economics devoid of culture, but rather it is a certain kind of culture rooted in particular practices and beliefs.

In addition to identifiable cultural beliefs and practices, what also connects neoliberalism to state power is its “paradoxical” quality. The paradox, according to Rose, is that neoliberal policy portrays itself as the critic of government calling for deregulation in favor of the “market” while ultimately depending on governmental authorities for implementation (1996). The paradox reveals dependence on state power, and in particular, efforts to subordinate social actors and centralize decision-making. Concerning

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81 For more on the historical context of this transition, especially in the late 1970s, see Foucault, Michel: "The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College De France, 1978-1979," Lectures at the College De France, (2010).
the former, implementing neoliberal policies requires a governmental actor to deregulate, cut social spending, and privatize. Such elements at the core of neoliberalism assume separate private and public sectors, with the public sector enabled to execute changes over and onto private, i.e. social, actors. Accompanying this role hierarchy, decision-making powers are reserved, or insulated, for a few economic elites in financial institutions. Through centralization and social subordination, state power enables the central cultural norms of neoliberalism to proliferate.

In Latin America, neoliberal reforms came at the expense of interventionist states. Before either “roll-back” or “roll-out” reforms, governments from Mexico to Argentina crafted credit, technical assistance, and tax policies to favor large-scale agricultural production to acquire foreign currency as part of import substitution industrialization (ISI) (Haggard: 1990; Frieden: 1991). Large-scale agricultural production was favored – and remains so in the name of neoliberal orthodoxy as comparative advantage – usually in the form of grain production for export (Anderson and Valdes: 2008). The turn to neoliberalism in the 1980s also insulated macro-economic policy-making from social actors, while opening social policy to their participation (Collier and Handlin: 2009). Evelina Dagnino calls this latter development the “perverse confluence” of neoliberalism and participatory governance, as greater social involvement is contingent on following neoliberal norms (2007). Her insight draws our attention to co-optation, which the MST avoids, through consistently challenging the decision-making dynamics and role hierarchy promoted through state power.
The Neoliberal State in Brazilian Agricultural Policy

Neoliberalism's “roll-back” phase in Brazil begins in the late 1980s, becoming entrenched in Collor de Mello's administration (1990-1992) with the ending of price fixing policies for particular crops and the cutting of large investment subsidies. At this time, we see a decrease in the amount of money distributed to all agricultural producers. Cuts that began during the Collor administration continued through the following Franco era (1992-1994) and the first mandate of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) (1994-1998) (Araújo, et al: 2007). In place of subsidies, large agribusiness operations began taking out loans from private banks rather than relying on governmental programs and credit.

Following both Rose and Peck and Tickell, executing “roll-back” neoliberalism involved governmental actors. The kinds of beliefs and practices they promoted, over and onto social actors, were rooted in a singular understanding of economic behavior made possible through subordinating social actors to governmental elites.


Grounding this transformation – specifically for how we understand MST resistance – is the change in agricultural policy to favor the idea of the “family farmer” as opposed to

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82 Prior to the neoliberal turn, the Brazilian system was characterized by price controls for specific crops, subsidized credit for technological investments (e.g. tractors), and particular governmental agencies being in charge of specific crops (e.g. coffee and sugar). These programs developed in the early 20th century, based on goals to secure rural to urban population shifts and providing food cheaply to the newly amassing urban populations (Barros 2008).

83 Such changes, however, did not completely end support for large-scale agriculture. Reliance on private banks has caused large producers to incur significant debts (in 2000, debt was 25% of gross agricultural production and in 2005, it was 25%) (Damico and Nassar: 2007), leading to federal government debt restructuring and bailouts twice over the last fifteen years (Rezende and Kreter: 2007).
the idea of the “peasant.” In one interview with a Ministério de Desenvolvimento Agrário (Ministry of Agrarian Development or MDA) official who works in the FHC-created Secretário de Agricultura Familiar (Secretary of Family Farming or SAF), I was told how credit and loan policies were intended for “family farmers, you know, like what you have there in the United States (Interview: João de Guadagin, MDA-SAF, 2-11-2011).” Others in the Instituto de Colonização e Reforma Agrária (Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform or INCRA) – the governmental institution mainly involved in agrarian reform policies – would use “farmer” (in English) to distinguish between Brazilian “peasants” and the supposedly superior United States “farmer (Interview: Luciano Valadares, INCRA, 2-2-2011).” Marking the shift towards the promotion of the “family farmer ethic” in rural populations was the development of two ministries for agricultural policy,84 as well as the creation of special education, land reform, and production policies, which came as a response to massacres of landless peasants in the states of Roraima and Pará (Ondetti: 2008). Even though these programs addressed certain issue areas where the MST is active, their official elaboration remains wedded to neoliberalism and state power.

The FHC administration’s “Reforma Agraria: Compromisso de Todos (Agrarian Reform: A Compromise for Everyone)” oriented agricultural policy under the banner of creating the family farmer. Along with the “Compromisso,” the FHC government created a set of policies known as the “novo mundo rural (new rural world).” The guiding idea was that all small producers were to receive the same treatment by “integrating agrarian reform beneficiaries into family farming (Cardoso: 1997, MDA/Jungmann: 1999).” As a

84 For more on this difference between the MDA and MAPA, see Fernandes (2010).
means of integration, the separate, already-existing credit policy for agrarian reform beneficiaries, o Programa de Crédito Especial para a Reforma Agrária (Special Program for Agrarian Reform Credit or PROCERA), tripled from SR 89 to SR 250 million in 1995 and 1998, respectively. However, this increase was not to last, as PROCERA was later eliminated, and agrarian reform beneficiaries were absorbed into the already-existing credit policies for small producers known as the Programma Nacional de Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar (National Program for Strengthening Family Farming or PRONAF).

PRONAF works to instill an individualistic business ethic, and thus neoliberal culture, revealing the specifics of the government’s intended family farmer ethic. To qualify, families must meet certain group-based requirements,\(^{85}\) divided according to gender, age and most importantly, income.\(^{86}\) Regardless of the category, one overall objective is to “expand and improve products and their production in order to better

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\(^{86}\) The stipulations are the following: Group A (recently settled farmers), Group B (family farmers not living on settlements), Group A/C (settled farmers previously in group A), agroindustry (for investments in infrastructure, crop commercialization, artisan production, rural tourism), agroecology (organic farming), Eco (sustainable development), Rainforest (sustainable development focused on reforestation areas), Semi-Arid (infrastructure development primarily in the northeastern part of the country), Woman (targeting programs for women), Youth, Defrayal, and Commercialization (for farmers and their cooperatives), Quotas (for cooperatives), Microcredit, Food (for particular crops such as milk, rice, beans and wheat). PRONAF works by the government fixing interest rates on particular loans that are destined to these groups. Annual defrayal interest rates are fixed for each PRONAF subcategory based on farmer’s income levels: up to $5,000 Reais, 1.5%; between $5,000 Reais and $10,000 Reais, 3%; from $10,000 Reais to $20,000 Reais, 4.5%; and from $20,000 Reais to $30,000 Reais, 5.5%. Annual investment credits are also fixed based on income levels: up to $7,000 Reais, 1%; between $7,000 to $18,000 Reais, 2%; $18,000 Reais to $28,000 Reais, 4%; and from $28,000 to $36,000 Reais, 5.5%. 

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family earnings for individuals and collectives,” to “increase capital, production and profit… [and] create incentives for family farmers, as well as stimulate a sense of responsibility (Ministry of Agrarian Development: 2-2-2006). The allusion to responsibility fuses a market culture and its imperatives – the pursuit of capital and profit – to the family, facilitating a means for the latter to identify with the former.

Second, despite the group-based classification system, the ethic is nearly entirely individualistic. For example, an overwhelming number of recipients have been individuals – 98% between 1999 and 2004. Little to no money and few contracts have been signed with cooperatives. Only a small number – 2% – have been signed with group associations or devoted to projects oriented around agricultural infrastructure (Correa and Silva: 2007: 56). Group participation is not rooted in some notion of creating active, empowered social actors who have decision-making power in the design or implementation of policy. Rather, such practices have already been carefully defined and targeted by governmental elites for the “roll-out” of neoliberal practices onto social subordinates. In this construction, social actors are passive recipients. A different, contentious group dynamic that features collective decision-making rules and procedures, as I will elaborate in the next section, characterizes the guiding elements of the MST’s oppositional economy.

The language – expressed by both INCRA and MDA officials as well as found in Compromisso and PRONAF criteria to receive credit – depicts agricultural production by the family-farmer-as-business as superior to other peasant ways of producing and as a

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goal of governmental policy. “Integration” is a step on the path towards creating “efficient,” market-oriented economic producers. Agrarian reform policies, and credit, work as instruments in the state-led effort to promote neoliberal governance, placing a neoliberal ethic, or culture, onto recipients. Experts, from officials in the MDA to INCRA, administer and deliver these credits to agrarian reform beneficiaries, along with the knowledge and ethic concerning family farming. With the family farmer, we find a collection of policies, practices, and beliefs that reveal the connection of neoliberal policy dictates and state power. Rather than at odds, the two function well together, complimenting one another.

Access to governmental resources is contingent on neoliberal principles. The Brazilian government, by promoting and providing credit accordingly, subordinates social actors in the process. The division of small producers into groups seemingly decentralizes access, but actually grants a relatively few number of governmental elites the decision-making authority concerning group criteria. Both concentrating decision-making power and subordinating social actors illustrates two of state power's central elements. And the attempts to fashion all small producers into a singular “family farmer” homogenizes beliefs and practices, subjecting alternative cultural practices to market rationality. This last quality shows the third element of state power at work – the homogenization of culture. State power centralizes decision-making power, subordinates social actors to governmental elites, and promotes a singular mode of cultural identification. In these ways, neoliberalism combines with the central elements of state power rather than working at odds with them.
Despite the change from FHC to the center-left Lula administration in 2002, neoliberal reforms – especially of the “roll-out” variety – were strengthened without fundamental changes. To assuage business and investor anxiety after feeling the pressure from international and domestic forces, Lula continued Cardoso's macro-economic monetary policies (Amaral, et al: 2008). And while the funding provided for INCRA increased, as well as credit through PRONAF for small-producers, the guiding neoliberal compass in agricultural policy established during FHC’s time remained unaltered. Neoliberal governance in agricultural policy began during the Cardoso regime in the 1990s and became further entrenched during Lula's time in office.

The hierarchy established between state agencies and producers demarcates different spaces for “state” and “social (or economic)” actors – producing a binary that subordinates passive rural recipients using elite-determined criteria. The neoliberal forms of economic behavior that are encouraged and promoted are uniform and singular, attempting to homogenize a singular culture of economic production. As I will show in the next section, the MST's design and implementation of production cooperatives and agroecology directly challenges the conduct and policies encouraged by the Brazilian government.

5.2 The MST's Institutionalization of Resistance through Cooperatives and Agroecology

In addition to protests against agribusiness and occupations of experimental
production areas, MST resistance in the area of agricultural production takes the form of the systematized implementation – what I consider the institutionalization – of an alternative, oppositional project. Agricultural policy in Brazil shows central elements of neoliberalism. The previous section of this chapter dealt with how neoliberalism combines with state power through certain governmental institutions and credit programs, especially PRONAF. In this section, I discuss how MST production institutionalizes resistance to the elements of state power and private property in designing and implementing alternatives to status quo, dominant agricultural policy dictates. Specifically, the movement's challenge comes through decentralizing decision-making, opposing the subordinate status of social actors in economic activities, and proliferating localized forms of production. By organizing production on a communal basis, the ways in which the movement has institutionalized their resistance in cooperatives and agroecology production also challenges private property and neoliberalism.

**CPAs: Resistance to Private Property and State Centralization**

The clearest example of the MST's efforts to institutionalize oppositional production is through its Cooperativas de Produção Agrícola (Agricultural Production Cooperatives or CPAs). Since the late 1980s, the CPA has been seen by the movement as the “superior form of cooperation (MST: 2008, 74).” Every CPA – totaling 49 with

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88 The two main examples of the latter are the MST occupations of research centers of Aracruz cellulose in Rio Grande do Sul (2006) and Synenta in Paraná (2007).
89 There are two main kinds of MST-promoted cooperatives, the CPA and the CPS. The CPSs, Cooperativas de Prestação de Servicos (Service Cooperatives) do not collectivize production on site but work mainly to produce technical assistance to members and facilitate production. For more, see MST (2008) and ITERRA (2001).
2,229 participating families (Carvalho: 2006) – has the same guiding rules and encourages the same kinds of opposition to neoliberal governance. One CPA I visited, the Cooperativa de Produção Agropecuária Nova Santa Rita (Cooperative of Agricultural Production in New Santa Rita or COOPAN) currently works with members of 30 families, a decrease from the original 60 families in the mid-1990s. Regardless of this decline – something I also encountered at the four CPAs I visited\textsuperscript{90} – the 30 families divide production into different areas, or sectors, rotating between pork, dairy, and rice production. Each sector periodically meets to discuss what they will produce and need, which they then communicate to the entirety of the cooperative general assembly for debate and approval. Essentially the same nucleo design featured by the movement in other policy area governance, such groups – rather than those proposed and implemented through PRONAF credit policies – make executive decisions concerning how to distribute and administer resources.

In the CPAs, the families' houses are shaped in a circle, known as the “agrovila,\textsuperscript{91}” with a communal garden as well as a common kitchen and a school. Collective organization – not just for eating but also for housing – also characterizes the division of land that belongs to COOPAN, where families live separately in individual houses that are grouped together but production and socialization spaces are not privately demarcated.

\textsuperscript{90} Besides COOPAN, the other CPAs I visited were Cooperativa Agropecuária Vista Alegre (COOPAVA) in São Paulo, Cooperativa de Produção Agropecuária Cascata (COOPTAR) in Rio Grande do Sul, and COPAVI in Paraná.

\textsuperscript{91} Agrovila is not a term special to the movement. It was initially part of the military government’s colonization settlements in the 1970s and was used when creating settlements in the Amazon.
Salaries are divided equally among members, with deductions for personal consumption coming out of their monthly pay (e.g. a deduction is made if someone eats some pork produced in the cooperative's pig sector). Thanks to communal production and living, some members leave for periods of up to two years to contribute in the movement's political activities while a core group maintains the operation (Field notes: COOPAN, 3-27-2011; see also MST-CONCRAB: 1995; MST: 2008). These practices demonstrate how COOPAN, other production cooperatives, and the ideas of cooperation promoted by the movement challenge private property. The inclusion of schools, communal eating, and communal land arrangements also open up typically isolated, or individualistic, social arrangements to collective decision-making.

MST cooperation also challenges the centralization of decision-making and the subordination of social actors that is encouraged in official, status quo agricultural policies. In the democratic, group-based division of labor found in the cooperative's different areas, spending and buying priorities are subject to debate. Besides debate, a porous division of labor characterizes each group, as nothing forces members to remain in one specific area. Such dynamics collapse divisions between “state,” “society,” and “economy.” In the MST's cooperatives, a clean and clear separation of public from private is erased. Neoliberal governance, through the exercise of state power, strictly separates theses spheres, organizing them in a hierarchical organization that subordinates

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92 While this is counter to how typical businesses operate, it does not make the MST's form of organization unique. From the cooperatives of Mondragon in Basque areas of Spain to the Kibbutz in Israel, equitable distribution of earnings is common cooperative practice. In fact, the MST crafted their form of cooperation by researching these cases (MST: 2001).
social actors to centralized, expert decision-making in insulated public, governmental institutions. As institutionalized in actual practice, MST resistance also contests the status quo agricultural production policy’s individualizing efforts seen in governmental programs such as PRONAF. Whereas the groups established in PRONAF credit programs reveal a hierarchy among the state authorities that create them and the social actors that perform in them, MST production groups equalizes decision-making power without a rigid role hierarchy. Besides frequent group meetings, elections by the cooperative’s members place leaders into upper-level positions within each enterprise (MST: 2010).

_Institutionalized Resistance to Culture: The Experience of Bionatur_

Another cooperative experience similar to COOPAN, but dispersed territorially throughout Rio Grande do Sul, is the agroecological seed cooperative Cooperativa Nacional de Terra e Vida (National Cooperative of Land and Life or CONATERRA), better known by its brand name Bionatur. Bionatur is central to the MST’s institutionalization of alternative agricultural production not only because of its focus on collective, decentralized production practices, but also because of its emphasis on seed exchange and distribution rather than sales. Bionatur is a “social business,” which means that losses are socialized, or assumed by all members, rather than falling on the shoulders of individuals (Interview: Bionatur equipe técnico, 3-30-2011). The priority is not profit but maintaining the production of diverse agroecological seeds. In this manner, the profit-oriented, capitalized “family farmer” emphasized and promoted since the FHC administration in the mid-1990s, is encountered with an alternative.
Bionatur also buys a certain percentage of the seeds from their members to sell to the government and private actors. This is a rule, established between the cooperative's producers and its management. The political significance of this regularized procedure, and why it counts as oppositional, is that it challenges monocultural production by encouraging producers to diversify (Interview: Bionatur equipe técnico, 3-30-2011). The limit on purchases provides producers a reliable source of income, but not one that they can exploit without end. They thereby avoid dependence on seed sales to the cooperative, opposing the specializing, potentially monoculture-creating logic implicit to comparative advantage. In this fashion, the institutionalization of seed purchasing and development contests neoliberalism.

While CONATERRA shows the same contentious practices that characterize COOPAN's institutionalized decision-making procedures, the former cooperative also opposes homogenizing tendencies inherent to state and neoliberal governance by localizing production practices. The separate groups that characterize Bionatur differ from CPAs like COOPAN in that they are dispersed throughout the Rio Grande do Sul, rather than remaining in one settlement, and they focus on agroecological seed production. Usually comprised of five or six growers, each group also has one lead coordinator and one MST-affiliated extension agent communicating with all the groups in a region. By functioning in multiple areas, different kinds of seeds can be grown, unique to specific regions (Interview: Bionatur grower, 4-2-2011). The group structure also allows for various kinds of seeds to be grown according to multiple, localized production methods. In this way, the cooperative structure challenges efforts to standardize cultural
Agroecological Production in the MST's “Transitional” Phase

In addition to Bionatur's efforts to promote agroecology, the MST attempts to retain the allegiance of disillusioned families – the reasons for which I will discuss in the next section – through encouraging families to stop using chemicals and to diversify production. At the end of the 1990s, many production cooperatives were in crisis economically (MST-CONCRAB: 1999), and movement leaders recognized the need to pursue an alternative way of organizing production. This led to a period of extended debates during the “transitional period (Interview: MST Direção Regional-Porto Alegre, 3-23-2011).”

One effect was the embrace of agroecological production, which further decentralized and localized agricultural production. For example, in a visit to one site in Rio Grande do Sul, one producer who grew mainly produce received regular technical assistance from the MST's technical assistance cooperative, Cooperativa de Serviços Técnicos (Cooperative of Technical Services or COPTEC), and belonged to a regional agroecological “nucleo (group).” Shortly before visiting the production site, COPTEC technicians led a presentation to the regional group – an assembly of producers numbering close to 25 – about permaculture and land use. The discussion centered on production practices and foods. Whereas state power works to homogenize modes of identification and beliefs – which are complimented by the emphasis placed by neoliberal policy on the market – separate groups enable different, multiple practices to develop. The movement's cooperative institutional arrangement enables this to take place.
how producers were to acquire knowledge of their specific sites, including locations of water sources, nature of soil quality, and lay out of the terrain. They were told that “they, too, were to do research. That everyone researches, not only people with college degrees. (Fieldnotes: Settlement in the Porto Alegre Area, 3-3-2011).” Through disseminating technologies and encouraging localized research, COPTEC/MST technicians enable the proliferation of local practices. Whereas state power favors standardized practices as well as centralized decision-making procedures, the movement's project contests uniformity while favoring a decentralization of decision-making power.

As in the policy areas of education and agrarian reform, the MST works to cultivate a common identity among all producers. Songs, such as “só sai reforma agrária,” reiterate that all members are to produce, work together, and share the surplus product. Various posters produced by the movement also show families displaying their produce. While in the next section I show how strategic strength problems have led to problems in the movement's creation of their producer identity in agricultural production, efforts have been made to join all the members under the banner of “workers.” The class-based identity, as I have already discussed in other policy areas, involves a certain adherence to Marxist principles and symbols, e.g. red clothes and hats, and flag design. The movement's “mistica,” as led by children and adults at movement schools and events, nearly always feature some kind of food item and production tool. And while the family is important to the movement production, it is avoided as the central guiding or orienting economic unit.93 In agricultural production, the movement’s work on creating a coherent

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93 The debate I have heard over peasant or family farmer is found more in academic
identity challenges the landowners – who are considered unproductive and thus illegitimate proprietors – and governmental elites. In agricultural production, while debate rages concerning how the movement is to produce, there is no question that movement members identify with the movement as workers and producers before they grant allegiance either to the state or the market.

The movement's effort to cultivate a producer, rural worker identity complements their project to oppose both state power and neoliberalism in agricultural production policy. Group decision-making practices within cooperatives, supported by regular elections, shows a fluid division of labor. This fluid mode of organizing production challenges the hierarchical mode of distributing tasks that characterizes state power's subordination of public, governmental actors over private, social ones. Also, rather than centralizing and concentrating decision-making processes, the movement's system of cooperative and initiative to collective production equalizes decision-making efforts concerning design and execution of agricultural production. MST efforts to contest private property occur through socializing living, as well as redistributing earnings and establishing limits to production. Neoliberalism when combined with state power's efforts to homogenize culture, favors a business ethic grounded in an idealized family farmer subject. The MST counters this family-based model by allowing for multiple, localized production spaces to develop within the spaces where their cooperatives and agroecological practices are located. In the next section, I explain how the movement has circles than within the movement. I think that there is analytical value to the distinction, but in my interviews with movement workers, individuals used the concepts interchangeably, showing no cleavage or opposition to one over the other.
developed their economies of opposition, documenting their limited, yet still important, success.

5.3 Explaining and Evaluating the MST's Resistance in Agricultural Production

The MST's Low Rate of Success in Agricultural Production

The MST boasts impressive numbers concerning its institutionalization of agricultural production. The last reliable measure I found was done in the mid-2000s, when the movement claimed 49 CPAs with 2,229 families participating, as well as 32 Cooperativas de Prestação de Servicio (Service Cooperatives or CPS) with 11,174 members, and 7 more cooperatives that deal with credit, work and other activities (Carvalho: 2006). The majority of these cases are in southern Brazil. Gonçalves estimates that around 15% of the families mobilized by the MST participate in cooperatives, with over 44% in the state of Paraná (2008). In another calculation, I was told that most, but not all, are found in the south, with the current percentage of participants at around 5% (Interview: Director Sector of Production, Paraná, 8-11-2011). In the same interview, I was told that less than 5% of movement members implement agroecological production techniques. If we take the movement's own membership tally – 1,500,000 people – this means that roughly 75,000 people participate in alternative agricultural production.

Another measure for movement involvement in agricultural production is the number of families accessing state policies for small-scale production, as those are more likely to use agroecological techniques. From numbers available in 2009 and 2010 in the Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos (The Food Acquisition Program or PAA), the
percentage of finances going to agrarian reform beneficiaries went from 8% to 12%,
(from $R 28,699,236 of $R 363,381,941 to $R 44,643,666 of $R 379,735,466) while
participating beneficiary families went from 7% to 11% (from 7,444 of 98,340 families to
10,440 of 94,398 families). Because we can deduce that roughly 50% of agrarian reform
settlements are under MST influence (CPT: 2000-2010), we can conclude that the
number of movement affiliates that practice agroecology is in the thousands.

Self-governmental movements aim to divide state power by challenging the
design and implementation of specific policy areas, unlike revolutionary movements that
occupy state power, or reform-style movements that seek incorporation within it. The
MST's systematized, institutionalized resistance in agricultural production, as elaborated
in the previous section, qualifies as a self-governmental form of contention. However,
when we compare the numbers in agricultural production with the results in educational
and agrarian reform policy, we see that the MST succeeds in agricultural production, but
at a lower level. This variation, in terms of people mobilized in agrarian reform,
educational, and agricultural production policy, shows that both MST agrarian reform and
educational efforts outpace MST efforts in agricultural production. The reason, as I
explain in this section, is found in how the movement's strategic plans in agricultural
production suffer from a lack of consistency, coherence, and preparedness.

In general, this section tests my three hypotheses: (1) that certain combinations of
strategic action lead to different modes of movement institutionalization, (2) how
increases in the iterations in movement plans of specific targets and goals, as well as in
the time spent researching and documenting targets and goals, result in greater strategic
strength and thus a higher potential for successful institutionalization and (3) if a low level of preparation exists with high levels of consistent and coherent objective formation, or visa versa, then we see a level of institutionalization lower than if both indicators were classified as high, yet higher than if both were low. The combination of two kinds of strategic plans – direct-action and instrumentalist – explain the development of self-governmental resistance, which are present but weak. The remainder of this section is devoted to how my focus on strategy provides a better explanation than other, more contextualized accounts for the MST's level of success in their institutionalization of an alternative, oppositional agricultural production project.

Instrumental and Direct-action Strategies in MST Self-Governmental Resistance

A strategic approach, focusing on instrumentalization and direct-action, centers analysis on movement plans. The previous section of this chapter detailed the nature of MST resistance in agricultural production. This section applies my theory of strategy to explain how the movement's cooperatives and agroecological production practices have institutionalized resistance. Direct-action plans, particularly, locate decision-making within the movement itself. They detail how the movement alone will control a particular policy area. Instrumental plans likewise undertake to explain how the movement can gain control, yet necessarily involve another actor – governmental or social – that the movement uses for its own ends. I evaluate both strategic plans in terms of their level of preparation, consistency, and coherence. Furthermore, as I discussed in the theoretical chapter of this dissertation, my understanding of strategy also situates a certain identity
that characterizes the movement's own self-understanding. I identify identity as a proximate cause in my theory of strategy, meaning that the levels of strategic strength correlate with the levels of cohesion and coherence within certain policy areas. Or in other words, when strategic strength is low, so will be the level of coherence and consistent elaboration of a movement's identity. Creating plans with a fractured identity leads to problems for the movement to communicate objectives to membership, as well as guide the development of plans.

Concerning preparation, the MST has experienced difficulties in creating direct-action production plans for the CPAs. The origins lie with the influence of the Catholic Church and the idea of cultivating the land in common, which was based in the religious imperative of treating fellow members and “creation” with respect, but featured few specific or practical details concerning how to manage an agricultural operation (Balanço Político da Cooperação no MST: 2006). In the mid 1980s, production was organized into the Sistema de Cooperativas dos Assentados (Cooperative System of Cooperatives or SCA), coinciding with the movement’s plan to organize all the settlements as collective enterprises (CONCRAB: 1997). This effort to formalize and systematize cooperative production, I was told, was seen by many as an imposition and many families rejected it. When families refused to join, divisions were created in the movement, and when families quit, divisions were created on particular settlements (Interview: MST Direção Estadual RS, 4-3-2011). Rather than preparing the member base on the importance and “how-to” concerning cooperative economic management, as well as providing

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94 This sector changes again in 2006, currently named the Sector of Production, Cooperation, and Environment.
alternatives, a singular, vague conception of cooperation dominated early direct-action plans.

For those in the CPAs, problems with adequate knowledge and implementation plans remained. The MST, in a self-critical move during its “transitional” phase, noted how the failure of many cooperatives was due to high debts and a lack of trained personnel, as well as poor production plans (MST-CONCRAB: 1999). Visiting various cooperatives allowed me to understand these issues. At successful sites, I was told how current members started with little to no experience in managing agricultural production. This is not to claim that they had no experience in agriculture. In fact, it was documented in the First Census of Agrarian Reform, conducted in 1996 – the year when many CPAs were created – that the overwhelming majority of agrarian reform beneficiaries had experience in the countryside, but mostly as salaried workers, squatters, or peasants (Schmidt, et al: 1998). These categories show that the majority of individuals in the movement occupied subservient, non-decision-making positions. Direct-action plans brought together people who were not trained in these positions. Or as I was told by one leader, “when we came together to socialize production, all we socialized was misery (Interview: MST Sector of Production Paraná, 8-11-2011).”

Instead of adequate knowledge on how to establish small-scale cooperative production, plans intended for the movement to adopt large-scale, agribusiness production. At one cooperative, I was told that beginning in the 1990s, the movement intended for cooperatives to engage in monocultural production in commodities like corn and soy. Goals were to “be like the big ones, like the large landowners (Fieldnotes:
COOPTAR, 4-5-2011).” It is hard to fault the movement members for holding these objectives, given that their knowledge concerning production came from working on large-scale operations. For many families, success meant adopting the chemical and machine-intensive, commodity production with which they had prior experience. And given that the 1996 census documents show that the vast majority of movement members occupied such low level decision-making positions within large-scale operations, we can extrapolate that the movement overall held to these aspirations but had little practical content concerning actual know-how.

Problems concerning preparation in the MST's direct-action strategy for implementing their cooperatives also characterized their instrumental approach. Prior to PRONAF's individualizing imperatives, the credits through PROCERA, from 1985-2001, explicitly incentivized groups through “totos (ceilings),” 1 and 2 (Souza, et al: 2010). The difference between the ceilings was that to receive Ceiling 2 resources, which were double Ceiling 1 financial amounts, one had to request credit as a group. Movement members who received credit referred to this period as a time of “easy money” because initial restrictions and requirements for obtaining credit were lax (Interview: COPERLAT Direção, 4-1-2011). Movement documents on cooperatives and cooperation recognize PROCERA as a vital instrument for economic development and cooperation, showing how the MST intended to use the credit program to fuel their alternative agricultural project (e.g. MST: 1995).

Despite these intentions, the movement members who received PROCERA resources began either with little to no productive means, or poorly formulated plans to
produce “like the big ones.” Combined with an unclear direct-action plan, PROCERA led to many farmers going into debt, and later leaving when they were insolvent. Likewise, while using the money for movement production objectives was the plan, vague objectives led members to focus on short term needs like purchasing food and building supplies, not on improving their production abilities (Interview: Claudete, INCRA-RS, 3-14-2011). Like the low level, or simply vague, knowledge characteristic of its direct-action plans, the movement had poorly formulated plans concerning how to instrumentalize governmental resources. Without a clear direction for resources destined for production, the movement shows a low level of instrumental strategic strength in terms of preparation.

In spite of the problems concerning how to instrumentalize resources and craft direct-action plans, cooperation and cooperatives exist. In some cases, like COOPTAT and COOPTAR, the reason is that they cut their losses and sold the larger equipment they purchased after receiving PROCERA credit, whereas most others, such as COANOL, went into bankruptcy and stopped production (Interview: Direção COOPTAT-RS, 6-12-2011). Also, the movement, after recognizing the crisis of solvency in the late 1990s, focused on “regional reference points,” or rather, special cooperatives, e.g. COOPAN in Rio Grande do Sul and COPAVI in Paraná, that concentrated their energies in terms of training members in production, financing, and working with the youth (MST: 2008). Rather than past attempts to fit all settlements into the same model, the direct-action plan for cooperatives oriented a select few. Additionally, at COOPAN, I was told that many members “learned by trial and error,” acquiring direct-action know-how from gradually
learning. The movement has also recently recruited leaders from the Basque cooperatives of Mondragón (specifically from their NGO, mundokide), who are teaching members how to manage cooperative finances and production in Sergipe and Paraná (Fieldnotes: Outside of Rio Bonito PR, 7-23-2011, Interview: Director of Mundokide, 7-25-2011).

Both direct-action and instrumental strategic plans explain the level – albeit low – of agricultural production institutionalization. The cooperatives resist state power and private property, yet the number of them and their members is low in comparison to other policy areas where the movement is active in promoting self-governmental resistance. Low levels of knowledge preparation in instrumental and direct-action strategies, however, do not mean that the movement completely lacked a strategic approach. While low, production know-how developed over time, only after serious problems riddled large-scale production failures, and it developed gradually, while resources acquired through credit programs and the use of allies for movement objectives have characterized plans.

A low level of preparation also characterizes the MST's instrumental strategic plans for agroecological production. This is where we see the movement’s involvement with public policies such as Programa Nacional de Alimentação Escolar (School Alimentation Program or PNAE) and CONAB. I was told by the director of the MST's confederation of cooperatives, CONCRAB, that the plan is to foment agroecological production practices for debt-burdened, insolvent and thus ineligible, producers by having them access policies through working with eligible members in cooperatives (Interview: CONCRAB President, 9-1-2011). Concrete examples include selling
vegetables to neighborhood schools via these social programs where insolvent, yet active, producer members affiliate with already existing cooperatives that facilitate their means to sell their produce and access policies (Interview: COPERLAT Direção, 4-1-2011). Despite these initiatives, the vast majority – almost 90% of all settled families, as revealed in CONAB numbers from 2009 and 2010 – do not access public policies.

The instrumental strategy involves using such government programs for the movement's alternative production project, which requires knowledge of how to navigate highly professionalized institutions such as MAPA. For example, accessing CONAB policies for small-holder agriculture involves regular meetings with the “grupo gestor (management group)” composed of not only movement leaders but representatives of Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome (MDS), Ministério da Fazenda, Ministério de Planejamento, Orçamento, e Gestão, and the Ministério de Educação (MEC, MAPA, and the MDA). The knowledge required at this level includes negotiation skills, which is new. In fact, these programs are Lula-era creations that the movement has only in the last five years begun planning to instrumentalize.

Strategy Continued: A Focus on the MST's Problems in Creating a Coherent Identity

The last complication that affects both the MST's direct-action and instrumental strategies concerns coherently and consistently articulating the nature of the movement and its relationship to its target, either agribusiness or governmental authorities. Here is where we see the latter elements of my theory of strategy – coherent elaboration of objectives and their consistent iteration. I demonstrate these latter components of my
theory of strategy through a focus on problems characterizing the MST’s identity in agricultural production. All other policy areas where the movement is active, including education and agrarian reform, feature distinct identities promoted by the MST within their overall umbrella conception. Identities are diverse within the movement, as Wolford as already discussed (2010). In agricultural production, however, this diversity has given way to rifts and divisions.

Historically, there have been intense – and fruitful – debates concerning divisions and divides, with the clearest being the 1985 national congress on whether or not families who receive land should remain in the movement. In this case, however, tensions create problems, specifically through the competing identities of “peasant,” “colono,” and “worker.” First, multiple movement documents note the existence of a “peasant” consciousness, not as something to cultivate, but as a form of production that needs to be replaced by “the worker (MST-CONCRAB: 1999, 2004).” In one interview, I was told how “the mentality of the colono” – a term used extensively in the south of Brazil to refer to all small producers and MST members – is “limited and needs to be trained to produce (Interview: Direção Regional-RS, 3-23-2011).” The “worker,” on the other hand, overcomes certain “ideological behaviors” that characterize “emerging classes like the peasant and artisan (MST-CONCRAB: 2004, 15-16).” Peasants and colonos, according to movement documents used to train members, are easily susceptible to manipulation, use simplified production practices, live in isolation, and hold reactionary beliefs. The goals are to form class consciousness and conceive of themselves as workers – overcoming their prior existences as colonos and peasants.
Strategic coherence is compromised by the MST's explicit *privileging* of a peasant form of production in their embrace of agroecology. The annual “Jornada de Agroecologia (Journey for Agroecology),” approaching its 12th year in the state of Paraná in 2013, focuses on disseminating – not overcoming or eliminating – production that explicitly favors peasant practices. The event is not small by any measure: at the 10th Jornada that I attended, workshops were attended by over 4,000 people on everything from bee-keeping to how to smoke one's own meat for preservation (Fieldnotes: Curitiba-PR, 7-1-2011). The production practices encouraged throughout all workshops were oriented around creating artisans, small-producers who independently produce and use their knowledge to improve their lives and their families. Each jornada also features a notebook, or systematization of the movement's agroecological best practices and techniques, which functions throughout states to teach peasant production plans.

Contradictions in identifying who is the subject of MST agricultural production are exacerbated by a relatively low number of documents and publications to foment the movement's oppositional project. At the time of my research, there were ten such “cartilhas (notebooks)” from the “jornada of agricultura,” as well as one “sistematização (systematization)” of agroecological experiences for distribution to movement producers (2006). At odds in terms of content, CONCRAB has published eleven notebooks for pedagogical use that feature advice on collective cooperative production – and usually the promotion of a worker consciousness over a peasant one – since 1993. The differences in publications show the different conceptions of the movement's identity, dividing resources for communication between identities in tension.
Problems concerning consistency and coherence in the movement's identity creation also appear in publications for internal distribution. The movement has consistently iterated the need for production in movement bulletins and publications, specifically in *Journal dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra* and *Revista Sem Terra*, which is illustrated by over 4,500 mentions since the 1980s. Cooperatives alone, however, have been discussed in publications only 742 times, and agroecology, just 209. In comparison, a search for “reforma agrarian (agrarian reform)” in the movement's two major internal publications yielded 7,789 hits. Simply put, the movement discusses and iterates its position on agrarian reform more than on production. The identity cultivated in the policy area that deals with agrarian reform is higher than in agricultural production, showing higher levels of internal movement communication on its practices and meaning. And the remainder – over 3,000 mentions – that do not specifically address agroecology or cooperatives shows a lack of specificity concerning production. When production is discussed and debated, the guiding identities of peasant and worker divide the focus and attention. Divisions impede the development of rules and procedures necessary to institutionalize resistance.

Such tensions encourage different ways of organizing production, rendering not only internal communication but also planning difficult. In one case, I was told that efforts (ultimately unsuccessful) to standardize agroecological educational techniques outside of Paraná in all movement production training centers resulted in internal movement conflicts and stalemate (Fieldnotes: Escola Milton Santos, 7-6-2011). Who the movement represents – peasant or worker – and how it intends to institutionalize
resistance in production are in debate and have been since the movement's emergence. The differences between worker, producer, as well as activist, have generated considerable divisions within the movement that led 50 key leaders to feel that the MST's emphasis on agroecology and cooperatives compromised the struggle for socialism (see the Carta da Saída). For the last ten years or so, the movement calls the overall strategic shift an effort to “accumulate forces,” which is intended to “recover” movement control of settlements and production (MST: 2009). Yet who (and how) “recovery” will take place is not agreed upon, leading to problems in planning.

The explanatory quality between strategic strength is revealed when we consider the inadequacy of alternative explanations. First, changes in the overall political economy or the shift to neoliberal governance may explain variation in movement institutionalization. Yashar's study of indigenous movements points to the potential that budget cuts have on weakening government's prior control over people, creating openings for mobilization (2005). The turn to neoliberalism – in both its “roll-back” and “roll-out” phases – potentially explains that to survive small-holders had to organize a cooperative form of production when prior state support was withdrawn. “Roll-out” neoliberalism, furthermore, would explain cooperatives not as resistance, but as indicative of decentralized policy implementation. Concerning the latter issue, MST cooperative planning and development precedes, temporally, neoliberalism's “roll-out.” To explain cooperative development, the movement's own plans – which begin in the early 1980s – provide a better causal explanation. And with respect to the explanatory potential of policy repeal and state withdrawal, this may provide the general background conditions
for the need to organize alternative production programs and policies, but not why we see such low levels of success in comparison to the policy areas of education and agrarian reform.

Social movement theories provide alternative explanations for institutionalizing resistance, in particular concerning instrumentalization. Certain social movement approaches would predict that the level of movement institutionalization would vary with the presence or absence of elite allies. According to theorists such as Tarrow (1998) or McAdam (1999), elites would facilitate interaction with movement leaders, who then would enable mobilization to develop. The issue is that we see a growth of government/movement interaction – what we could call “openings” in the sense of creating PAA and PNAE – and persistent, stubbornly low levels of alternative agricultural production. The numbers of cooperatives, as well of agroecological developments, show change independent of governmental assistance or recognition. In fact, the MST adopted peasant-style production as a result of previous strategic efforts, failures, and learnings, not because of some array of contextual factors.

If the movement had developed a coherent subject, institutionalization would be radically different. If a worker identity was adhered to, without the adoption of agroecological, peasant forms of production, then the movement would have ceased to exist as a force pressuring for oppositional agricultural production. Essentially, this would have meant forming cooperatives like “the large producers,” which most likely, would have led to a status quo, conventional form of production not grounded in resistance. This counter-factual scenario presupposes an additional feature discussed – adequate
knowledge preparation – which the movement would also have needed for this to develop. Assuming a coherent identity for the movement's base, rooted in a peasant form of production, could have led to greater success. The movement would have led different campaigns, perhaps even opposing the use of chemicals and the development of large-scale monocultures much earlier. This would have also led to a dramatically different production structure: the focus on small-holders would most likely have caused the movement to pressure lawmakers for more access to credit policies. The path chosen by cooperatives such as COOPTAT and COPAVI wed both the cooperative and the agroecological. While they capture both, and oppose private property and state power, they are also few and far between, as well as relatively new.

Strategic problems have led to the movement's low level of success in institutionalizing an alternative mode of agricultural production. This does not means that there are no instances of this alternative, or that it is a failure – collective cooperatives and examples of agroecological production exist. The movement hosts events, such as the Jornada de Agroecología, which disseminate best practices and identities. The production of notebooks is used to train members and cultivate forms of identification. Content-wise, however, we see tensions. In general, tensions can be productive and lead to development. From the examples in Paraná, as well as the extreme stance adopted in certain training documents concerning peasant and worker production, such tensions are not productive. Rather, they impede cohesion and lead to conflicts, especially concerning who is the movement's “base.” While direct-action and instrumental strategies cause the movement's development of self-governmental resistance in agricultural production, the movement's
strength in each strategic orientation is low. For this reason, more than for contextual factors such as state strength, elite allies, or neoliberal transformation, the movement has a lower level of success.

5.4 Conclusion: The Problem with Identity

This chapter has two main purposes: (1) to show that the MST's organization of cooperatives and agroecological production exemplify this new mode of social movement resistance that I call self-governmental and (2) to explain and evaluate through my theory of strategy the movement's efforts to institutionalize this form of resistance. I emphasize strategy to highlight how all forms of social movement resistance originate from a plan. In the case of the MST and self-governmental resistance – as opposed to reform and revolutionary struggles – movements combine direct-action and instrumental strategies. In institutionalizing resistance in agricultural production policy, the MST institutionalizes resistance by forming collective forms of economic production, which localizes production, defies state efforts to centralize decision-making, and contests a rigid, role-based, division of labor. While the MST's brand of resistance in agricultural production policy fits the self-governmental mold, it has not been as successful as efforts in education and agrarian reform. The reason, as I explored in this chapter, is the low level of strategic strength in direct-action and instrumental plans.

This chapter also features an extended discussion of movement identity within my theory of strategy. Different identities exist in every movement. Malcolm X's brand of civil rights, and the kind of identity rooted in self-determination, differed substantially
from the version promoted by Martin Luther King Jr. Similarly, the MST contains many modes of identification. This is not necessarily a negative quality for mobilization. But when diversity turns to rifts, then the development of a coherent plan of action is imperiled. Identity situates movement membership with their targets, each other, and tactics. Their development, especially in self-governmental contention, comes out of past struggles in Latin America. Yet, if identities are in conflict with one another in a movement, then coordinated, sustained action – the definitive elements of collective action – cannot develop. The MST's troubles in agricultural production, with crafting a stable identity, reveal these stumbling blocks.

Additionally, the meaning of trends in manifestations for agricultural production indicates similar developments in the areas of education and agrarian reform. As in those areas, consistent protests coupled with low levels of cooperatives and agroecological production practices, shows a movement potentially on the cusp of a change. Like in the other policy areas, the movement's novel mode of resistance – self-governmental contention – appears to be heading in a more conventional, reform-style direction. As seen in Figure 1 in Appendix 1, their protest and demand-making efforts in this area have remained fairly consistent over the last ten years. During this same time period, the majority of collective cooperatives had already been established. Or in other words, the main mode of challenging state power and private property – the CPA – had, for the most part, been established with few new additions. Comparing trends in protest among all policy areas where the movement is active – education, agrarian reform, and agricultural production – shows no correlation between pressure and level of institutionalization.
Persistent trends, however, show a decline in self-governmental contention with persistence of reform-like qualities.

The low levels of strategic strength and the number of successful agricultural economic production plans and policies are concerning for the movement. In this area, more than others, the movement has been plagued by vague plans and low levels of preparation. When successful, the movement's efforts to collectivize production raise the overall standard of living for the entire settlement. They also show that governmental resources spent on agrarian reform policies are not a waste. But without clear proposals and directions, both from the government and the movement, success in this key area of the movement's struggle is in danger.

A just as troubling finding is that nearly all the successful collective production cooperatives, the CPAs, were developed by movement members during the encampment phase of their struggle. I found no case during my fieldwork of a fully collectively organized cooperative that originated following de jure settlement recognition. And as the number of occupations and encampments has declined substantially over the last five years, as documented in Chapter 3, then so have the chances of forming economies of opposition that will in the future contest private property and state power. In this fashion, the MST's current strategy of accumulating forces, as discussed in previous chapters, limits the movement's actions in agricultural production as well as in agrarian reform.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

Summary, Findings, and Limitations

My case study of the MST was driven by the following question: how can a social movement successfully develop a self-governmental mode of institutionalizing resistance? I intentionally foregrounded the concept of institutionalization to draw attention to how resistance is not spontaneous, but deliberate and systematic. This idea, itself, is not new to social movement theory, e.g. definitions of contentious politics in Aminzade et al: 2001 or McAdam et al: 2001 propose the notion of “episodic contention” as contrary to spontaneity. This conceptual point, however, has not found its way into much contemporary research. Most studies remain solely focused on the disruptive actions of movements by studying trends of protests, marches, and rallies. Many case studies and analyses tend to investigate the glitzy, attention-grabbing, more sporadic instances of resistance.

Tarrow draws our attention to both sides of social movement resistance: disruption and stability. While not fully developing conceptually or theoretically his insight, the point is that sustained, coordinated collective defiance contains a paradox. Specifically, he notes that to persist in destabilizing actions, movements have to stabilize. Most research omits the latter and focuses on the former. Tarrow's paradox forces movements to devise ways to continue contention. His analysis, nonetheless, concentrates only on reform-style institutionalization, while others, notably Goldstone (1991) and Tilly (1978), examine how revolutionary resistance becomes regularized.

The MST neither fits the reform nor the revolutionary mode of institutionalizing
resistance: the movement has not sought inclusion within existing power dynamics, as is characteristic of reformist movements, and it has not sought to occupy, or take, state power, as is characteristic of revolutionary struggles. Furthermore, the MST does not run candidates in elections, exist for profit-making, or primarily engage in illicit activities. Defying categorization as political party, business, or criminal syndicate, and persistently challenging dominant, status quo economic, political, and cultural relations, the MST is a social movement. Yet, how the MST is a social movement, defies classification as either reform or revolutionary. This forces us to come up with a new concept to characterize their form of resistance, which I call self-governmental.

My study also exposes the conceptual tensions in the social movement literature concerning the differences between state and government. Tarrow's discussion, as well as most other research on contentious politics, considers states as unified and coherent entities. In adopting a discussion of powers – notably, centralizing decision-making, subordinating social actors to governmental elites, and homogenizing cultures – I relax the notion of unity and the common sense assumption that states exist as units (as if maps reveal the existence of states). Social science and common language – not reality – grant singularity to the collection of powers, which together, constitute what I repeatedly refer to throughout this dissertation as state power. I do not use the language of state/society relations, not only because this presupposes a classic liberal form of state, but also because self-governmental resistance problematizes this very separation.

MST efforts to control specific policy areas differentiate their form of contention from the others. By policy, or policy area, I include the de facto practices, laws, and ideas
surrounding the delivery of a service that is typically considered the prerogative of government. In the areas of agrarian reform, education, and agricultural production, I explain and describe how the MST institutionalizes ways of controlling service design and implementation, from collectively-organized cooperatives that contest neoliberal economic policy directives promoted by the Brazilian government to occupations that decentralize the means to acquire land.

For reform-style contention, movements demand inclusion into the exercise of state power as they demand or ignore the institution of private property. For revolutionary struggles, movements seek to occupy state power and oppose private property. The central problem is that both of these kinds of struggles reproduce state power through their very acts of resistance. In reform-style movement's challenge of state power, contention takes shape around seeking the inclusion of those previously excluded from the exercise of state power. Revolutionary movements, on the other hand, assume a kind of radical exteriority during their initial mobilization, yet plan to occupy state power without altering its fundamental design. They, too, ultimately reproduce state power while opposing the institution of private property. Self-governmental resistance differs in so far as movements such as the MST divide state power by vying for control of individual policy areas, rather than attempting to exercise state power in its entirety, while at the same time, contesting private property. Sharing with revolutionary contention the institutionalized opposition to private property, self-governmental resistance further differs by continuously constituting a challenge to state power. The continuous challenge to state power by self-governmental resistance also differentiates it from the kind of
defiance characteristic of reform style resistance.

My causal explanation for the MST's variable success – measured by the movement's ability to mobilize people and create concrete sites under their control – in institutionalizing self-governmental resistance centers on strategy. I define strategy as a guiding plan that temporally and logically precedes all actions. It contains a movement's objectives and methods for engaging with targets and allies. Strategy is not found only in written documents or pamphlets. I discern movement strategic plans in written accounts, as well as in interviews with movement leaders and repeated interactions with targets. For the concept in general, I identified certain subcategories – mediated, direct-action, and instrumental. Each, in various combinations, led to different modes of institutionalizing resistance, e.g. reform, revolutionary, or self-governmental. Within each subcategory, I measure the strength of instrumentalist and direct-action strategic plans by assessing coherence, consistency, and level of knowledge preparation. Identity – which I find to be an intervening variable – impacts the institutionalization of resistance in terms of how the movement understands itself and its relationship to its objectives.

In seeking an answer to my research question, I find that the main element that explains the MST's institutionalization of self-governmental resistance is strategic strength. More than any contextual factor – such as the presence/absence of elite allies, the strength of governmental institutions, or changes in the economy – strategy is the main explanatory factor that leads to the variations in the levels of successful movement institutionalized resistance in different policy areas. Contextual factors, as showcased by Tarrow (1998) and McAdam (1999) in their applications of the concept of political
opportunity structure or in Political Process Theorty, provide potential explanations for the origins of protest waves, but not for variations in kinds of resistance. For discussing the different trajectories, it is the movement, rather than elite allies or state strength, which launches and implements certain strategic plans that result in certain kinds of resistance.

Another finding in my research concerns how identity and strategic planning work together to explain the institutionalization of resistance. The MST promotes a singular, uniform sense of identity, which is buttressed by more specific versions for each policy area. When the MST consistently and coherently iterates its identity in certain policy areas, e.g. in agrarian reform by communicating to its base and targets the meaning of “sem-terra,” then strategic plans are stronger and communicated more easily. Divisions, when they appear as salient cleavages within movement self-conceptions, stall plan-making, and thus the institutionalization of resistance. This is nowhere more apparent than in the MST's efforts in agricultural production policy. Here, the movement lacked a coherent identity concerning the subject of production. Tensions between a “peasant” and a “worker” producer identity impeded the MST's ability to design and implement strategic plans. I find that diversity in a movement's self-understanding is not to blame for a lack of success. But when diverse identities become divergent and irreconcilable, then success is endangered. In this case, strategic plans cannot be consistently communicated, which also imperils knowledge preparation. The institutionalization of resistance, therefore, occurs at a low level.

Identity plays a central role in my explanation and description of self-
governmental resistance. Specifically, movement-centered identities challenge state power through defying one of its defining elements – the promotion of cultural homogenization. I uncover that in acting as a buffer between state-promoted forms, e.g. nationalism, multiple identities enable diverse cultural practices in the areas of education and agrarian reform to develop. Thus, whereas states promote cultural homogeneity, self-governmental movements promote heterogeneity. My analysis of state power, drawing on the work of Scott (1998), also draws attention – in addition to creating cultural homogeneity – to efforts to centralize decision-making authority and subordinate social actors to governmental elites in an administrative division of labor. MST self-governmental resistance contests these elements of state power through decentralizing decision-making power and breaking down the division between government and society, between public and private. Their resistance against these two features of state power is apparent in their contentious institutionalization of counter agrarian reform practices.

Land occupations, which typically are conceived as disruptive, also constitute an alternative decentralized manner to locate land that challenges the status quo, a government-supported policy alternative that relies on expert knowledge and presidential decree. Government-sanctioned agrarian reform relies on a stark institutional divide between certain bureaucratic entities and social actors. Administrative inequality is opposed through the MST's institutionalized nucleo (small group) structure that distributes tasks between members equally in places like their encampments.

Institutionalizing the nucleo system of decision-making and role distribution characterizes all the areas where the MST implements self-governmental resistance. From
the administration of production cooperatives to organizing land occupations, the focus on groups – what the movement calls “organicidade” – is key to their resistance. This does not mean that the nucleo arrangement is the same in each area. Rather, while small groups are apparent in counter policy area design and implementation, its content varies in each respective area. This aspect of the MST’s resistance speaks to concerns expressed by rational choice theorists, specifically Olson’s discussion of large v. small groups. The MST appears to have learned from Olson that the chances to successfully organize collective action are facilitated in smaller groups because sanctions are easier to administer (1965). As I elaborated in each chapter, the movement institutionalizes their “organicity” within their larger movement institutional arrangement, a la Lenin’s conception of democratic centralism.

Small groups carry out the most work, from the encampment to the cooperatives. Cohesion has been maintained through a combination of delivering material and ideational goods to members. This is not to say that division and rifts have been avoided, or that the movement has been immune to defections. In fact, one of the main schisms took place during my research, when 50 key leaders left. Regardless of recent developments, the movement's mode of organizing resistance has retained a relatively high level of cohesion for most of the MST's 30 year existence.

My project is limited in fully considering the role of private property in self-governemental resistance. Locating the ways in which the MST contests private property is easy: collective cooperatives intentionally eschew demarcated individual land holdings, the movement demands that land ownership within agrarian reform settlements remain
with the government rather than individual families, and educational initiatives criticize wage-labor. In my account, however, I do not elaborate on the conceptual nature of private property and its potential relationship to state power. For example, is the state, itself, an instantiation of it? Do territorial divisions, managed by a centralizing elite, make states into private property? Are the recent sales of large swaths of territory in Brazil, as well as in the Ukraine, indicative of how states are nothing more than potential subdivisions for sale? Certain policy areas – specifically agrarian reform – show the direct connection between the practices of certain governmental institutions and private property. Private property is prominent in social movement resistance, especially in self-governmental contention. While I establish this connection, its dynamics require additional attention.

6.1 Comparisons with other Movements: Self-Governmental, Reform, and Revolutionary

Another limitation of my project concerns applying my theory of strategy to other movements. Coherence, consistency, and knowledge preparation are all central to strategic planning. Applications to the other movements, however, could not appear in this dissertation due to space and time constraints. To make up for this limitation, in this section, I have documented trends in social movement resistance in other Latin America countries such as Nicaragua, Peru, Mexico, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Argentina. In this section, I compare these other movements with the MST in order to display how my theory of strategy explains the development of their respective modes of institutionalizing resistance. I do not elaborate on every indicator in my theory to the same degree as I did
with the MST in each chapter. My cursory study in this section is meant to show that my theory potentially applies and warrants further research.

My classification of the three different movements appears in Chapter 2, which, reproduced below, shows my definitional rationale for each kind of movement.

Table 1: Kinds of Movements, Defining Qualities, and Examples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind</th>
<th>Reform</th>
<th>Revolutionary</th>
<th>Self-Governmental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Initially challenges state power, yet later reproduces it. Seeks inclusion and incorporation into government. Ignores or promotes private property.</td>
<td>Initially challenges state power, yet later reproduces it. Seeks parallel governments and excludes already-existing ones. Demands and abolishes private property.</td>
<td>Continuously challenges state power. Governs particular services and does not desire a dual government. Demands and abolishes private property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examples</td>
<td>United States Civil Rights Movement, LGBT Movement, Environmental Movements, Anti-Nuclear Movement, (Late) Confederación Identidades Indígenas de Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Identities of Ecuador or CONAIE), Cocalereo-MAS</td>
<td>Bolsheviks, Early 20th Century Fascists (e.g. Italian and German), Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), July 26th Movement, Sandinistas</td>
<td>MST, Rondas Campesinas (Peasant Leagues), Zapatistas, Piqueteros, (Early) Confederación Identidades Indígenas de Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Identities of Ecuador or CONAIE)</td>
</tr>
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In this section I do not go through every one of the movements found in the chart. Rather, I focus on paired comparisons in three sub-sections: other self-governmental movements, reformist resistance, and revolutionary struggles. In the first sub-section, I compare the Piqueteros and Zapatistas in order to show how they each qualify as self-governmental movements. Comparing them, while keeping in mind the MST, allows us to see the relevance of identity and instrumentalist strategic plans. Comparing indigenous
movements in the second sub-section foregrounds the decision to engage in strategies of mediation by forming political parties. Because the movements themselves formed parties, and remain integral in their administration, I refer to Bolivia's MAS and Ecuador's Pachakutik as movement-party alliances. I chose these two cases for comparison because they show differences in levels of success. In the third sub-section, I explore Sendero Luminoso's and the Sandinista's respective modes of revolutionary contention. I evaluate the former's failure and the latter's successful institutionalization of revolutionary resistance in light of my theory of strategy. While each movement in this section deserves chapter-length treatment, my discussion here provides a preliminary comparative study that shows the application of my theory to movements other than the MST.

Other Examples of Self-Governmental Resistance: the Piqueteros and the Zapatistas

The Zapatistas and the Piqueteros display similar modes of institutionalizing resistance that qualifies their form of contention as self-governmental. Both can be considered “least-likely cases (Eckstein: 1977)” because the Zapatistas are typically considered first and foremost an indigenous movement and the Piqueteros are an urban, unemployed workers movement. And even though both are found in middle-income countries, their respective member bases differ widely in terms of income levels and history. If my theory explains the development of their form of resistance, given such differences between them, then this would confirm my approach. If movements in Argentina and southern Mexico embrace direct-action and instrumental strategies, then
we should see self-governmental contention. And if within these strategic plans, we observe variations in coherence, consistency, and knowledge preparation, then, in some fashion, we should observe corresponding variations in levels of resistance.

Born out of unemployed workers struggles in the Argentine state of Neuquén, the Piquetero movement gets its name from its distinct tactic – road blocks (in Spanish, *piquetes*). Since its origin, the movement has become national. While an exact count of members is difficult to find, at their height during the 2001-2002 economic crisis, the total number of piquetes reached 2,336, with usually between 500 and 1,000 individuals attending each one (Massetti: 2006). The roadblocks, while disruptive, also have constituting or stabilizing properties. In addition to drawing attention to the problem of unemployment and demands for social services, members charge a “toll” for passers-by. Piquetes also function to draw the attention of governmental authorities, who distribute resources to remove them from the streets. The money received goes towards a series of movement-run projects, from collectively-run soup kitchens to small craft production. Piquetes, like the MST's land occupations, have both disruptive and stabilizing qualities.

Strategically, and in terms of identity formation, the Piqueteros have much in common with the MST. Relying on the movement members' own initiatives and pooling their collective knowledges – whatever they bring to the shantytowns where they live – reveals plans to design and implement policies in a direct-action fashion. Scholars who describe their activities as “autonomous” or “horizontal and participatory,” in fact, showcase how actions involves the movement's own indigenous leadership and member base (Masseti: 2004; Muñoz: 2008). Autonomy serves as a way to describe their form of
strategic planning, what I refer to as direct-action.

We can also detect plans for using governmental resources for the movement's own objectives, indicating instrumentalist planning. The regularized engagement with state authorities to extract greater social services, for example, indicates not spontaneous actions, but carefully planned efforts. Not only are they planned, but the results are known in advance. The goal is not to take state power, or to improve service administration, but to take and use existing policies. Just as important, the movement has eschewed running candidates in elections. They prefer, like the MST, to avoid developing plans based in mediation. From this brief discussion, we see that in terms of strategic planning, the Piquetero movement has developed plans both in a direct-action and instrumentalist fashion.

They have also worked on creating their identity, as an “unemployed workers organization.” This means that they feature people who are unemployed from the standpoint of the formal state-recognized economy and who are also workers from the perspective of their own productive capacities (Dinerstein: 2010). Their work on this identity establishes their opposition to the state-promoted form that would characterize their status as social service recipients – i.e. subordinating social to governmental elites – and as unproductive people. Their identity is derived from, as well as embodies, their strategic orientations, which includes direct-action and instrumentalist plans.

We can connect the Piquetero movement's strategic plans to its institutionalization of resistance for control of certain policy areas. Specifically, the movement contests the manner through which welfare policies are administered. Rather than promoting
centralized decision-making authority as promoted in state power, the movement promotes collective decision-making practices concerning how to distribute material resources received from piquetes (Special Report: Clarin, 9-26-2002). The movement's small group formation and equitable distribution of social welfare resources challenges a strict separation between state and society by granting the movement a role in deciding how welfare is distributed. They use these resources to form community gardens and collectively-organized marketing networks for fruit and vegetables, as well as bakeries and facilities for textile and craft production. These economic activities are self-managed and cooperative, turning social welfare policy resources into a means to challenge private property, given their basis in principles of social economy and solidarity (Paomino: 2004).

Their collective, cooperative brand of administration, thus, challenges private property, as well as how standard Argentine governmental social service administration occurs.

Piquetero contention has also been described in ways akin to my conceptualization of self-governmental resistance. Dinerstein et al's characterization of their resistance as “conflictual institutionalization (2008),” draws attention to how the movement has regularized negotiations, protests, and roadblocks to confront governmental authorities, as well systematizing an alternative way to provide social services. Elsewhere, their contention is described as “inside and outside the state,” as they attempt to “re-appropriate social services (Dinerstein: 2010).” While recognizing the movement's claims to decision-making autonomy and self-management in policy – not only in demands, but in designing and implementing alternatives – scholars stop short of

95 For complete story, see http://edant.clarin.com/diario/especiales/piqueteros/.
conceiving of the Piquetero's activities as indicative of governance. My concept fits the case, and enables us to better describe the form of their contention. Self-governmental resistance, institutionalized by the Piqueteros and the MST, centers on a movement's alternative mode of service provision that contests state power and private property, while simultaneously constituting and destabilizing the form of order dictated in particular policy areas. As shown by the Piquetero's decentralized organization and regularized contention in the area of social welfare policy that opposes private property, their collective action is self-governmental.

It is in their identity where we see problems in their institutionalization of resistance. Divisions have always marked the movement, from more radical wings that refuse any cooperation with political parties to others that have endorsed leftist parties (Special Report: Clarin, 9-26-2002). Especially since the recovery of the Argentine economy after the 2001-2002 economic crisis, as well as the election of the late Nestor Kirchner in 2003, certain sectors of the movement began to coordinate protests with the government and defect (Frey and Cross: 2007). Whereas the MST displays problems in crafting a coherent identity and plan of action in the policy area of agricultural production, the tensions between disparate Piquetero organizations show divides within the movement itself. Without a stable, coherent identity, the movement – or “self” at the center of their form of governance – has encountered problems coordinating and stabilizing the institutionalization of resistance.

The problems revealed by rival identities are connected to issues in both direct-action and instrumentalist strategic planning. Specifically, while the movement has plans
for using governmental resources from social services, they do not have plans for how to confront different kinds of governments. Their preparation of knowledge concerning how to instrumentalize governmental resources was better during the economic crisis and when an oppositional government occupied state power. Additionally, various movement members have begun to work at the discretion of a favorable government, hoping for rewards for their service as opposed to forming their own indigenous bases of resistance. They have thus ceded ground on direct-action planning and the worker component of their identity. For these reasons, we see the decline in Piquetero mobilization beginning in 2004 (Masseti: 2006). My theory of strategy, and in particular the place of identity, explains the nature of the Piquetero movement and its later problems.

Like the Piqueteros, the Zapatista's struggle has been defined in terms of autonomy, which I call direct-action strategy. From schools to cooperatives, the movement trains its own members to implement and design their practices. Members are taught that social programs are nothing more than “limosnas (alms).” Inculcating this mentality illustrates a wider, direct-action plan that guides action. The movement also instrumentalizes the Mexican government and allies in important ways to develop their project. Relying on NGOs, rather than government for material resources, the Zapatistas have brought such non-movement actors as Enlace Civil into the institutionalization of their resistance (Barmeyer: 2009). Like the MST's use of the Brazilian Constitution, the Zapatistas legitimize their struggle with reference to the language of rights and the Mexican Constitution. Their identity, which features indigenous practices and customs, also cuts across all their strategic plans.
While the Zapatistas' official origin dates back to their armed insurrection on January 1st, 1994, to show opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the first day of its official introduction, a collection of Maoists, urban intellectuals, and Catholic Church-affiliated groups had been organizing indigenous peoples since the early 1980s. Barmeyer, in his in-depth study of the movement, describes their resistance as “taking on state roles” in their maintenance of an armed defense wing, schools for children, and collectively-organized cooperatives (2009). The Zapatistas showcase what they call the Caracoles (Spanish for “Snails,” common and significant in Mayan culture) and Juntas de Buen Gobierno (Councils of Good Government), which organize the movement’s de facto social, economic, and political control over certain municipalities, los Municipios Autónomos Rebeldes Zapatistas (The Autonomous Zapatista Municipalities in Rebellion), that were first formed in 1994.

Zapatista service provision in these municipalities shows qualities that challenge state power and private property, revealing the movement's deployment of direct-action and instrumentalist strategic plans. The movement's governance of social relations, including punishment, does not exist as an extension of already-existing practices of the Mexican government. In fact, indigenous (specifically Mayan) customs establish codes of conduct for movement members in their self-declared autonomous municipalities. A central element of such practices – especially for how they constitute resistance – is how they showcase collective forms of consensus decision-making practices (Tilly and Kennedy: 2006; Speed: 2007).96 Rather than centralizing power and subordinating

96 This is not always perfect, and women often do not have the same status as men. The
governmental elites to social actors, Zapatista order-providing security by groups includes many, previously marginalized people. This collapses the public/private divide. The content of the instruction taught in their schools, likewise, highlights indigenous languages and history. They oppose state practices directly through refusing to accept resources despite governmental attempts to provide, as well as indirectly through teaching students the history (and continuing necessity) of indigenous resistance (Baronnet: 2008; Stahler-Stolk: 2010). Also, collectively organized, administered, and owned cooperatives equally distribute earnings, challenging the neoliberal imperatives of individuality and profit-seeking, as well as private property (Swords: 2007, Hollinger: 2012).

The Zapatistas, more so than the Piqueteros, challenge state power's characteristic centralization of decision-making authority, subordination of social actors, and cultural homogenization in a variety of policy areas, from security to education. The Zapatistas also combine direct-action and instrumentalist strategies in their coordinated, sustained challenge to state power and private property. While they have been successful in developing their brand of self-governmental contention, their inability to extend their struggle beyond isolated places in Chiapas shows an overall limited level of achievement. The reason lies in the low level of strength found in their instrumentalist strategic orientation. The MST, especially in the area of agrarian reform, has instrumentalized point, however, is that it challenges state power and government-promoted forms of order. The practices imminent to resistance are not necessarily emancipatory. For more on women and indigenous resistance, see Olivera, Mercedes. "Subordination and rebellion: Indigenous peasant women in Chiapas ten years after the Zapatista uprising." The Journal of Peasant Studies 32, no. 3-4 (2005): 608-628.
resources, organizational frameworks, and language from INCRA, the primary governmental institution in charge of agrarian reform. INCRA and its policy area are national in scope. This enables the MST to access policies with distribution networks and plans beyond any specific state and group. The Zapatistas, however, have not developed the same kind of relationship beyond Chiapas. They have linkages with allies internationally, but these have not established reliable, persistent connections. Likewise, their appeals to the Constitution and rights, while national, are not consistent and regular. Zapatista self-governmental resistance, while resting on both direct-action and instrumental strategies, is weak in terms of the latter.

Both the Piqueteros and the Zapatistas are examples of self-governmental movements. They do not attempt to take state power and have not developed in ways to seek inclusion into the workings of state power. This means that they defy classification as either a revolutionary or reform-style movement. Like the MST, both movements rest on a combination of direct-action and instrumental strategies as they institutionalize resistance against state power and private property. In this cursory analysis of each movement, I could not analyze each respective movement's activities in particular policy areas. Conclusions from my “pathway” case study of the MST, regardless, illustrate certain weaknesses in the movement's respective struggles. When discussing other self-governmental movements and applying my theory, I find the reasons for the Piquetero's and Zapatista's levels of successful resistance in strategy and identity.

For the Zapatistas, their style of self-governmental contention draws our attention to the importance of instrumentalizing certain actors. The Piqueteros draw our attention
to the importance of identity. Essentially, easily divided ideologies and identities can be exploited by allied political parties. In a sense, this is akin to the dangers faced by the MST in the area of agricultural production. In the movement's coordinated contention in that policy area, divided and contentious modes of identification impeded successful development of resistance during the Lula administration (2002-2010). The Piqueteros illuminates the kinds of dangers a movement must navigate when contesting allied, so-called “friendly” governments. Allied governments may be just as dangerous to social movements as administrations that directly oppose them through repression. If the movement's goal is to help a certain party win an election, then there is no problem. But, if their goals are more extensive, and include consistently challenging state power, neoliberalism, current property arrangements, economic inequality, etc., then allied governments actually lead to a movement's demise without addressing their grievances.

From Self-Governmental Resistance to Reform: Indigenous Contention in Ecuador and Bolivia

Indigenous resistance, as exemplified by CONAIE, the “Cocaleros (Coca-leaf growers union)” in Bolivia, as well as the Zapatistas in Mexico, is usually considered similar. Yashar groups them in her explanation of movement origins, claiming that a combination of neoliberalism, state retreat, and preexisting networks provided the adequate openings that facilitated their emergence (2005). While such studies see commonality between these movements for organizing people around an indigenous identity, my focus on kinds of resistance notes that they differ in fundamental ways. Specifically, the movements in Ecuador and Bolivia formed political parties and engaged
in reform-style contention. Each country's social movements have been instrumental in forming and staffing their respective indigenous-oriented political parties (Van Cott: 2005). The creation of movement-party alliances reveals significant shifts in how indigenous resistance is conducted in the Andes. This change – from self-governmental resistance to reform – allows me to test my theory by presenting here a preliminary sketch of the shift from direct-action to mediated strategies.

CONAIE’s origins in Ecuador, like the self-governmental movements, took place during the late 1970s and 1980s. Unlike other movements, it is a confederation of separate indigenous organizations, most notably two other federations – la Confederación de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Kichuas del Ecuador (Confederation of Kichua People of Ecuador or ECUARUNARI) and la Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazónia Ecuatoriana (Confederation of Indigenous Identities of the Amazon or CONFENAIE).97 CONAIE’s respective member organizations number over 25. The confederation gained prominence, first, for their mass 1990 uprising that placed the movement on the national stage not as a “peasant,” or primarily class-based organization, but one built on “Indigenismo (Pallares: 2002).” This notion, as explained by Pallares, is not completely devoid of material elements. Rather, these movements blend – how they do so, as I discuss, has repercussions for their resistance – cultural and material demands. And second, the movement earned recognition for participating in the “Junta de Salvación Nacional (Junta for National Salvation),” where with the military and the

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97 For a more complete history of various other indigenous organizations that came to form CONAIE, see Chapter 4, “Ecuador: Latin America's Strongest Indigenous Movement,” in Contesting Citizenship in Latin America (2005).
movement helped to depose then-president Jamil Mahuad with plans to create a Venezuela-style, socialist government (Barracca: 2007). International pressure from the United States to freeze investments ended this experiment after one day.

This foray into government posed a break with the movement's more typical self-governmental, and later, reform-style forms of contention. Initially, more self-governmental practices of institutionalizing resistance characterized separate organizational practices in customary law and education. Concerning the former, the self-governing legal arrangements – including practices such as flogging and community incarceration – constituted practices of Kichwa, Otalaveña communities in Ecuador's Sierra region. Even though customary law always existed, in some fashion, in indigenous communities, Otalvena movements mobilized their own as a collective challenge to the government's efforts to extend developmental and national ideologies in the region in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Korovkin: 2001). In fact, such movement initiatives had been subordinated and severely repressed for decades. CONAIE also led efforts in the 1990s to assure bilingual education in local schools, where students would learn indigenous language and culture from movement teachers with governmental support (King: 2004).

In each of these examples, movement member organizations went from demand-making practices, to demand-implementing. They also, in self-governmental fashion, display movement strategic plans to use governmental resources in the process. Material resources for education and support were derived, after some initial opposition, in 1988 for movement-administered bilingual education for the entire country. Occupying a managerial role in both customary law administration and education, indigenous
movements challenged state power through defying efforts to homogenize cultures and monopolize decision-making practices. Otavaleña community justice, like its counter-part in Zapatista Caracoles, collapses public and private roles, thereby contesting state power's subordination of social to governmental actors. And even though such practices have always characterized indigenous communities, in various regards their practices in the late 1970s and early 1980s, were directed by organizations as part of a political project. These examples reveal traits that qualify these organizations that compose CONAIE as self-governmental, at least in their early stages.

CONAIE's mode of institutionalizing self-governmental resistance, however, has changed over time to become reform-style. The main reason for this change arises from the movement's own strategic planning orientation. What indicates this is the movement's entry into electoral politics. Beginning in the mid-1990s, in what has been referred to as the movement's “strategic shift,” self-governmental action gave way to “collaboration with non-popular powers” through forming the political party, Pachakutik (Jameson: 2011). For much of the 1990s, the movement actually discouraged electoral involvement, forbidding members to hold political office (Mijeski and Beck: 2011). This changed, when a focus on “integration and unity” began to characterize movement plans, and their strategy shifted from developing organizational autonomy and self-governance, to achieving policy changes by changing the constitution (Becker: 2011). Claiming a right to self-determination for indigenous people and communities has always been at the forefront of CONAIE's struggles. The emergence, however, of Pachakutik in the mid-1990s signaled a shift in strategic planning that involved running candidates in elections.
at various levels of government, culminating in attempts in 2008 to declare the plurinational nature of the country by revising the Constitution. Self-determination and governance have always constituted indigenous struggles. The means to achieve these demands, however, have changed.

Ecuador's indigenous movement's strategic shift to institutionalizing reformist contention brought changes in terms of the kind of resistance that became institutionalized. First, the movement's decision to enter electoral politics came at the same time as opposition to private property declined. The challenge to neoliberalism, which took place through protests and demanding concessions from multinational investors became less characteristic over time of mobilization (Jameson: 2011). The result was a shift in policy area focus: rather than isolating certain areas where the government exerted influence, e.g. security, education, etc., the movement sought inclusion into state power through delegating decision-making power to another entity – a political party. That some of the movement's own leaders, for instance Luis Macas, would occupy positions of governmental authority and run for office, does not matter when considering the shift from self-governmental to reform-style resistance. What is important is not the individual, but the means through which a movement attempts to practice opposition to dominant, status quo powers. By forming a political party, the movement delegated decision-making power to a non-movement organization that sought inclusion and unity with state power.

We can evaluate the movement's shift because my theory of strategy applies to all strategic subcategories, including instrumental, direct-action, as well as mediation plans.
In Ecuador, the level of successful institutionalization is low. We can measure success with similar indicators used to document MST institutionalization – number and percentages of participants. In this regard, Pachakutik has disappointed. In fact, the movement's political party had its highest level of success in its first inroad into electoral politics in 1996. In this year, 17% of the country voted Macas for president, while the party earned 8% of the national deputies and averaged 5% nationally of each provincial legislature (Mijeski and Beck: 2011). The party has seen stark declines in support since then, as the movement and the party have been divided in terms of identity and tactics. Indeed, the confederations that compose CONAIE's base have been divided since the decision to enter electoral politics.

Strategic cohesion and identity are two problems that the movement-party alliance, CONAIE-Pachakukik, has not resolved. What we find is that embracing “Indigenismo” in opposition to state-forced, more class-based modes of identification, did not entail a coherent, positive indigenous set of practices. As more of a rallying cry for self-determination, positive content of this “self” remained in a kind of radical plurality, held together in self-governmental contention but not reform. The MST's privileging of diverse forms of practicing education and production, allowing for heterogeneity where state power forwards homogeneity, always took place under the movement's overarching form of identity that works as a shield against state-promoted alternatives. Only in agricultural production do we find rival identities, not diversity. In a similar fashion, the rival confederations within CONAIE could not unify forces under a common identity adequately. One result was poor planning, evidenced in deals with the military junta to
leave power and support for the failed presidency of Gutierrez in 2003. Divisions among confederations concerning how to engage with the government – and even whether to run candidates – have consistently split member organizations. This lack of a coherent strategic vision generated a weak presence as a governmental entity, leaving movement organizations susceptible to clientelist politics and diluting their demands and positions (Mijeski and Beck: 2011). A lack of unity translated into strategic planning problems and thus difficulties in institutionalizing resistance, in this case, of the reform variety.

Reform-style contention has also characterized indigenous movement efforts in Bolivia. One notable difference between Ecuador and Bolivia, however, is the apparent success of reformist efforts in the latter case. Whereas Pachakukik has never gained a substantial number of seats, Bolivia's main indigenous political party MAS – al Movimiento a Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism) – retained the presidency, with Evo Morales winning re-election as the country's first indigenous president, and clear majorities in both houses of the national legislature in 2009. Despite “socialism” in the name of the party, voters and members are not mobilized on the basis of class. Rather, like in Ecuador, “Indigenismo” remains the ultimate guiding identity regardless of Evo Morales's roots in the Cocaleros (Coca-leaf growers union).

MAS, and the movements that comprise it, show the signs of reformist contention. Besides developing a political party, the recent goal was to change the Constitution in 2009 in order to enshrine greater rights to indigenous peoples, recognize Bolivia as plurinational, and institutionalize land reform. The latter issue would seem to indicate a challenge to property relations, specifically private property, and thus place MAS in the
The reality is that the institutionalization of land reform in the Constitution has not resulted in any substantive changes (Kohl: 2010). In what some have called “twenty-first century socialism,” MAS actually accepts existing property relations, while using the state power to redistribute resources in a more equitable fashion (Kennemore and Weeks: 2011). The plan is to use state power to build a more equitable kind of welfare state for all Bolivians, not institutionalize resistance through claiming certain policy areas for movement control and design. As we saw in Ecuador, the party's efforts to change the Constitution illustrate an attempt to find inclusion for indigenous peoples within state power. Neither MAS' movements nor the party vie for control of individual policy areas, like the MST or Zapatistas. Their formation of a political party indicates the adoption of a mediation strategy that also does not contain a coordinated, sustained challenge to private property or capitalism.

While the number of elected representatives shows a greater level of electoral success than what characterizes Ecuador, opposition from civil society groups and problems with knowledge preparation have resulted in limited achievements. The nationalization of the country's hydrocarbon sector, as well as renegotiation of contracts with oil and gas companies, do not collectivize or promote alternative property arrangements (Kennemore and Weeks: 2011). Although inroads in economics are limited in their impact, traditional economic elites have still continually mobilized protests in opposition (Postero: 2010a). Furthermore, economic and political crises have been mismanaged by a new political party whose base membership and support comes from social movements (Kohl: 2010). The members, because they come from a tradition of
opposing government and not participating within it, have limited experience. As a result, their level of knowledge preparation concerning how to govern and work with oppositional interests is low.

In Bolivia, the party-movement alliance has retained a coherent, consistent strategic approach that explains its higher level of success with respect to Ecuador. Postero calls MAS's project “hegemonic,” in the sense that indigenous rights, economic redistribution, and political reforms are becoming dominant in the changing Bolivian political landscape (2010b). These parts of MAS' platform, despite avoiding direct challenges to economic power and property arrangements, have retained a high level of coherence and consistency since Morales' first election in 2006. Morales' election allows for coherence to take root by consistently proclaiming objectives. Coherence and consistency are strong, as is displayed by MAS’ ability to retain unity amongst the different social movements that compose its base. Challenges remain, however, because MAS is composed primarily of social movements with little to no prior experience navigating electoral politics (Garcia: 2007).

Both the indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia have adopted reform-style contention. As is indicative of this kind of institutionalized resistance, these movements have eschewed contentious activities with respect to private property. Constitutional reform efforts in both countries reveal, as well, that each movement and their party desire to constitute government and find inclusion into state power, not challenge it. Applying my theory of strategy to developments in each respective country provides explanations for the variable success. Particularly, in Ecuador, a low level of
preparation and problems concerning cohesion among different organizations has led to serious difficulties in institutionalizing reform-style contention. Bolivia is more successful, despite problems with knowledge preparation. Comparing MAS' efforts with Pachakukik in Ecuador shows the former's greater level of coherence and consistency in strategic planning. Oppositional elites, while not part of my theory, also have made institutionalizing reform difficult in Bolivia.

Another implication from my comparison of kinds of institutionalized resistance – in this section, between self-governmental and reformist kinds of opposition – is the nature of policy area opposition. What we find in reform-style resistance is a general jettisoning of economic policy. The most successful case – Bolivia's movement-party linkages that have produced MAS – is characterized by efforts to push for an improved social democracy, or rather, a welfare state. These goals are valuable and have positively impacted members’ lives. They have not, however, consistently and coherently launched campaigns, or institutionalized a mode of resistance that strikes at private property. Land reform – a demand of movements and parties in both Ecuador and Bolivia – has not been taken up in earnest, remaining more of a rallying cry and demand. Reform-style contention, as shown in these examples, for the most part, ignores patterns of property ownership. Economic or agricultural policy is mainly left off the agenda of these movements and their parties. Collective, or cooperative, modes of production receive little attention.

Collier and Handlin note that current movements mobilizing in the post-neoliberal era tend to extend their influence in social policies – e.g. health care, welfare, and
education – because economic policy has become insulated (2009). While inflation and monetary policies are not opposed in self-governmental resistance, the examples of the MST, Zapatistas, and Piqueteros reveal how contention continues within economic policy over property arrangements and the ways to organize production. A comparison between reform and self-governmental resistance shows that Collier and Handlin's finding is true, but only for a certain kind of movement. Or rather, economic policy has not been fundamentally altered by reformist movements. Yet for movements that resist through promoting self-governance, contesting and posing alternatives to neoliberal economic policy is constitutive of their very nature.

*Revolutionary Struggles: the Sandinistas and the Shining Path*

The Zapatista's initial armed insurrection and CONAIE's one day occupation of state power with the Ecuadorian military, while hinting at revolutionary tendencies, were in actuality radical departures from their respective self-governmental and reform-style forms of resistance. Revolutionary contention differs from these two other forms of institutionalizing resistance because the movements* occupy* state power – not divide it – or are included within it. The reason why we see this kind of resistance is the movement's strict focus on direct-action planning. While direct-action usually characterizes all forms of struggle in some fashion, in revolutionary struggle this takes an extreme form.

Revolutionary institutionalized contention opposes state power as practiced by a movement's respective government, as well as opposing private property. Reform movements, on the other hand, are initially caused by direct-action strategies, but
ultimately transition to mediation, while self-governmental contention arises from a mix of direct-action with instrumentalist strategic plans. Concrete manifestations of revolutionary institutionalized resistance appear in the development of worker councils, autonomous schools and clinics, as well as armed insurrections. Governing practices (excluding armed struggle) are independent from already-existing structures or power and authority. This extreme exteriority is different from self-governmental resistance. As we saw through the MST, they may appear revolutionary, but they actually use governmental resources to oppose state power and private property.

La Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front or FSLN) is the last revolutionary movement in Latin America that has been successful. The Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru, while mobilizing at roughly the same time, displayed a relatively lower level of success than its counterpart in Nicaragua. One way to measure success is to count the people mobilized. While both organizations were vanguardist in nature and thus directed by a dozen or so leaders, the Shining Path, in one estimate, boasted between 2,000 and 8,000 people (Scheina: 2003), while a principal organization within the FSLN – Asociación de Trabajadores del Campo (Association of Rural Workers or ATC) – counted over 58,000 active members at the time of seizing state power in 1979. In addition to this wide disparity in the number of participants, another crucial mark of success is that the Sandinistas took power and the Shining Path did not. Despite their downfall, the Shining Path, at certain times during the 1980s, controlled around 40% of Peru's territory (Dietz: 1990). The Shining Path, in comparison to the Sandinistas, shows an overall lower level of resistance.
The Sandinistas and Shining Path emerged at roughly the same time and with similar objectives. They also shared a general adoption of Marxist-Leninist principles as the basis for their identity. While the FSLN opposed an autocratic, United States-supported Somoza dictatorship in the 1970s, Sendero Luminoso's origins and development mainly occurred during Peru's democratic transition post-1980. The plan to take state power by force was planned and mainly performed by the movement's own membership, which for the FSLN, was in part funded by Cuba (Prevost: 1990).

Both movements engaged in their respective struggles on their own terms, under their own direction. Or in other words, each movement engaged in revolutionary struggle because of the direct-action strategic plans they developed. The exclusion of already-existing governmental authority, as well as the implementation of an alternative form of order, was central to direct-action plans to take state power in its entirety, differentiating these movements' form of contention from self-governmental opposition that focuses on policy areas separately. Reform-style resistance does not attempt to take state power, but rather – as seen in the Ecuadorian and Bolivian movements' development into political parties – to find inclusion within existing state power practices. The FSLN and Sendero Luminoso crafted plans for their organizations, guided by certain Marxist-Leninist principles, to occupy and take state power alone. Neither planned to use governmental or ally resources nor planned on delegating power to an already-existing agent in their respective governments. A slight aberration from this style of strategic planning is the FSLN's use of Cuban resources in their struggle. This is not a major problem because Cuba was extremely peripheral in the actual execution of movement plans.
The manner through which these respective movements institutionalized indicates their revolutionary, rather than self-governmental or reformist character. Armed insurrection characterized both struggles, drawing a stark contrast between adherents and opponents. The FSLN, principally through the ATC, engaged in large scale land occupations and efforts to redistribute land owned by the then reigning Somoza family (Deere and Marchetti: 1981). Sendero Luminoso challenged state power by occupying territories and later taking up such mundane activities as conducting marriages, regularizing exchange relations, and punishing thieves (Burt: 2004). The FSLN, also, established schools to train and conduct literacy campaigns for militants – often with Cuban support – while taking territory and occupying the Somoza family's large estates. Such regularized activities, practiced by both movements, excluded already-existing governments in their entirety. These movements sought to govern, but as parallel entities, what Lenin called, “dual power.”

These movements also displayed similar organizational patterns that characterize their proto-state-ness. Shining Path's organization was incredibly centralized: the movement's leader, Abimael Guzmán, stood atop a rigid, top-down hierarchy where cells of four or five members had leaders who made decisions, without connections to other cells that operated in the same way (McClintock: 1989). A similar model, molded on Lenin's idea of “democratic centralism” dictated the FSLN internal organization, with the national directorate on top and separate committees disseminating decisions taken by the leadership to local areas (Cuzán: 1991). The MST, also, boasts the same kind of internal organization. While nowhere near as secretive as the Shining Path, the MST’s version of
democratic centralism also differs because of institutionalized, compulsory two-year elections and more local decision-making autonomy for nucleos. In comparison with other, more vanguardist movements, the MST is simply less hierarchical. The other movements show how they were extremely centralized – a key element to state power – within their organizations prior to overthrowing their respective governments. Furthermore, the Marxist-Leninst identity served as the basis for the FSLN's government upon seeking power, homogenizing cultures and identities following the revolution.

An application of my theory of strategy to each movement helps shed light on why the Shining Path's efforts were met with limited success, whereas the Sandinistas took power in 1979. A major problem in the Shining Path's struggle was the identity they promoted. On one hand, it was coherent, yet too much. Its appeals to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism were very doctrinaire, but ethereal and difficult for potential adherents to understand (Dietz: 1990). On the other hand, the movement's decision to enter Lima and engage in urban armed insurrection does not fit with Maoism's focus on the peasantry (Graves: 1992). Coherence, for the Shining Path, was compromised by abstract ideas that were detached from the people it meant to convince and also by some of the movement's key tactical choices. Direct-action planning explains the form of contention they institutionalized. Flaws within its plan tell us why they had limited success.

The Sandinistas, conversely, maintained a clear and coherent adherence to Marxism-Leninism throughout their struggle. Years of studying and directly learning from Cuban revolutionaries assisted to cohere their identity, as did their embrace of Liberation Theology (Luciak: 1990). Especially after the 1972 earthquake that exposed
corruption within the Somoza regime, the FSLN prepared rural and urban workers, artisans, and students in revolutionary politics and identity. The FSLN, more so than the Shining Path, displayed a coherent Marxist identity with which they prepared their members consistently throughout their institutionalization of revolutionary contention.

The Shining Path, as evaluated against my theory, shows how coherence with the base is necessary. They show that strategic coherence and consistency can exist with no concrete tie to the people the movement seeks to mobilize. When the plans and identity promoted do not resonate and connect with the people the movement intends to mobilize, then the chances of success decrease. Direct-action plans, while apparent in both movements, were stronger for the FSLN. For this reason, they had more success in institutionalizing revolutionary contention. The FSLN ultimately took power in 1979 (to cede power in open elections in 1990), whereas the Shining Path was riddled with problems up to the time when its leader was jailed in 1992.

One of my goals in this section is to analyze certain self-governmental movements other than the MST, reform-style movements, and revolutionary struggles against my theory of strategic action. Given space restrictions, I could only cursorily scrutinize each movement’s plans and actual ways they institutionalized contention. My case study of the MST, which consumed the bulk of this dissertation, allowed me to fine-tune my theory conceptually and analytically. As a pathway case, my study allowed me to analyze a new form of social movement resistance and develop a new theory to explain it. This new, more agentic theory, is intended to shift focus away from mechanical, contextual factors that consume most research.
The focus on the Zapatistas and Piqueteros did not disclose any new developments. The cases served more to further highlight the role of identity and instrumentalization in my theory, as well as illustrate the nature of self-governmental contention for movements outside Brazil. Both count as “least-likely cases” because their differences on many counts would seem to defy a common explanation, something my theory provides. Concerning the reformist contention in Ecuador and Bolivia, the most salient issue concerned the movement-party alliances' lack of attention to economic policy. I selected these cases not only because of the displayed qualities of reformist resistance but also because of the displayed variations in terms of success. For the latter kind of movement – revolutionary – identity assumed a more crucial factor than in the other modes of institutionalization. As in my discussion of reform-style movements, I chose these cases based on success rates. Pairing cases in terms of success allowed me to pinpoint parts of my theory that worked as a “treatment,” as if they existed in experimental conditions.

6.2 Further Implications and the Meaning of Resistance

It's worth asking after analyzing the three kinds of movements, if the nature of self-governmental resistance is territorially confined to Latin America. I believe that although currently it is mainly found on the continent, it could spread to other locations. The components of strategic action I lay out – coherence, consistency, and preparation – as well as the differences between the subcategories of direct-action, mediation, and instrumentalization, are by no means unique to Latin America. What does make the
continent different is the history of revolutionary struggles (Cuba remains particularly salient). Their centralized, presidential forms of leadership and organization, as well as Marxist-Leninist identity, have left a mark on the strategic choices made by current movements. In fact, the question of inequality and class relations remains central to all kinds of movements analyzed in this conclusion, with indigenous actors challenging its hegemony and other self-governmental movements tweaking it.

In conversation with some colleagues, I have been asked if self-governmental resistance is apparent in organizations in the Middle East, such as Hamas or the Muslim Brotherhood. While a couple years ago, I always stated that I was unsure, I am more confident after observing Hamas’ efforts to enter into parliament in Palestine, and the Muslim Brotherhood's creation of a political party to participate in elections in Egypt, that these organizations are akin to reform-style contention. Hamas' armed resistance would seem to indicate their revolutionary aspirations, but because they run candidates in open elections, I imagine that they would also accept private property relations. They fit awkwardly within the reformist category because their struggle is one of national independence and self-determination, which the Muslim Brotherhood also claims. In this sense, they are akin to Latin America's indigenous movement's demands and ideals. Regardless, I am not familiar – nor comfortable – reaching definitive conclusions about the region and the organizations found there. These are conjectures that require more discussion at a later time.

A final curiosity concerning my study of each of these modes of institutionalization is the time period. Most research on Latin American social
movements focus on changes brought by post-1980s neoliberal structural adjustment. The movements that I discuss – with the MST as the primary example but shadowed by the Piqueteros, Zapatistas, as well as Rondas Campesinas in Peru and early CONAIE member organization’s practices – all developed their mode of institutionalizing contention at or around the time of neoliberal transitions. While I recognize the temporal commonality, I also notice how each movement has connections – from Maoists in southern Mexico to Cubans in Brazil – to revolutionary struggles and modes of resistance. In fact, with the potential exception of the Rondas Campesinas – who likely took cues on what not to do from their resident revolutionary movement, Sendero Luminoso – many leaders in their respective self-governing movements partook in revolutionary struggles, or trained with others who had. For this reason, the kind of movement that they developed adopted certain strategic approaches that were learned from revolutionary experiences.

I am not claiming that revolutionary contention is no longer possible. I think, however, that movements plan for success, and the revolutionary option to institutionalize struggle has been decided against in the last twenty years. Goals, I also believe, have changed. Taking state power, occupying the apparatuses of government to execute policy for all, is not considered the most viable way to gain resources or alter social relations. Like the MST members who work at COOPAN, the collectively organized and owned cooperative, movements learned by trial and error. And the strategic approach that features instrumentalizing allies and governments was developed over the course of years. The identities, as well, were crafted in such a fashion to orient members to their targets in
a certain way. Their planned opposition to state power and private property, likewise, has been developed after years of careful reflection, discussion, and internal debate.

In *Power and Movement*, Tarrow recognizes that social movements are historically contingent. Or in other words, they have emerged at a certain point in time, and thus, may also eventually disappear. I agree, yet also believe that the stark terms through which he defines social movement resistance presents an inadequate “either/or” differentiation between coordinated resistance or demobilization-through-institutionalization. As my classification of movements reveals, the differences are not so stark. There are different kinds of movements, which, as we saw in the case of indigenous struggles, can even morph into one another. Changes in kinds of resistance are where we could refocus our attention, rather than posing the question of whether or not social movements will endure.

Lastly, the MST teaches us the meaning of self-governmental resistance. But its lessons concerning this mode of institutionalizing social movement contention may be ending as the movement approaches a unique conjunction in its history. In 2010, after presenting at a conference on this new form of resistance that the MST exemplifies, I was asked if the movement would disappear if they stopped conducting land occupations. I responded that, if occupations would cease, the movement would not cease. While I still stand by my response, after more analysis, I think now that the movement would change substantially. And we are seeing those changes, especially as the number of occupations and encampments in Brazil currently number in the dozens. The movement itself, shortly after my fieldwork in 2011, decided to halt land occupations in the south of the country.
This, as the CPT numbers on demonstrations show, does not mean that the movement is demobilized. It does mean that the movement has changed course, opting to exchange contentious activities concerning private property for street protests. We are left to believe that the MST is becoming, at least according to my theory, more and more a reform-style movement. This does not entail, as is often mentioned in the Brazilian press, that the movement has lost its course or purpose. Rather, it is showing that the innovative nature of its struggle – the reason I went to Brazil and researched the movement in the first place – may be ending.

One central lesson, especially from my analysis of strategy, is that the direction of resistance – not only of the self-governmental variety, but in general – ultimately lies with the movement itself. More than other factors, or “waiting for the time to be right” to organize, it is the agency of the movement that dictates the terms of coordinated struggles. Careful attention to plans and identity formation leads to certain outcomes and modes of resistance. Without plans, there is no movement, and thus, no resistance. The most important element in coordinating social movement contention is the actual coordination, or strategic planning, that leads movements to engage their membership and targets in certain ways. This does not mean that social movement resistance takes place over night or at the whim of elites. Rather, strategic planning takes years to develop and implement. Despite the long, hard disciplining work that goes into strategic planning and creation, coordinated resistance, in any form, can take place anywhere.
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**Documents**


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**Fieldnotes**


Interviews
Appendices

Appendix 1, for Chapter 3

Figure 1: Total Land Occupations v MST Occupations

Figure 2: Total Manifestations v Agrarian Reform Manifestations v MST Agrarian Reform Manifestations

Figure 3: Total Occupations v Manifestations

Figure 4: Evolution of INCRA’s Budget, 1995-2010

Pink is initially estimated expenses
Blue is authorized expenses
Teal is actual expenses

Source: INCRA 2010, Organized by Robert Kiel, INCRA.
## Appendix 2, for Chapter 4

### Figure 1: MST Schools and Students v State Schools and Students

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## Figure 2: PRONERA Beneficiaries, 2010

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Source: INCRA, 2011 (Clarice Aparecida dos Santos).
Figure 3: Total Mobilizations for Education v MST Mobilizations

Appendix 3, for Chapter 5

Figure 1: Total Manifestations v Agricultural Production Manifestations v MST
Agricultural Production Manifestations

Figure 2: MST Agrarian Reform Manifestations v Education Manifestations v Agricultural Production Manifestations